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 C. B. Martin's 'Limit View', Distinctions of Reason and the 
Metaphysics of Mind 
 
Alexander Daniel Carruth 
 
Abstract: 
 
This thesis is concerned with the 'Limit View' account of the nature of properties, first 
advanced by C. B. Martin, which holds that all real properties contribute to both the 
dispositional and the qualitative natures of the objects by which they are instantiated. 
According to the Limit View, the dispositional is identical to the qualitative, and both are 
identical to a single, unitary property. This distinctive position in the debate concerning the 
relative status of dispositional and categorical/qualitative properties has been charged with 
obscurity. This charge arises, in part, due to the manner in which Martin presented the 
view, and in part due to its standing in stark contrast to orthodox positions in the debate. 
 In order to meet this charge, the aims of the first half of this thesis are threefold: 
first, to present a clear and thorough examination of the development and content of the 
Limit View as presented by Martin; second, to examine the Limit View in light of criticisms 
levelled against it and to defend it from such criticism; and, third, to present a viable and 
consistent, critical interpretation of the Limit View.  
 Following this, the interpretation of the Limit View advanced in the first half of the 
thesis is applied to the debate concerning the ontology of mind and body. New responses 
to the Argument from Conceivability and the Knowledge Argument are developed; and 
what it means to characterise an entity as 'physical' or 'mental' is investigated. Based on 
the findings of this investigation, I argue that, if one accepts the Limit View, the position 
one should adopt concerning the ontology of mind and body is a new variant of neutral 
monism, which is outlined and distinguished from other positions in the debate in the final 
chapter of this thesis. 
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1 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Charles Burton Martin made significant contributions to the development of the field of 
contemporary metaphysics throughout his more than fifty year long career, although the 
majority of his publications did not appear until later in his life. His work has contributed to 
debates concerning emergentism; causation; truthmaker theory (which he is held to have 
originated, see, for instance Crane (in Crane, ed., 1996 p.15)) and ontology, especially 
regarding the nature of properties. One of Martin's most striking claims is that all real 
properties are properly characterised as both dispositional and categorical (or qualitative).
1
 
It is this position with which this thesis is primarily concerned. This position Martin at one 
time dubbed the 'Limit View', although he later regretted this name as he saw it to be 
potentially misleading with regard to how we should interpret this claim (for instance, 
Martin (1997, p.216)).
2
 As will become apparent as this chapter progresses, the Limit View 
represents a significant and revolutionary departure from traditional approaches to the 
question of whether properties are fundamentally dispositional or categorical. Until 
recently, the Limit View has remained a little-discussed position in the debate concerning 
whether properties are best characterised as dispositions or categorical properties. Some 
commentators have been led to suggest the view is unintelligible or hopelessly obscure 
(see Armstrong (2005, p.315) or Lowe (2006, p.134) and section 4.4 of this thesis). 
  Despite the significance of Martin's contributions, there is something of a scholarly 
gap surrounding much of Martin's work, especially concerning exactly how the Limit View is 
to be understood.
3
 This situation is exacerbated because the manner in which Martin 
presents the Limit View shifted and developed over the course of the almost twenty-five 
year period during which he published on the subject (the earliest statement of the Limit 
View appears in an endnote in Martin (1984)). A combination of these shifts and the 
                                                           
1
 Paul Snowdon says of Martin "[...]he also developed profound views about causation, opposing the 
dominant regularity theory, more or less before anyone else, and regarding the notion of causation 
as central to our psychological concepts, again before virtually everyone else." (2008) 
2
 However, the name has stuck, and I shall employ it in this thesis with the caveat that it should not 
be taken to have any consequence for how the theory is to be interpreted or understood. 
3
 John Heil has adopted this view and worked with Martin on its development towards the end of 
Martin's career. Arguably much of the attention Martin's philosophy has attracted is in large part 
due to the efforts of Heil—he published a collection of essays honouring Martin (1989); published 
with him towards the end of his career (1998) and (1999) and was instrumental in the editing and 
publication of The Mind in Nature (Martin, 2008), his final publication and only book exploring his 
metaphysics. 
2 
 
sometimes difficult and demanding style with which Martin writes have led, I argue in 
Chapter Four of this thesis, both to many mis-readings of the Limit View and also to the 
charge of (metaphysical) obscurity which is levelled at Martin by Lowe and Armstrong.
4
 
Unless Martin's position is to be consigned to the landfill of both historically and 
metaphysically obscure theories, a detailed critical analysis of the thesis is required, as is a 
sustained and sophisticated defence of the position against the criticisms which have been 
raised against it. Such an analysis and defence is called for, as the Limit View not only 
represents a significant contribution to the debate on the fundamental ontology of 
properties, but also has the potential to impact on many areas of debate in contemporary 
philosophy; most notably in the philosophy of mind. Thus, the aims of this thesis are 
fourfold:  
(1) to make some inroads into closing the scholarly gap concerning Martin's work 
through an examination of both the development and content of the Limit View;  
(2) to examine the Limit View in light of criticism levelled against it and to defend it 
from such criticism; 
(3) to present a viable and consistent critical interpretation of the Limit View; 
(4) to examine the application of the Limit View to the debate concerning the 
ontology of mind and body.  
It is not my intention in this thesis to establish that the Limit View represents the only 
viable position in the categorical/dispositional debate, nor even to argue that it is the single 
most appealing or plausible position. Rather, my ambitions are more modest. In the first 
half of this thesis I aim to show that the Limit View is reasonable, plausible and on at least 
an equal footing with other positions in the debate. In the second half of the thesis, I 
examine how adopting the Limit View account of properties equips one to tackle questions 
concerning the ontology of mind and body. I argue that adopting the Limit View allows one 
to respond to powerful arguments given in favour of property dualism. However, I suggest 
that this does not mean that the proponent of the Limit View must be a physicalist; rather, 
I sketch a new version of neutral monism which I argue is the most natural position for a 
proponent of the Limit View to occupy in the mind-body debate. 
 
                                                           
4
 “[...]he is compelled to say that every particular property or trope is at once dispositional and 
categorical (or qualitative) in nature. But, as I say, I do not really understand what this could mean.” 
(2006, p.134) 
3 
 
1.1    Debates Concerning Properties 
One of the background assumptions of this thesis is that there are properties, and that 
properties number amongst the ontological fundamentals (a thesis concerning the 
ontology of properties that did not operate under this assumption would be deeply 
conflicted!). It will not be a concern of this thesis to explicitly address the question 'what 
are properties?', where this question is taken to bring the very being of properties 
themselves into question. I take properties, broadly speaking, to be ways things are.
5
 For 
instance, being round is a way something, perhaps a piece of wood, can be, as is being 
solid.
6
 Importantly, when two ways of being differ, they are different properties (or 
different property-complexes). As a starting point of giving an account of property, I take 
this position to be relatively uncontroversial. However, there is much controversy regarding 
the nature of properties. Philosophers lock horns over whether properties are abundant—
that is, that at least for every meaningful predicate there is a corresponding property—or 
are sparse—that is, that there are fewer properties than meaningful predicates (see Lewis 
(1983b)); whether they are universals—entities that can be multiply instantiated in 
numerically distinct cases—or particulars—singular entities that are non-repeatable but 
may resemble each other to various degrees (see Armstrong (1989) and Campbell (1990)); 
and whether fundamentally properties are dispositions or qualities/categorical properties.
7
 
It is with this final debate that this thesis is concerned. This section offers an overview of 
the major positions in that debate: categoricalism, strong dispositionalism and weak 
dispositionalism. It will not be a concern of this section to argue for or against any of these 
positions, or to offer an in depth analysis of their relative merits, rather, its aim is to set the 
stage for the examination of Martin's Limit View of properties which is critical of all these 
accounts. 
 How something will behave (or fail to behave) given certain situations or 
circumstances is intimately connected with some of the ways that that thing is. These ways 
of being are most commonly referred to as 'dispositions'. The terms 'capacity', 'tendency' 
                                                           
5
 Whilst all properties are ways things are, it is plausible that not all the ways things are are 
properties: the relation between these two may not be symmetrical. 
6
 I do not mean to commit myself to realism about 'roundness' or 'solidness' as properties here, 
these are just simple examples. 
7
 And this is not an exhaustive list of the puzzles raised by properties! 
4 
 
and 'power' may also be used to refer to these sorts of properties.
 8
 Whilst there may be 
subtle differences between the proper application of these various terms, and the details 
of these differences are doubtless pertinent to certain philosophical projects, I shall not be 
exploring them in this thesis (see Bird (2013) for an interesting argument in favour of 
distinguishing 'powers' from 'dispositions'). Paradigm examples of dispositions tend to 
include ascriptions such as 'fragility' and 'solubility'. When we describe a vase as fragile, we 
are saying that one of the ways the vase is is such that in certain circumstances there are 
things it will and will not do. For instance, should the vase be struck with a hammer, it will 
shatter into several pieces. Describing an aspirin tablet as soluble involves some 
commitment to the claim that should the tablet be placed in a suitable, unsaturated 
solvent (in the case of aspirin, say, a glass of water) it will, or is likely to, dissolve and bring 
the solvent closer to saturation. As shall be seen below, philosophers disagree on how to 
analyse these sorts of claims about things and the ways they are. 
 
1.2    Reducing Dispositions 
 As discussed above, the ascription of a disposition to a thing is intimately related 
with notions of how that thing will behave or fail to behave in certain situations. This has 
led many philosophers to consider dispositions as intimately related to conditionals of the 
following sort: 
(1.i) If the vase is fragile, then the vase would shatter were it to be struck with a 
hammer; 
(1.ii) If the aspirin tablet is soluble, then the tablet would dissolve were it to be 
placed in water; 
or more generally: 
 (1.iii) If the O has disposition D, then the O would manifest-D-ly were C to occur. 
It should be relatively uncontroversial to note the connection between the having of a 
certain disposition and the truth (or likelihood of truth) of the sorts of conditional 
statements listed above. However, this connection has led many philosophers to propose a 
reductive analysis of dispositions in terms of conditional statements that courts far more 
controversy. The Simple Conditional Analysis states that: 
                                                           
8
 Molnar, for instance, prefers the term 'powers' but sees all these terms as broadly co-referring, or 
at least referring to a class of entity that have something broadly in common (2003, p.57).  
5 
 
(1.iv) Something x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s iff, if x were 
to undergo stimulus s at time t, x would give response r. (See, for instance, Lewis, 
1997, p.143) 
Whereas (1.i), (1.ii) and (1.iii) simply state that if something does have the relevant 
disposition, certain conditionals are true of it, the Simple Conditional Analysis analyses the 
having of a disposition in terms of the truth of the relevant conditional statement For 
instance, according to the Simple Conditional Analysis, a glass 'being fragile' is reductively 
analysed to truth or falsity of the following sort of conditional: 
(1.v) A glass is disposed to break at time t when knocked (i.e. is fragile) iff if the 
glass were to be knocked at time t, the glass would break. 
If the Simple Conditional Analysis is correct, then if the above conditional can be shown to 
be true, then we ascribe the disposition 'fragility' to the glass in question. If it can be shown 
to be false, we are compelled to conclude that the glass is not fragile. Accepting the Simple 
Conditional Analysis seems to rob dispositions of any full blown status as constituents of 
reality; rather, they are considered as existing (or not) just in case of the truth (or falsity) of 
some counterfactual statement or other.  
 The Simple Conditional Analysis was once widely accepted, being endorsed by 
influential figures such as Gilbert Ryle (1949), Nelson Goodman (1954) and W. V. O. Quine 
(1960). However, powerful objections have been levelled against such an analysis of 
dispositions. Martin raises the possibility of 'finkish' cases; situations where the occurrence 
of the stimulus guarantees that the relevant disposition is removed and so the consequent 
of any (1.iv)-type statement about the disposition in question will always be false, and so 
we (ex hypothesi) mistakenly fail to ascribe the disposition to the object in question.
9
 Other 
counterexamples to the Simple Conditional Analysis have come from antidote cases. For 
example, consider a case where a man has already taken an antidote to a poison he 
ingests. Whilst it seems right to say that the poison does have the disposition to harm, and 
the stimulus 'ingesting' is present, the antidote guarantees the falsity of the relevant (1.iv)-
type conditional, and so the Simple Conditional Analysis leads us to mistakenly fail to 
ascribe the disposition to the poison.
10
 Further counterexamples are presented by cases of 
masking. For example, consider the case of a fragile glass packed in plenty of bubble wrap 
packaging, whilst it seems correct to continue to consider the glass fragile, (1.v) would be 
                                                           
9
 See Martin (1994) for a full account of finkish-ness and detailed examples. 
10
 See Bird (1998) for a full account of antidotes and detailed examples. 
6 
 
false of it, and so the Simple Conditional Analysis leads us to mistakenly fail to ascribe 
fragility to the glass.
11
 These counterexamples show that, at the very least, the Simple 
Conditional Analysis is highly problematic, if not outright false. Attempts to defend the 
Simple Conditional Analysis by appeal to ceteris paribus clauses seem to be of little help as 
they tend towards vacuity: 
(1.iv.2) Something x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s iff, if x 
were to undergo stimulus s at time t, x would give response r, ceteris paribus, that 
is, unless conditions are such that is does not give response r to stimulus s at time t. 
(1.iv.2) tends towards vacuity because of the generality of the 'unless' clause. This renders 
the analysis broadly equivalent to the claim that something has a disposition just in case it 
will manifest in a certain way so long as the situation it is in set up such that this is the 
manifestation it will produce, which is true of anything whatsoever. Furthermore, it is not 
clear to me that a sensible division can be maintained between dispositions, stimuli and so-
called 'conditions' (see sections 2.1 and 2.2 for further discussion of this point). It also 
cannot be claimed, in defence of the Simple Conditional Analysis, that the sort of 
counterexamples raised above (as is sometimes the case with counterexamples and 
thought experiments) are abnormal fanciful philosophical inventions divorced from real 
situations: electrical fuses are real-life examples of finks (Molnar (1999)); antidotes to 
poison are a real phenomena; and as anyone who has ever moved house knows, there is 
little as mundane as a fragile object swathed in bubble-wrap (see Fara (2005)).  
 Such counterexamples have led David Lewis to announce that whilst "[A]ll of us 
used to think, and many of us still think, that statements about how a thing is disposed to 
respond to stimuli can be analysed straightforwardly in terms of counterfactual 
conditionals [...] The simple conditional analysis has been decisively refuted by C.B. Martin" 
(1997, p.143). Lewis went on to propose a more complex conditional analysis, the 
Reformed Conditional Analysis: 
(1.iv.3) Something x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s iff, for 
some intrinsic property B that x has at t, for some time t' after t, if x were to 
undergo stimulus s at time t and retain property B until t', s and x's having of B 
would jointly be an x-complete cause of x's giving response r. (1997, p.157) 
                                                           
11
 See Johnson (1992) for a full account of masking and detailed examples. 
7 
 
Whilst Lewis' Reformed Conditional Analysis seems to deal with the problem raised by 
finks, it is less clear it deals with masking and antidotes; in these cases there is no loss of 
the relevant property B, and yet the required manifestation still does not occur. Perhaps 
the Conditional Analysis could be further modified to accommodate cases of masking and 
antidotes, but what really seems to be the problem with the attempt to reductively analyse 
dispositions in terms of the truth of conditional statements is that the project of reducing 
what seem to be genuine features of the world (dispositions) to sets of statements is 
simply wrongheaded. However, there are other reductive analyses of dispositions which do 
not involve conditionals. 
 Categoricalism holds that at the fundamental level, all properties are categorical or 
qualitative (and so non-dispositional). Dispositional properties, if they exist at all, are 
amenable to reduction to some categorical or qualitative base. Different accounts are given 
as to exactly how this reduction is to be cashed out. David Armstrong objects to what he 
sees as the ontologically obscure positing of properties in nature which somehow 'point' to 
that which does not exist. (For example, consider a disposition that never manifests, say 
the disposition 'fragile', which is instantiated by a vase which never receives any shocks or 
blows whatsoever, and so never breaks.) The alleged ontological obscurity of never-
manifested dispositions motivates Armstrong to attempt to reduce dispositional 
properties. He does so by arguing that statements ascribing dispositions to objects are true 
in virtue of certain laws of nature (in Crane, ed. 1996, p.17). Laws of nature, for Armstrong, 
are relations between properties, which are universals and categorical in nature. The sort 
of relation Armstrong envisages a law as being constituted by is a complex higher-order 
property that issues in a certain regularity (or probabilifies a certain regularity) of the 
relevant entity instantiating a further property (ibid., pp. 41-44). Thus, the vase's being 
fragile is not as a result of it having some irreducible dispositional property. Rather, 
ascribing fragility to the vase is made true in virtue of the vase having a certain categorical 
property (Armstrong suggests this might be the microstructure of the glass—ibid., p.38) 
and this property standing in certain (also categorical) relations. In virtue of standing in 
these relations, the vase is subject to certain laws. These laws ensure or probabilify the 
breaking of the vase if it is struck with a suitable force.
12
 Ascribing a disposition, fragility, to 
the vase just is to say that it has a certain microstructural property and exists in a world 
where certain laws of nature hold; dispositions need not be posited as irreducible or full 
                                                           
12
 Depending on whether one wishes to propose a deterministic or probabilistic account of laws. It 
should be noted that nothing in the current discussion turns on this point. 
8 
 
blooded entities themselves, or if they are posited they are to be reductively identified with 
the relevant categorical property. (Crane attributes this claim to Armstrong, ibid., p.4.) On 
such a view, the only genuine properties are categorical. 
 Prior, Pargetter and Jackson (1982) advance an account of properties that, unlike 
Armstrong's account, does not identify dispositions with their 'bases' (in Armstrong's 
account this base would be the microstructure). Their account centres around three 
specific theses, namely that: 
 (PPJ1) All dispositions have a causal basis. This basis is some property or property-
 complex that is, alongside some triggering condition, a "causally operative 
 sufficient condition for the manifestation" towards which the disposition is 
 directed (ibid., p.251);
13
 
 (PPJ2) That dispositions are not identical to these bases;
14
 
 (PPJ3) That dispositions are causally impotent. This thesis is drawn from a 
 combination of (PPJ1) and (PPJ2) alongside a denial of systematic causal 
 overdetermination (ibid., p.255). 
The occurrence of the relevant triggering conditions and the having of a particular (taken to 
be non-dispositional) causal base is all that there is to explaining the truth of conditional 
statements about objects sometimes taken to imply the presence of a disposition (such as 
'if the glass is knocked it will break' or 'if the tablet is put in water it will dissolve'). 
Dispositions, then, are not fundamental properties of objects. Rather, in putative cases of 
dispositionality, the relevant fundamental property or property-complex is that which 
comprises the causal base. Dispositions seem to be functionally determined and are, if they 
exist at all, second-order properties of these causal bases. Prior, Pargetter and Jackson hold 
that their claims are consistent with a species of 'weak realism' that would hold that there 
are no properties that could properly be called dispositions (ibid., p.256).
15
 
  
                                                           
13
 Prior, Pargetter and Jackson give the examples of "knocking" as the trigger for the disposition 
'fragility' and "putting in water" as the trigger for solubility (1982, p.251). 
14
 Prior, Pargetter and Jackson give three arguments for why this is the case (two broadly empirical, 
one based on taking property names to be rigid designators—1982, pp. 253-254). 
15
 For more on the relationship between dispositions and their purported categorical bases (both in 
support of and against such an analysis of dispositionality), see Armstrong (1968); Mellor (1974); 
Mackie (1997); Johnston (1992); McKitrick (2003b), and Molnar (2003). 
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1.3    Realism about Dispositions 
In opposition to these various reductive analyses of dispositionality are a number of 
varieties of Dispositionalism; the view that dispositions are an irreducible and fundamental 
feature of reality. Dispositionalism can be broadly divided into two camps, 'strong' and 
'weak'. Strong dispositionalism holds that an object's real properties are exhausted by its 
dispositions. Sydney Shoemaker puts forward a strong dispositionalist account which holds 
that a property's causal role is primary and that all properties of concrete objects are 
individuated by their 'causal profile' (2007, pp. 5-6).
16
 These causal profiles are had 
essentially by the property concerned (1980 and 1998). In response to objections (see 1998 
for details) raised to his Causal Theory of Properties, Shoemaker introduces a distinction 
between 'forward-looking' and 'backward-looking' causal features of properties; the former 
being a property's "being such as to contribute in certain ways to what their possessors 
cause, or what powers their possessors have" and the latter a property's "being such that 
their instantiation can be caused in such and such ways" (1998, p.64). Thus it is not only the 
causal role the property plays in contributing to effects, but also the causal role it plays in 
being contributed to as effect that determines its identity. In later work, he holds that only 
the forward looking features of the property constitute its causal profile (2007, p.5). 
Shoemaker also distinguishes between the (first order) powers an object has and the 
properties on which these powers depend, which he describes as "second-order powers[...] 
powers to produce first-order powers" (1980, p.112). For Shoemaker "what makes a 
property the property it is, what determines its identity, is its potential for contributing to 
the causal powers of the things that have it" (ibid.). For Shoemaker properties just are: 
[...]clusters of conditional powers[...] the identity of property is determined by its 
causal potentialities, the contributions it is capable of making to the causal powers 
of things that have it. And the causal potentialities that are essential to a property 
correspond to the conditional powers that make up the cluster with which the 
property can be identified; for a property to have a causal potentiality is for it to be 
such that whatever has it has a certain conditional power. 
This account is intended to capture what is correct in the view that properties are 
just powers[...] whilst acknowledging the truth[...] that a thing's powers or 
dispositions are distinct from, because 'grounded in', its intrinsic properties. (ibid., 
p.115) 
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 Shoemaker would not call his account 'dispositionalist' as he holds that 'dispositional' is a 
predicate which picks out not a type of property, but a type of predicate (1980, p.113). I have no 
desire to split hairs over terminology. What is important is that, as should be clear, Shoemaker's 
account of property stands in contrast to the reductive analyses of dispositions discussed above. 
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Shoemaker identifies his position as primarily epistemologically driven. It cannot be 
explained how properties "engage our knowledge" unless some version of a causal theory 
of properties is accepted (ibid., p.116).
17
  
 Hugh Mellor has also argued in favour of strong dispositionalism. He argues against 
reducing dispositions to any sort of microstructural property (contra Armstrong) on the 
basis that to explain such structures we need dispositions, and so such properties cannot 
be a reduction base for dispositions (1974, pp. 171-172). Even traditionally paradigm 
examples of non-dispositional properties, such as triangularity, seem to bestow conditional 
features to their bearers; for example, being "such that if the corners were to be (correctly) 
counted the result would be three" (ibid.). Mellor takes the sign of dispositionality to be 
supporting subjunctive conditionals (1982). All real properties, he holds, support such 
conditionals, and so to consider that there are any non-dispositional properties is simply 
"myth" (1982, p.96). Mellor has since modified his viewpoint and has argued that whilst 
predicates might be properly described as dispositional or non-dispositional, properties 
"can just be" (without being either of these!), that to "call a property F 'dispositional' is just 
to transfer that epithet from the predicate 'F', [and] this is a false dichotomy" (2000, p.768). 
This is not to suggest that Mellor now sees properties as non-dispositional, but rather that 
he takes the distinction between categoricality and dispositionality to be a mistaken one 
(or mistaken if it applies to properties as opposed to predicates). 
 Stephen Mumford favours a strong dispositionalism in which all real properties are 
just clusters of powers (see for instance 2004, section 10.6). More recently, he has 
expressed support for a one-category trope ontology, in which objects and substances are 
accounted for by bundles of tropes, and tropes themselves are clusters of powers (2013, 
pp. 14-15). This position perhaps represents the most thoroughgoing dispositionalism one 
might endorse: the view that at the fundamental level, everything is a disposition. 
Alexander Bird argues in favour of the claim that all fundamental properties have 
dispositional essences (see for instance 2005 or 2007). However, he does consider the 
possibility that there might be non-fundamental properties that are categorical, and even 
that there might be non-fundamental properties which are neither essentially disposition 
nor categorical (one example he gives of such properties are those whose essence involves 
having a certain composition, such as 'being a methane molecule'—see 2013, p.28). 
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(see, for instance, 1998).  
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 Weak dispositionalism, in contrast, holds that at least some properties are 
dispositions, and that such properties are irreducible to non-dispositional properties. These 
claims are sometimes coupled with the claim that almost all real properties are real 
dispositions. Ullin T. Place argues for a weak dispositionalism, holding that dispositions 
cannot be reduced to categorical properties, although having certain categorical properties 
standing in certain relations to one another by the object in question will usually (if not 
always) figure in the explanation of said objects having certain dispositions (in Crane, ed. 
1996, p.26). Molnar argues that almost all real properties are what he calls 'powers'. The 
hallmarks of being a power are: directedness, independence, actuality, objectivity and 
intrinsicality. (See Molnar, 2003, chapters 3-7 for detailed arguments for each of these 
criteria.) Molnar goes on to argue that all scientifically discovered properties meet these 
requirements. Claims that if such properties are dispositional they must have some 
categorical base (such as those made by Armstrong and Prior, Pargetter and Jackson) are 
dismissed based on the grounds of the 'missing base argument': Molnar argues that 
experimental data from the physical sciences supports the claim that the fundamental 
properties are powers, and fails to support the claim that such powers have some non-
powerful basis (pp. 131-136). On these grounds, reductive accounts of dispositionality are 
to be rejected. However, Molnar does accept that there may be (and almost certainly are) 
some non-powerful properties, although these may well be restricted to the spatio-
temporal properties pertaining to an object's location (see 2003, chapter 10).   
 Ellis and Lierse also present a weak dispositionalist account, which does: 
[...]not seek to restore their [dispositions'] reputation by attacking the status of 
categorical properties, or by arguing that all properties are basically dispositional, 
as some philosophers have done[...] what[...] we seek to provide, is a more 
adequate semantics, and an ontologically more satisfactory theory of 
dispositions—one which allows at least some dispositions to be counted as genuine 
properties existing in their own right. (1994, p.27) 
They tie the notion of a disposition to that of a natural kind. Within a metaphysical 
framework of natural kinds of objects it is argued we should also accept natural kinds of 
processes. Where a natural kind of object is given or designated by the instantiation by the 
object of the relevant real properties, so too is a natural kind of process given or 
designated by the instantiation by the objects involved in the process of relevant real 
dispositions (ibid., p.28). Thus dispositions are to be taken alongside categorical properties 
as equally real and genuine features of the way the world is. There is to be no prospect for 
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reducing dispositions to categorical properties: the latter are not the sort of entity suited to 
providing the grounds for a process' belonging to one natural kind rather than another. 
 In this section I have briefly glossed several of the major positions in the debate 
over the ontological status of dispositions. In the section that follows I present an 
introduction to Martin's Limit View of properties, and locate this position within his general 
metaphysical system. 
 
1.4    Martin and the Limit View 
It is in the context of the debate over the fundamentality of dispositional/categorical 
properties that Martin presents the Limit View; an account of the ontology of properties 
that recognises some truth in the positions outlined above, whilst also arguing that none 
are satisfactory. I shall not offer an in-depth account of the Limit View here, as Chapter 
Three of this thesis is dedicated to a detailed and extensive analysis of the development of 
the position.
18
 Rather I shall be concerned to present a brief introduction to the position, to 
locate it within the debate discussed above and also to provide a summary of pertinent 
aspects of Martin's general metaphysical outlook. It is not my intention, however, nor a 
concern of this thesis, to defend these other aspects of Martin's metaphysics, I discuss 
them here simply in order to give context to the position with which this thesis is 
concerned. 
 Martin first introduced the Limit View (although it had not yet been given this 
moniker) in an endnote to his (1984), stating that “[a]ny real, empirical property has its 
categorical and dispositional aspects” (p.20). The motivation for this claim comes from 
arguments (to be discussed in the Chapter Three of this thesis) that it cannot be maintained 
either that properties are purely categorical or that they are purely dispositional. Thus he 
agrees with the categoricalist in that pure dispositionality is a fiction and that categoricality 
is a real part of the way the world is. He also agrees with the dispositionalist that pure 
categoricality is a fiction and that dispositionality is a real part of the way the world is. Yet 
he disagrees with both camps in holding that neither categoricality nor dispositionality is 
fundamental or basic with regards to the other. Martin goes on, in two different papers, to 
state: 
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 It has been argued that over the course of his career Martin actually presented more than one 
discrete position under the moniker Limit View. See Chapter Three of this thesis and, for example, 
Molnar 2003 pp. 149-157). 
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 Pure categoricality[/categoricity] of a property or state is as much of a myth and 
 philosophical artifice as is pure dispositionality. (1993a, p.519 and 1993b, p.184) 
This claim, combined with the claim that: 
 [...]properties are indissolubly categorical-cum-dispositional or dispositional-cum-
 categorical. The dispositionality is as basic and irreducible as is the categoricity, and 
 there is no direction from one as basic in a property to the other as ‘supervenient’.
 (1993b, p.184) 
captures the core commitments of the Limit View. All properties, for Martin, are equally 
categorical and dispositional, and the hope of reducing either dispositionality or 
categoricality to the other, or of eliminating one of these notions from our ontology is: 
[...]philosophical artifice and error (ibid.) 
[...]conceptual artifice and unrealisable abstraction suggested, perhaps, by some of 
the surfaces of grammar. (in Crane, ed. 1996, p.74) 
Properties, at the fundamental ontological level, then, are neither purely dispositional nor 
purely categorical, rather, both categoricality and dispositionality inhere in all properties. 
Exactly how this claim might be cashed out is the concern of the next five chapters of this 
thesis. Having introduced the position, and its unique place in the categorical/dispositional 
debate in property ontology, I shall go on to discuss a number of aspects of Martin's 
general metaphysics.
19
 
 Martin pursues a realist metaphysic in which he is committed to a two-category 
ontology. The fundamental ontological categories he compasses are 'substance' and 
'property'. His realism is best expressed in his commitment to the truthmaker principle; 
that any truth about the world is true in virtue of there being some truthmaker, some way 
the world is, that makes it true:
20
 
 Not all the ways the world can be represented are ways the world is, so a 
 particular creature found it necessary to employ the following convention to 
 distinguish representation from misrepresentation. Representations that indicate 
 the way the world actually is they called 'true', and representations that failed to 
 do so they called 'false'. 
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 This account I shall draw from The Mind in Nature (2008), Martin's final publication and work that 
comes closest to a sustained account of his overall philosophical standpoint. The only other book he 
published was a monograph, Religious Belief (1959). 
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 Martin is often credited with originating truthmaker theory, although, as with many of his 
philosophical innovations, he certainly was not the first to publish on the topic. See for instance 
Snowdon (2008) or Crane (in Crane, ed., 1996 p.15). 
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 Truth is a relation between two things—a representation (the truth bearer) and 
 the world or some part of it (the truthmaker). (2008, p.24) 
Alongside this Martin urges against any linguistically driven account of metaphysics, 
claiming the Quinean motto 'To be is to be the value of a variable' (for instance, 1948) 
ought to be met with "laughter" (2008, p.93). Both life and the world, Martin argues, were 
there before there was language, before there were any variables to be the value of!
21
 
Without truthbearers, there would indeed be no truth: such a world would be devoid of 
truths about the world, but there would be world aplenty to sustain potential truths if 
there were any truthbearers. 
 Martin's realism and anti-linguisticism is complemented by a commitment to 
atomism and holism. His atomism manifests as the claim that ontology will bottom out in 
what Locke referred to as 'the finer insterstices of nature'. These 'insensible corpuscles' 
may turn out to be epistemologically inaccessible to us, but Martin holds we can at least, 
without knowing of their nature, infer their existence (see for instance 2008 p.40). 
Manifest, macro-level objects are composed of these fundamental ontological atoms in 
various relations. Martin calls this position "the compositional model" (ibid., p.39). 
Genuinely emergent phenomena are taken to stem from the complexity of the 
compositional model. (See Martin, 2008 Chapter 10 for details.) Thus Martin's system 
compasses an ontologically fundamental level of atomistic entities which, variously 
composed and related, give rise to a whole host of dependent but genuinely emergent 
entities and phenomena—this is Martin's holism. Martin does not offer an account of 
exactly what entities the fundamentals of his system are, but indicates a faith in physics to 
answer the question:  
 My account[...] is intended to apply even to unstructured elementary particles, or 
 superstrings[...] or whatever turns out to be the ultimate basis for the world 
 around us. (ibid., preface, p.xv) 
His seeming lack of concern with the answer to this question may stem from what he sees 
as a Lockean standpoint that hoping to supply "specific and full" identity conditions for 
anything other than abstract entities (so for any physical object or fundamental) is a task 
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 This point is well illustrated (literally) in the final cartoon of Martin's book of humorous 
philosophical drawings Philosophical Pictures (1990). 
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that would be "endless" and so "[t]he demand for them is the ploy of the mad logician" 
(ibid., fn.1, p.47).
 22
 
 Against this background Martin develops his account of properties. Anti-linguisticist 
sentiments lead Martin to develop a sparse theory of properties. Minimally speaking, a 
sparse theory holds that not every meaningful predicate denotes a property. Properties 
and meaningful predicates are not isomorphic, and thus sparse theory stands in opposition 
to semantic or linguistic views of property under which for every predicate true of some 
object, that object has some property that matches up one-to-one with the predicate. The 
claim of the sparse view is simply that this is not the case, there is not one property for 
every meaningful predicate that can be applied to an object (and vice versa): 
 Predicates are linguistic, mind-dependent entities; many properties of objects are 
 neither. Linguisticism is silly, but it is also endemic and largely unnoticed by many 
 practising ontologists. (ibid., p.80) 
That meaningful predicates and real properties do not match up one-to-one should be 
evident from the considerations of such predicates as: 
 (1.vi) 'is such that it is not the case that p and also not p' 
 (1.vii) 'is non-self-identical' 
 (1.viii) 'is north of London' 
Every entity whatsoever satisfies (1.vi); everything is such that contradictions are false.
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We could replace the two instance of 'p' in (1.vi) to generate another predicate, say with 'q' 
in the place of 'p'. Every entity whatsoever would satisfy this new predicate, also. We could 
follow this procedure an infinite number of times, generating an infinite number of (1.vi)-
like predicate which are satisfied by every entity whatsoever. If linguisticism is correct, then 
these predicates pick out properties; and therefore, every entity whatsoever instantiates 
an infinity of identical (1.vi)-like properties. This should strike those of an ontologically 
serious mindset as inflationary, implausible and unattractive. (1.vii) seems meaningful and 
so under a linguistic account of property would denote a property. However, nothing could 
be such that it had the property of non-self-identity. The worry with (1.vii) is not merely the 
(already somewhat queer and ontologically suspicious) issue of proposing that there exists 
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 Martin writes "Of course, all of God's children have identity conditions. I have not seen a detailed 
and full set of identity conditions for any spatiotemporal entity (chair, rock, suit jacket, cricket ball, 
etc.)" (2008, fn.1, p.47) 
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 Considerations from para-consistent logic aside. 
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a property that has no instances, but the even queerer and more suspicious suggestion that 
there is some property that cannot in principle have any instances. Finally, whilst (1.viii) is 
clearly meaningful and true of many entities (me as I sit in Durham writing this chapter, for 
instance), changing this would not require any change in the way I, intrinsically, am. 
Properties supposedly denoted by (1.viii) and similar predicates have in the debate been 
referred to as 'mere Cambridge' properties, and are to be contrasted with 'real' properties. 
Martin would, and I with him, refrain from calling these properties at all. The sparseness of 
Martin's view of properties extends past the minimal requirement of denying predicate to 
property isomorphism (which would be consistent, for example, with holding that all but 
one meaningful predicate denotes a real property) to the claim that the fundamental 
properties, ontologically speaking, will be the properties of the fundamental atoms (ibid., 
p.39), allowing for "a realist compositional model for the relationship between the 
macroscopic and the submicroscopic" (ibid., p.42). Thus for Martin, most predicates will not 
denote genuine fundamental properties; macro-level predicates, if they pick out a property 
at all, will pick out a complex, structured property composed of more basic properties 
standing in various relations and configurations. 
 Martin's properties are tropes, particulars grouped by exact or inexact similarity. 
There are no abstract universals and nothing to a particular property over and above its 
particular instantiations. The similarity relation which replaces the need for positing 
abstract universals is for Martin "a similarity simpliciter between one, unique, individual 
specific property instance and some other property instance" (ibid., p.81). As properties are 
the respects in which objects are more or less similar to one another, a property instance 
"needs no further respect in which to be similar or dissimilar [to other property instances in 
its exact similarity class]" (ibid.). Many metaphysicians who offer a trope theory of 
properties wed this to a bundle theory of objects. This consists in the claim that an object is 
nothing over and above a collection of co-present tropes (property instances), leading to a 
single category ontology. Martin, as mentioned above, holds a two-category ontology, and 
so rejects the bundle theory. He claims: 
 Space-time is a bearer of properties; it is not itself borne as a property. Thus it 
 makes no sense in ontology or modern physics to think of space-time as empty and 
 propertyless. Obviously, space-time fulfills the conditions of a substratum. (ibid., 
 p.1) 
And: 
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 I have insisted that space-time has properties, yet it is not itself had as a property 
 of even set of properties, and it could not exist without properties. A propertied 
 space-time is a one-object universe and space-time satisfies the correct definitions 
 of 'substratum.' (ibid., p.195) 
Properties, then, are borne by regions of space-time, and macro-objects as we discriminate 
them are regions or segments of space-time propertied such that they exhibit relevant 
similarities and dissimilarities to each other.  
 Turning to Martin's account of the nature of properties, he holds that all properties 
are dispositional as well as qualitative. Martin rejects any conception of dispositionality 
which sees a disposition as a relation between a property and some potential or actual 
manifestation: 
 Dispositions are actual, although their manifestations can fail to be. It is an 
 elementary confusion to think of unmanifesting dispositions as unactualized 
 possibilia, although that might serve to  characterize unmanifested manifestations. 
 As such, a disposition cannot be a relation to a  manifestation. (ibid., p.12) 
If we were to take a disposition as a relation to a manifestation, then we have two options: 
to see this as a relation to some abstract possible entity or to consider the disposition as 
extant only in virtue of some actual manifestation. The former option commits one to 
permitting abstract entities as relata in real relations, something that would not sit well 
with Martin's realist commitments. The latter option has the unfortunate consequence that 
if a disposition only exists in virtue of being a term in a relation to an actual manifestation, 
then dispositions that never manifest (for instance, in the case of a fragile glass which 
never gets struck and so never breaks) cannot be said to exist or be had by the relevant 
object. Any ontologist who takes dispositionality seriously will find this consequence absurd 
(even one who wishes to offer a reductive or deflationary account of dispositionality). As 
Martin puts it: 
 A thing's dispositions can change[...] A piece of glass can be fragile for an hour and 
 cease to be fragile for an hour, the result of a change in temperature. Neither a 
 disposition nor a change of disposition  need manifest itself. The glass need not 
 actually break during the hour that it is fragile[...] If a piece of glass breaks, 
 something has happened to it. If a piece of glass ceases to be fragile, something has 
 happened to it. (ibid.) 
Change in dispositionality is an actual change, a change in the real properties of an object, 
whether or not this change is apparent or even in principle detectable by us (Martin gives 
the example of a deity who causes a glass to become fragile when and only when it is 
struck. In such a case we might never be able to detect that the glass is not fragile the rest 
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of the time. (ibid., p.13)). Similar considerations lie behind Martin's objections to reductive 
conditional analyses of dispositionality discussed in the previous section of this paper. 
 Martin rejects accounts which view the correct model for understanding 
dispositionality as a disposition being ‘set off’ by some triggering event so long as there are 
appropriate background conditions. In place of this, Martin suggests the notion of 
reciprocal disposition partners for mutual manifestations: 
 The two-event-cause-and-effect view is easily avoided and replaced by the view of 
 mutual  manifestation of reciprocal disposition partners, suggesting a natural 
 contemporaneity. (ibid., p.46) 
 …whatever is causally operative should have its full status as reciprocal or 
 collaborative disposition partner for a mutual manifestation. (ibid., p.87) 
 With reciprocal disposition partners each being for the mutual manifestation, 
 each must have the directedness and selectivity for such a manifestation. (ibid., 
 p.88) 
Consider again our fragile glass. Under the model suggested by Martin, that which disposes 
the glass to break, its fragility, is not a lone entity 'waiting' for the right opportunity to fly 
into action (say, the striking). Rather, the fragility, the striking, the solidity of the entity 
which strikes, the gravitational field, the presence of a relatively thin atmosphere and so on 
all act in concert to bring about a mutual manifestation: the breaking of the glass. There is 
no hierarchy here. The fragility of the glass should be given no metaphysical priority in our 
model (ibid., p.144). A single disposition is directed towards an “infinity of reciprocal 
disposition partners for, against or neutral with regard to an infinity of manifestations” 
(ibid., p.30). Thus, the very same fragility of the vase could partner to produce very 
different and novel results with a different set of reciprocal disposition partners. 
 Dispositions should not be thought of as isolated, but rather as participating in a 
network or web of potency/dispositionality: 
  Start with any disposition partner and you find a network—a Power Net. (ibid., 
 p.87) 
 Every disposition is, in this way, a holistic web, but not just an amorphous spread 
 of potency. (ibid., p.6) 
In every genuine disposition ascription an ineliminable reference to the infinity of potential 
partners is inherent. The dispositions that an object instantiates locate it within the 
intricate structure of this network, they define its connections, its potentiality for 
interaction. But, as Martin insists, this potency is not shapeless, raw or blurred round the 
edges; on the contrary, it is brought into sharp definition by the reciprocal partnerings 
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which are possible for that object in virtue of the particular genuine dispositions 
(properties) it possesses. The network is infinitely intricate and complex, but equally it is 
perfectly defined and delineated. The network (and any particular disposition that 
participates in it) is disposed towards far more than it could ever manifest. Whilst the 
potentialities which this intricate filigree of reciprocal partnerings for mutual manifestation 
are directed towards run to infinity, the number of mutual manifestations which actualise 
will always be much lower. This plenitude of potentiality, Martin claims, is “carried” by the 
relatively limited number of actual dispositions, and it is “natural that so little can carry so 
much” (ibid., p.60). 
 This conception of dispositionality informs Martin's account of causation, which 
holds the inter-relatings of reciprocal disposition partners for mutual manifestation to be 
prior notions to those of cause and effect: 
 [...]the view of mutual manifestation of reciprocal disposition partners [suggests] a 
 natural  contemporaneity[...] It [causation] is not a matter of two events [cause 
 followed by effect], but of one  and the same event—a reciprocal disposition 
 partnering as a mutual manifestation. (ibid., p.46) 
And: 
 It becomes obvious that dispositionalities are prior to and more basic and far 
 more numerous than their mutual manifestations, which is cause and effect. 
 Disposition and manifestation are the basic categories by means of which cause 
 and effect are to be explained. (ibid., p.55) 
Causation is not a case of some lone cause occurring from which stems some isolated 
effect. Such a picture may be epistemically helpful, but, Martin holds, at the fundamental 
ontological level causation is underpinned by the intricate and complex coming together of 
a large number of dispositions which 'work together' to bring about the manifestation we 
might denote 'effect'. Ontologically speaking, there is little promise of identifying either 
some one amongst these, or some particular event, as 'cause' whilst neglecting all the 
others. 
 In this section I have outlined those features of Martin's general metaphysical 
account which are most salient for the matter at hand—an evaluation of his Limit View 
account of properties. In the next section of this chapter I shall outline the structure this 
thesis will follow in addressing this topic. 
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1.5    Summary of Chapters 
Chapter Two presents a review of how the distinction has been drawn in the literature 
between powers or dispositions on the one hand, and categorical or qualitative properties 
on the other. I argue against characterising dispositions and qualities contra-distinctively 
and mutually exclusively. A way of drawing the distinction is outlined which does not 
render the Limit View's 'surprising identity thesis’ a prima facie inconsistency. 
 In Chapter Three, I present an in depth, chronologically ordered exploration of how 
the Limit View is presented through the body of Martin’s work. I argue that various distinct 
positions can be identified which have borne this name. Attending to the similarities and 
differences between the various versions of the Limit View provides a foundation for the 
defence of this view against criticisms examined in Chapter Four, and the critical 
interpretation of that view which I argue in favour of in Chapters Five and Six. 
 Chapter Four examines various criticisms which have been levelled at the Limit 
View. Drawing on the work of the second chapter, I argue that the majority of these 
criticisms arise due to misinterpretations of Martin’s position. However, Lowe’s charge that 
the surprising identity thesis is metaphysically obscure cannot be met in this fashion. 
 In Chapters Five and Six I aim to meet this challenge, by providing a critical 
interpretation of the Limit View which pays particular attention to attempting to clarify the 
surprising identity thesis. In doing so, I draw on a combination of resources from multi-
categorical ontology and from Francisco Suárez’s work on the metaphysics of distinctness, 
which both clarifies the surprising identity thesis and resolves the prima facie contradiction 
between the holding of this thesis and Martin’s insistence that, notwithstanding their 
identity, a distinction which is “more than in the eye of the beholder” (Martin (1996, p.174) 
and  (1997, p.202)) obtains between the dispositional and the qualitative. 
 In the second half of the thesis, I explore how the version of the Limit View which I 
defend in the first half can be put to work in the debate surrounding the ontology of mind 
and body. Chapter Seven introduces the material and briefly outlines Martin’s own account 
of the mind. New responses to the Zombie Argument and the Knowledge Argument which 
are available to those who adopt the version of the ‘Limit View’ outlined earlier in the 
thesis are developed in Chapters Eight and Nine respectively. Thus, it is argued, that this 
position ought to be seen as attractive by anyone wishing to avoid the property-dualist 
conclusions of those arguments.  
21 
 
 In Chapters Ten and Eleven I explore how ‘the physical’ and ‘the mental’ ought to 
be characterised. I argue in favour of a science-based conception of the physical in which 
dispositionality is a central concept, and, drawing on work by David Chalmers and Galen 
Strawson, a conception of mentality in which qualitativity is key.  
 On the basis of these characterisations, it is argued in Chapter Twelve that the 
adoption of the Limit View should lead one to accept a monistic ontology of mind and 
body. I argue that this position is best conceived of not as a physicalist or 
idealist/phenomenalist position, but rather as a variant of neutral monism. The details of 
this position are explored, with focus on what distinguishes it from both traditional forms 
of neutral monism, and from a variety of other approaches to the debate concerning the 
ontology of mind and body. 
 I conclude that, despite facing a serious challenge in the form of Lowe’s charge of 
obscurity, Martin’s Limit View account of properties can be made clear. Furthermore, its 
adoption opens up powerful new lines of response to arguments in favour of property 
dualism. However, the adoption of the Limit View does not commit one to a traditional 
physicalist position (either reductive or non-reductive); rather, it leads to a neutral monism 
which maintains the monistic approach often associated with physicalism, whilst respecting 
dualist intuitions that there is some significant difference between the physical and the 
mental (although, on this account, that distinction is not a fundamental, ontological one). It 
is indicated that with more work we might uncover potential advantages of this neutrally 
monist account of the nature of mind and body, in areas such as the mental causation 
debate and the philosophy of perception. 
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Chapter Two: Dispositionality and Qualitativity 
 
"In this matter, nothing is pure." (Martin (2007, p.68)) 
 
This thesis is centred around a long running debate in the metaphysics of properties: that 
which concerns whether there are two fundamentally different kinds of properties, on the 
one hand, dispositions or powers or tendencies (I take these terms to be broadly 
equivalent) and on the other, categorical properties or qualities or occurents. Paradigmatic 
examples of dispositional properties include fragility, solubility, elasticity; paradigmatic 
examples of categorical properties include shape and mass. As seen in the introduction, 
there are various possible positions which can be taken on this issue. First, one might assert 
that there are two fundamental kinds of property, each of equal ontological standing. 
Secondly, one might assert that whilst both kinds of property exist, dispositions are 
dependent on categorical properties. Thirdly, one might hold that only one kind of property 
exists; either dispositions or categorical properties. (See sections 1.2 and 1.3 for examples 
of all these positions). Alternatively, one might question whether this distinction can be 
drawn at the fundamental, ontological level, and hold that whilst there is just one kind of 
property, they are neither best characterised as dispositional nor as categorical (for 
instance, Martin (in Crane, ed. (1996)), Heil (2003), and more recently Strawson (2008b), 
Engelhard (2010) and Jacobs (2011). This final view, which itself may take a number of 
forms, is the focus of this thesis. 
 In this chapter I shall be examining various attempts to characterise the distinction 
between the dispositional and what is most traditionally called the categorical (although I 
follow Martin in taking 'categorical' to be a misleading name for the  contrast class to 
'dispositional', and prefer the term 'quality', in this chapter I shall use both terms 
interchangeably).
24
 I am not, in this chapter, concerned so much with the nature of the 
distinction itself (whether it is a conceptual or ontological one), but rather with the various 
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 It could be argued that 'categorical' ought to be contrasted to 'hypothetical'. If one believed 
dispositions were not full blooded properties, that they were merely possibilia or the like, then 
perhaps they should be contrasted to categorical properties (one might think this is one made the 
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principles along which the distinction has been drawn. As shall be seen, it is common to 
characterise the difference between the two contra-distinctively, most usually by offering 
some criteria C for dispositionality and then defining the categorical as properties-which-
are-not-C. This broad approach makes the classes of disposition and categorical property 
mutually exclusive, forcing the final account outlined above into the unstable position of 
claiming that properties are either both C and not-C or neither C nor not-C. Following the 
examination of the various attempts to characterise both the dispositional and the 
categorical which have been popular in the literature, I shall attempt to offer a 
characterisation which does not render the dispositional and the qualitative mutually 
exclusive, thus laying the groundwork for a credible interpretation of the view that the 
dispositional/categorical distinction is not one which can be drawn at the level of 
fundamental ontology. 
 
2.1    Dispositions, Categorical Properties and Conditionals 
As discussed in section 1.2, many have been so taken by the apparent relationship between 
dispositionality and conditionals that they hoped to provide a reductive analysis of 
dispositional properties in favour of the truth of certain conditionals. In that section, 
however, we saw how powerful counter-examples have been raised against this analysis. In 
this section, we will examine whether an approach to characterising what distinguishes 
dispositions from categorical properties that makes appeal to conditionals can be 
maintained. Consider a paradigm example of a dispositional property, say, fragility, and 
consider a particular instance of this property, say, as it is instantiated in a particular vase. 
There seem to be a variety of subjunctive conditionals which are true of the vase in virtue 
of its instantiation of fragility, such as: 
 (2.i) If the vase were struck with a hammer, then it would shatter. 
Noting this relationship between paradigm cases of dispositionality and the truth of certain 
subjunctive conditionals has led many to suppose that entailing subjunctive conditionals is 
criterial for dispositionality, and thus that the distinction between dispositional and 
categorical properties can be drawn based on this criterion. If the instantiation of a 
property by a substance entails the truth of some subjunctive conditional, then that 
property is a disposition. If it does not, then the property is categorical.
25
 On this approach, 
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'dispositional' and 'categorical' represent two mutually exclusive classes: no property could 
be such that it both entails and does-not-entail the truth of some subjunctive conditional.  
 In order to establish the adequacy of characterising the distinction between 
dispositional and categorical properties by appeal to the entailment of conditionals, two 
claims need to be substantiated. First, it needs to be shown that the instantiation of 
dispositional properties does indeed entail the truth of subjunctive conditionals. Secondly, 
it needs to be shown that the instantiation of categorical properties does not. Whilst 
drawing the distinction in these terms has some prima facie appeal, serious challenges 
have been raised to each of the claims outlined above.  
 Martin has suggested that rather than providing a criterion for dispositionality, 
conditionals are merely "[...]clumsy and inexact linguistic gestures[...]" towards them 
(1994, p.8). This view is motivated by consideration of what he calls 'finks'. A disposition is 
finked if the coming to pass of an event which would normally be expected to trigger the 
manifestation of the disposition causes the loss of the disposition itself, thus meaning that 
the manifestation never occurs. These triggers are specified in the antecedent of the 
associated subjunctive conditional, whilst the manifestation is specified in the consequent. 
Consider our fragile vase. Imagine it has been hooked up to some futuristic protection 
device, which operates such that if the vase ever receives a blow from a hammer, its 
physical structure is instantaneously changed such that it can absorb the blow without 
shattering. Ex hypothesi, the vase in the example is fragile, but the conditional: 
 (2.i) If the vase were struck with a hammer, then it would shatter. 
is not true. Similar problems are raised by Bird who considers the case of 'antidotes'. In 
antidote cases, whilst the disposition is not removed, some further factor interferes with 
the process of manifestation with the result that despite the occurrence of the trigger, the 
manifestation does not come about: 
The sorcerer [who wishes to protect the vase], being a brilliant physicist, may be 
able to ad-minister shock waves to the struck [vase] which precisely cancel out the 
shock of the original striking, hence saving the [vase] from destruction. (1998, 
p.228) 
Again, ex hypothesi, the vase is fragile, indeed, this is the very reason it makes sense that 
the sorcerer has to go to pains to protect it. But again, the conditional (2.i) is not true, for 
the antidote-effect of the counteracting forces the sorcerer would administer to his 
precious vase mean that no shattering will occur. The possibility of finks and antidotes 
suggests that there is no straightforward entailment from the instantiation of a disposition 
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such as fragility to the truth of a subjunctive conditional such as 'If the vase were struck 
with a hammer, then it would shatter.' If these points stand, then it is untenable to draw 
the distinction between dispositional and categorical properties along the lines of the 
entailment of subjunctive conditionals, for dispositions do not entail such conditionals. 
 Mellor has argued that in virtue of the instantiation of paradigm examples of 
categorical properties, such as shape, certain subjunctive conditionals follow: 
Take the paradigm, molecular structure—a geometrical (for example, triangular) 
array of inertial masses. To be triangular is at least to be such that if the corners 
were (correctly) counted the result would be three. (1974, p.171) 
Mellor's objection to distinguishing between dispositional and categorical properties by 
appeal to conditionals denies not that the instantiation of a disposition entails a 
conditional, but rather asserts that the instantiation of any real property will entail some 
subjunctive conditional. If this is the case, then the proposed characterisation of the 
distinction cannot be maintained. It should be noted that accepting Mellor's criticism does 
not commit one to any particular view on the ontology of properties. If one accepts the 
entailment of a subjunctive conditional as criterial for dispositionality, then one might draw 
from Mellor's argument the conclusion that all real properties are dispositions. However, 
one might take the objection simply to show that the entailment of a subjunctive 
conditional is not the line along which to distinguish dispositional from categorical 
properties, leaving open the possibility of holding any of the positions outlined in the first 
paragraph of this chapter. 
 Given the problems raised above, whilst there may well be some important 
relationship between dispositionality and conditionals, it does not seem that the distinction 
between dispositions and qualities/categorical properties can be straightforwardly drawn 
based on the former entailing subjunctive conditionals, and the latter failing to do so. 
Mumford (1998) has defended the view that the distinction between dispositional and 
categorical properties can be drawn along such lines. Briefly, he argues that through an 
appeal to ideal and background conditions, finked (and, I take it, this response could be 
extended to antidote cases also) cases can be successfully accommodated. He appeals to a 
notion of conditional conditionals (ibid., p.88): 
(2.ii) If conditions are ideal, then (If the vase were struck with a hammer, then it 
would shatter.) 
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As finked (and antidote) cases involve non-ideal conditions, the finked (or antidoted) vase, 
whilst it does not entail (2.i), still entails (2.ii). To Mellor's objection, he responds that 
whilst both dispositional and categorical properties may entail conditionals, they do so in 
different ways, and so a principled distinction can still be maintained based on the 
relationship between the ascription of the property and the entailment of conditional 
statements (ibid., pp. 79-81).
26
  
 If one understands the interaction of dispositions as mutual manifestation, as 
Martin does (see section 1.4 of this thesis), as I do, and as Mumford also now does (see, for 
instance, ibid., p.16 or Mumford and Anjum, forthcoming), then I do not think the appeal to 
ideal and background conditions can be maintained, for all 'conditions' (that is, the 
arrangement of all the dispositions) are equally involved in the (mutual) manifestation. This 
renders conditionals such as (2.ii) trivial, as it comes down to something like: 
(2.iii) If all the dispositions involved are directed such that if the vase were struck 
with a hammer, then their mutual manifestation would be the shattering of the 
vase, then (If the vase were struck with a hammer, then it would shatter.) 
Given their triviality, the truth of conditionals such as (2.iii) fails to explain away cases such 
as finking and antidoting. Furthermore, their truth follows from anything whatsoever (and 
the scope of the anything here is not even limited to property ascriptions), and so they 
cannot provide a principled line along which to distinguish dispositionality from 
categoricality/qualitativity. Approaches to characterising the distinction between the 
dispositional and the categorical by appeal to the entailment of conditionals, in light of 
these objections, cannot be maintained.
27
 
 
2.2    Stimuli and Manifestations 
Another approach to characterising what distinguishes dispositions and categorical 
properties makes appeal to the notions of stimulus and manifestation. Bird (2007, pp. 43-
45) characterises dispositions as properties which, of necessity, relate some characteristic 
stimulus to some characteristic manifestation. Categorical properties, in contrast, if they 
relate stimuli and manifestations, do so only contingently. As with the approach discussed 
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in section 2.1 above, this makes the distinction between dispositional and categorical 
properties/qualities mutually exclusive; Bird makes this explicit, stating "[c]learly no 
property may be categorical and have a dispositional essence at the same time" (ibid., 
p.44). Mumford's functionalist account of dispositions, advanced in Mumford (1998), also 
characterises dispositionality in terms of a property, as a matter of conceptual necessity, 
relating stimuli to manifestations in a certain manner (what he calls causal mediation, see, 
for instance, ibid., pp. 197-198).
28
 However, Mumford maintains that the distinction applies 
at the level of how properties are characterised or conceived (for instance, ibid., p.215). 
According to the sort of conception of dispositionality suggested by Bird and Mumford, 
then the fragility of a vase should be conceived as: 
(2.iv) The vase being fragile necessitates
29
 R(striking-with-a-hammer, shattering) 
 Conceiving of dispositionality in terms of stimulus-manifestation pairs (or clusters 
of such pairs) bears some similarity to conceiving of dispositionality in terms of 
conditionals. Given this similarity, analogues of the problems mentioned above seem to 
apply to this account also. For instance, it seems that the vase in either the finked or 
antidote-d situations is still fragile, although its being so does not relate the occurrence of 
the stimulus (striking) to the occurrence of the manifestation (shattering). Bird has 
suggested, in response to the problems of finks, that finked cases cannot occur at the level 
of the fundamental, sparse properties (2007, section 3.3.2). Whilst he holds that antidoting 
might be possible at the fundamental level, he holds that progress in science suggests that 
it will be relatively constrained. This should allow for the possibility of accommodating 
antidotes into the characterisation of a disposition: 
If A is an antidote to the disposition D to yield M in response to S, then we could 
replace D by the disposition D* to yield M in response to (S in the absence of A1, A2, 
A3, …), where {A1, A2, A3, …} is the set that includes every possible antidote to the 
original D. (ibid., p.62) 
If this move is acceptable, then the possibility of antidotes does not threaten to undermine 
the characterisation of a disposition in terms of relating a stimulus-manifestation pair, for 
all cases in which an antidote is present are specifically excluded by the nature of the 
disposition itself. That there might appear to be something gerrymandered about such a 
move, Bird recognises, although he suggests that in the case of fundamental properties this 
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should not be so problematic, given that antidotes are likely to be relatively few in number 
(ibid., p.63).
30
  
 I do not find such a response convincing. The possibility of alien (or far flung) 
antidotes seems to raise two problems for excluding antidote cases in the characterisation 
of a disposition. The first problem is epistemic. Given that we lack knowledge of what alien 
antidotes there might be to a given fundamental disposition, we cannot ever complete the 
list of antidote cases to be excluded. Perhaps this problem is not metaphysically serious, 
and we can just accept that our knowledge of the nature of dispositions will always be 
limited. The second problem concerns the worry mentioned above that excluding antidote 
cases looks like some form of gerrymandering. Bird suggests that this worry is ameliorated 
in the case of fundamental properties because scientific progress suggests that the number 
of antidote cases for a given disposition will be relatively limited. On this basis, even if we 
should take the building-in of antidote cases into the characterisation of a disposition to be 
gerrymandered, it will be relatively harmlessly so. However, given the possibility of alien (or 
far flung) antidotes (for fundamental dispositions), there does not seem to be any grounds 
to the claim that the number of antidote cases is low; we simply cannot know whether or 
not this is in fact the case. If this claim cannot be maintained, then there are no grounds for 
maintaining that the apparent gerrymandering of dispositions in the fundamental case is 
harmless—this problem applies as much to the case of fundamental dispositions as it does 
to any others. 
 A more general worry I have about characterising dispositionality in terms of 
stimulus-manifestation pairs is that it stands at odds with the notion of mutual 
manifestation. According to the stimulus-manifestation conception, dispositions 'stand-by' 
as it were, waiting to be 'set off' by the appropriate stimulus. This model fails to adequately 
capture all sorts of phenomena which look to involve dispositionality. Martin (1983, p.522) 
gives the example of two playing cards leant up against one another as one would place 
them when building a house of cards; whilst this certainly looks like an instance of 
dispositions producing some manifestation (mutual support), the prospects of identifying 
one card or the other as providing the 'stimulus' seems slim. Mumford has more recently 
rejected this model, and offers the example of procreation (2013, p.16); when a sperm and 
an egg come together and produce an embryo, it does not look like we ought to attribute 
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the disposition to do so to one of them and characterise the other as simply the stimulus. 
Rather, manifestation comes about due to mutual and reciprocal action of the various 
dispositions involved. 
 Characterising the distinction between disposition and quality/categorical property 
in terms of the former relating, of necessity, a particular stimulus and particular 
manifestation in a particular fashion; and the latter of doing so, if at all, only contingently, 
faces similar objections to the attempt to do so through reference to conditionals: 
antidotes and finkish cases threaten the analysis, and it fails to accommodate the mutual 
and reciprocal nature of manifestation.
31
 If, as has been suggested, it is not appropriate to 
characterise dispositions in terms of stimulus-manifestation pairs, then the distinction 
between these and qualities/categorical properties should not be drawn by reference to 
such pairs. 
 
2.3    Quiddities 
Whilst the account discussed above in section 2.2 defines qualities/categorical properties 
negatively, as non-dispositional-properties, Bird does also suggest that a positive account 
according to which a categorical property is one which has a quiddity is also possible (2007, 
fn.38). He has since adopted this position, stating: 
Powers contrast with categorical properties. The latter I take to be sparse 
properties that do not have any essential properties beyond self-identity (and, 
maybe, their degree of polyadicity). (2013, p.27) 
On such an account, categorical properties are to be distinguished from other sorts of 
property on the basis that they alone have trivial essences; that they are quiddities, 
properties whose identity is fixed primitively.
32
 As a disposition includes in its essence the 
dispositional features it bestows on its bearer, its essence is non-trivial, and so dispositions 
can be distinguished from categorical properties along these lines.
33
 As with the previous 
two accounts, this manner of drawing the distinction renders 'dispositional' and 
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non-fundamental, properties which are neither dispositional nor categorical (2013, p.28). 
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'categorical' mutually exclusive; no property could be such that its essence is both trivial 
and non-trivial. 
 Jacobs (2011) also makes a connection between qualitativity and quiddity. 
However, he takes qualities to be thick quiddities. Whilst a quiddity in Bird's sense of the 
word is an entity whose essence is exhausted by self-identity, numerical one-ness, a thick 
quiddity has some sort of distinctive nature, and so "[t]hick quiddities differ from each 
other, not merely numerically, but by nature" (ibid., p.90). Jacobs goes on to characterise 
the sort of nature that a thick quiddity has by reference to phenomenal qualities or 
qualia—the intrinsic nature of a property which is a thick quiddity is in some important 
sense similar to the qualities of which we are directly aware in conscious experience.  
 I shall delay further discussion of the notion of qualities/categorical properties as 
quiddities, thick or not, until after the next section; for the role that this concept ought to 
play in the discussion of dispositionality and qualitativity/categoricality can be most clearly 
seen when examined alongside the material discussed below.  
 
2.4    Directedness 
Dispositions are often characterised as properties which are directed towards a certain 
manifestation or set of manifestations. To possess a particular disposition, such as fragility, 
is to be directed towards behaving (and not behaving) in certain ways when in the presence 
of other dispositions. Some have considered this directedness to be akin to the 
intentionality often taken to be exhibited by mental states (see, for instance, Martin and 
Pffiefer (1987); Molnar (2003), and Place (1999)). I discuss the relationship between 
dispositionality and intentionality further in section 11.1 of this thesis; nothing discussed in 
this section will turn on how similar the directedness of dispositions is to that of intentional 
mental states, and so on this question I shall for now remain neutral. 
 Molnar offers the following two characterisations of dispositions (or powers, in his 
terminology) and qualities or categorical properties: 
(2.v) disposition: “a property that is essentially directed to a specific manifestation” 
(2003, p. 155); 
(2.vi) categorical property/quality: “a property that is not essentially directed to a 
specific manifestation” (ibid.). 
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It is worth noting that the distinction here is not drawn in terms of directedness per se, but 
with regards to whether or not that directedness is essential to the property; whether the 
property could be the very property it is without directing its bearer in the manner that it 
does. That a disposition is, of its essence, directed towards some particular manifestation 
or set of manifestations seems uncontroversial. Indeed, the very concept of dispositionality 
seems analytically related to the notion of being directed towards a manifestation. To be 
dispositional is, at least, to be disposed to x, y or z. Once again, categorical 
properties/qualities are defined negatively, as non-dispositional properties; Molnar says of 
qualities that they are "either not connected to anything beyond [themselves] or [are] 
contingently connected" (ibid.). That a property, in order to qualify as a quality, must not 
be essentially directed towards a manifestation (or set thereof) seems to me far less clear. 
It certainly does not seem that the concept of qualitativity is analytically related to not-
being-directed in manner equitable to the way in which the concept of dispositionality is 
related to being-directed. Perhaps it is the case that qualities, if they do bestow some 
directedness on their bearers, only do so contingently. But the notion of a quality which 
does so necessarily at least makes sense, in a way that the notion of a disposition which is 
only contingently directed does not.  
 Being essentially directed towards some manifestation or set of manifestations is, I 
contend, an appropriate characterisation of what it is to be a disposition (albeit a fairly 
minimal one). However, there is a disparity, noted above, between this characterisation 
and that given of qualitativity/categoricality. Therefore, we are not compelled, on the 
grounds of accepting (2.v), to also accept (2.vi). I contend that we ought not to accept 
(2.vi). Accepting qualitativity as characterised in (2.vi) has dissatisfactory consequences.
34
 
Suppose we do accept both (2.v) and (2.vi). First, there is a sense in which such an 
approach begs the question against the Limit View, for it cannot be that any property 
meets both (2.v) and (2.vi), on pain of contradiction. Sympathisers with the Limit View will, 
on this count, find the characterisation unsatisfying, although critics might take the 
inconsistency as evidence that there is something ill-formed about the Limit View. 
However, there is a more general problem: accepting (2.v) and (2.vi) elides the differences 
between dispositionalism and the Limit View. For both views accept that all real properties 
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32 
 
are (2.v)-properties. And both views accept that there are no (2.vi)-properties.
35
 However, 
there does seem to be something at stake between dispositionalism and the Limit View. 
What is at stake might be cashed out in terms of purity: the proponent of the Limit View 
will agree that all real properties are (2.v)-properties, but not that this characterisation 
exhausts their nature: they are not purely (2.v)-properties. 
 It is worth noting that anyone, including the proponent of the Limit View, can 
accept (2.vi) as a coherent characterisation. What the proponent of the Limit View will 
deny is that there are any (2.vi)-properties. And they will affirm that whilst all real 
properties are (2.v)-properties, (2.v) fails to fully or exhaustively capture the nature of a 
real property. I follow Martin and Heil in taking these claims to amount to the claim that all 
real properties are both dispositional and qualitative. However, should the reader find 
themselves particularly attached to the idea that (2.vi) does properly characterise 
qualitativity, it may be that their disagreement with the Limit View is primarily 
terminological. That is, if one really wants to define 'quality' as 'non-disposition'; then one 
is free to do so. But if that is the choice one makes, then I suggest the Limit View can still be 
sensibly interpreted as something like the denial that there are any (2.vi)-properties and 
the assertion that whilst all properties are (2.v)-properties, this characterisation is not 
exhaustive: there is more to a property's nature than what it is essentially directed 
towards. I would call this something more qualitativity, and shall continue to do so; but it 
could be called something else. 
 Specifying the Limit View as above raises the questions of how exactly this 
'something more' ought to be characterised; that is, how the distinction between what is 
dispositional and what is qualitative should be spelled out. Minimally, the characterisation 
of qualitativity that I have been hinting towards would look something like this: 
(2.vii) quality: a property that is something other than essential directedness to a 
specific manifestation. 
(2.vii) and (2.v) are not mutually exclusive: something can be essentially x and also 
something other than essential-x-ness: man, for instance, may be essentially mortal, but 
this does not mean man's nature is exhausted by his mortality (perhaps man's nature also 
includes rationality or morality or some other feature). However, (2.vii) does accommodate 
what might be the driving intuition behind the various attempts to characterise the 
distinction between dispositionality and categoricality/qualitativity contra-distinctively and 
                                                           
35
 Perhaps, categoricalism will hold that all properties are (2.vi)-properties. 
33 
 
mutually exclusively: when we attend to the qualitative nature of some object, we are not 
primarily concerned with how that object will behave (with how the properties of that 
object are directed towards various potential manifestations). Furthermore, (2.vii) does not 
beg the question against any particular view: those who take properties' natures to be 
exhausted by their dispositionality can deny that there are any (2.vii)-properties; those who 
take properties' natures to be non-dispositional can hold that all properties are (2.vii)-
properties (for (2.vii) allows for the property to be either not directed at all, or to be 
directed non-essentially, as well as allowing for essential directedness); those who hold 
that there are both (2.v)- and (2.vii)-properties and that these are ontologically distinct 
classes of property can be accommodated; as can proponents of the Limit View who hold 
that all real properties are characterised both by (2.v) and (2.vii). That all parties to the 
debate can be accommodated by characterising dispositionality and qualitativity according 
to (2.v) and (2.vii) lends support to these characterisations. 
 (2.vii), however, says nothing about how to elaborate on the 'something other' 
than directedness towards a manifestation that a quality is. Below I want to make some 
suggestive remarks about how one might conceive of qualitativity in more positive terms. A 
quality, as I understand the term, makes some contribution to its bearer in terms of an 
intrinsic what-it-is-like-ness. This intrinsic what-it-is-like-ness is, in some sense, 
independent of the directedness (one could term this the what-it-will-do-ness) which is 
characteristic of dispositionality. The defender of the Limit View will not, of course, 
consider this independence to be of ontological strength. Qualities can be the contents of, 
inform or feature in our experiences; our primary mode of access to them is through 
phenomenal experience (I shall discuss the relationship between qualitativity and mentality 
at much greater length in Chapters Eleven and Twelve of this thesis). This is not to say that 
all qualities are mental entities, or that every instance of a quality is an instance of 
experience. Perhaps this makes qualities thick quiddities, as Jacobs characterises them (see 
section 2.3 above); although I am not convinced the notion of a thick quiddity is any clearer 
than the intuitive grasp we have a qualitativity.
36
 
 Dispositions bestow on their bearers a nature which directs how that object will 
behave. Qualities bestow on their bearers an intrinsic character beyond this directedness. 
These notions are therefore conceptually distinct. But they are not incompatible; there is 
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no prima facie inconsistency between the claims that a single property is both a (2.v)-
property and a (2.vii)-property. 
 
2.5    Purity 
There is a sense, however, in which the dispositional and the qualitative represent two 
mutually exclusive classes: when we are considering pure dispositionality and qualitativity. 
A property could be considered a pure disposition according to the following 
characterisation: 
(2.viii) pure disposition: a property that is essentially directed to a specific 
manifestion, and is nothing over-and-above this directedness 
whereas a pure quality would be: 
(2.ix) pure quality: a property that is essentially not directed to a specific 
manifestation 
that is, a property such that, of its essence, bestows no directedness towards behaviour on 
the object that instantiates it. Martin characterises such a property as one which is "in pure 
act[...] always manifesting all of which they are capable" (2008, p.54). He claims that only 
the properties of abstracta, such as mathematical entities, could be in pure act (ibid.). 
Clearly, no property can be both a (2.viii)-property and a (2.ix)-property. Indeed, the Limit 
View claims that no natural property is either a (2.viii)-property or a (2.ix)-property, for "in 
this matter, nothing is pure" (2008, p.68). In the next chapter, I shall be providing an in-
depth excavation of Martin's writings on the Limit View, in which the arguments supporting 
this claim shall be examined.
37
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Chapter Three: The Limit View: An Archaeology 
 
Martin first introduced what he later came to call the Limit View in his (1984) paper ‘Anti-
Realism and the World’s Undoing’. This thesis remained central to the work he produced 
over the following twenty-three years, and, as can only be expected, the thesis, and 
Martin’s manner of expressing it, evolved over that period. This chapter presents a largely 
non-critical and theory-free exposition of the Limit View that tracks both the development 
of the ideas which comprise the thesis and the changes in the modes of expression 
employed by Martin—more often metaphorical than not—in expounding the Limit View. 
The purpose of this chapter is not interpretative, and whilst what follows is intended 
primarily as a record of the changes in Martin’s presentation of the Limit View from 1984 
until his death in 2008, naturally some analysis— especially of the metaphors Martin 
employed in his characterisation of the Limit View—is inevitable. Such analysis will, in this 
chapter, be limited to exploring the various ways in which these metaphors can be 
interpreted: in this chapter I will not be arguing for any particular interpretations above 
others.
38
 
 The motivations for including a presentation of Martin’s position in such a non-
critical way are threefold. First, given the centrality of the Limit View to this thesis it is 
apposite that a full account of its development be presented. A clear presentation of the 
raw material (and nowhere in Martin’s own work, nor in the work of his critics, is such an 
account to be found) which is to be analysed is key to motivating a faithful and suitably 
nuanced interpretation. Secondly, given the changes in the presentation, and perhaps also 
substance, of the Limit View, a thorough, non-interpretative exposition of the view such as 
follows is necessary to avoid confusion regarding just what is being discussed.
39
 Thirdly, in 
Chapter Four of this thesis I argue that the majority of the criticisms levelled against the 
Limit View (for example, those presented by both Armstrong and Place in Crane ed., 1996) 
are the result of misinterpretations of Martin’s work. In motivating both the critical 
interpretation of the Limit View which will be argued for later in this thesis and such a 
response to Martin’s critics, it will be helpful to have recourse to the a-critical and non-
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 It has been argued that Martin presents at least two fully distinct positions under the name Limit 
View—see Molnar (2003 sections 9.2.2 and 9.2.5). 
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interpretative exploration of the development and presentation of the Limit View. It is the 
business of this chapter to provide such an exploration. 
 
3.1    The Birth of the Limit View 
I have already presented a brief survey of various positions taken in the debate between 
categorical and dispositional properties, and outlined the terms of this debate (see 
Chapters One and Two of this thesis). The Limit View represents (at least) one more 
position in this debate. Martin (1984) presents a number of arguments against the 
reducibility of the dispositional to the categorical. These arguments primarily target 
Dummett’s claim that for statements ascribing dispositions to objects to be determinately 
truth-evaluable, they must be reducible to a set of non-dispositional “reports of 
observation” statements. These reports of observation, Dummett claims: (i) provide 
grounds for a convincing causal explanation of the disposition in question, and (ii) are 
necessary and sufficient for the truth of the disposition ascription in question (1979). 
Although Dummett is the focus, Martin holds that the arguments he presents against 
Dummett hold equally against a variety of positions loosely classifiable as verificationist 
(1984, p.3).  
 Briefly, these arguments highlight the difficulty in giving explanations of so-called 
categorical states in language that are completely free of disposition-laden talk (ibid., p.9) 
and a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that, once dispositionality is taken seriously, there 
could be any contingent identification of dispositional states with categorical states (ibid., 
pp. 9-10). The argument runs as follows: if categorical and dispositional states are only 
contingently identified, then two worlds could differ just in terms of how the dispositions 
and qualities match up. However, this difference seems to lack any explicable ground. How 
could it be that the very same property could be the truthmaker for a certain disposition 
ascription in one world and fail to be so in another? Either one accepts that if dispositions 
and categorical properties are to be identified, they must be necessarily identified, or else 
one must accept this brute difference between worlds, which lacks any difference maker.
40
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 Whilst I agree with Martin that the relationship between the dispositional and the qualitative 
cannot be contingent, I am not sure this argument provides the best support for that claim. 
However, I include it here to illustrate the lines along which Martin was thinking at this time. (See 
Heil (2010) or (2012, section 4.11), for further arguments in support of this claim.) 
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 He appends to the rejection of the reducibility of the dispositional to the 
categorical the claim that dispositionality is found “all the way down” (ibid., p.11):  
the only things that do not have dispositional properties (that lack potency and are 
in pure act, as St. Thomas would say) are God, if He exists, and numbers, if they 
exist. All the way down, even to neutrinos, or elementary aspects of fields, nothing 
manifests all that it is capable of at any moment or segment of space time. (ibid.) 
In an endnote following this claim, there appears the following statement: 
Any real, empirical property has its categorical and dispositional aspects. (ibid., 
p.20) 
This statement is given no further analysis, explanation or development. Despite the 
brevity of its treatment, the above statement is the first formulation of what Martin would 
later go on to call ‘the Limit View’.
41
 Given this very minimal introduction to the Limit View, 
little more can be said regarding the commitments that such a view entails than the 
following: 
(3.i) dispositionality is not reducible to categoricality;
42
 
(3.ii) dispositionality exists at all levels of reality;
43
 
(3.iii) there are no properties such that they lack a dispositional aspect; 
(3.iv) there are no properties such that they lack a categorical aspect. 
At this point, neither (3.iii) nor (3.iv) is supported by adequately motivated arguments. 
Martin provides arguments for (3.i) and (3.ii) as detailed above. However, neither (3.i) nor 
(3.ii) individually, nor their conjunction, entails the truth of either (3.iii) or (3.iv). For 
instance, it is consistent with both (3.i) and (3.ii) that the world could contain some 
irreducible purely dispositional properties, and some irreducible, purely categorical 
properties, standing in various relations to each other. However, this is inconsistent with 
(3.iii) and (3.iv), and so these are not entailed by the (3.i) and (3.ii). Just as (3.iii) and (3.iv) 
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Martin (1993b, p.182). Although, that said, he later goes on to reject the name. And then later still 
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 Again, Martin’s claim for this does not entail the existence of categoricality at all levels of reality. 
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are wanting of supporting arguments, so too is the notion of property ‘aspects’ introduced 
in the quotation given above wanting of explanation. The attempt to appropriately 
articulate this notion (which Martin eventually goes on to reject, 1996) is considered in the 
next section of this chapter, whose focus is Martin’s two 1993 papers ‘The Need for 
Ontology—Some Choices’ and ‘Power for Realists’. 
 
3.2    The First Phase of the Limit View: Aspects and Sides 
In (1993a) and (1993b), Martin offers his first detailed accounts of the Limit View. In the 
previous section we noted that, whilst Martin had provided arguments for the existence 
and irreducibility of dispositions, this is not enough to establish the commitments of the 
Limit View outlined above. There being some irreducible, purely dispositional properties, 
and some irreducible, purely categorical properties is consistent with what has been argued 
for, but is inconsistent with the (at this stage, merely asserted) Limit View. Martin (1993b) 
addresses the first of these two potential phenomena: purely dispositional properties. To 
explain all properties in terms of pure dispositionality, Martin argues, would render an 
account where:  
[E]very ‘is’ is replaced by a ‘would be’. Each categorical property that would be 
manifested by some purported dispositionality is itself a candidate for replacement 
by some further dispositionality. It is hard to model a real happening on such an 
account. (1993b, pp. 177-178) 
The force of this argument is that if properties are modelled only as pure dispositionality, 
pure potential for manifesting the currently unmanifested, we are never left with any 
concrete, determinate, actual properties. Rather, such an account merely furnishes us with 
potentialities for further potentialities for further potentialities etc. etc. Such a position 
seems to preclude the very possibility of ontological candour; in response to questions such 
as ‘what is there?’ or ‘is there an n?’ the only possible answers would be of the form ‘well 
there might be if…’. The issue here is purity. If the essence of every property is exhausted 
by its directedness towards some manifestation, then nothing seems to be enacted when 
dispositions manifest. The state of the world is one of shifting potentials, but potentials for 
what? To answer this question, we could only make reference to further directednesses, 
raising the very same question again (and so on). This sort of position is not necessarily 
incoherent.
44
 However, it seems to clash with the immediate data of our manifest 
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experience, which may render it unattractive to some. Furthermore, Martin suggests that 
such an account lacks ontological seriousness (ibid., p.178), and, if he is correct, this will 
make the position unsatisfying to any philosophy of an ontologically serious mindset. What 
is needed is “a categorical state truth-maker for these claims of dispositionality” (ibid.). 
Martin is already committed to the view that whatever this “categorical state” is which will 
do the truth-making, it cannot, given the arguments he presents in (1984), be a categorical 
property which is contingently related to the disposition in question. 
 Having rejected accounting for property in terms of pure dispositionality, Martin 
reasserts the commitment that properties cannot be thought of as purely categorical; that 
is, as manifesting at all times all that they are capable of.
 
In both papers he states: 
Pure categoricality[/categoricity] of a property or state is as much of a myth and 
philosophical artifice as is pure dispositionality. (1993a, p.519 and 1993b, p.184) 
and: 
No intrinsic properties, right down to the ultimate properties of elementary 
particles or the ultimate properties of spatio-temporal regions of fields, are, in 
Aquinas' terms, in pure act or purely categorical. They are not and, indeed, cannot 
be manifesting all of which they are capable. (1993a, p.519 and 1993b, p.184) 
The assertion is not at this point argued for, it seems that Martin takes it to be obvious that 
this is the case.
45
 Eliminating dispositionality; reducing dispositionality; accounting for 
property in terms of pure dispositionality; accounting for property in terms of pure 
categoricality, and the combination of these last two have all been rejected. This leads to 
the Limit View: 
Any intrinsic property is Janus-faced, a two-sided coin, and only at the limit of an 
unrealizable abstraction can one think of these as separate properties in 
themselves[…] there are no degrees within the limit by which a property is 
categorical or dispositional[…] The categoricity and the dispositionality of a 
property or property state are abstractly distinct but actually inseparable, and no 
nonformal property can manifest all its dispositionality simultaneously. 
It isn’t that an intrinsic property or quality is purely categorical but dispositionality 
is ‘supervenient’ on it, for properties are indissolubly categorical-cum-dispositional 
or dispositional-cum-categorical. The dispositionality is as basic and irreducible as is 
the categoricity, and there is no direction from one as basic in a property to the 
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other as ‘supervenient’. To separate one from the other as the really basic property 
is philosophical artifice and error. (1993b, p.184)
46
 
The passage is dense, and suggests commitment to a number of positions. The next few 
paragraphs will be dedicated to unpacking the Limit View as articulated in the passage 
quoted above. In what comes below it is important to note a subtle difference between 
Martin’s use of language in the above passage, and the terms the debate is normally 
couched in—Martin does not talk of ‘dispositional properties’ and ‘categorical properties’, 
but rather of the ‘dispositionality’ and the ‘categoricity’ of properties—property for Martin 
is not neatly divided into two types, but rather, what are taken to be type-terms in the 
debate are treated as feature-terms or aspect-terms which tell us something about a 
unitary phenomena: property. 
 The passage opens with two visual metaphors which are intended to elucidate 
how, under the Limit View, properties are to be considered: ‘Janus-faced’ and as a ‘two-
sided coin’. One consideration such metaphors bring to light is mereological. When we 
conjure up an image of the Janus-faced figure, or of a coin with ‘heads’ and ‘tails’ sides, it 
seems that each of the faces or sides can be thought of as a part which, along with its 
counterpart (and perhaps some other parts) composes the whole. This seems to suggest 
that perhaps the dispositionality and categoricality of an intrinsic property, if they are like 
the faces of Janus or the sides of a coin, ought to be considered in a mereological fashion, 
as parts which make up a composite whole property. If we take the metaphors of the coin 
and the Janus-faced figure to apply at the ontological level, as telling us something about 
the fundamental nature of the different aspects of properties and the relationship between 
them, then the mereological interpretation seems apt.  
 Another interpretation of these metaphors can be motivated if we consider them 
as applying at the conceptual level, as revealing something about the very notions of 
‘dispositionality’ and ‘categoricality’. Like the Janus-faced figure, whose gaze is cast always 
in contrary directions from a single point, perhaps we are to understand the notions of 
dispositionality and categoricality as always ‘projecting’ towards contrary conceptions of 
the single property from which they both spring. There is an intimate link between what 
can be said about the two sides of a coin; for instance, to say a coin landed heads-up has 
the implication that it landed tails-down, indeed it could not land heads-up without landing 
tails-down. Perhaps, then, the coin metaphor could be interpreted as elucidating the 
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nature of the link between the dispositional and the categorical; just as there are strict 
implications between the ways a coin lands, perhaps there are strict implications between 
having a certain dispositional nature and have a certain categorical or qualitative nature. At 
this stage it is not my intention to endorse a particular interpretation of these metaphors, 
and nor do I imagine that what appears above is an exhaustive account of how they might 
be interpreted. In giving a few plausible and intuitive examples of alternative (and not 
necessarily mutually exclusive) interpretations, it can be seen that the articulation of the 
Limit View offered by Martin in these works is in need of careful and sensitive analysis.  
 Martin also characterises the Limit View in the following ways: 
only at the limit of an unrealizable abstraction can one think of these as separate 
properties in themselves[…] (ibid.) 
The categoricity and the dispositionality of a property or property state are 
abstractly distinct but actually inseparable[…] (ibid.) 
To separate one from the other[… ] is philosophical artifice and error. (ibid.) 
The quotations above suggest that the case of supposed distinction between dispositional 
and categorical properties does not reflect the way the world really is. The distinction is 
somehow a product of our way of thinking of, perceiving, conceptualising, representing, 
treating, understanding, etc. etc. properties that cannot really be classified as purely 
dispositional or purely categorical: properties somehow inevitably involve both 
categoricality and dispositionality.
47
  
 The key to understanding this appears to be ‘abstraction’, a concept mentioned 
twice by Martin in the passage above. When we take a property to be either purely 
dispositional, or purely categorical, we are not considering the property in its entirety. In 
the first case we have abstracted away all but the potential the property has for as yet 
unmanifested manifestation; in the second it is precisely this that has been abstracted, and 
we conceive of the property as inert being. If we come to hold that such abstractions are in 
fact accurate representation of how properties really are, then we are guilty of 
philosophical artifice and error. This manner of characterising the Limit View seems at odds 
with the first potential interpretation of the Janus-faced figure and coin metaphors as 
attributing a sort of mereology to intrinsic properties, where they are composites of 
dispositional and categorical parts. If the distinction between the dispositional and the 
categorical is one which obtains at the abstract level, but not at the ontological level, then 
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it is hard to see how dispositionality and qualitativity could be two parts of one composite 
whole. 
 Martin further outlines the sort of ontology he envisages for properties as 
conceived under the Limit View: 
It isn’t that an intrinsic property or quality is purely categorical but dispositionality 
is ‘supervenient’ on it, for properties are indissolubly categorical-cum-dispositional 
or dispositional-cum-categorical. The dispositionality is as basic and irreducible as is 
the categoricity, and there is no direction from one as basic in a property to the 
other as ‘supervenient’. (ibid., p.184) 
The intimacy of the connection between dispositionality and categoricality is asserted in 
this quotation. The claim that properties are “indissolubly categorical-cum-dispositional or 
dispositional-cum-categorical” suggests that an account of the Limit View which takes 
dispositionality and categoricality to be parts of a composite property-whole is misguided.
48
 
Whilst Martin omits to articulate precisely how we are to understand the connection 
between dispositionality and categoricality, he does reject a number of ways we might 
understand it: first, the quotation makes clear that we ought not to consider one as 
supervening on the other; secondly, given their equiprimordiality, there is no scope for one 
being reducible to the other; thirdly, for this same reason, one cannot be seen as emergent 
from the other and fourthly, one cannot be seen as standing to the other in the relation of 
cause to effect. 
 The articulation of the Limit View provided in Martin (1993a) and (1993b) provides 
some hints towards how to understand the ontology of properties (albeit in the form of 
somewhat ambiguous metaphors) and some clear strictures regarding how not to 
understand it. In the next section I will examine what I take to be the ‘second phase’ of the 
Limit View—that laid out in Martin’s contributions to Dispositions: A Debate (Crane, ed., 
1996). 
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 The comment that “there are no degrees within the limit by which a property is categorical or 
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3.3    The Second Phase of the Limit View: Abstraction and Artifice 
Martin presents several more arguments in favour of the reality and irreducibility of 
dispositions (and so contra categoricalist accounts) in Crane, ed. (1996).
49
 The first is a 
response to attempts to explain macro-dispositions (such as fragility and solubility) in terms 
of the micro-structural properties of the entities that instantiate them. Martin argues that 
as structural properties are themselves intrinsically dispositional, there is little hope for 
employing them as a reduction base for dispositions in general (ibid., p.73). The second 
defends the status of dispositions that never manifest, focussing on the example of two 
spatio-temporally distant types of elementary particles which would interact in an 
idiosyncratic fashion were they to come into contact with each other, but never actually 
get to meet. It seems that in such a case we would not want to deny these particles their 
dispositions for these never-manifested manifestations (ibid., p.74). The third argument 
Martin presents is a direct attack on pure categoricalism: 
When [Armstrong] goes on to say ‘Martin might claim that such a world [one 
where properties have a categorical but not a dispositional side] would be an inert 
world, because it would be a world which lacked causality’[…], he is correct in 
thinking that Martin would claim that an inert world was possible but that a world 
or entity or property with no dispositionality was not possible. To say that a thing 
or property was intrinsically incapable of affecting or being affected by anything 
else isn’t just a case of inertness and it amounts to no-thing. (ibid., p.132) 
In this passage Martin makes a direct link between being and having some measure of 
dispositionality; the purely categorical does not exist, because even if it did, it would be a 
mere nothingness! The difference between an inert world and nothing, then, would be that 
in an inert world there were entities with dispositions ready to manifest, but the world is 
such that those conditions upon which the manifestation of these dispositions would be 
triggered can never occur. 
 Martin concedes that the pure dispositionalist account of property has “at least a 
degree of plausibility” which is enhanced, it is argued, by the “impossibility[…] of 
characterising any property as purely qualitative,” (ibid., p.60) as argued for above. 
However, Martin does go on to reject this position on two grounds: first by employing an 
argument similar to the one detailed above given in Martin (1993b), that to consider a 
property as purely dispositional would be to consider it as merely a propensity for some 
outcome, a “mere mathematicised measure” (in Crane, ed., 1996, p.73). Any such measure 
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“is such only in virtue of there being qualities for which or of which it is the quantity or 
measure. The alternative is an unacceptably empty desert of Pythagoreanism…”
50
 
Accepting qualitativity/categoricality is necessary to establish concrete being. The second 
response that Martin gives to the pure dispositionalist runs as follows: 
Martin’s response to any such account is to state it fairly but baldly and let its 
absurdity show through. 
The image of a property as only a capacity for the production of other capacities for 
the production, etc. is absurd, even if one is a realist about the capacities. Whether 
one takes this argument as just question-begging or revealing a reductio ad 
absurdum, the opponent cannot plead misrepresentation. (ibid., p.86)  
The grounding for the Limit View of properties Martin gives here is the same as that given 
in (1993a) and (1993b). Martin has argued that both pure dispositionalism and pure 
categoricalism must be rejected, and so some alternative account of the nature of 
properties must be given.
51
  
 Martin (1996) gives the following articulation of the Limit View in Chapter 5, and 
repeats it early in Chapter 8: 
Martin’s Limit View of the qualitative and dispositional character of properties is 
the following three claims: 
• To speak of a qualitative property is to take some real property as only at 
its bare potency-free purely qualitative limit, which, of course, it never is. 
• To speak of a dispositional property is to take some real property as only at 
its purely dispositional non-qualitative limit which, of course, it never is. 
• No real property of an object, event, process or even space-time segment 
or field can be thought of as existing at either limit. 
The thought of anything being at either the limit of the purely and only qualitative 
disposition-free pure act of being (such as the potency-free qualities of the God of 
Thomas Aquinas) or the limit of the pure state of potency (such as the qualities-for-
reduction-to-possible-operations of a thoroughgoing operationalism or qualities as 
measurement-probabilities ‘bundles’) is conceptual artifice and unrealisable 
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abstraction suggested, perhaps, by some of the surfaces of grammar. (ibid., pp. 73-
74) 
In this passage Martin provides a much clearer exposition of the commitments of the Limit 
View than was given in the passages quoted in the previous section of this chapter. He 
omits the visual metaphors of the Janus-face and the two-sided coin, which as we have 
seen are open to myriad interpretations. He also avoids the terminology of ‘aspect’ and 
‘side’ which had appeared in earlier work. Rather, the focus here is on ‘limits’. However, 
the notion of a limit, where real properties are concerned, is one which requires 
explanation.  
 Could ‘limit’ be interpreted in a physical or visual fashion, as two ends of a scale or 
spectrum, or perhaps the outer bounds of a region? Remembering that there are no 
degrees between the limits, this seems unlikely. Properties are not such that they can be 
conceived of as composites which could have a ‘bigger’ categorical part than a dispositional 
part, and vice versa; nor are dispositionality and categoricality two ends of a continuum 
with different properties being plottable as different points on that continuum. Perhaps 
then ‘limit’ applies to the conceptions which the property admits of. We are discouraged 
from thinking of two types of property juxtaposed one with the other, and encouraged to 
see the binary division of dispositional/qualitative as stemming from a process of 
"conceptual artifice and unrealisable abstraction" (ibid., p.74). When the abstraction of one 
element—either the qualitative or dispositional—from the conception of the property is 
thorough and complete, we find ourselves at a ‘limit’; all that is left is the pure form of its 
counterpart. In this way, pure dispositionality and pure qualitativity are the conceptual 
‘limits’ of which the property admits. But to consider that such pure qualitativity or 
dispositionality is grounded in some purely qualitative or dispositional property would be 
erroneous. The account of the Limit View given in the passage above leaves open the 
question of exactly what sort of relationship obtains between the dispositionality and 
qualitativity of a property.
52
 
 In the previous section of this chapter, a number of interpretations of Martin’s 
Limit View were considered which rendered dispositionality and qualitativity somehow 
parts which make up a composite property-whole. Whilst I have already discussed some 
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reasons to think such an interpretation might be in error, in Martin (in Crane, ed., 1996) he 
explicitly rejects this conception of the Limit View: 
The only way to express this Limit View of real properties that does not amount to 
treating real properties as compounds of purely qualitative and purely dispositional 
properties is to show how the attempt to abstract these as distinct elements is 
unrealisable in reality and only approachable as limits for different ways of being 
the same unitary property such that they may be necessarily or contingently co-
variant. This will hold for all real properties all the way down even to the most 
ultimate properties of elementary particles or fields. (ibid., p.86) 
Any interpretation of the Limit View as articulated in by Martin in Crane, ed. (1996), then, 
cannot take the terms ‘dispositionality’ and ‘qualitativity’ to denote different parts which 
compose a property-whole. This passage also reveals a little more about what relations 
may hold between the dispositionality and qualitativity of a property: Martin claims that 
change in the one will result in some change in the other. However, it remains an open 
question as to whether this co-variance is bound by ties which are necessary, or merely 
contingent.
53
 He expresses the same openness about the relations that hold between the 
dispositionality and qualitativity of a property on the following page: 
The Limit View has maximum flexibility in expressing both the necessary (if any) 
and contingent (if any) relations between qualitativity and the dispositionality of 
properties[…] 
Necessities will have to be earned but so will contingencies. The Limit View is 
specially suited for the statement of either or a judicious mixture. (ibid., p.87) 
So far, we have only been provided a negative account of what exactly the relationship 
between the two features of property under discussion might be. Martin gestures towards 
a positive account, by means of analogy, later in the text: 
The dispositionality and qualitativity of any intrinsic property is similar to the way 
shape and size are of extension. In each case, one cannot exist without the other, 
though one can vary without the other. Contra Hume and Armstrong, they are 
distinct  but not separable… 
On the Limit View one must logically exclude separability and affirm the necessity 
of co-existence of dispositionality and qualitativity for any property, but then one is 
free on any given case whether their co-variance is necessary or contingent. (ibid., 
pp. 133-134) 
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No extended thing can have a shape without having some size, and nothing can be of an 
extended size without having some shape or other. However, there are many things of the 
same shape (for instance, many square things) which have different sizes, and conversely, 
many things of the same size (say, things with a volume of 10cm
3
) which nevertheless have 
differing shapes. Accepting this: 
(3.v) No property can have qualitativity without having some dispositionality; 
(3.vi) No property can have dispositionality without having some qualitativity; 
(3.vii) There are properties which have the same qualitativity but nevertheless have 
different dispositionalities; 
(3.viii) There are properties that have the same dispositionality but nevertheless 
have different qualitativities. 
The co-variance (whether necessary or contingent) of dispositionality and qualitativity in 
general is ruled out by such an account. However, given the last line of the passage above, 
we can see that Martin permits that on a case-by-case basis there can be particular 
properties for which co-variance obtains between their dispositionalities and qualitativities, 
but that whether such co-variance is necessary or contingent is to be decided in each 
instance, not dictated by a general rule. 
 Earlier in this section and in the previous section 3.2 the importance of the notion 
of abstraction to Martin’s account was discussed. One potential way of interpreting the 
claim that pure dispositionality and pure qualitativity are the products of abstraction would 
be to consider these two features of properties as simply ways-to-think-about-property. 
However, Martin explicitly rejects such a conception: 
Expressing the qualitativity and dispositionality of any real property merely as ‘a 
way of thinking of, mode of predication concerning, way of regarding, looking at, 
etc.’ suggests that it is merely in the eye or voice of the beholder. If the users of 
such deontologising expressions wish to claim such anthropomorphism then the 
users should make that ontology clear. If the users do not wish to endorse this 
anthropomorphism then they should join in the task of saying clearly what in the 
world the expressions indicate. (1996, p.174) 
The Limit View is not to be taken as rendering dispositionality and qualitativity a mere 
mind-dependent way of describing or understanding the world. Martin is concerned with 
ontological seriousness and candour. For him both dispositionality and qualitativity are as 
real as the properties to which they pertain. This does set up a puzzle, however: if anti-
realism about dispositionality and qualitativity were being endorsed then the claims of the 
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Limit View that these are abstractions would be straightforward and easily 
comprehended.
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 Given that this position is clearly rejected, it remains for an account to be 
given of what it means to maintain both that: (i) pure dispositionality and pure qualitativity 
are “conceptual artifice and unrealisable abstraction” (ibid., p.74) and, at the same time, (ii) 
that nonetheless some distinction between dispositionality and qualitativity obtains which 
is not a merely conceptual or mind-dependent distinction. An attempt to develop such an 
account is the subject matter of Chapters Five and Six of this thesis. 
 
3.4   The Third Phase of the Limit View: Identity and Gestalts 
In two papers ‘On the Need for Properties: The Road to Pythagoreanism and Back’ (1997) 
and ‘Rules and Powers’ (co-authored with John Heil, (1998)) Martin presents yet another 
articulation of the Limit View. In the first of these papers he reiterates a number of 
arguments against reducing dispositions to so-called categorical properties that have been 
discussed above (1997, pp. 202-203) and rehearses the argument that a purely 
dispositional account of properties is “like a promissory note that may be actual enough 
but if it is for only another promissory note which is[…], that is entirely too promissory” 
(ibid., p.215) as well as introducing the claim that any attempt at explaining property in 
ontologically candid language will be unable to do so in purely dispositional terms (ibid., 
paralleling an argument given in Martin (1984, p.9) against a purely categorical account of 
property). Both papers repeat the argument given in Martin (1996, p.132), that a purely 
qualitative property would not merely be inert, but would be a no-thing (1997, p.216) and 
(1998, p.289-290). As the (1997) paper gives a fuller account of the Limit View than (1998) 
one, and the two accounts are sufficiently similar, this section shall focus on the former. 
However, I shall examine one point raised in the latter towards the end of this section 
which is not addressed in the earlier paper. 
 Martin (1997) provides some more explanation of the ways in which the 
dispositionality and the qualitativity of a property relate to one another: 
It is my suggestion that the properties of entities that are constitutive of any state 
of affairs must be qualitative as well as dispositional, and dispositional as well as 
qualitative. They are correlative (Locke), complemental, inseparable, and covariant 
when they are displayed in their intrinsic and irreducible form at the level of the 
“finer interstices.” (p.215)  
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The inseparability and covariance of the dispositionality and qualitativity are discussed in 
the section above. Two new features of the relationship between the two are introduced 
here: correlativity and complementality. The two terms are closely related, but there are 
some connotations each carries that the other does not.  
 Correlativity suggests a mutuality in the relationship between dispositionality and 
qualitativity, such that they are dependent on and affective with regards to one another. 
Complementality, in the sense relevant here, is the making complete of something. 
Indicating that dispositionality and qualitativity stand in such a relation, Martin emphasises 
the intimate nature of the connection between the two: dispositionality and qualitativity 
are ‘incomplete’ when considered alone.  
 The notion of a property's 'completeness' seems to create a tension in Martin’s 
articulation of the Limit View. He has rejected any mereological understanding of 
dispositionality and qualitativity (see 1996, p.86 and section 3.3 above) and indeed repeats 
this rejection at (1997, p.216). However, talk about the ‘completeness’ of a property, if 
taken literally, seems to imply just such a conception. Hence, the complementality of 
dispositionality and qualitativity must be read metaphorically, and as such is open to a 
number of interpretations. Perhaps the metaphor applies at the epistemological level, and 
to consider only one or the other would be a partial consideration; any complete 
conception or consideration of a property must recognise both. 
 Martin recognises and addresses this problem: 
[…]characterization in terms of “different ways of being” is still too suggestive of a 
mixture. It is even more than necessary covariance (as in equiangular and 
equilateral). For any property that is intrinsic and irreducible, what is qualitative 
and what is dispositional are one and the same property viewed as what that 
property exhibits of its nature and what that property is directive and selective for 
as its manifestations. These cannot be prised apart into the purely qualitative and 
the purely dispositional. What is exhibited in the qualitative informs and 
determines what is the forness of the dispositional, and what is the forness of the 
dispositional informs and determines what is exhibited in the qualitative. There is 
no direction of priority or dependence. There is no reduction of one to the other. 
The only way that this can be expressed is by claiming that the qualitative and 
dispositional are identical with one another and with the unitary intrinsic property 
itself. This is perhaps a surprising identity, but frequently it happens that different 
representations turn out to one’s surprise to be of the identical entity. (ibid.) 
The claim at the end of this passage is a bold one: the correct way to understand the 
manner in which the dispositional and the qualitative relate is via the notion of identity: 
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(3.ix) The dispositionality of a property is identical with that property itself; 
(3.x) The qualitativity of a property is identical with that property itself; 
(3.xi) The dispositionality and qualitativity of a property are identical with each 
other. 
In characterising the dispositional and the qualitative in such a manner, it seems Martin is 
rejecting the analysis of their relationship as analogous to that of size and shape with 
regard to extension: if the dispositionality and qualitativity of a property are identical one 
with the other, it is hard to see how claims (3.vii) and (3.viii)—that there are properties 
with the same qualitativities as one another and yet different dispositionalities, and vice 
versa—can be maintained.
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 That the two are to be considered identical does provide 
grounding for the intimacy of the relationship between the two as discussed earlier in the 
chapter. Martin goes on to characterise this identity as a ‘surprising’ one, commenting that 
“frequently it happens that different representations turn out to one’s surprise to be of the 
identical entity” (ibid. p.216). This comment offers some clues as to how we are to 
understand the identity between dispositionality and qualitativity. Two representations of 
one entity—say the coding of a single image into both .bmp and .jpg file formats—are not 
identical representations, but they are representations of a single entity: in such cases, the 
.bmp represents ImageA and the .jpg represents ImageB and ImageA=ImageB. Pure 
dispositionality and pure qualitativity are to be taken somehow as ‘representations’, 
arrived at by abstraction, of a single, unitary property. Pure dispositionality is not identical 
to pure qualitativity in that they are not the same manner of representing the single, 
unitary property (in each case something different about the property has been 
abstracted), but the two are identical in that that which they represent is a single, unitary 
and obviously self-identical property. In the passage that follows the quotation discussed 
above, Martin reminds us that the dispositionality of a property ought not to be seen as a 
relation between the property and a manifestation (dispositions exist quite independently 
of their manifestations—ibid.). If we were to make this mistake it would be very hard to see 
how the Limit View could be correct, as there could not be any sort of identity between a 
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 As a trope theorist, Martin would analyse ‘the same’ in the sentence above as ‘exactly similar’ as 
opposed to ‘identical’ (as a realist about universals would do). However, I cannot see this allowing 
him to maintain (3.vii) and (3.viii). If a property P1 has a qualitativity q1, and q1=d1 (that property’s 
dispositionality) and another property P2 has an exactly similar qualitativity q2, how could it be that 
q2=d2 where d2 is not exactly similar to d1? If this were to be the case, then surely we could not 
maintain that q1 and q2 are exactly similar, for they differ in regard to what d they are identical to. 
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relation (a property which has, of its essence, an adicity of two or above) and a non-
relation (which must necessarily be monadic). 
 Martin invokes yet another visual metaphor in an attempt to articulate the Limit 
View which now incorporates the notion of the (surprising) identity of the dispositionality 
of a property with the qualitativity of that property: 
What is qualitative and what is dispositional for any property is less like a two-sided 
coin or a Janus-faced figure than it is like an ambiguous drawing. A particular 
drawing, remaining unitary and unchanged, may be seen and considered one way 
as a goblet-drawing and differently considered, it is a two-faces-staring-at-one-
another-drawing. The goblet and the faces are not distinguishable parts or 
components or even aspects of the drawing, although we can easily consider the 
one without considering, or even knowing of, the other. The goblet-drawing is 
identical with the two-faces drawing. (1997, pp. 216-217) 
A gestalt image is a single set of markings that can be seen as a representation of more 
than one thing. Famous examples include the goblet-faces gestalt and the duck-rabbit 
gestalt. Gestalt images are not a mixture of two pictures—one of a goblet, one of faces or 
one of a duck and one of a rabbit—but rather, and often as Martin notes, surprisingly, a 
single image which can be seen in both ways (although usually not simultaneously). We are 
encouraged to see the dispositional/qualitative distinction in these terms: the property (the 
gestalt image) is singular and unitary, but can be ‘seen’ or ‘considered’ in different ways as 
dispositional or qualitative (as faces or a goblet). These considerings, however, do not 
reveal that the property has “distinguishable parts or components or even aspects” (ibid.), 
but rather reveals a surprising fact about the property: it is both dispositional and 
qualitative and these are identical—although of course the ‘considerings-as’ are not 
identical considerings (it is both a drawing of a goblet and a drawing of faces and the 
goblet-drawing and the face-drawing are identical; although of course the seeing-as-a-
goblet and the seeing-as-faces are not identical seeings).  
 At the end of the previous section we considered an interpretation of the Limit 
View as holding dispositionality and qualitativity as somehow mind-dependent or merely 
in-the-eye-of-the-beholder; an interpretation which Martin rejects (1996, p.174). Martin 
(1997, p.202) repeats this rejection. In encouraging us to consider the distinction between 
the dispositionality and qualitativity of a property as analogous to the distinction between 
a goblet and two-faces in the appropriate gestalt, there seems to be a tension in Martin’s 
account: surely these ways of seeing the gestalt are merely in-the-eye-of-the-beholder. As 
was stated in the previous section, an in depth look at how this tension can be reconciled is 
52 
 
the business of later parts of this thesis. Consider briefly, however, an abstract image, such 
as the Rothko (Orange and Yellow, 1956) below, and a gestalt: 
 
           Fig 3.a                 Fig 3.b 
 
Of the Rothko, it could be said: ‘I see a sunrise, and a sunset’, and equally ‘I see both 
passion and passivity’. Of the gestalt it could be said ‘I see a goblet, and two-faces’. There 
does seem to be a difference between these sets of statements: the two things said of the 
Rothko seem to be merely matters of interpretation; there is no implication that the 
painting is a picture of a sunrise and a sunset or a picture of passion and passivity. In the 
case of the gestalt, however, this is the claim. Indeed, this is what makes it a gestalt! The 
point is brought into even sharper relief if we imagine someone seeing the gestalt in a 
gallery and saying ‘I see both passion and passivity’. This response would not be 
inappropriate, but is clearly of an entirely different kind to ‘I see a goblet, and two-faces’. 
The latter statement seems to be grounded in something which transcends the speaker's 
own thoughts or considerings; something about the picture itself.  
 This is a rough sketch of how we might understand the analogy between gestalt 
images and the dispositionality and qualitativity of a property without thinking this 
rendered dispositions and qualities as mere eye-of-the-beholder entities. Martin and Heil 
(1998, p.289) contains a similar, but briefer, articulation of the Limit View; the analogy of 
the gestalt is employed, the Janus-face and two-sided coin metaphors rejected. However, 
identity itself is not mentioned. The next section of this chapter focuses on Martin and 
Heil’s paper ‘The Ontological Turn’ (1999), where the notion of surprising identity is further 
explored. 
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3.5   The Fourth Phase of the Limit View: Identity Explored 
Martin and Heil (1999) reiterate a number of points, arguments and positions discussed 
above: they reject purely categorical properties because these lack both the ability to affect 
and to be affected; they reject purely dispositional properties because they are merely a 
potential for a potential for a potential… They also assert the Limit View, the claim that 
properties have a dual nature that is both dispositional and categorical, rejecting any 
understanding of this duality in terms of supervenience, dependence or reduction. That 
dispositionality and qualitativity are of properties, rather than types of properties is 
emphasised: 
These somethings about the ball are its properties; each endows the ball with a 
distinctive qualitative character and a distinctive range of powers or 
dispositionalities. (1999, p.44) 
The overall dispositionality and qualitative character of an object depend on the 
properties it possesses and relations these bear to one another. A ball’s sphericity, 
for instance, gives it (in concert with the ball’s other properties) a distinctive 
appearance and disposes it in particular ways. (It will roll, for instance, and reflect 
light in a certain pattern.) (ibid., pp. 45-46) 
What must be recognised is that it is in virtue of properties—which can neither be 
genuinely characterised, at the expense of the other, as dispositional or qualitative—that 
certain dispositionalities and qualitativities arise. Indeed, the macro-dispositions and 
macro-qualities of objects will be a result of a complex combination of the dispositionalities 
and qualities which arise from the properties of the objects fundamental constituents 
(whatever these may turn out to be). Martin and Heil again draw an analogy to the gestalt 
images to illustrate the relationship between the dispositionalities and qualitativities of a 
property: 
Dispositionality and qualitativity are built into each property; indeed, they are the 
property. The inseparability of a property’s dispositionality and qualitativity is 
analogous to the inseparability of the old lady and the young woman in Leeper’s 
famous ambiguous figure. (ibid. p.46) 
We are reminded that we ought not to conceive of the dispositional as a polyadic relation 
between a property and its manifestation, on the one hand, and the qualitative as a 
monadic property on the other. Thinking in these terms will prove itself a stumbling block 
to understanding that the nature of the relationship between the dispositionality and 
qualitativity of a property is one of identity, for it is hard to see how an essentially polyadic 
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entity could be identical to a monadic one. One reason given for rejecting the relation view 
of dispositions is the independence of a dispositional property from its manifestation. 
 Martin and Heil offer the following statement of the surprising identity thesis: 
A property just is a certain dispositionality that just is a certain qualitativity[…] 
What we propose boils down to a surprising identity: the dispositional and the 
qualitative are identical with one another and with the unitary intrinsic property 
itself. The suggested identity is surprising only because we have grown used to 
distinguishing the dispositional and the qualitative. Once it is recognized that these 
are simply different ways of representing the selfsame property, the identity can 
be seen to resemble countless others. 
For any intrinsic, irreducible property, then, what is dispositional and what is 
qualitative are one and the same property differently considered: considered as 
what the property exhibits of its nature, and considered as what the property is 
directive and selective for as its manifestations. These cannot be prized apart into 
the purely qualitative and the exclusively dispositional. The qualitative informs and 
determines the “forness” of the dispositional, and the “forness” of the dispositional 
informs and determines the qualitative. (ibid., p.47) 
Dispositionality and qualitativity have commonly been held to be distinct and separate: the 
claim that they are identical, if it is accepted, will then come as a surprise. The explanation 
provided for our taking the two to be distinct and separable is that they are “different ways 
of representing” the same thing, or the same thing “differently considered”. As has been 
mentioned earlier, how such an account can be maintained without descending into some 
sort of mind-dependence or ‘in-the-eye-of-the-beholder’ account of dispositionality and 
qualitativity requires further explanation, and this shall be the business of Chapters Five 
and Six of this thesis. We are also encouraged to think of the relationship between 
dispositionality and qualitativity as one of mutual determination. This seems puzzling given 
their claimed identity: it would seem strange to say “I mutually determine how I am with 
myself”; mutuality occurs between distinct existences, it is not an internal relation. Either 
Martin and Heil’s position is contradictory, or we must take this mutuality not to apply at 
the ontological level, but perhaps be an epistemological statement: what we know of the 
dispositionality of a property, once we have realised the surprising identity thesis, will 
inform and determine what we can know of the qualitativity of that property, and vice 
versa. Another possibility is that the mutuality claim be interpreted as a (perhaps slightly 
unfortunately worded) statement of the intimacy of the relationship between the 
dispositional and the qualitative: what one is the other consists in and vice versa because 
they are the same thing! 
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 Martin and Heil go on to reject two ways of understanding this intimacy that had 
been previously endorsed in Martin (1996, p.133) and (1997, p.215): 
This identity thesis must be distinguished from a view according to which 
dispositionality and qualitativity are taken to covary, even when the covariance is 
strictly necessary—as in the case of a triangle’s equilaterality and equiangularity 
[contra Martin 1997]. 
The necessity of a connection between nonspecific size and shape of an object is of 
little interest [contra Martin 1996]. In defending the identity of a property’s 
qualitativity and dispositionality, we mean to be speaking only of specific, 
maximally definite or determinate qualities and dispositions. Reality traffics in 
specifics. This is the locus of necessities (and nonnecessities), identities (and 
nonidentities). Imagine a triangle with a particular size and shape. If the quality of 
the triangle’s size or shape changes, so must its dispositionality—and vice versa. 
The covariance here is not that of one’s being caused by the other, nor is it merely 
accidental. (1999, p.47) 
Whilst a triangle’s equilaterality and equiangularity are necessarily covariant—one cannot 
change without effecting some change in the other—such an example is not strong enough 
to provide a suitable analogy to the dispositionality/qualitativity case; a trinagle’s 
equilaterality is not its equiangularity, but a property’s dispositionality is its qualitativity. 
Indeed both, ontologically speaking, just are the property, albeit under some partial 
consideration or abstracted representation. Given the explicit rejection of the size and 
shape analogy, the tension between the identity thesis and Martin's prior claim that there 
could be properties with the same qualitativities as one another and yet different 
dispositionalities, is resolved, as statements (3.vii) and (3.viii) have now been explicitly 
rejected. The Limit View, as expressed here, is not simply that whatever is a property must 
have some dispositionality and some qualitativity or other; that this is what it means for 
something to be a property (compare this claim to the claim that all extended things must 
have some size and some shape or other, as this is what it means to be extended). Rather, 
according to the Limit View, all properties confer on their bearers both a certain qualitative 
nature and a certain readiness for certain manifestations. This is what it is for that property 
to be the specific property that it is. Once this is understood, there is no scope for 
interpreting the Limit View as allowing properties to vary in their dispositionality but not 
their qualitativity, or vice versa. 
 Martin and Heil (1999) emphasise the understanding of the Limit View as the thesis 
of surprising identity. The visual metaphors of Janus-faces and two-sided coins have fallen 
by the wayside; analogies with geometric relations have been rejected and whilst still 
 mentioned, the analogy with gestalt images receives far less focus in this paper than it has 
done previously. In the final section of this chapter, I examine Martin’s final publication, his 
2008 book The Mind in Nature
 
3.6    Addendum: Gestalts Revisited
Martin (2008) is largely composed of re
several other papers), and regarding the Limit View there has been little substantive 
addition or change. As such, I shall not be giving a detailed analysis of the places where he 
does discuss the Limit View in this text, as it would mean simply repeating much of what 
has gone before in this chapter. However, there is one significant addition in the form of a 
much more detailed explanation of how cases of gestalt images are supposed t
analogies to properties as conceived under the Limit View. Consider the gestalt image 
below: 
 
 
 
 
 
Martin (2008, p.68) makes the following claims about such an image:
1. Some can see only the duck
2. Some can see only the rabbit
3. Some can see nothing about the picture
4. Some can alternatively see the duck or the rabbit in the picture
5. Some can see both the duck and the rabbit at once, each filling the picture
6. It is false to suppose that we see part of the picture as purely a
and a different part as purely and solely duck, because the parts are not exclusive 
of one another
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7. The duck drawing and the rabbit drawing are the selfsame unitary drawing. That 
explains, as nothing else can, the fact that they fully overlap. 
These claims are to be considered parallels of the following claims about the nature of 
properties: 
1'. Some can only (conceptually) 'see' the quality in its pure act with no potency—
categoricalists such as Armstrong; 
2'. Some can only (conceptually) 'see' the potency—dispositionalists such as 
Mellor; 
3'. Some can 'see' nothing about properties—perhaps Quine’s linguisticism; 
4'. Some can alternatively 'see' the quality or dispositionality of the property; 
5'. Some can 'see' both the quality and dispositionality at once, each filling the 
property—this would be Martin, Heil and others who accept the Limit View; 
6'. It is false to suppose that we 'see' an aspect of the property as a purely and 
solely nondispositional quality and another aspect of the property as purely and 
solely nonqualitative dispositionality, because the aspects are not exclusive of one 
another—they fully overlap; 
7'. The quality property and the dispositional property are the identical and unitary 
property. That explains, as nothing else can, that they 'fully overlap'. 
Whether or not the parallels drawn above help the reader to understand the way in which 
gestalt imagery is similar to the conception of properties under the Limit View probably 
varies from reader to reader. I do not take Martin, in drawing these parallels, to be giving 
an argument in order to persuade people of the correctness of the Limit View (he gives 
such arguments in previous works, and elsewhere in Martin 2008). Rather, I take him to be 
trying to provide a model by which the reader might come to understand the surprising 
identity posited in the Limit View via an already familiar concept. The truth of statement 
5—and so perhaps the truth of 5’, which might be seen as crucial to the Limit View—is 
open to question:
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 can people really see both the duck and rabbit at once filling the 
picture? However, this does not seem to pose a serious problem for Martin. Such a failure 
would indicate a limitation of the perceptual/conceptual abilities of the 
observer/considerer, but should not be taken to have metaphysical consequences. 
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Whether or not we can see both the duck and the rabbit at once filling the picture (or the 
dispositionality and qualitativity each filling the property) does not determine whether or 
not in fact the duck-picture and rabbit-picture both at once fill the ambiguous-line-drawing 
(or indeed, whether or not in fact the dispositionality and qualitativity each fill the selfsame 
unitary property). 
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Chapter Four: Answering Martin's Critics 
 
This chapter will be concerned with criticisms levelled against the Limit View. As was 
discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis, the Limit View developed and changed over the 
course of Martin's career. Thus, objections raised at different points in Martin's career 
were raised to slightly different versions of the Limit View. This forces a methodological 
choice: responses can either be given using only the details and resources of the version of 
the Limit View against which the relevant criticism was levelled, or responses can be given 
which employ the resources of the interpretation of the Limit View which is argued for in 
this thesis. This chapter takes the latter approach. The responses given in this chapter 
should not, therefore, be seen as necessarily applying to the criticisms in the context within 
which they were originally raised. Rather, this chapter is exploring whether or not those 
criticisms stand against what I take to be the strongest version of the Limit View, as argued 
for in this thesis. It is a dialectical point worth mentioning that the relative success of these 
criticisms against other versions of the Limit View has contributed to the formulation of this 
interpretation of Martin's position.
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 This chapter looks first at the criticisms raised in the state-of-the-art text 
Dispositions: A Debate (Crane, ed., 1996) by both Armstrong and Place. Following this is an 
exploration of Molnar's criticisms of what he delineates as two distinct interpretations of 
the Limit View (2003). Finally, I briefly discuss the charge of obscurity levelled by Lowe 
(2006, p.134), which I take to be the most serious of all these criticisms. 
 
4.1    Armstrong's Objections 
Armstrong (in Crane, ed., 1996) levels several criticisms against Martin's Limit View. This 
section addresses each of these criticisms in turn. In the subsequent section, I examine a 
criticism raised by Place in the same volume. In the responses I give in this section I shall 
make reference to work Martin produced subsequent to the publication of Dispositions: A 
Debate; to the charge of anachronism I reply merely 'mea culpa'. The purpose of the 
current exercise is not to assess the success of these criticisms in a given context (as is 
amply explored in Chapter Three of this thesis, the Limit View went through several 
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 For instance, of Armstrong's second criticism to any interpretation of the Limit View which does 
take the qualitative and the dispositional to be discrete sides or parts of a property. 
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changes as it developed over the course of Martin's career), but rather to explore whether 
or not they stand against the best theory that can be drawn from the body of Martin's 
work. 
 Armstrong's first criticism arises from Martin's postulation of the following possible 
scenario. Consider two elementary particles. These particles are disposed such that were 
they to come into contact with one another, they would produce a novel and idiosyncratic 
manifestation unlike any manifestation either particle has produced with any other particle 
with which it has come into contact. The particles are spatio-temporally distant from each 
other, however, and never meet in the whole history of the world (Martin in Crane ed., 
1996 p.74). Martin argues that the possibility of such a case (and such a case seems prima 
facie plausible) indicates that these particles have irreducible, but never manifesting 
dispositions (ibid.). Armstrong's claim is that if we accept that these fundamental particles 
have irreducible and un-manifested (indeed never-manifesting) dispositions, then we must 
either accept the existence of relations which are lacking at least one of their terms, or else 
take irreducible dispositions to exist at some "second, inferior, level of being: merely 
potential being" (ibid., p. 91).
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 Armstrong makes the further claim that we ought to be 
"extremely reluctant" (ibid.) to accept the notion of merely potential being. The first fork of 
the dilemma—that this argument might introduce relations missing at least one of their 
terms—is misguided: Martin's very claim that some dispositions exist un-manifested stands 
as an argument against providing an assay of dispositions as a relation between a property 
and a manifestation.
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 Furthermore, Martin explicitly rejects the notion that dispositions 
ought to be understood in this manner: "[...]dispositionality is not a relation between what 
is dispositional and what is its manifestation" (1997, p. 216).
60
  
 If this objection is to have any force then, it must lie in the second claim that if we 
do not treat dispositions as these 'abnormal' relations, they must exist as merely potential 
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 This is of course an option—as Armstrong points out, Grossman postulates such 'abnormal' 
relations (1983, section 8.2). However, such a position is undoubtedly controversial, and if Martin's 
position forces us to accept it, this certainly seems to count against the Limit View, although it falls 
far short of a refutation. 
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 The non-relational nature of dispositions is discussed in sections 1.4 and 3.5 of this thesis. (See 
also, for instance, Molnar (2003, Chapter 4) for a lengthy discussion of the independence of 
dispositions from their manifestations.) 
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being.
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 Martin, in putting forth the elementary particle case, presents an argument against 
the reduction of all dispositions to categorical properties. In such a case, the claim is, whilst 
we can suppose that we can have complete access to and knowledge of the categorical 
nature of each particle, this tells us nothing of the nature of how such particles would 
interact, ex hypothesi, the novelty and idiosyncrasy of such an interaction is something we 
cannot know. Rather, all we can suppose of this latter is that it would occur, that is to say, 
that the postulated elementary particles have some irreducible dispositionality. As Martin 
puts it "[...]they have causal dispositions ready to go. The dispositional is as real and 
irreducible as the categorical" (in Crane, ed. 1996, p.74). Why then might one think that the 
elementary particle case suggested by Martin entails that dispositions exist at some 
secondary level of merely potential being, when he clearly states the opposite immediately 
following his state of the case? Armstrong is motivated by the fact that: 
[...]at no point in the whole history of the world does this manifestation occur[...] 
[Y]et somehow the irreducible disposition involves the manifestation. It would 
appear that here we have a second, inferior, level of being: merely potential being. 
(ibid., p.91).  
It is clear that the manifestation which does not occur exists merely in potentia. However, 
this fact does not entail that the disposition that would, given appropriate conditions and 
interactions with other dispositions, lead to the manifestation's occurrence also exists 
merely in potentia. Quite to the contrary, if we are to suppose that there is something 
genuinely about the situation that makes it true that were the particles to meet they would 
interact in a novel manner, this something cannot be considered a mere-potential-
something. Rather, this fact is underpinned by ways that each of the particles are, that is, 
by properties of the particles. These ought to be considered as real as any other 
truthmaker. 
 Furthermore, it seems that Armstrong, when motivating his objection from mere-
potentiality fails to treat the claim that irreducible dispositionality is an element of reality 
alongside other claims Martin makes about the nature of property. What must be borne in 
mind are Martin's claims that "[t]he dispositional is as basic and irreducible as is the 
qualitative" (ibid., pp. 132-133) and that "[t]o separate one from the other[...] is artifice and 
error" (ibid. p.133), claims later cashed out in terms of an identity, albeit a surprising one, 
between the dispositional and the categorical/qualitative (see sections 3.4-3.6 of this 
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 It barely seems worth mentioning that for any philosopher who does accept a second level of 
potential being as unproblematic, this objection will be of no worry whatsoever. 
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thesis). If the claim that the dispositional and the categorical/qualitative are both identical 
to the property itself is taken seriously (as indeed it should be, it is a central tenet of the 
Limit View), then to accept Armstrong's accusation that dispositions are mere potential 
being implies, given the identity claim, that Martin is accused of taking not just dispositions 
but also qualities, indeed the entire category of property, as merely potential. Now if this is 
the case, it would be truly damaging. But this is clearly not Martin's position.
62
 Armstrong's 
criticism stems from treating Martin's account of the dispositional as if irreducible 
dispositions were additional properties to qualities existing somehow alongside them, with 
qualities providing the 'genuine being' and dispositions as 'mere corollaries'. This, however, 
is a misinterpretation of the Limit View, and when viewed aright, it should be clear that 
Martin should not be interpreted as making such a claim.
63
  
 Armstrong's second criticism concerns the nature of the relation the categorical 
and dispositional 'sides' of a property bear to one another. In particular, Armstrong asks 
whether this relation is a necessary or contingent one. The problem is set out as follows: if 
the relation is contingent, then it is possible that different dispositions could be associated 
with the same qualities. Even more problematically, if the relation is contingent, it seems 
that it would be possible for qualities and dispositions to exist independently of one 
another, a claim which is in direct opposition to the Limit View: 
It seems that it could not be contingent. For if it was, then it would be possible to 
have the categorical 'side' with different powers or even with no powers at all. And 
once this is allowed, what is the force of calling the powers a 'side' of just one 
entity? (ibid., pp. 95-96) 
However, if the relation is one of necessity, then Armstrong argues any effect issuing from 
the disposition as cause also issues, by transitivity, from the quality. If this is the case, then 
why not simply cut out the middleman and do away with the disposition? Armstrong's 
wording is telling: 
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 Indeed, Martin's arguments against accepting pure dispositionalism are premised on the 
metaphysical unacceptability of an account of property built on merely potential being (see section 
3.2 of this thesis).  
63
 I recognise that I am not providing here an argument to show that this is the case. See Chapter 
Three for an exploration of what the Limit View is claiming and is committed to. Furthermore, 
Armstrong's criticism takes the form of an assertion rather than an argument, and so I take counter-
assertion to be adequate to dispel any worry it might cause. 
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But if powers spring necessarily from the categorical side then, by transitivity, 
effects spring necessarily from the categorical nature. (ibid., p.96)
64
 
Armstrong clearly assumes, and builds into his criticism, the notion that categoricality is 
somehow prior to dispositionality. Talking of powers springing from qualities implicitly 
assumes an asymmetry in the nature of the relationship between disposition and quality (if 
A springs from B, then it cannot be that B also springs from A). This prejudice in favour of 
the categorical clouds Armstrong's criticism. Martin's position is clearly stated as holding 
that for disposition and quality "there is no direction for one's being basic in a property" (in 
Crane ed., 1996 p.133). 'Springing forth' is entirely the wrong metaphor on which to 
understand the relation between disposition and quality: the relation, indeed, is one of 
identity, as discussed above. Once this is recognised, we can unpack Armstrong's criticism. 
His claim that if there is a necessary relation between power and quality (which of course 
there is according to the Limit View, identity being a necessary relation par excellence), 
then by transitivity effects spring from the categorical nature, can be upheld. However, the 
suggestion that this renders dispositionality a dispensable "middleman" (ibid., p.96) clearly 
cannot. Given that there is no priority between power and quality, even if they are both 
related to the effect, neither is rendered obsolete by dint of being a mere intermediary 
between the other and the effect, and so neither can be "cut out" (ibid., p.96). 
Furthermore, if we were to grant that Armstrong's argument succeeds and, in order to not 
beg the question against either 'side' (as Armstrong seems to in his prejudice in favour of 
the categorical) then it seems the argument is of equal force against both powers and 
qualities, for we might say:  
'But if the quality springs necessarily from the dispositional side then, by 
transitivity, intrinsic nature springs necessarily from the dispositional. And at that 
point it would be tempting to cut out the middleman (irreducible categoricality) 
and simply postulate dispositional properties'   
If we grant the objection, it seems to cut both ways, and thus is no more damaging to 
dispositions than it is to qualities. Neither the dispositional nor the categorical ought to be 
'cut out', rather, it should be clear that the Limit View holds that each is as real, actual and 
indispensable as the other. 
 Another objection Armstrong raises, albeit with the caveat that "he [Armstrong] 
recognises[...] that here he is opposing Martin's view rather than arguing against him" (in 
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 Molnar echoes this criticism (2003, p.151). 
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Crane, ed. 1996 p. 95), is that it is a consequence of Martin's position that there will be 
either a 'necessary connection' (if dispositions are deterministic) or a 'logical probability' (if 
dispositions are not deterministic) connecting cause and effect.
65
 Cause and effect are 
distinct existences, and so Armstrong claims we should "[...]reject such a view on the 
ground that there can be no logical links between distinct existences[...]" (ibid.). Martin, 
(and I in agreement with him) simply rejects the claim that there cannot be such links 
between distinct existences, consider: 
[...]the way shape and size are of extension. In each case, one cannot exist without 
the other, though one can vary without the other. Contra Hume and Armstrong, 
they are distinct but not separable. 
Contra Armstrong's Humeanism, there are even cases of distinctness that lack 
separability that also must co-vary, e.g. the old example of equiangular and 
equilateral. 
[...]An example of necessary causal relations ('linkings') between distinct properties 
is how a square peg does not fit into a round hole the way a round peg does. (in 
Crane, ed. 1996, pp. 133-134) 
I take the above quotation to be adequate to establish that, contra Armstrong, there can at 
least sometimes be logical links between distinct existences, and so it is no criticism of the 
Limit View prima facie that it postulates such links.
66
 There is a second question which 
arises from Armstrong's objection: even if we do grant that there can be logical 
connections between distinct existences, it can still be asked whether cause and effect are 
the sort of distinct existences which it is appropriate to consider so connected.
67
 A full 
answer to and exploration of this question would require far more space than can be 
spared here.
68
 I shall restrict my response to the observation that it seems far less 
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 These terms are Armstrong's, and I shall adopt them for this discussion. If a 'necessary connection' 
obtains between cause and effect, then for every possible world in which the cause occurs, the 
effect follows. If a 'logical probability' holds between cause and effect, then there is some objective 
probability that the effect will follow given the cause, and that probability will be the same in every 
possible world in which the cause occurs. 
66
 It should also, given the contents of Chapters Five and Six of this thesis, be clear that I do not find 
such links problematic. These chapters are concerned with the exploration of how things can be 
such that they are inseparable and yet distinct!  
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 This question is not one that Armstrong explicitly raises, as he does not consider such links 
acceptable for any class of entity. 
68
 Martin's theory of causation (or more properly, his theory of reciprocal disposition partners for 
mutual manifestation, which he takes to provide an explanation for causation in terms prior to those 
of cause and effect, see Martin (2008, Chapter 5)) goes some way to providing such an answer, one 
that I shall not rehearse here. Mumford and Anjum (2011, Chapter 3) provide an argument against 
65 
 
metaphysically mysterious to suppose that in exactly similar causal situations A and B 
exactly similar effects will follow (in a deterministic case) or there will be an exactly similar 
probability of exactly similar effects following (in a non-deterministic, probabilistic case) in 
each case, than it would to suppose the converse; that is, that there would be a difference 
in effects in A and B. Without a difference maker present in either situation to explain why 
one effect follows in A and another in B, (and ex hypothesi there cannot be any difference 
maker) I find the supposition that nevertheless there would be a difference in effects 
obscure. On this basis, it seems unproblematic to consider cause and effect viable 
candidates, at the least, for distinct existences with some sort of necessary connection.
69
  
 None of the objections to the Limit View raised by Armstrong (in Crane, 1996), 
given a proper understanding of that thesis, ought to give rise to serious worry. However, 
Armstrong has more recently raised another objection, a charge of obscurity. This shall be 
discussed in section 4.4, below. In the next section of this chapter I shall turn to another 
objection raised Place.  
 
4.2    Place's Objections 
Whilst Place recognises that "the differences between Place's position and Martin's are less 
substantial than those between Martin's position and Armstrong's or between Place's 
position and Armstrong's" (in Crane, ed. 1996 p.105), he takes issue with Martin on the 
central claim of the Limit View: that no property can be purely categorical or purely 
dispositional. Contra Martin, Place presents the following argument for the existence of 
purely dispositional properties. Consider sharpness: 
[A]lthough the fineness of an edge or point is a necessary condition for a thing's 
being apt to cut or pierce other things, in order to have that dispositional property, 
the object must also be harder and more rigid than the object to be cut or pierced. 
This shows us three things: 
1   that the concept of 'sharpness' is an amalgam of two distinct concepts, 
             - the structural concept 'having a hard, rigid and fine edge or point', and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
taking causes to necessitate their effects which appears to be consistent with the model of causation 
Martin adopts. They argue that causes cannot be taken to necessitate their effects, because it 
always remains a possibility that another disposition partner could be added to the situation which 
would interfere with the production of the effect. 
69
 I echo Armstrong's caveat that here perhaps I am merely opposing the view to the contrary, rather 
than providing a robust argument against it. 
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             - the purely dispositional concept 'being apt to cut or pierce' 
2   that the relation between the features of an object[...] is causal[...] they are 
distinct existences 
3   [...]the fineness of the edge or point is categorical/qualitative; the hardness and 
rigidity are both dispositional. (ibid., pp. 114-115) 
We are invited to reflect on the fact that “to say of an edge or point that it is fine and to say 
of it that it is apt for the purpose of cutting or piercing is not to say the same thing” (ibid.). 
Citing this example is supposed to show that there are at least some purely categorical 
properties (e.g. fineness of the edge) and some purely dispositional properties (e.g. 
hardness, rigidity and aptness to cut or pierce). If some concepts can be analysed in the 
manner in which Place analyses sharpness above, as complex concepts composed of purely 
categorical and purely dispositional concepts, and the further move (for which Place 
provides no argument) that these concepts correspond to genuine properties can be 
supported, then it seems that a counter-example to the central claim of the Limit View 
(that genuine properties are neither purely categorical nor purely dispositional) has been 
provided.  
 In his 'Reply to Place' (in Crane, ed., 1996, pp. 140-146) Martin does not respond to 
this criticism, or even acknowledge it. However, the sort of response that should be given 
by a proponent of the Limit View is clear. Contra Place's analysis of the concept of 
sharpness into the elements of 'fineness, hardness and rigidity' and 'aptness to cut or 
pierce', I would argue that to say of something that it is sharp just is to say that it is 'apt to 
cut or pierce'. It is hard to see what else could be meant by 'sharp' (in the given context). 
What makes something sharp/apt-to-cut-or-pierce is it's having a fine, hard and rigid edge 
or point.
70
 So, to maintain his claim to having provided a counter-example to the Limit 
View, Place would need to show (rather than just state), first, that fineness, hardness and 
rigidity pick out genuine properties, and secondly, that the first is purely categorical and 
the second two purely dispositional. Remember that Martin maintains a sparse view of 
properties (as discussed in section 1.4) according to which: (i) properties do not match up 
one to one with meaningful predicates, and (ii) the properties of fundamental particles are 
basic, the complex properties of larger entities are composed of and so analysable in terms 
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 It should be noted that even if one accepts Place's analysis of the concept, Martin does not deny 
that we have purely dispositional and purely categorical concepts (indeed, he holds that we do, and 
it is for this very reason that we have taken it to be the case that the world contains purely 
dispositional and purely categorical properties). However, we should not simply read our ontology 
off of our concepts. 
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of these.
71
 As Martin puts it "[t]his is to think that if the properties and relations of entities 
that we are considering are complex then the entities must have simpler constituents and 
their properties and relations must be simpler" (1997, p.199). The concepts Place cites are 
clearly not properties of fundamental particles, and so are had, according to a Martin-style 
analysis of property, in virtue of the object concerned being composed of certain 
fundamentals which have certain properties.
72
 If fineness, hardness and rigidity are to be 
taken as counter-examples to the Limit View, it must be established that they are had, in 
the first case, in virtue of the object of which they are predicated having fundamental 
constituents which have some purely categorical properties which make it true that that 
object is fine; and in the second two cases, that they are had in virtue of the object having 
fundamental constituents which have some purely dispositional properties which make it 
true that the object is hard and rigid. If the terms 'fine', 'hard' and 'rigid' apply to an object 
in virtue of its being composed of fundamental constituents with properties that conform 
to the Limit View, then fineness, rigidity and hardness are not counter-examples to the 
Limit View, even if what these terms pick out are purely categorical or purely dispositional 
contributions made to the object by the properties which are the truthmakers for the 
ascriptions of fineness, rigidity and hardness to the object. If this is the case (which it is not 
even prima facie clear that it is) all that is established is that certain terms denote partial or 
abstracted representations or concepts, which, as mentioned, are the source of our (as 
Martin contends) mistakenly taking there to be purely categorical/dispositional properties. 
Place falls far short of providing arguments to establish what would be necessary to 
provide a counter-example to the Limit View, his criticism amounts to no more than a mere 
assertion of the contrary: that there are purely categorical/dispositional properties. Given 
that Martin provides a priori arguments against each of these possibilities, which are not 
addressed by Place's criticism, a supporter of the Limit View ought not to be worried by the 
case which Place raises. 
 
4.3    Molnar's Objections 
In Powers (2003) Molnar (recognising the same development in the Limit View discussed in 
Chapter Three of this thesis) identifies two separate positions that can potentially be 
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 Martin lays out his compositional model in (1997, pp. 198-201). 
72
 And any successful attack on the Limit View should be at least amenable to this sort of analysis, 
otherwise it seems the critic is merely talking at cross purposes to Martin, or else not really attacking 
the Limit View per se, but rather disagreeing with Martin about basic ontological commitments. 
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attributed to Martin: one which he calls 'Dual-sided theory' (the theory, which I have 
argued is a misconception of the Limit View, that all properties are somehow composed of 
an irreducibly qualitative side/aspect/part and an irreducibly dispositional 
side/aspect/part) and the other he terms 'Neutral monism' (an interpretation of the Limit 
View which includes the thesis of surprising identity). In this section I shall discuss one 
objection which Molnar levels at both of these positions, what he terms 'the missing base 
objection,' (2003, pp. 131-136, for example—Molnar also levels this objection at reductive 
categoricalism) and one he levels only at 'neutral monism'.
 73
 
74
 
 The missing base objection targets Martin's claim that the world contains 
irreducible qualitativity/categoricality. The challenge that Molnar makes stands as follows: 
What and where are these qualitative sides of the essential properties of 
fundamental subatomic particles (or field densities)?[...] they have to exist, they 
have to be part of the basic ontological inventory of the world. (ibid., p.151) 
yet, with regard to fundamental properties Molnar claims: 
[...]we have, on the very best experimental and theoretical evidence, no reason for 
supposing that they [such properties] have a non-dispositional or qualitative 
nature[...] The postulation of such a nature does not seem to be required for 
anything. Why believe in it? (ibid., p.157) 
This objection contains two distinct claims, which must be treated individually, and which 
attack one of the central tenets of the Limit View—that irreducible qualitativity is a feature 
of every genuine property—in different ways. 
 The first claim is one from current evidence from the empirical sciences: that we 
are currently unable to identify qualitative properties at the level of fundamental physics. 
On the strength of this lack of evidence for qualitative properties at what is considered the 
most basic level by current particle physics, Molnar argues we should not include 
qualitativity in our fundamental ontology. A potential response which immediately springs 
to mind would be to question whether or not what current particle physics takes to be the 
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 The name 'the missing base objection', is, when applied to the Limit View, something of a 
misnomer, as it should be clear that Martin does not argue for irreducible qualitativity as a reduction 
base. 
74
 Molnar also echoes Armstrong's objection to the Limit View concerning the relationship between 
the 'sides' of a property in his discussion of dual-sided theory (2003, pp. 150-151), which is examined 
earlier in this chapter. However, he does not advance on Armstrong's discussion and so I take the 
response to Armstrong's criticism given above to equally stand as a response to Molnar's reiteration 
of that criticism; to rehearse it again here would be idle repetition. 
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most basic level actually is the fundamental physical level, or whether, as is plausible, 
future physics will uncover an even more basic level, one at which qualitative properties 
will be exhibited. Molnar counters this line of response with the claim that given recent 
experiments we can also be fairly confident that what physicists currently take to be the 
most basic level of physical entities will not, in future experiments, turn out to in fact be 
composed of some more basic entities (ibid., p.133).
75
 If we accept Molnar's claims, then 
we must concede that the most basic physical entities do not, according to current science, 
exhibit qualitative properties. This raises the question of what, then, justifies positing such 
properties in our fundamental ontology. He takes these claims to provide strong support 
for the conclusion that there is no qualitativity/categoricality at the fundamental 
ontological level, and therefore no genuine properties of fundamental particles are 
properly described as qualitative/categorical.
76
 The Limit View is mistaken in making the 
claim that every genuine property is qualitative-cum-dispositional, as there is insufficient 
empirical evidence for the claim to qualitativity, and further evidence which suggests that 
this lack of evidence will not be rectified by advances in the physical sciences. 
 There are two avenues of response open to the defendant of the Limit View to this 
objection. The first is the general point that whilst the findings of current empirical science 
are informative and suggestive for the metaphysical and ontological accounts we advance, 
they are not metaphysically compelling. This is not to say that empirical evidence should be 
treated with scepticism or disdain. As Martin puts it, when discussing his 
compositionalism:
77
 
None of this [discussion of the relation of findings in physics] should suggest that 
the philosopher should react with dumb faith to the latest and changing revelations 
from theoretical physics or by an arrogant disbelief or a “That’s what they say now” 
cynicism. It should incline philosophers to a greater alertness to alternative ways 
the world may be. (1997, p.201) 
Drawing on such and such findings in recent experiments, whilst lending support to a 
certain position or line of argument within metaphysics, will never be sufficient alone to 
establish that position:  
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 My knowledge of fundamental physics is not adequate to comment on this claim, however, my 
response to this objection will not rely on its denial. Molnar cites Kane (1995) in support of this 
claim. 
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 With the exception of spatio-temporal properties (Molnar, 2003, p.172). 
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 See Martin, 1997, Section 3. 
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Ontology is the setting out of an even more abstract model of how the world is 
than that of theoretical physics, with place-holders for scientific results and some 
excluders for tempting confusions. Ontology and theoretical science can help one 
another along with, we hope, minimal harm. (ibid.) 
Whilst Molnar makes the claim that "we have, on the very best experimental and 
theoretical evidence, no reason for supposing that [properties] have a non-dispositional or 
qualitative nature" (2003, p.157), it must be noted that 'dispositional' and 'qualitative' are 
not ascriptions made by the findings of theoretical physics—in stating the Limit View 
Martin does not reject any claim made by physicists—but rather are part of the special 
vocabulary of ontologists. It is a matter for debate within ontology how (and indeed 
whether or not) these terms match up to evidence from physics. It is a methodological 
mistake to think that data from the natural sciences alone stands as proof for or against 
either the existence of qualities or the existence of dispositions. Property types (in the 
context of debates concerning the ontology of properties) simply are not specified in the 
laws of physics. The second avenue of response is a related one: the main arguments 
Martin provides in support of his claim that properties cannot be purely dispositional are a 
priori (see Chapter Three of this thesis). If we do not take these arguments to sufficiently 
support Martin's position, then the Limit View is in trouble regardless of this objection, for 
it is under-motivated. However, if Martin's arguments are taken to provide good reasons to 
accept the claim that every property involves some irreducible qualitativity, then, as well 
established a priori claims they will not be much threatened by the sorts of observations of 
current empirical science that Molnar cites.
78
  
 The second line of criticism exhibited in Molnar's discussion of the 'missing base 
objection' is one of redundancy: 
The postulation of such a nature does not seem to be required for anything. Why 
believe in it? (ibid., p. 157) 
If, as Molnar claims, holding that all properties essentially involve some irreducible 
qualitativity/categoricality is explanatorily impotent and thus that the postulating of this 
qualitativity/categoricality is surplus to the requirements of any assay of the fundamental 
ontology of property, then one of the central claims of the Limit View—that all properties 
are both qualitative and dispositional—seems mistaken. Rather, it should be conceded that 
all properties are nothing but pure dispositions. In assessing this criticism we must be clear 
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 I take it as a general methodological principle that conclusions reached a priori are not threatened 
by a lack of a posteriori evidence in their favour (direct a posteriori evidence against them would be 
another matter).   
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as to what a strong dispositionalist thesis entails: the claim that all properties are nothing 
over and above a power/capacity/disposition for the production of some further 
power/capacity/disposition, which in turn is nothing over and above the 
power/capacity/disposition for the production of some further... and so on. If this picture 
appears palatable, then the second claim of Molnar's objection will hold some force against 
the Limit View. However, I am with Martin, and would imagine many other metaphysicians 
would be also, in finding such an account of property “entirely too promissory” (1997, p. 
215). Indeed, comments made by Molnar (2003, Chapter 5) suggest that he wishes to avoid 
such an analysis of dispositionality.
79
 If this is the case, then his disagreement with Martin 
on this point may be more a matter of terminological disagreement (with regard to what it 
means for something to be purely dispositional) and dissent with regard to extent—how far 
the role of some non-dispositional nature to property extends—rather than as fundamental 
a disagreement about the nature of property as it appears to be. Furthermore, Heil (2010) 
has recently argued that qualitativity may be essential to providing identity and 
individuation conditions for dispositions. If he is correct, then qualities are, pace Molnar, 
not explanatorily redundant. 
 Molnar's second criticism of the Limit View, levelled against the interpretation he 
terms 'neutral monism', is a charge of anti-realism. Molnar claims that the terms 'quality' 
and 'disposition' are prima facie inconsistent: he defines power (disposition) as “a property 
that is essentially directed to a specific manifestation” (2003, p.155) and quality as “a 
property that is not essentially directed to a specific manifestation” (ibid.). Thus set up as 
direct antonyms, there is a clear conflict in considering the two terms to apply to one and 
the same thing (such an application would be a claim of the form P(x)&¬P(x), and so a 
straight contradiction). Thus, any account of property which wishes to apply them both (as 
the Limit View does) to a single entity cannot accept the definitions of these terms 
proposed by Molnar. How might these terms be interpreted then? Molnar looks to Martin's 
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 Molnar writes, for instance "[T]o say something has a power is not to say merely that some 
manifestation-event is possible. Powers are not merely the potentiality of some behaviour." (2003, 
p. 99) The proponent of the Limit View should agree wholeheartedly with this claim. They will say 
that what makes it the case that a power/disposition is not "merely the potentiality of some 
behaviour" (ibid.) is just that it is not purely dispositional/powerful. If it were, then indeed it would 
be this mere potentiality. Molnar provides convincing arguments against his 'powers' being mere 
potentialities (see ibid., pp. 100-101), but does not offer an assay of what it is, ontologically 
speaking, about them which makes them more-than-mere-potentiality. The proponent of the Limit 
View would explain this in terms of no property being purely powerful/dispositional, rather all 
properties being dispositional-cum-qualitative and qualitative-cum-dispositional.  
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gestalt-perception analogy for such an interpretation (see sections 3.4-3.6 of this thesis for 
a detailed discussion and references to Martin's own discussions of this analogy). He claims 
that whilst this analogy provides such an interpretation which deals with the inconsistency, 
“the explanation comes at a cost, and the cost may be unacceptably high” (ibid.). Molnar 
takes Martin's gestalt analogy to have the consequence that “whether an object has 
powers and qualities depends in part on the considerings that happen (on what we see 
things as)” (ibid., pp. 155-156). Molnar claims that this leads to an unacceptably anti-realist 
conception of both dispositions and qualities, according to which whether a property 
counts as these is a mind-dependent matter.
80
  
 There are several lines of response the defendant of the Limit View can give to the 
charge of anti-realism. Elsewhere in this thesis I discuss two of them at length: to challenge 
the claim that the gestalt analogy implies mind-dependency, and to challenge the claim 
that all distinctions which involve some conceptuality lead to anti-realism (see section 3.4 
and the whole of Chapters Five and Six—indeed, if what I argue for in these chapters is 
convincing, this objection is immediately countered and need not concern the proponent 
of the Limit View). I shall not rehearse these responses here, and shall instead focus on two 
other ways Molnar's objection can be countered. 
 Molnar motivates the objection by establishing a prima facie inconsistency (indeed, 
given his definitions, there is actually a contradiction) in holding that for some property x, x 
is a disposition and x is a quality.
81
 This inconsistency/contradiction, and thus the 
motivation for the objection, rests on the plausibility of the characterisations he gives for 
power/disposition and categorical property/quality, which were examined in section 2.4 of 
this thesis: 
(2.v) disposition: “a property that is essentially directed to a specific manifestation” 
(2003, p. 155); 
(2.vi) categorical property/quality: “a property that is not essentially directed to a 
specific manifestation” (ibid.). 
Whilst the characterisation of power or disposition seems uncontroversial, it is not as 
obvious that quality should be defined in terms of non-directedness-to-a-specific-
manifestation. It might be argued that to define disposition and quality thus, as exhaustive 
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 And indeed, if Martin's position really does mean anti-realism with regard to both dispositionality 
and qualitivity, any right-thinking metaphysician would also find it unacceptable!   
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 Which is the central claim in the Limit View! 
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antonyms (Molnar essentially defines quality such that it means all-and-any-properties-
that-are-not-dispositions) is to beg the question against the Limit View. What is key when 
examining questions regarding the Limit View is the issue of purity. Following Molnar's 
lead, the definition of a pure disposition would be: 
(2.viii) pure disposition: a property that is essentially directed to a specific 
manifestion, and is nothing over-and-above this directedness. 
A pure quality would arguably be: 
(2.ix) pure quality: a property that is essentially not directed to a specific 
manifestation. 
 (2.v) requires that any disposition be, of its essence, directed towards some specific 
manifestation; (2.viii) requires that a pure disposition is nothing more than the fact of this 
directness. The difference between (2.vi) and (2.ix) is subtle; the former states that a 
quality may lack directedness, it is not of the essence of quality that it be directed but it is 
not specified that it cannot be; the latter stipulates that of its essence a pure quality must 
not be directed towards a specific manifestation. It should be clear that a proponent of the 
Limit View will hold that all properties fit (2.v). It should also be clear that she will deny that 
there are any properties fitting (2.viii) and (2.ix). Thus, she holds that all properties are 
dispositional but not purely disposition, and also not purely qualitative. This leads to the 
conclusion that whatever it is about property that makes it true that it is not purely 
dispositional must be that it admits of some measure of qualitativity (although, of course, 
not pure qualitativity!). However, the issue of inconsistency remains: whilst we have seen 
that an essentially directed property (Molnar's disposition) can be more than this 
directedness, and that a property that is not essentially directed (Molnar's quality as 
defined in (2.vi)) may still be non-essentially directed, it would still be contradictory to say 
of any property that it was both essentially and not essentially directed towards a specific 
manifestation (that it was both disposition and quality). This returns us to the earlier 
observation that defining quality merely negatively in terms of not-being-essentially-
directed might seem strange. In section 2.4 I proposed a potential alternative 
characterisation of quality: 
(2.vii) quality: a property that is something other than essential directedness to a 
specific manifestation. 
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 As mentioned previously, (2.vii) is unlikely to be exhaustive; there might be more to say 
about the nature of qualitativity than its being-other-than-pure-dispositionality.
82
 (2.vii) has 
an advantage over (2.vi) in that it allows for something substantive to be said about quality 
where the antonymous (2.vi) simply consigns anything-not-a-disposition to the category of 
quality. Furthermore, there is no prima facie inconsistency between (2.v) and (2.vii), and 
thus this definition does not beg the question against the Limit View. Rather, it remains an 
open question whether or not it is appropriate to describe properties as being both 
dispositions and qualities, or whether each property is either one or the other. Without the 
prima facie inconsistency between disposition and quality, Molnar's objection lacks 
motivation and poses little threat to the Limit View. 
 A second response to this criticism takes a slightly different approach. In the way 
his objection is set up, Molnar takes 'power' and 'quality' to be type-terms ranging over 
properties. Some properties are of the type 'power', some of the type 'quality' (and, 
maintaining this line of thought, Martin would take all properties to be of both types). 
Molnar tries to establish that, given Martin's analogy to gestalt-perception, if this is the 
case, then properties are only of both these types mind-dependently: a property is only of 
the type 'disposition' mind-dependently and that same property is only of the type 'quality' 
mind-dependently. Therefore, without the operations of human consciousnesses, no 
properties are of either type. This Molnar takes to be an indication of an unacceptable anti-
realism. The proponent of the Limit View should in fact agree that there are only properties 
of the types 'pure quality' and 'pure disposition' mind-dependently, but should not concede 
that this involves any sort of anti-realism with regard to property, or indeed with regard to 
dispositionality or qualitativity.
83
 It is a mistake, under the Limit View, to view 'disposition' 
and 'quality' as type-terms, where these type-terms are considered to pick out distinct 
kinds of entity at the level of fundamental ontology; the only type-terms that properly 
apply at that level are those of 'substance' and 'property'.  
 Given this, the proponent of the Limit View is an anti-realist about 'dispositions' 
and 'qualities', qua distinct fundamental ontological types, that is to say, she does not 
accept that at the fundamental level there are some entities that are dispositional-and-not-
qualitative-properties and some other entities that are qualitative-and-not-dispositional-
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 See section 2.4, 11.3 and Chapter Twelve of this thesis for some (relatively) speculative discussion 
about the nature of qualities. 
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 Martin describes taking there to be properties of these 'pure' types as "philosophical fantasy" 
(1997, p.215). 
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properties. But is this anti-realism unacceptable? I hold that it is not, for the proponent of 
the Limit View is realist about (at least) three things: the fundamental ontological category 
of 'property' and about both dispositionality and qualitativity at the fundamental level. 
Rather than this realism being cashed out in terms of two distinct property types 
'dispositions' and 'qualities', the Limit View holds there to be only one type of property: 
property itself. But each and every property contributes both to the qualitative nature and 
to the dispositional nature of the substance that instantiates it. These contributions are not 
mind-dependent in any way, they are features of the way things are external to any 
operations of the human mind. Mind-dependence only enters the scene when we wish to 
(incorrectly, according to the Limit View) consider, through abstraction, properties as either 
purely dispositional or purely qualitative; and what is mind-dependent here is not the 
dispositionality or qualitativity, but rather the purity. The dispositional and the qualitative 
are real enough, the proponent of the Limit View is not making the claim that nothing is 
dispositional or qualitative.
84
 Rather, they claim that the ontological basis for the 
dispositionality and qualitativity exhibited by objects, and that which provides the 
truthmakers for statements concerning this, are entities from a single fundamental 
ontological category: properties! What would be worrying is if it were a consequence of the 
Limit View that the dispositional and qualitative features of objects turned out to be mind-
dependent, but Molnar provides no argument to suggest this is the case. There is plenty of 
realism in the Limit View—Molnar's charge does not stand. 
 
4.4    Obscurity 
Armstrong has more recently expressed  his worries concerning the Limit View as below: 
I confess that I find this totally incredible. If anything is a category mistake, it is a 
category mistake to identify a quality—a categorical property—and a power, 
essentially something that points to a certain effect. They are just different, that's 
all. An identity here seems like identifying a raven with a writing desk. (2005, 
p.315) 
Lowe (2006) levels a similar charge of obscurity against Martin: 
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 Indeed quite the opposite is asserted, for the proponent of the Limit View all properties (rather 
than none) are mind-independently both dispositional and qualitative. The proponent of the Limit 
View seems, contra Molnar's accusation, to have an abundance of realism! 
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[...]he is compelled to say that every particular property or trope is at once 
dispositional and categorical (or qualitative) in nature. But, as I say, I do not really 
understand what this could mean. (p.134)  
This objection is clearly very general, but if it stands, also very serious (indeed, I take it to 
be the most serious objection examined in this chapter). If the central thesis of the Limit 
View—that contrary to the paradigm positions in the debate, 'disposition' and 'quality' do 
not pick out different types of property, but rather all properties are both dispositional and 
qualitative, and neither one can be reduced to the other—is metaphysically obscure, then 
the tenability of the Limit View is called into question. Naturally, such a grave and general 
charge requires an extensive and equally general response, one much larger than can be 
provided in a short section of one chapter. Indeed, it is in part the purpose of the last two 
chapters, this chapter and the chapter that follows to provide a response to the charge of 
obscurity levelled by Armstrong and Lowe. I hope that, in clarifying the background of the 
Limit View, and examining the nature of the surprising identity thesis, these chapters jointly 
provide an account of the Limit View that is not metaphysically obscure, and therefore take 
it to be the case that the obscurity objection does not stand. 
 I have argued that none of the criticisms raised against Martin's Limit View in the 
literature are sufficient to require that the position be abandoned. However, what the 
exploration of the criticisms has helped to show is which aspects of the Limit View in some 
of its incarnations are untenable. In the next two chapters I aim to integrate the findings 
this chapter and the last two with considerations concerning the metaphysics of identity 
and distinctness, and present a final interpretation of Martin's Limit View which I hold to be 
most tenable, defensible, clear and theoretically rich.  
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Chapter Five: Distinctness 
 
In the previous two chapters a tension was identified between two key claims of the Limit 
View; namely, that dispositionality and qualitativity are in reality both identical to the same 
unitary property, and that dispositionality and qualitativity are not artefacts of the mind, 
that they are not merely ‘in-the-eye-of-the-beholder’. The worry is motivated thus: for any 
particular property, p1, there is some disposition, d1, for which it is true that d1=p1, and also 
some quality, q1, for which it is also true that q1=p1; therefore, by transitivity of identity, 
d1=q1. This is the ‘surprising identity’ discussed by Martin (see for instance 1997, p.216). 
What is traditionally taken in the disposition debate to be two classes of entities—
‘dispositions’ and ‘qualities’—are revealed as a single class—‘properties’—and where a 
distinction was previously maintained, an identity now inheres. If, following this shift, we 
still maintain distinct concepts of dispositionality and qualitativity, prima facie it seems this 
must be merely an act of the intellect; a mental separation of what is, in reality, unitary and 
singular (property) into two distinct conceptual classes which do not correlate with any 
distinction in reality. This seems to render the distinction between dispositionality and 
qualitativity—and, therefore, the being-qua-disposition/quality of dispositions and 
qualities—merely ‘in-the-eye-of-the-beholder’, a position Martin explicitly denies. (See for 
instance Martin 1996, p.174 or 1997, p.202.) This denial is a tenet of the Limit View that I 
consider worth maintaining. If Martin's position does turn out to be anti-realist about both 
dispositionality and qualitativity, it becomes difficult to see in what manner it is realist 
about properties at all.
85
 
 This chapter will explore the ontology of sameness and distinctness. It will begin 
with a brief gloss of the notions of identity and distinctness. The second section will 
examine the employment of the scholastic notions of ‘distinctions of reason’ or ‘formal 
distinctions’ within recent work on the tropes/universals debate. Both Gibb (forthcoming) 
and Campbell (1990) make recourse to the 'formal distinction' in response to the 'problem 
of trope simplicity', albeit in different ways and to different extents (Gibb provides a much 
more thorough and detailed argument than Campbell). Mertz, in presenting his account of 
'relation instances' provides a detailed analysis making use of these Scholastic distinctions 
(in particular Mertz, 2004), so in the third section I turn to an examination of his treatment 
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 Although one could accept the identity thesis and reject the claim that the distinction that obtains 
between dispositions and qualities is more than 'in-the-eye-of-the-beholder'. This seems to involve 
conceding that dispositionality and qualitativity are mere artefacts of the human intellect. 
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of the subject matter, one I ultimately find unsatisfactory. The fourth section of this 
chapter returns to the source material, the scholastic philosophy of John Duns Scotus and 
Franscisco Suárez, with particular attention paid to Duns Scotus’ version of the ‘formal 
distinction’ (2012) and Suárez’s distinctio rationis ratiocinatae or ‘distinction of the 
reasoned reason’ and ‘modal distinction’ or ‘distinction from the nature of the case’ (2007). 
The final section explores each of the accounts of distinctness discussed previously in the 
chapter with regards to how they might shed light on the abovementioned tension in 
Martin’s account. Whilst I conclude that most of the accounts are either inappropriate for 
the case at hand, or else beset with problems that make them unattractive propositions for 
applying to Martin's case, both Gibb's account and Suárez's distinction of reason represent 
potential ways to understand the puzzle of holding that the distinction between 
dispositions and qualities is more than a mere act of mental separation, and yet also that 
dispositions and qualities are surprisingly identical. The issues discussed in this chapter, 
along with the archaeological exploration of the Limit View given in Chapter Three and my 
responses to Martin’s critics (see Chapter Four) form the foundations of the critical 
exposition of the Limit View to be given in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
 
5.1    Identity and Distinctness 
There is something to Lewis’ (semi)glib comment that “[i]dentity is utterly simple and 
unproblematic. Everything is identical to itself; nothing is ever identical to anything except 
itself. There is never any problem about what makes something identical to itself; nothing 
can ever fail to be,” (1986, p.192). At the fundamental level, this holds true; there are no 
entities that are not identical to themselves (identity is carried in the concept of 
‘themselfness’, as it were); nor are there entities which are identical to entities which are 
not themselves (conversely, ‘themselfness’ is also carried in the concept of identity). Yet it 
is the nigh-on tautologous nature of such a statement that makes it scarcely illuminating or 
informative with regards to its subject matter.
86
 When we think we have problems or 
puzzles arising from identity, this is not down to us taking it to be the case that there are 
fundamentally, ontologically distinct entities that yet still we wish to take to be 
fundamentally, ontologically identical, or indeed, vice versa; fundamentally, ontologically 
identical entities that in spite of this we wish to take to be fundamentally, ontologically 
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 The statement that “everything is identical to itself” seems tantamount to ‘everything is identical 
to that with which it is identical’. 
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distinct. Rather, I contend, we work from plausible putative cases of identity or distinctness 
with the intention of discovering whether or not these are reflected at the fundamental, 
ontological level.
87
 That is, investigations into the nature of identity and distinctness in 
general and into particular cases involving these notions are, in large part, directed toward 
determining whether the things we pre-critically take to be one or many really are one or 
many, respectively. 
 A reasonable starting point for any discussion of identity is the principle of ‘the 
identity of indiscernibles’ and its converse, the ‘dissimilarity of the diverse’ (as discussed in 
McTaggart, 1921). These principles claim that no two distinct objects can share all their 
properties, and thus that two putatively distinct entities, if it turns out they do share all 
their properties, are in fact one and the same entity. Two concepts putatively applied to a 
single entity, if they entail two non-shared sets of properties, must in fact apply to two 
entities. However, it should be clear that, in the case of the current discussion, this 
principle is not pertinent; what we are discussing is properties themselves, not bearers of 
properties.
88
 
89
 Likewise, discussion of identity in terms of composition is relevant only to 
complex wholes composed of proper parts, whereas the subject of the present 
discussion—properties—pertains to ontological fundamentals.
90 91
 If it is not appropriate to 
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 These plausible putative cases will be, I contend, most commonly motivated by our pre-critically 
taking there to be either a distinctness or identity at the level of the concepts we have regarding the 
entities concerned (for instance, the Hesperus/Phosphorus case), although I have no firm 
commitment to, nor does anything in this discussion hinge on, this being the case.  
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 It might be commented here that properties can themselves be the bearers of properties—second 
order properties—and so perhaps the principle can be applied in light of this. Whilst I do not wish to 
take a position on the matter of whether there are genuinely any second order properties, it must 
be made clear that if we do include these in our ontology, they cannot provide the identity 
conditions for our first order properties on pain of regress (for if a property’s identity if fixed by the 
properties it bears, then those properties’ identities will be fixed by the properties they bear, and so 
on…). 
89
 It should also be noted that these principles are not universally accepted. (See for instance Black, 
(1952), where he discusses the possibility of a universe containing only two qualitatively identical 
spheres at some distance from each other, or Lowe (2002), p.62.) 
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 See, for example, Part 1 of Lowe (2002), or Van Inwagen (1980); there is a wealth of literature on 
this topic. 
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 At this point one must make reference to Armstrong's account of complex properties (1997, pp. 
31-33), where he argues that it does remain a live possibility that all properties are complex all the 
way down; there are no simple, non-composed properties; and that even if it does turn out that all 
complex properties are composed of simple fundamental properties, this does not entail the non-
existence of the complex properties they compose. This second point, a rejection of mereological 
reductionism concerning properties, is relatively uncontroversial. The first claim, that there might be 
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frame our discussion of identity in terms of shared sets of properties or shared sets of 
proper parts, we need some other principle to ground our notion of identity. Suárez 
remarks that "[...]unity implies a negation of division, and is therefore opposed to 
multitude, which arises from division or distinction[...]" (2007, p.16). Perhaps, in terms of 
the current subject matter, identity may be best cashed out negatively: A is identical with B 
when no distinction obtains between the two entities. Where there is no division or 
distinction, there is no multitude, and so there is but a single entity, and therefore identity. 
In order for such a treatment to be informative, naturally, an assay then needs to be given 
of what constitutes such a distinction (what the Scholastics call a 'real distinction'), and 
how this might be juxtaposed with other classes of distinction. The rest of this chapter 
focuses on giving such an assay. 
 
5.2    Distinctness and the 'Problem of Trope Simplicity' 
Some things are really, fundamentally, ontologically distinct; that is, for some A and some 
B, A≠B. Socrates and Plato were really dis[nct people; the University of Durham is really 
distinct from the University of Cambridge; the two hydrogen atoms in a water molecule are 
really distinct from one another. That such real distinctions abound I take to be 
uncontroversial, although there may be cases where positing such a distinction does arouse 
controversy.
92
 In some cases where we draw a distinction, no such distinction exists in 
reality, the distinction is purely an act of our intellect. For instance, when we distinguish 
between Hesperus, Phosphorus and Venus, these are clearly really distinct names, but 
what they name is a single entity: the second closest planet to the Sun in our solar system. 
The distinction drawn conceptually (the early Greeks took Venus-in-the-morning, or 
Phosphorus, and Venus-in-the-evening, or Hesperus, to be two genuinely distinct celestial 
bodies) is not reflected at the fundamental, ontological level—the subject of a discussion 
about the distinction 'between' Hesperus and Phosphorus is only a single entity, the planet 
we call Venus, and there is no more to the distinction than a conceptual mistake—taking 
                                                                                                                                                                    
complexity all the way down, is much more controversial. Furthermore, an account of the identity of 
a simple in non-mereological terms has good prospects of being applicable also to complex wholes, 
whereas a compositional account cannot ever be applied to a non-composed simple. Martin is also 
committed to the view that there exists a fundamental level of simple properties (see section 1.4 of 
this thesis). For these reasons, I will not attempt to resolve the matter at hand by making recourse 
to mereological or compositional accounts of identity, Armstrong's arguments notwithstanding. 
92
 What constitutes such real distinctness shall be further addressed below in section 5.4. 
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what is in fact one planet to be two. Perhaps an even stronger example would be the 
distinction we make when we state that A=A. Here we engage in some holding-apart or 
double-consideration of an entity we know (indeed, in the act affirm) to be one.
93
 That 
some distinctions are merely the result of our own intellect I also take to be 
uncontroversial; although again there may be cases where positing that some putative 
distinction is merely a mental distinction arouses controversy. Much of this chapter will 
focus on the question of whether a distinction can exist between these extremes—a 
distinction which is not so great as a real distinction at the fundamental ontological level, 
and yet which has some foundation in reality such that it is not merely a product of our 
mistakenly taking one thing to be two—and on the nature of such a distinction. 
 It is precisely this sort of distinction that has been drawn recently in literature 
within the trope/universal debate.
94
 In response to ‘the Problem of Trope Simplicity’,
95
 
both Campbell and Gibb appeal to a ‘formal distinction’, which Campbell states is meant 
“as Scotus used the term” (1990, p.56).
96
 Campbell goes on to explain the drawing of a 
distinction between a trope as a particular and as a characteriser is a matter of abstraction, 
one that in no way “involve[s] conceding that a trope is after all complex (a union of 
particularity with a nature-providing property)”, coupling this with the claim that the 
particularity of a trope is “incapable of distinct and independent existence” (ibid.). Tropes 
are simples, not complexes, they do not have a particular-part and a characterising-part 
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 See Suarez (2007, p.18) for some discussion of this sort of mental distinction. 
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 Proponents of both tropes and universals have made recourse to such a distinction, and so I take 
the validity of these distinctions to be uncontroversial at least within the confines of this debate. As 
shall be seen in this section, such a distinction is drawn in defence of trope ontologies, and also 
employed in Mertz’s so-called ‘moderate realism’ (which may be seen as something of a halfway-
house between trope-theory and realism about universals). As Mertz notes, realists who accept bare 
particulars, such as Armstrong (for instance, 1997) make use of this sort of distinction in maintaining 
the simplicity of universals whilst absorbing the predicational-tie into these entities (2001, p.47, 
fn.11). 
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 Briefly, the claim that it is incumbent on the proponent of trope theory to explain how they can 
simultaneously maintain the claims that tropes are simple and that tropes have both a 
particularising nature and a characterising nature. This sort of objection to trope theory is levelled, 
for example, by Armstrong (2005) and Hochberg (1988), (2002) and (2004).  For a full discussion see 
Gibb (forthcoming). 
96
 It should be noted that the correct way to interpret Duns Scotus’ use of the term is a controversial 
matter, and that Scotus has even been accused by Suarez of equivocating in his own use of the term 
(2007, p.27). Therefore Campbell’s claim to be using the term in the same manner is somewhat 
uninformative.  
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which compose a trope-whole.
97
 
98
 We draw the distinction between being a particular and 
being a characteriser only because we are considering tropes in an abstract fashion, 
attending selectively to only a portion—the particularity—of the (simple, unified) nature of 
their being. This distinction is not merely mental, tropes are both really particulars and 
really characterisers; these are not mistaken names for the same thing as is the case of 
Hesperus and Phosphorus; but this particular-ness and characterising-ness are true of a 
single, unitary ontological simple: a trope.  
 Gibb advances a defence of trope simplicity, which, whilst it also makes use of this 
sort of distinction, differs from Campbell's in important ways. She comments that some 
“may feel uneasy about Campbell’s claim that we can focus on the particularity of a trope 
in abstraction from its nature” (forthcoming). However, it seems much less controversial to 
claim that we can abstractly consider the nature of a trope apart from its particularity.
99
 
Whilst Campbell fails to offer an explanation of the grounding of this distinction in reality 
(which nonetheless is less than a real distinction), Gibb does have an account of what 
licenses the claims that tropes are both simple and can play the dual roles of particular and 
characteriser. We are mistaken to think of the particularity and nature of a trope as parts of 
a trope: 
The particularity and nature of a trope are not constituents or ingredients of it 
which could in some way come apart. It is not that a trope has a nature and has a 
particularity. Rather, a trope is a nature and is a particular. (forthcoming, p.16) 
'Nature' and 'particular' are ontological categories to which tropes belong. An entity's 
belonging to a formal ontological category is not a matter of it having or instantiating some 
further, also entity-like, property. To say 'a trope is a particular' is to ascribe what Gibb calls 
a formal ontological predicate to the trope, and not to ascribe the property of 
'particularness'. As is discussed in section 1.4 of this thesis, there are good reasons to reject 
the notion that all meaningful predicates pick out properties: 
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 For some interesting puzzles arising from Campbell’s employment of this sort of distinction in this 
case and others, see Moreland (1989) and (2002). As they are not pertinent to the discussion at 
hand, I shall not rehearse them here. 
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 Ehring (1997) and (1999) and Robb (2005) also defend tropes as simple. However, their arguments 
do not make use of the Scholastic distinctions under discussion here. Gibb (forthcoming) discusses 
some problems with the line of response taken by Robb. 
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 It seems far less controversial to propose that we can attend to what is common to all white 
pieces of A4 paper without attending to the particularity of one specific sheet than it does to 
propose we can attend to what is particular about the whiteness of this specific sheet without 
attending to that whiteness itself. 
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These predicates do not pick out properties, for they are formal ontological 
predicates, which serve to categorise the elements of being and hence should not 
be included amongst the elements of being. (ibid., pp. 16-17)  
Thus, a real distinction (that is, a distinction between thing and thing) cannot obtain 
between a trope's nature and a trope's particularity, as these categories and their 
correlative predicates are not “bits of being that could be separable in reality” (ibid., p.18); 
categories are not thing-like. However, truthmakers for statements such as 'a trope is a 
particular' are not mind-dependent, as the facts of ontological categorisation are 
“fundamental, objective, exist[ing] independently of us” (ibid.). Thus, the distinction 
between a trope-as-particular and a trope-as-nature is less than a real distinction between 
thing and thing, a distinction which obtains between two different entities, but rather is 
founded upon the two ontological categories to which, in virtue of its nature, the trope 
belongs, and is thus more than a mere product of our mental activity. This sort of 
distinction does not entail that tropes are complex, and so trope simplicity is defended. 
 Mertz defends an ontology of ‘unit attributes’ or ‘relation instances’.
100
 These are 
taken to be ontologically basic and simple entities. Yet they consist of what Mertz 
delineates as two aspects: one combinatorial and the other intensional (2001, p.47; 2002, 
p.168). The combinatorial aspect of the 'relation instance' determines what it is that this 
‘relation instance’ ties together; the intensional aspect determines the character the 
entities tied have in virtue of being thus tied. It should be easy to see how a similar 
problem to ‘the Problem of Trope Simplicity’ arises for relation instances; namely, how can 
it be maintained that these are constituted by both a combinatorial and an intensional 
nature, and yet are simple entities? Mertz, like Campbell and Gibb, appeals to a distinction 
that is less-than-real but greater-than-merely-mental, by “[…]positing a basic ontic unit[…] 
that is internally simple, yet sustains the foundations for two distinguishable aspects[…]” 
(ibid., p.46).
101
 He goes on to recognise that “[T]his requirement of a dual distinction said of 
a simple entity is for some enigmatic, if not straight-out contradictory,” (ibid.) leading him, 
to a certain extent in Mertz (2001) and to a much greater degree in (2004), to offer a 
detailed account of how the types of distinction discussed in this section might be 
understood and assayed ontologically speaking. It is to this account, which for reasons to 
be detailed below I find ultimately unsatisfying, that we turn in the next section.  
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the three are similar just in their positing of the sort of distinction being discussed in this chapter. 
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5.3    Mertz on Simplicity and Distinctness 
Mertz glosses what he considers our traditional notion of simplicity as below: 
(5.i) an entity is simple when it “has no proper parts, is non-composed, or is 
(actually) undivided and (potentially) indivisible” (2004, p.89); 
he supplements this with a definition: 
(5.ii) x is simple =df x has no proper parts (ibid., p.93). 
(5.i) and (5.ii) entail that any entity which has discrete or distinguishable parts which 
compose it as whole cannot be a simple. All such entities are complex. Mertz, however, 
argues for the abandonment of these notions of simplicity. ‘Simplicity’, he claims, “is to be 
seen as not the contradictory of ‘composite’ but rather as equivocal between the non-
composite or ‘absolutely simple’[…] and the composite[…] the ‘continuously simple’.” (ibid., 
p.95). (5.i) and (5.ii) adequately capture the notion of absolute simplicity, but fail to take 
into account an equally valid species of simplicity: ‘continuous simplicity’. An entity is taken 
to be ‘continuously simple’ when its nature does admit of some composition, but there is 
no ‘ontic distance’ between the composing constituents. 
 ‘Ontic distance’ obtains when there are genuine distinctions between the parts of a 
composite whole. For Mertz, genuine distinctions are marked by the need for there to be 
some particular constituent of the whole whose role it is to bring together the disparate 
parts into a state of unity:  
[…]all internal division is marked by the requirement that one of the constituents 
have the special causal status of agent unifier among the remaining constituents[…] 
in order to bridge the division and effect what is a manifold whole. (ibid., p.91) 
Any wholes so composed are designated ‘articulated composites’. That they are both 
united into a whole, and yet really distinct is to be understood on the following analogy: 
[…]the interval nature of a relation as an ontic predicate and among discrete relata 
implies a holding-apart of its subjects even as it holds them linked (together-as-a-
distance), on the analogy of a rigid connecting rod[…] (ibid., p.109) 
It is the ‘rigidity’ of the constituent agent unifier which both marks and maintains ‘ontic 
distance’. In juxtaposition to standard (‘articulated’, and therefore genuinely complex, non-
simple) composites, and correlating to the abovementioned notion of ‘continuous 
simplicity’, Mertz introduces a class of entities he calls ‘continuous composites’: 
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In supposed composites whose constituents are only formally distinct there would 
be no ‘ontic distance’ between yet distinct constituents that would require an 
agent unifier to bridge. (ibid., p.91) 
This joining is the unity of a continuous composite, i.e., a union of two distinct 
entities without the agency of a further interposing ontic predicate or act of 
unification. (ibid., p.105) 
How we are to understand these non-complex composites is not immediately apparent. 
The difficulty stems from explaining how it is that these composite wholes are properly 
called composite. In the case of a standard composite, recourse can be made to the 
presence of the agent unifier: it is the very presence of this constituent that licenses our 
claims that the entity being considered is genuinely a whole-composed-of-parts in two 
important senses. First, as opposed to being a mere aggregate or sum, and secondly, as 
being a case of composition of distinct constituents, and not a mere blob. The 
togetherness-at-a-distance provided by the ‘rigid connecting rod’ of an agent unifier seems, 
prima facie, to be a key concept in understanding composition per se. Composition, in the 
case of the ‘continuous composite’ must be understood according to some other standard. 
 One analogy Mertz offers for understanding ‘continuous composition’ is that of the 
heterogeneous continuum, such as a colour wheel: 
The coloring of the whole is not homogeneous yet there are no internal boundaries 
marking numerically distinct regions of different colors. The disk is, phenomenally, 
a continuous composite and as such a simple entity. The unity of a continuous 
whole is a continuum of the yet distinct—a fusion without diffusion, a concretion 
without an identity-obliterating blending. (ibid., p.94) 
This analogy, I contend, is of little use for understanding the notion of continuous 
composition as Mertz wishes to employ it. The concept has been introduced in order to 
elucidate the defence of unit attributes from a problem raised by their having a dual-nature 
as both combinatorial and intensional. A heterogeneous continuum of differentiated but 
blended colours can be made sense of because each specific colour-point on the wheel 
stands in relation as determinate (say, scarlet) to an overarching determinable (colour)—a 
relation which it shares with every other point on the continuum. The spectrum is 
specifically a colour spectrum, an arrangement of determinate colours ordered according 
to their resemblance to each other. Likewise, we can easily conceive of a sound-spectrum, 
say a continuous change in pitch or tone. What is much harder to conceive of would be a 
single, continuous colour-and-sound spectrum. Combinatorial-ness and intensional-ness do 
not seem to share a relation to any single overarching determinable. A continuous 
spectrum from combinatorial-ness to intensional-ness would be much more like the 
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(somewhat inscrutable) notion of a continuous colour-and-sound spectrum than a colour 
wheel. Indeed, just as it is hard to understand what might be meant by a colour-and-sound 
spectrum, it is hard to conceive of combinatorial-ness to intensional-ness partaking in any 
kind of continuum. Even if we concede that the example of the heterogeneous colour 
wheel lends support to the plausibility of the class ‘continuous composite’, it does not 
seem to give us any reason to suppose that relation instances, as Mertz characterises them, 
should be properly thought of as belonging to that class. Indeed, if continuous composites 
are like colour wheels, then, for the reasons given above, if anything, the example suggests 
relation instances should not be thought of as belonging to that class.
 
 
 The same holds for Martin's properties. It is hard to see how disposition and quality 
might partake in any kind of continuum, and indeed Martin explicitly rejects this notion; he 
says of properties that "[...]there are no degrees within the limit by which a property is 
categorical or dispositional[…]” (1993b, p.184) and without degrees, no possibility of either 
a homo- or heterogeneous continuum. It is equally difficult to see how the particularity and 
nature of a trope could be seen as composing some sort of heterogeneous continuum (I 
take pains to stress that neither Gibb nor Campbell suggest that they might). The point is 
that Mertz's analogy to a colour-disc not only fails to be apt to help explain his unit 
attributes, but makes for an inappropriate analogy to all the types of entities discussed in 
this chapter. It is to these entities that the formal distinction has been applied. If the 
analogy of the colour-disc is, as Mertz holds, supposed to illuminate this distinction, then 
the fact that it fails to comfortably analogise to any of the entities to which various 
contemporary metaphysicians have wished to apply the formal distinction (including Mertz 
himself) suggests that either: (i) the distinction is being misapplied or (ii) the analogy is 
mistaken, and the colour-disc example does little to illuminate our understanding of the 
formal distinction. (ii) is by far the more palatable consequence to accept, and can draw 
support from the fact that, as will be seen in the following section, taking the formal 
distinction to be best explained in terms of heterogeneous continua lacks basis in the works 
of the Scholastics from whom we inherit such distinctions. Mertz's analogy should be 
rejected, and a suitable assay of the ontological basis for these sorts of distinction is still 
wanting. 
 Mertz re-visits the analogy towards the end of the paper: 
It is continuous in having no inherent boundaries or divisions between colors, and 
thus is undivided and so simple, yet it is composed of distinguishable colors so 
known  by selective attention[…] (ibid., p.124) 
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The key claim here is that in the case of such a continuum (say we grant the analogy for the 
moment) the only distinction that applies to the constituents of this supposed ‘continuous 
composite’ are those imposed by “selective attention”, by abstraction. However, this is a 
claim that is, at the very least, open to challenge. There are no regions on the colour wheel 
that are indeterminately coloured; that is, every property instantiation falling under the 
determinable ‘coloured’ is some fully determinate colour. Let us consider that this colour 
wheel is exhaustive but minimal; that is to say on it is represented every possible 
determinate colour, and each is represented once and once only. Thus, any given region on 
the colour wheel is distinct from any other, in virtue of being differently coloured from any 
other region.
102
 Is this distinction imposed by our selective attention? It does not seem so. 
Fully determinate colours differ from each other in terms of brightness, saturation and hue, 
and these are not products of our ‘selective attention’. Any appearance to the contrary is 
merely an artefact of our limited perceptual abilities, which give rise to the illusion of “no 
inherent boundaries or divisions between colours” (ibid.). Hence, in the case of 'continuous' 
colour wheels, genuine distinctions obtain between regions. If we accept colour wheels as 
providing an illuminating analogy for 'continuous composites', then it seems we should 
conclude, contra the specified nature of a ‘continuous composite’, that fully real 
distinctions obtain between the components in these cases, and thus ‘continuous 
composites’ collapse into ‘articulated composites’. In raising this objection to Mertz's 
analogy, I aim to remain as neutral as possible with regards to the metaphysics of continua. 
Whether the colour wheel can be analysed down to discrete points (as atomism would 
hold) or whether the regions discussed above are themselves smaller continua tending 
towards the infinitesimal, what is clear is that any such region differs from every other 
region in virtue of instantiating at least one different property to the other regions. Ex 
hypothesi each region is differently coloured, and this can only be explained by the regions 
having different properties. Even if we were to accept that the latter position entailed that 
no region, regardless of size, is homogeneously coloured, it should still be clear that each 
such region is distinct from any other region by being differently coloured, and this will 
continue to be the case all the way down. 
                                                           
102
 I apply the restriction of minimalism here for simplicity and in order to give Mertz’s claim a fair 
run: it should be clear that if each colour really appeared more than once, we would ex hypothesi be 
applying a distinction between those instances (that is what would make them more than one 
instance!) that was not the result of abstraction, and thus be begging the question against Mertz. 
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 The points raised above show that there is little prospect of any fruitful illumination 
of the concept of ‘continuous composition’ by analogy to colour wheels. Another potential 
explanation of this type of composition would be to claim that there is no need of an agent 
unifier as constituent because the constituents themselves have it in their nature to unite 
directly one to the other (perhaps in analogy to two pieces of Lego in juxtaposition to two 
pieces of an Airfix model).
103
 However, such a position may be in danger of generating a 
Bradley-style regress; for if the constituents (in Mertz’s case the combinatorial and 
intensional natures of relation instances) each also had some kind of uniting nature, it 
would seem that they themselves were ‘continuous composites’ (of combinatorial-uniting 
and uniting-intensional kinds). And if in turn their ‘continuous composition’ is to be 
explained by each constituent having a uniting nature then… it should be easy to see the 
problem here. As this potential explanation is not endorsed by Mertz, having identified 
what prima facie appears to be a substantial problem, we shall pass over it without further 
comment.  
 Perhaps the key to understanding the composition in the case of a ‘continuous 
composite’ is to be found in a deeper analysis of Mertz’s claim that the constituents in such 
cases are “only formally distinct” (ibid., p.91). Mertz states that “With a formal distinction 
there is a differentiation—a rendering discrete—by intellectual separation of what is 
founded in and is partial to a fuller undifferentiated in se” (ibid.). Accordingly, that which is 
formally distinguished is so in virtue of certain mental operations regarding the subject, 
whereas the purported extremes of this distinction, by the above statement, are in fact, in 
themselves undifferentiated. Mertz relates this to composition: 
If[…] there were such an entity [a ‘continuous composite’] then any actual 
differentiation of constituents could only be ‘external’ and the result of an act of 
cognitive abstraction, what has been called in the tradition a ‘formal distinction’. 
(ibid., p.90) 
It seems then, that composition in the case of the ‘continuous composite’, is predicable not 
of the entity in question in and of itself, but rather in virtue of abstractive 
conceptualisations of that object which involve some partial consideration. If this is the 
case, it is hard to see how this is a case of composition involving constituents. Perhaps we 
are merely meant to take ‘continuous composite’ as a term of art designating that which is 
taken as distinct as the result of partial or abstractive consideration. Furthermore, that the 
differentiation occurent in a ‘continuous composite’ is a product of mental activity seems 
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 Although not one, to my knowledge, that Mertz endorses. 
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at tension with Mertz’s characterisation of such entities quoted above, that this is “a unity 
of two distinct entities” (ibid., p.105), and claims made elsewhere in the paper that the 
constituents of such entities are non-identical (for instance p.91, p.95, p.116, p.124). With 
regards to the first claim, if ‘distinct’ in this context means ‘distinct in virtue of having been 
partially or abstractly considered’, it is hard to see how this justifies calling such entities 
composites. This would also be directly at odds with the latter claim that the constituents 
in question are non-identical. For surely, non-identity between two entities cannot obtain 
in virtue of our mental activities, unless we want to concede that we ought to simply read 
off our ontology from our conceptual scheme. This is something, I, and I am certain many 
ontologists, would be unwilling to concede.
104
 So, as this non-identity must be prior to the 
“act of cognitive abstraction” (ibid., p.90), then it remains incumbent on Mertz to provide 
some explanation of how a ‘continuous composite’ is properly so called. Without such an 
explanation, the introduction of this class of entities does nothing to elucidate how it can 
be that some entities, as Mertz, Gibb and Campbell wish to maintain (albeit in different 
ways, with different arguments and for different reasons—apart from making recourse in 
some way or another to the resources of Scholastic metaphysical distinctions, their 
positions should not be identified), are simple and yet properly admit, found and support a 
distinction—a distinction which is more than a mere artefact of our minds, and yet, due to 
the simplicity of the entity, less than a real, fundamental, ontological distinction between 
two entities.  
 In order to further the project of developing a suitably nuanced and detailed assay 
of the ontology of this sort of distinction, such that this might throw light on Martin’s 
claims about the nature of property, the next section of this chapter will examine the 
material drawn on by the authors mentioned so far: the Scholastic philosophy of John Duns 
Scotus and Francisco Suárez. 
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 If we were to accept this as an acceptable metaphysical principle, we would have to say, for 
instance, that prior to the astronomical discovery that Hesperus and Phosphorous were in fact two 
names for one celestial body, when they were taken to be two distinct entities, then ontologically 
speaking, there were indeed two distinct entities, each picked out by one of these names. 
Subsequent to the discovery, tracking the shift in conceptual schema, there would have been an 
ontological shift to a single entity, Venus, and Hesperus and Phosphorus cease to be. The 
unattractiveness of such a position I take to be immediately apparent. 
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5.4    Duns Scotus, Suárez and Distinctions  
Both Duns Scotus (Ord. 2, d.2, pars I, q.2, nn. 92-94) and Suárez (2007, pp. 16-18) accept 
and discuss the two uncontroversial distinctions, the real and the mental, discussed above. 
Suárez sees the marker of a real distinction as being separability. Entities A and B are really 
distinct only if they can be separated and both continue to exist, or if their separation is 
what he calls 'mutual', that is, if their separation leads to the ceasing-to-be of one of the 
entities—this can be either A or B—it is not of necessity always one or the other (ibid., 
section II). However, as he notes, there may well be cases where two really distinct entities 
have always existed conjoined, and so we may not have evidence of their separability 
(whilst in some cases we may be able to infer this separability from similar cases, there may 
be cases where this is not possible) and so a real distinction may evade our notice. Whilst 
separation—or knowledge of its possibility—is sufficient for a real distinction, it is not 
necessary. The possibility of separation is necessary, but we may be even in principle 
unable to be aware of this possibility in certain cases (ibid.). King attributes a very similar 
position to Duns Scotus (2003, p.21). When things are really distinct, this is a distinction of 
“one thing and another” (ibid.) or a “distinction between thing and thing” (Suárez, 2007, 
p.16). Mental distinctions exist when the distinction is either totally or partially a result of 
an act of the intellect.
105
 Suárez distinguishes between two types of mental distinction: the 
‘distinction of the reasoning reason’ (distinctio rationis ratiocinantis) and the ‘distinction of 
the reasoned reason’ (distinctio rationis ratiocinatae). The former is a mere mental 
separation, such as that made in stating ‘A=A’, which “arises exclusively from the reflection 
and activity of the intellect” (ibid., p.18), whereas the latter is taken to have “a foundation 
in reality” (ibid.).
106
 Scotus calls the latter a distinctio rationis a parte rei (a ‘real conceptual 
distinction’—see King, 2003, p.22). In the rest of this thesis, when I speak of a ‘distinction of 
reason’, it is meant in this latter sense: a distinction at least partially constituted by or 
owing to some act of the mind but nevertheless finding some grounding, foundation or 
license in the way things really are.
107
 Distinctions of the former sort will be referred to as 
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 As in the cases of partial consideration and abstraction discussed above. 
106
 The ‘distinction of the reasoned reason’ will be discussed in more detail below. 
107
 Suárez’s terms, whilst precising, are unweildy, and Duns Scotus’ misleading—this distinction is 
not a real one (in the sense discussed so far in this chapter), indeed the term ‘real conceptual 
distinction’ is verging on the oxymoronic, when in Duns Scotus’ metaphysics ‘real’ and ‘conceptual’ 
are opposing classes of distinction! 
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‘mere mental distinctions’; although these will be subject to far less discussion. Both Duns 
Scotus and Suárez also discuss ‘formal’ and ‘modal’ distinctions, more of which below.
108
 
 Distinctions of reason are (at least) partially a result of the way in which we take 
things to be; when we draw a distinction through our concepts, say, which is not reflected 
at the fundamental ontological level. However, unlike a mere mental distinction, these 
distinctions are appropriate, and have their foundations in the way things really are, and 
we are led to make such distinctions by the nature of things themselves. In the case of a 
distinction of reason between A and B, A=B, but there is something or other about how A/B 
is in itself which licenses our drawing of this distinction.
109
 A distinction of reason: 
[…]arises not entirely from the sheer operation of the intellect, but from the 
occasion offered by the thing itself on which the mind is reflecting. Hence the 
foundation that is held to exist in nature for this distinction is not a true and actual 
distinction between the things regarded as distinct[…] Rather the foundation must 
be either the eminence of the object which the mind thus distinguishes (with a 
distinction that many call virtual), or at any rate it must be some reference to other 
things which are truly distinct in the real order, and with respect to which such a 
distinction is excogitated or conceived. (Suárez, 2007, p.18) 
However, these distinctions cannot be said to be real distinctions, distinctions between 
thing and thing, as that which in reality provides a grounding or foundation for the 
conceptual drawing of such a distinction is a single entity. Suárez holds distinctions of 
reason to hold when “the whole reality contained in the object is not adequately 
represented, nor is its entire essence and objective notion exhausted”, they are the result 
of “precisive abstraction” (ibid., p.19). Here we can see the ontological foundation of such 
distinctions. What are taken to be two extremes of a distinction are genuinely partial 
representations of what is in fact unitary: the representations are veridical, it is only the 
taking of them to be representation of two different entities that is not. One requirement 
for the drawing of a distinction of reason is that, when A and B are taken as diverse under 
their relative concepts CA and CB, there must be some “formal diversity in the objective 
concepts” (ibid., p.60). If there were no such diversity, we would have a mere mental 
distinction, such as the distinction between Hesperus and Phosphorus. This is a particularly 
important point if one is to be a realist about concepts. If one is a realist about concepts, 
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 It should be noted that each means something quite different by 'modal distinction'. 
109
 It is worth noting at this point that where Mertz (2004, p.91) equates “formal distinctions” with 
“distinctions of reason that have their foundations in things” he may be equivocating—these terms 
are supposed pick out different types of distinction, as shall be seen below. 
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then concepts may occupy a thing or at least thing-like role within ones ontology. This 
being the case, then there would be a real, fundamental, ontological distinction between CA 
and CB in the case of a distinction of reason; they would be distinct as thing-and-thing. This 
real distinction between concepts may then go some way to explaining the foundation of 
the distinction of reason in the way things really are.
110
 
 Duns Scotus (2012, p.235-243) also discusses a kind of distinction which plays a 
central role in his metaphysics; what he calls the ‘formal distinction’. As with the distinction 
of reason, despite a formal distinction being drawn between A and B, really A=B. Thus a 
formal distinction is less than a real distinction between “one thing and another” (Ord. 2, 
d.2, pars I, q.2, nn. 92-94). However, unlike a distinction of reason, the formal distinction is 
not held to be a product of the intellect; it exists antecedently to any act of the mind.
111
 
The basis of the formal distinction is that some really singular entities admit of a plurality of 
rationes. A ratio “picks out a set of features that make something to be what it is” (King, 
2003, pp. 22-23).
112
 Rationes are mind independent, our mental activity plays no role in 
delineating what sets of features make things what they are: these are objective facts 
discoverable by us, not something we create. A formal distinction arises when one entity 
admits of two (or more) rationes which do not include one another in the features they 
specify.
113
 Duns Scotus uses a number of terms for the items held distinct by a formal 
distinction, with various connotations, however, I will persist in the use of neutral 
terminology here. (See King (ibid., p.23) for an account.) Duns Scotus’ formal distinction 
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 Even if we are not realist about concepts, Suárez asserts a “negative real distinction” that holds 
between distinct non-beings. This is called a real distinction on the grounds that if the non-beings 
were beings, then a real distinction would obtain between them (2007, p.17).  
111
 Here we see that the distinction drawn by Mertz (2004) is far closer to the distinction of reason 
than Duns Scotus’ formal distinction. Campbell’s distinction also looks closer to the distinction of 
reason, despite his claims to the contrary. Gibb’s account, drawing on the resources of categorial 
ontology, is more in the spirit of the formal distinction. 
112
 On first glance Duns Scotus' rationes seem to bear comparison to Fine's (see for instance, 1994) 
notion of a 'real definition'. However, whilst Duns Scotus holds a single entity to admit of multiple 
rationes, prima facie Fine's position would seem to permit only a single 'real definition' to apply to a 
single entity, and thus the positions ought not to be equated.  
113
 Note that, therefore, a formal distinction will not hold in cases of determinate/determinable 
relations: whilst a scarlet disc admits of multiple veridical rationes, one picking it out as the very 
determinate shade of scarlet it is; one picking it out as red; one as coloured and so on, the more 
determinate rationes are included in the most determinable ratio, and so on down the hierarchy, 
and so there is no case of formal distinction here. 
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raises some difficult questions; namely, how could it be that an entity is such that it admits 
of a definition of its being by a plurality of rationes without either: 
(5.iii) It being a plurality of beings; that is, including some real distinction; 
or: 
(5.iv) These rationes being somehow partial or abstractive from some 
comprehensive and complete ratio, and thus being partially constituted by the 
mind. 
Suárez only discusses the formal distinction in relation to Duns Scotus’ work, but this 
problem is one that he raises, and which leads him to conclude that this term is 
“excessively equivocal” (2007, p.27) as: 
The formal distinction is of wider extension, and can be greater than the distinction 
from the nature of the case [Suárez’s modal distinction, to be discussed below][…] 
[F]rom another point of view it can be a lesser distinction[…] applied to formalities 
as conceived in a state of precision by our minds. In this latter sense the distinction 
does not exceed the level of a mental distinction. (ibid.) 
The formal distinction, it is argued, must collapse into one of the two distinctions discussed 
above. Either it is a real distinction between thing and thing (perhaps held to apply to a 
single entity because of cases such as those that Suárez mentions in his discussion of 
separability, where we have never had experience, nor can infer from analogy, the 
separability of two things we have only encountered conjoined) or else our intellect plays 
some role in determining the division of the partial rationes away from the comprehensive 
and complete ratio of the singular, unitary entity in question.
114
 Whether or not the 
criticisms of the formal distinction raised here stand will be addressed in the next section of 
this chapter. 
 Both Duns Scotus and Suárez discuss another type of distinction, which they each 
call the ‘modal distinction’, although they mean quite different things by this term.
115
 Here I 
shall address only Suárez’s account, as it is the more pertinent to our current enquiry.
116
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 Suárez also suggests that arguments in favour of Duns Scotus’ formal distinction are question 
begging. This claim is employed to lend further support to the claim that the distinction collapses 
into one of two positions described above. See the text for further details (2007, pp. 26-77). 
115
 Suárez also calls this the ‘distinction from the nature of the case’, for brevities sake I shall use the 
term given above. 
116
 Duns Scotus’ modal distinction is held to obtain between qualities that admit of degrees of 
intensity and the specific degree of intensity (or ‘intrinsic mode’) of a particular instance of that 
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Suárez’s modal distinction at first glance appears very similar to Duns Scotus’ formal 
distinction:  
[…]there is among created things a certain actual distinction which is found in 
nature prior to any activity of the mind, and that such distinction is not so great as 
the distinction between two altogether separate things or entities. This distinction, 
to be sure, could be designated by the general term “real”, inasmuch as it is 
verified in reality, and is not merely an extrinsic denomination issuing from the 
intellect. (ibid., p.27) 
However, whereas Duns Scotus’ formal distinction was taken to obtain where we have 
distinct items A and B somehow genuinely held distinct but, in reality, A=B, Suárez’s modal 
distinction obtains between some thing A and a mode of that thing C. In these cases the 
distinction cannot be so great as a real distinction, a distinction between thing and thing, 
precisely because C does not belong to the category ‘thing’. In this sense, there is only one 
thing which is being discussed, A. Furthermore, Suárez maintains, a mode, of necessity, 
cannot survive separation from that of which it is a mode—and separability is the marker of 
a real distinction. Modes are, however, entities in a broader sense, in that they have some 
essence: 
Essence can mean strictly a nature sufficient of itself to constitute an entity in the 
real order, or, more widely, any real principle that is constitutive of real being or 
mode. In this latter sense we concede that there are distinct essences in a thing 
and in a mode, and hence that objectively there is between them a distinction 
which in some sense is a real distinction. (ibid., p.39) 
As the distinction between a thing and its mode is a result of the difference in essence of 
these entities, it cannot be a mental distinction; our intellect plays no role in determining 
the essences of entities. Yet it cannot be so great as a real distinction, for only one extreme 
is a thing. Thus thing and mode, whilst not held apart by a mental distinction, are “distinct 
with a lesser distinction, which is properly called a modal distinction” (ibid., p.32). Clearly 
the plausibility of (and the motivation for positing) Suárez’s modal distinction turns on 
whether or not we wish to include modes as he conceives them and accept that there are 
non-thing-like entities included within our ontology.
117
 However, if we do accept such 
                                                                                                                                                                    
quality. As 'disposition' and 'quality' are not instances of different intensities of a single quality (see 
sections 3.2-3.3), this distinction is not relevant to our attempts to provide an assay of their 
ontology. (See King (2003, p.25) for a fuller discussion.) 
117
 I say thing-like because we might accept entities that are not ‘things’ but still hold that we could, 
for the purposes of drawing distinctions and identities, treat them in the same manner as we treat 
things. 
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entities, the lesser or minor real distinction Suárez draws between a thing and its mode 
appears sound, although it should be noted limited in it’s application to such entities. 
 Over the last few sections we have examined and analysed a variety of notions of 
distinctness and sameness. In the section to follow I will begin to sketch how such notions 
relate to our interpretation of the Limit View—the relevance of these various approaches 
to distinctness to the Limit View and Martin’s key claim of ‘surprising identity’, should at 
this point I hope, be clear. 
 
5.5    Understanding Surprising Identity 
This chapter has been concerned with a number of accounts of distinctness and identity, 
and in particular with accounts that admit of some sort of distinction that is taken to be 
less than a distinction between two fundamentally separate things, but is more than a 
mere mental distinction. In this section I shall return to each of the distinctions that have 
been discussed so far (some far more briefly than others) with a view to exploring how they 
might shed light on Martin's claim that whilst dispositionality and qualitativity are both 
identical with a unitary property (and thus with each other), nevertheless there obtains a 
distinction between them which is more than merely in-the-eye-of-the-beholder. I shall 
first very briefly discuss those accounts which I take it to be readily apparent are not of 
much use in understanding this claim, before moving on to focus in more detail on those 
that exhibit more promise. 
 It should be immediately clear that neither a 'real distinction' nor a 'mere mental 
distinction' as discussed in this chapter are appropriate as analyses for the distinction 
Martin is claiming obtains between disposition and quality: the first is denied by the 
surprising identity thesis; the second by the claim that the distinction is more than in-the-
eye-of-the-beholder. Campbell's account lacks sufficient detail to provide a satisfactory 
assay of what it is, ontologically speaking, that explains and provides a foundation for his 
notion of a formal distinction. Moreover, it seems to be based purely on our abstractive 
abilities, and so plausibly amounts to nothing more than a mere mental distinction. On this 
basis there is little prospect of illuminating Martin's position by making recourse to 
Campbell's employment of the formal distinction. The problems identified with Mertz's 
account (see section 5.3) are significant, and on their basis his account cannot be of any use 
in the present endeavour. Given the arguments discussed above, Duns Scotus' 'formal 
distinction' does seem to collapse into either a real distinction or a distinction of reason 
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and so I shall not discuss it here as a separate class of distinction. This leaves Gibb's 
account; Scholastic accounts of the distinction of reason and Suárez's modal distinction. I 
shall examine each of these in turn, exploring how they might help us to understand 
Martin's claims about the nature of properties. 
 The modal distinction as discussed by Suárez is, whilst not a real distinction 
between thing and thing, still greater than a mental distinction as its foundation is not to 
any degree mental. Rather the distinction stems from the difference in essence between a 
thing and some mode of that thing. As modes are not things, the distinction is not a real 
distinction. Applying Suárez's modal distinction to Martin's account of property would 
require that properties are treated in a thing-like manner, whilst 'disposition' and 'quality' 
would be modes of being of the property. However, prospects for such an application are 
not good. The category of modes in Scholastic metaphysics includes the real accidents (all 
real accidents, which seem the closest analogue to Martin's sparse properties, are modes, 
although not all modes qualify as real accidents). So if properties themselves are modes, 
they cannot play the role of the 'thing-side' in Suárez's modal distinction. Rather, the 'thing-
side' ought to be filled by a substance. As Martin holds a two-category ontology in which 
property and substance are the two fundamental and exclusive categories (see section 1.4), 
a property cannot also be a substance, and so cannot be that in which a mode inheres, and 
so is not a suitable candidate for partaking in the 'thing-side' of the modal distinction 
between a thing and its mode of being. 
 Gibb explains how a trope can be both a particular and a characteriser whilst 
remaining a unitary, singular entity by appeal to categories of being, which are not 
themselves 'bits' of being. Thus, a singular unitary trope is a particular in virtue of belonging 
to the formal ontological category 'Particulars' and a characteriser in virtue of belonging to 
the formal ontological category 'Characterisers': 
The particularity and nature of a trope are not constituents or ingredients of it 
which could in some way come apart. It is not that a trope has a nature and has a 
particularity. Rather, a trope is a nature and is a particular. (forthcoming, p.16) 
If a similar logic is to be applied to the Martin case, then disposition and quality would need 
to be formal ontological predicates which indicate that entities that bear them belong to 
certain ontological categories: those of 'Disposition' and 'Quality'. Properties would then 
belong to these two categories, alongside either the category of 'Universals' or 'Particulars' 
(depending on which side one pitches one's tent in the trope-universal debate) and 
'Characterisers'. To be a disposition or a quality is to characterise in a certain way. Thus, the 
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categories of 'Disposition' and 'Quality' would be sub-categories subsumed under the 
category 'Characteriser'. On this analysis, properties, a unitary singular entity, are properly 
described as dispositions in virtue of belonging to the formal ontological category 
'Dispositions' and are qualities in virtue of belonging to the formal ontological category 
'Qualities'. This explains the identity of the dispositional and the qualitative (it is but a 
single, unitary property which belongs to both categories) and maintains the more-than-in-
the-eye-of-the-beholder nature of their distinctness . As Gibb reminds us: 
But this [inseparability] does not mean that the distinction between a trope's 
nature and its particularity is merely a product of our mind, for ontological 
categorisation is not such a product. The distinction, as with any such ontological 
distinction, is a fundamental, objective one which exists independently of us. (ibid., 
pp. 16-17)  
Mutatis mutandis for Martin's account. However, the success of applying Gibb's account to 
Martin's position rests on the plausibility of taking 'Dispositions' and 'Qualities' as formal 
ontological categories.  
 As mentioned above, Gibb's approach seems, prima facie, to be making an appeal 
to something akin to Duns Scotus' formal distinction. However, we have seen arguments 
from Suárez to suggest that the formal distinction collapses into either a real distinction, or 
else a distinction of reason. It cannot be a real distinction to which Gibb is appealing, as this 
would imply that tropes admit of genuine composition, and so are not simple. Therefore, if 
Suárez's arguments are correct, then the distinction at work is in fact the distinction of 
reason. It is important, therefore, to examine this distinction in more detail. It should be 
noted that, if what I have said above is correct, if one interprets the surprising identity 
thesis via appeal to an account like Gibb's, then one seems to be committed to something 
like the obtaining of a distinction of reason between the dispositional and the qualitative. 
However, it does not appear that the converse is true: one could choose to interpret the 
surprising identity thesis by means of an appeal to the distinction of reason directly, 
without committing oneself to an account such as Gibb's. 
 The Scholastic distinction of reason is properly called mental, as it obtains at least 
partially due to an act of the mind—partial consideration or abstraction. However, it is 
more than a mere mental distinction (more than merely in-the-eye-of-the-beholder, as 
Martin would have it); it has a foundation in the way things are. So, 'disposition' and 
'quality' would be terms which, whilst they applied to a single, unitary entity (the property) 
would refer to partial or incomplete representations of that object: the 'property-qua-
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disposition' (ignoring all that said property contributes to the qualitative nature of its 
bearer) and the 'property-qua-quality' (ignoring all that said property contributes to the 
dispositional nature of its bearer). There needs to be more to the case than merely this 
abstraction to license the claim that such a distinction is greater than merely-mental, for 
abstraction is a purely mental exercise. Whilst the partial representations of the property 
have their foundation in the way things are, what is required is a foundation for their 
distinctness. Suárez locates this foundation in the distinction between the relative concepts 
involved (2007, p.60). 'Disposition' and 'quality' are ex hypothesi distinct concepts, 
otherwise there would be nothing surprising about their identity. So, if we are realists 
about concepts, and take them to be thing-like entities, then a real distinction obtains 
between the concepts 'disposition' and 'quality'. It is this real distinction which provides a 
foundation in reality for the claim that whilst disposition and quality apply to a singular 
unitary entity—a property—and dispositions and qualities are not really distinct, the 
distinction between them is more than merely mental as it is founded on the real 
distinction obtaining between their relative concepts. However, this sort of realism about 
concepts is controversial to say the least! If we do not consider concepts to be thing-like 
entities, then a real distinction cannot obtain between them, and so once again the 
question of the foundation that makes the distinction of reason more than merely mental 
is raised. This foundation is to be found in what Suárez calls the 'negative real distinction'. 
This distinction has modal foundations (in the contemporary sense, rather than as Duns 
Scotus or Suárez would use the term), as it applies to entities that are not thing-like (what 
Suárez call 'non-beings') which, if they were (thing-like) beings would be really distinct. This 
negative real distinction, if we are non-realist about concepts, would provide the 
foundation for our distinction of reason. The plausibility of applying the distinction of 
reason to Martin's account rests then on two things: accepting that properties are the sort 
of entity that admits of being partially represented as a disposition and partially 
represented as a quality; and also accepting either a realist theory of concepts or Suárez's 
notion of negative distinctions between non-beings. 
 This chapter has examined a number of approaches to identity and distinctness, 
from both the perspective of contemporary debates in property ontology and the 
Scholastic source material upon which commentators in these debates have drawn. These 
approaches have been related to Martin's Limit View account of property in order to throw 
light on the initially puzzling claims of the surprising identity of the dispositional and the 
qualitative, and that nevertheless the distinction obtaining between these two is more than 
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a mere act of the mind. Two approaches have been identified which, given the acceptance 
of certain additional theses, provide accounts of the ontological foundations for such a 
distinction. These two approaches, and how they relate to one another, shall be further 
examined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Six: An Interpretation of the Limit View 
 
The last five chapters of this thesis have provided an exposition of the quality/disposition 
distinction; examined the development of the Limit View in Martin's own work and 
discussed criticisms levelled against the Limit View and explored ways of explaining the 
surprising identity claim. The purpose of this chapter will be to draw together the findings 
of these chapters to provide a concise and clear interpretation of the Limit View. 
Arguments for the commitments outlined and claims made in this chapter are to be found 
elsewhere in this thesis, for this reason there will be extensive cross referencing of previous 
chapters in this one. This chapter begins with a brief review of a number of claims and 
theses that are key to properly understanding the Limit View. This is followed by an 
articulation of the commitments of the Limit View. It is then shown how this presentation 
of the Limit View can be interpreted under either of two potential accounts for explaining 
the surprising identity claim. The final section of this chapter will introduce the applications 
of the Limit View to be discussed in the two following chapters. 
 
6.1    Review 
Both an examination of the development of Martin's own presentation of the Limit View 
(see Chapter Three) and a consideration of how Martin's position can be successfully 
defended against his critics (see Chapter Four) help to identify a number of ancillary claims 
and theses which are key to properly understanding the Limit View. In this section I briefly 
outline each of these claims. Extended discussion of these claims, where necessary, has 
been completed elsewhere in this thesis and so shall not be entered into here. Rather, the 
purpose of this section is to state clearly and all in one place those additional theses 
required to make sense of the Limit View. I do not review here all of Martin's general 
metaphysical commitments (see section 1.4), as not all of these need be held in order to 
sensibly maintain the Limit View—it is to those that are required or provide useful 
illumination that I restrict myself.
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 I shall not spend much time arguing that these particular claims are in fact required. I take it to be 
relatively clear in all the cases discussed why the maintenance of these supporting positions is 
needed. If the reader takes any of these to be in excess of requirements, then this seems to weaken 
the account none, the claim in question can simply be suspended or discarded as the reader sees fit. 
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(AC1) The truthmaker principle 
Meaningful sentences (etc.) that represent the world as being some way or another are 
either true or false. When such a sentence is true, it is so in virtue of the world being some 
particular way: the very way it is represented as being. This way that the world is is a 
truthmaker for the true sentence (2007, pp. 24-25). Sentences that lack truthmakers, or 
that have falsemakers—Martin countenances absences as truthmakers for negative 
existentials such as "There are no arctic penguins", and falsemakers for their corresponding 
existential sentence "There are some arctic penguins" (see Martin in Crane, ed. (1996, pp. 
181-186)—are false; they are misrepresentations. The world itself (and the ways the world 
is) are neither true nor false. Truth and falsity are features of truthbearers, and these are 
representations. In a world that lacked truthbearers, there would still be ways that the 
world is, and these have the potential to act as truthmakers at that world should some 
truthbearers come about, but at such a world, there would be no truth or falsity (2007, 
p.25). A single truthmaker—some way a world is—can support many and diverse truths; 
that is to say, truths (accurate representations) and truthmakers are not isomorphic, they 
do not match up one-to-one. A consequence of this is that we ought not to expect to be 
able to settle ontological issues by way of enumerating true representations, for it is not 
the case that for each and every true representation there is some particular and distinct 
way the world is that makes that representation true (although every true representation 
requires something to make it true, that same truthmaker may well be shared by a vast 
number of true representations). To make this mistake is to subscribe to what some call the 
Picture Theory (Heil (2003, chapter 3)).  
 (AC2) The real properties are sparse, not abundant 
Properties and meaningful predicates are not isomorphic, they do not match up one-to-
one. That is, for some-thing x there may be some meaningful predicates that are true of it, 
but which do not correspond to any single property that that thing instantiates, and 
conversely, that thing may instantiate a property which is not picked out by any single 
meaningful predicate. There are powerful arguments in favour of accepting some sort of 
sparse theory independent of questions regarding the ontological status of properties (see 
section 1.4). Martin holds that what real properties there are, and in what ways they 
'match up' to the meaningful predicates of natural language, is a matter to be decided 
empirically (2007, p.66), but one need not agree with this in order to hold a sparse view of 
properties.  
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 It ought to be obvious that there could be some meaningful, purely dispositional or 
purely qualitative predicates that are true of some entity or other — and if it is conceded 
that properties match up one-to-one with meaningful predicates, then a counter-example 
to the Limit View would be easily produced. (See section 4.3). If one accepts a sparse 
theory, generating such a counter-example is much more difficult — the opponent would 
have to show not only that there are meaningful purely dispositional/qualitative predicates 
that feature in true representations, but that the only possible ontological basis for these 
would be purely dispositional/qualitative properties. 
 (AC3) Dispositions are not relations 
This claim does not merely comprise part of Martin's wider metaphysics of dispositionality 
(for a brief exposition of this see sections 1.4 and 3.5), but is integral to the Limit View—if it 
is to be maintained that dispositionality and qualitativity can be identified, then it cannot 
turn out that one of these is relational, whilst the other is not. A disposition is a monadic 
property, and is not a relation between an object and some as-yet-unrealised 
manifestation. 
 (AC4) Reality is compositional 
Higher-level complex phenomena are composed of smaller, more basic parts. At some 
point this bottoms out in a fundamental level of what Martin follows Locke in calling "the 
finest interstices of nature" (for instance (2007, p.78), see also section 1.4 of this thesis). 
This viewpoint complements (AC2) in helping to us know where to look for the real 
properties, and thus where best to apply the Limit View. This should not be taken as 
implying that only the properties that are instantiated at the fundamental level are real, 
but rather that higher-level complex properties, whilst they may also be real, are 
dependent on their more fundamental components. This dependency is that which a whole 
owes its parts. (See Martin (2007, chapter 4).) 
 (AC5) Quality and disposition are not mutually exclusive 
Despite how they have sometimes been defined, quality and disposition should not be held 
in contradistinction to one another—that is to say, qualities ought not to be defined as 
something along the lines of ‘all and only those properties that are not dispositions’.. 
Rather, both 'quality' and 'disposition' should be given their own substantive, and non-
mutually exclusive definition. (See Chapter Two). It should be easy to see that considering 
them to be mutually exclusive would render the Limit View highly implausible (if not 
incoherent).  
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6.2    The Limit View 
This section enumerates what, given the exploration of it that has occupied this thesis thus 
far, the Limit View is committed to. These commitments are not argued for or subjected to 
extended discussion here, where necessary cross-references are provided. 
 (C1) Qualities are real 
There are real properties such that they make a contribution to the qualitative nature of 
the things that instantiate them—and this is all that is required in order for it to be the case 
that qualities are real. Such properties provide the truthmakers for statements regarding 
the qualitative nature of the things in question—that is to say, there are some ways the 
world is, independently of how it is represented, that make true (or fail to make true) 
representations regarding the qualitative nature of things within the world. These ways the 
world is would continue to obtain, even if there were no such representations. 
 (C2) Dispositions are real 
There are real properties such that they make a contribution to the dispositional nature of 
the things that instantiate them—and this is all that is required in order for it to be the case 
that dispositions are real. Such properties provide the truthmakers for statements 
regarding the dispositional nature of the things in question—that is to say, there are some 
ways the world is, independently of how it is represented, that make true (or fail to make 
true) representations regarding the dispositional nature of things within the world. These 
ways the world is would continue to obtain, even if there were no such representations. 
 (C3) All real properties are both qualities and dispositions 
All real properties are such that they contribute both to the qualitative nature and to the 
dispositional nature of the things that instantiate them—and this is all that is required in 
order for it to be the case that all real properties are both qualities and dispositions. All real 
properties are apt to act as truthmakers both for statements regarding the qualitative 
nature of the things that instantiate them and for statements regarding the dispositional 
nature of the things that instantiate them.  
 (C4) The quality is identical to the property itself 
It is not the case that the property has some part, aspect, feature, etc., that is the quality. 
Rather, the property in question and that which informs the qualitative nature of the thing 
that instantiates the property (that is, the quality) are one and the same, they are identical. 
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Therefore, it is the property itself that informs the qualitative nature of the thing that 
instantiates it. 
 (C5) The disposition is identical to the property itself 
It is not the case that the property has some part, aspect, feature, etc., that is the 
disposition. Rather, the property in question and that which informs the dispositional 
nature of the thing that instantiates the property (that is, the disposition) are one and the 
same, they are identical. Therefore, it is the property itself that informs the dispositional 
nature of the thing that instantiates it. 
 (C6) The quality is identical to the disposition 
Given (C4) and (C5), and the transitivity of identity, we must conclude that the quality and 
disposition are identical. That is to say, that which informs the qualitative nature of the 
thing (the quality, which given (C4) is just the property itself) is identical to that which 
informs the dispositional nature of the thing (the disposition, which given (C5) is just the 
property itself). That is to say, when any-thing instantiates any real property, that property 
will make a distinctive contribution to both the qualitative nature and the dispositional 
nature of that thing. This is all that is needed for the property to be rightly considered both 
a quality and a disposition. These are rightly considered identical because there is, 
ontologically speaking, only the property itself that is making these contributions.  
 (C7) Property is a unitary phenomena 
On this account, one ought not to conclude that properties, as they contribute to both the 
qualitative and dispositional natures of the things that instantiate them, must be somehow 
composite entities that consist of some part which is a quality and some part which is a 
disposition. (See sections 3.4-3.6). To do so would lead to intractable problems for the Limit 
View (See section 4.1). Rather, the real properties are unitary, simple and basic. They are 
not composed of further parts, and feature at the most fundamental ontological level 
alongside the substances that instantiate them.  
(C8) 'Quality' and 'Disposition' are not type terms 
The terms 'quality' and 'disposition' do not function as type terms which pick out distinct 
types of properties (in say, the way 'dog' and 'cat' are type terms which pick out distinct 
types of domesticated mammals). (See section 4.3). If speaking of qualities and dispositions 
(mis)leads one to think in this way, it may be better to re-couch such talk in terms of 
'qualitativity' and 'dispositionality'.  
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 (C9) No real properties are pure qualities 
To be a pure quality, a property would have to be in 'pure act' (Martin, (2007, p.39)), 
always manifesting itself completely, with no potentiality whatsoever. There are no real 
properties like this. This is not to say that there could not be some true description of a real 
thing that referred purely to its qualitative nature. Rather, the truthmaker for such a 
description would be a property (or number of properties) that, whilst they contribute to 
the qualitative nature of the thing in question, do not solely do this. Considering, speaking 
of, conceiving, treating, etc., a property as a pure quality is to deal with that property in a 
partial and abstracted manner. 
 (C10) No real properties are pure dispositions 
To be a pure disposition, a property would have to be nothing more than the potentiality 
for some future manifestation, and not characterise its bearer in any other way (ibid., 
p.72). There are no real properties like this. This is not to say that there could not be some 
true description of a real thing that referred purely to its dispositional nature. Rather, the 
truthmaker for such a description would be a property (or number of properties) that, 
whilst they contribute to the dispositional nature of the thing in question, do not solely do 
this. Considering, speaking of, conceiving, treating, etc., a property as a pure disposition is 
to deal with that property in a partial and abstracted manner. 
 (C11) Qualitativity is not reducible to or eliminable in favour of dispositionality  
Despite what many previous accounts have held, there is no prospect for removing 
qualitativity from our ontology so that we are simply left with dispositionality. (See 
Chapters Three and Four) 
 (C12) Dispositionality is not reducible to or eliminable in favour of qualitativity 
Despite what many previous accounts have held, there is no prospect for removing 
dispositionality from our ontology so that we are simply left with qualitativity. (See 
Chapters Three and Four) 
 (C13) Qualitativity is not emergent from; supervenient on or caused by (etc.) 
dispositionality 
There is no explanation for the fact that all real properties are qualities that can be given by 
appeal to the fact that all real properties are dispositions in some more fundamental or 
foundational way, such that dispositions are held to be ontologically prior to qualities. (See 
sections 3.5-3.6). 
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 (C14) Dispositionality is not emergent from; supervenient on or caused by (etc.) 
 qualitativity 
There is no explanation for the fact that all real properties are dispositions that can be 
given by appeal to the fact that all real properties are qualities in some more fundamental 
or foundational way, such that qualities are held to be ontologically prior to dispositions. 
(See sections 3.5-3.6).  
 
6.3    The Surprising Identity Thesis 
Qualitativity and dispositionality are real, irreducible, ineliminable features of the world. 
However, they both find their basis, ontologically speaking, in a single type of entity: 
properties. These properties are the ways things in the world are. Any such way some-thing 
is will have consequences for that thing; it will inform both what that thing is like, 
regardless of how it might behave in possible (but currently non-actual) circumstances 
(that is, it will confer some quality on the thing) and it will determine how it will behave in 
any one of a vast number of possible (but currently non-actual) circumstances (that is, it 
will confer some disposition on the thing). The property that will be the source of these 
contributions to the thing in question is unitary, and so these contributions cannot be 
separated one from the other in reality, that is, we could not get rid of one whilst 
maintaining the other, for to get rid of one would require us to get rid of the property itself, 
and so the other would follow. Both the quality and the disposition are identical to the 
property itself, and so also to each other.  
 As discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis, it might appear that there is tension 
between the claim that the distinction between qualities and dispositions is not merely 
mind-dependent, but that they are nevertheless identical to one another. What the 
proponent of the Limit View desires to maintain is that whilst the distinction between 
qualities and dispositions is clearly not what we have called a 'real distinction', that is, a 
distinction between two things (or thing-like entities), this distinction is not mind-
dependent, it has some antecedent foundation in reality, in the way the world actually is 
prior to any action of the mind. It is therefore incumbent on the proponent of the Limit 
View to give some kind of account of this foundation. 
 One response to this tension is to take 'quality' and 'disposition' to denote formal 
ontological categories to which all properties belong. Just as Gibb has argued that 
properties can be simple and belong to both the categories of 'Particular' and 
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'Characteriser' (see Gibb (forthcoming), and sections 5.2 and 5.5 of this thesis), so it can be 
argued that properties belong also to the categories of 'Quality' and 'Disposition'. Indeed, 
these would be most plausibly conceived of as subcategories of 'Characteriser'. A schema 
would look something like: 
Object 
/                 \ 
Substance                    Property 
           |                          /                 \ 
                                  
119
         Particular                     Characteriser 
                                                      |                           /                       \ 
                                                                        
120
               Quality                         Disposition 
                                                                                     |                                      | 
                                                                                     
121
                                       
122
 
 
Fig 6.a 
 In considering such a schema, it is essential that we do not consider each new 
branch to represent a new kind or type of thing. Rather, every divide represents a pair of 
categories to which the entity above belongs. The only level within the hierarchy at which 
different kinds or types of things (for Martin (1980) propertied-substances) occur is that of 
Object.
123
 A taxonomy or schema dividing reality into these kinds or types of things would 
be of an entirely different nature to the schema outlined above; there are no relations, 
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 This branch may continue to many sub-categories, but as the ontology of substance is not the 
focus of this thesis, I shall leave the matter open. 
120
 This branch may continue to further sub-categories, but as the nature of properties as 
particulars/universals is not the focus of this thesis, I shall leave the matter open. It should also be 
noted that whilst this branch is labelled 'Particular', in line with both Gibb and Martin's own 
commitments, there is nothing in this thesis which requires it to be so—it could equally be 
'Universal'—I intend to remain neutral with regards to this controversial debate within the ontology 
of properties. It is worth mentioning that Martin himself felt that this debate may eventually come 
down to terminological, rather than substantive, disagreement (for instance, in Crane, ed. (1996, 
p.72). 
121
 This branch may or may not continue to sub-divide; this is a matter on which, for the purposes of 
this thesis, I remain neutral. 
122
 This branch may or may not continue to sub-divide; this is a matter on which, for the purposes of 
this thesis, I remain neutral. 
123
 At the end of Martin (2008), he suggests a preference for an ontology free of objects. However, 
the sense in which the term is used there is not the technical sense in which I am using it here, to 
mean propertied-substance (Martin certainly would not have a preference for an ontology without 
propertied-substance).  
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correspondences, parities, etc., that one could draw between them. This second sort of 
taxonomy or schema is, perhaps, the sort which are generated by the natural sciences. 
Given the above characterisation of the schema in place, the distinction between any of the 
different categories is not a 'real distinction', that is, a distinction between two different 
things, as the categories do not pick out things. These distinctions occur only at the top 
level of the hierarchy. What this schema claims is that all these things are propertied 
substances; and all properties are particulars and characterisers; and all characterisers are 
qualities and dispositions.
124
 The direction of priority is, as it were, top-down rather than 
bottom-up (whereas, according to Martin's compositionalism ((2007, chapter 4) and 
section 1.4 of this thesis), the direction of priority for the other sort of schema, which 
categorise the different kinds of things, is more likely to be bottom up, with the entities at 
the ends of the branches being the physical fundamentals, the "finest interstices of 
nature", whatever they turn out to be).
125
 This then satisfies the requirement that, in line 
with the surprising identity thesis, the distinction between quality and disposition is not so 
great as one between thing and thing—that is, it is not a 'real distinction'. It seems to also 
satisfy the requirement that whatever distinction does exist between quality and 
disposition, it exists antecedently to any operation of the mind, that it is something more 
than a mere mental, mind-dependent distinction. The facts of ontological categorisation 
are fixed prior to how we think about the world. They would obtain even if there were no 
minds in the world to consider these facts. Thus, this interpretation of the Limit View fulfils 
the second requirement, that the distinction between quality and disposition is more than 
'in-the-eye-of-the-beholder' (see ,for instance, Martin (1996, p.174) or (1997, p.202)). 
Taking 'quality' and 'disposition' to operate as formal ontological predicates, which pick out 
categories to which properties, as characterisers, can be said to belong provides a plausible 
ontological foundation for the claim that, whilst strictly speaking qualities and dispositions 
are identical (the surprising identity thesis), the distinction we draw between them (which 
albeit requires some act of precisive abstraction) is not merely "in-the-eye-of-the-
                                                           
124
 Or perhaps a more precise, but much more clumsy term (and thus one I will not adopt), is 
'propertiednesses'. Whilst I continue to use the term 'property' which may be thought to carry thing-
like connotation, this is to be resisted. Alongside this is to be borne in mind the now much-repeated 
warning that although the language may suggest thing-like-ness, ontology is not to be read off 
language use. 
125
 At least, this is how it seems to me. I do not intend to argue this point, as it has little bearing on 
this thesis. 
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beholder", but draws its license from the way the world is prior to any mental operation, 
that is, has some foundation in reality. 
 An interpretation of this sort finds support in Martin's general metaphysical 
framework. In 'Substance Substantiated' (1980), Martin discusses Locke's account of 
substrata and provides what he sees as a 'refurbishment' that makes such an account 
appropriate for debates in contemporary metaphysics. He presents a metaphysic whereby 
objects are primary.
126
 Objects are to be understood as "property-bearer -- properties 
borne" (ibid., p.6). 'Substratum' and 'properties', if considered on their own, as pure 
property or substance, rather than as partaking in the formation of an object, can only be 
partial considerations or abstractions: 
When we are thinking in the most general possible way of the attribution of 
properties (each and every one) to an object, we are thinking of, or partially 
considering, the object, perhaps a passionfruit, simply qua or simply in its role as, 
the bearer, not itself borne, of its properties without at the same time considering 
it in terms of the actual properties it undoubtedly bears.  
Partially considering a passionfruit, as what bears whatever properties it bears, is 
thinking of it under a partial, incomplete description -- as a bearer of properties. 
(ibid., pp. 9-10) 
He argues that: 
It is, then, an error to think of either the substratum of an object or of the 
properties of an object as parts of an object. They are the non-object things about 
an object. And even the finest parts right down to those objects that are the 
'insensible corpuscles' of physics are such that, like the larger, observable wholes 
they might make up, there is that about them that is the bearer of properties, and 
that about them that is the properties borne. (ibid., p.8) 
Properties and substrata (that is, substances) are not then to be thought of as things, or 
even as thing-like entities. They are not the sort of entity that can enter into mereological 
relations in order to form complex wholes; only things (or for Martin, 'objects') can do this.  
It should be clear that this position is consistent with the proposed interpretation given 
above, and fits comfortably into the schema proposed: these "about"-nesses are equivalent 
to formal ontological predicates. It should also be clear to the reader that this line of 
thought regarding the distinction between substance and property, and their place in the 
ontological hierarchy, is formally similar to that proposed by Martin for how we ought to 
understand quality and disposition. As we have already seen, pure qualities and 
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dispositions are unrealisable abstractions and partial considerations of properties which 
are in themselves qualities-cum-dispositions. Any attempt to think of them in terms of 
parts which make up some complex whole is also to be resisted. That this interpretation of 
Martin's claims about properties, qualities and dispositions is consistent with, and shows 
formal similarity to, other claims he makes about fundamental ontology lends it plausibility. 
 The second line of interpretation which was discussed earlier in this thesis appeals 
to the Scholastic notion of a distinction of reason, a distinction between entities that is less 
than a real distinction (which obtain between two different things, say, between the 
passionfruit I ate yesterday and the one I ate a week earlier, or indeed between either of 
these and myself, or the chair I sat on to eat them), but greater than a merely mental 
distinction (which obtain only between those things that are in reality non-distinct, but are 
held to be distinct by some operation of our minds, such as when we mistakenly consider 
the selfsame object to be two different objects on two different occasions on which we 
encounter it). Distinctions of reasons involve some operation of the mind in order to render 
the entities in question distinct; if they did not require this then they would in fact be real 
distinctions. However, unlike merely mental distinctions, distinctions of reason have some 
grounding in reality, some foundation in the way things actually are (although this 
grounding is not, it must be emphasised, a real distinction between the two entities held 
distinct by the distinction of reason in question). It should not be hard to see how such an 
account can be appealed to in order to substantiate Martin's claims that whilst property is 
a strictly unitary phenomena, and qualities and dispositions are in fact surprisingly identical 
(and so no real distinction obtains between them), nevertheless the distinction between 
these is more than "in-the-eye-of-the-beholder", that is, more than a merely mental 
distinction. Distinctions of reason involve acts of precisive abstraction (see section 5.4 of 
this thesis) just as Martin claims that the distinction between quality and disposition is 
based on abstraction (see sections 3.3-3.5 of this thesis), and it is due to this that some 
mental activity, the act of abstraction, can be properly attributed to the distinction—and so 
we cannot consider the distinction a real distinction (which would obtain regardless of all 
mental activity). But in order for an appeal to the distinction of reason to be informative as 
to why this distinction is not "merely-in-the-eye-of-the-beholder" we need to examine 
what it is that gives such distinctions their foundation in reality, that is, what it is that 
makes them more than merely mental distinctions. 
 Suárez offers the following comments about the foundations in reality of 
distinctions of reason:  
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[...]the foundation must be either the eminence of the object which the mind thus 
distinguishes (with a distinction that many call virtual), or at any rate it must be 
some reference to other things which are truly distinct in the real order, and with 
respect to which such a distinction is excogitated or conceived. (Suárez, 2007, p.18) 
This disjunction offers two ways in which the distinction of reason can be given a 
foundation in reality. The first disjunct appeals to the "eminence" (eminentia in the original 
Latin) of the (in reality) unitary object which is, ontologically speaking, identical to both 
extremes of the entities held to be distinct by reason.  
 
6.4    Eminence 
What follows will be a fairly lengthy discussion of eminence. I will ultimately conclude that, 
insofar as we might wish to apply the distinction of reason to the Limit View of properties, 
appeals to eminence will not be helpful. However, it is important to see how and why this 
is the case. We are interested in the foundation in reality that licenses or grounds a 
distinction of reason, and Suárez identifies eminence as one possible foundation. Thus, it 
would be remiss to fail to explore this notion, even if, in the end, it is concluded that it is 
not helpful to the current inquiry—eminence is not an easy concept to pin down. Whilst 
Suárez employs the term repeatedly throughout the Metaphysical Disputations, he offers 
little explanation of its meaning. To my knowledge, the most extended piece of discussion 
directed towards this concept within the Metaphysical Disputations is to be found in 
disputation 30. Suárez here refers to a discussion of whether God contains all created 
perfections in the Summa Theologica, where the claim is made that perfections can be had 
in one of two ways: 
[…]either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent--as when man reproduces 
man; or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal agent--thus in the sun is the 
likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. (Aquinas, 1911-1925, I q.4 
art. 2) 
Aquinas goes on to conclude: 
Since therefore God is the first effective cause of things, the perfections of all 
things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. (ibid.) 
To contain formally is to contain in a literal sense: 
 (FC) if O contains x formally, then O actually has x. 
God does not contain the perfections of created beings in this literal sense, but rather 
'eminently'. However, it is not clear from Aquinas' discussion what such containment 
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consists in, other than the indication that "likeness" is involved. These two quotations also 
illustrate a possible ambiguity in the concept—the first seems to suggest that when 
something contains a perfection eminently, it does not contain that perfection literally, but 
rather contains a likeness of that perfection. Thus, eminent containment is the having of 
some other perfection than the one in question, this other perfection being relevantly 
related (by 'likeness') to the perfection under examination. That is to say: 
 (EC1) if O contains x eminently, then O contains y, and y is a likeness of x.
127
  
Suárez elaborates on the concept of eminent containment as below: 
To put it briefly, we may say that to contain something eminently is to possess such 
a perfection in a superior manner, which contains in virtual form whatever is to be 
found in the lower perfection. (Suárez, F in Ariew et al, p.34). 
This passage and the second quotation from Aquinas above, seem to imply, contra (EC1), 
that eminent containment does involve the very same perfection, but contained in some 
relevantly different manner. We could render this reading of the concept of eminent 
containment as: 
 (EC2) if O contains x eminently, then O contains
em
 x.  
It is worth noting that (EC1) and (EC2) are not exclusory of each other, although for reasons 
which will be discussed below, I do not think anything is to be gained from their synthesis. 
In the name of thoroughness, we could render a synthesis of these two readings of Suárez's 
and Aquinas' descriptions of eminent containment as: 
 (EC3) if O contains x eminently then O contains
em
 y and y is a likeness of x. 
 The ambiguity noted above is also picked up on in both Robinet (2001) and Gorham 
(2003). Robinet associates the view that eminent containment involves one item differently 
contained with Suárez (p.11) and that of it involving one mode of containment and two 
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 It might be worth noting at this juncture that, of course, one way of being a likeness of something 
is to be that very thing, although if this is the case for Aquinas, then it is hard to see how this 
comment is helpful to those of us trying to understand the nature of eminent containment as 
distinct from that of formal containment.  
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items differently contained with Gregory of Valencia (pp. 14-15).
128
 Gorham discusses 
Descartes' use of eminent containment.
129
 He distinguishes between a realist:
130
 
[...]if [O] contains [x] eminently then [O] contains [x] and [x] is not identical to some 
property [y] that [O] contains formally. (Gorham, 2003, p.6) 
and reductionist: 
[...]to say that a given perfection [x] exists eminently in a substance [O] is to say 
simply that [O] formally contains certain other perfections [y]. (ibid.) 
analysis of the concept. These can be presented, as realist and reductionist respectively, as 
below: 
(EC4) if O contains x eminently, then O contains x and x is not identical to some 
property y which O contains formally;  
(EC5) if O contains x eminently, then O formally contains y, and x≠y. 
 Stevens (1978) and Norton (1978) engage in a debate over the correct way to 
interpret Descartes' use of the concept of eminent containment. They focus on what I shall 
call the 'excellence criteria': the claim that central to any interpretation of eminent 
containment is the claim that to contain eminently involves containing something more 
'excellent' than whatever is contained formally.
131
 Neither Stevens nor Norton offer any 
explanation or definition of the term; they adopt it as a straight translation from the French 
"excellentes" (Descartes, 1673, p.33). Briefly put, it seems that the term is not being 
employed in the manner of a value judgement (such as when one might say "That was an 
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 I shall examine both approaches as a potential manner of interpreting the concept. For the 
purposes of this thesis I am more concerned with the question of how any viable interpretation 
might bear on the question at hand than I am with historical scholarship of Suárez's work. 
129
 There is very little critical material regarding eminence, despite the concept appearing in the 
work of such significant figures as Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz and Suárez. What material there is 
tends to focus on Descartes' use, and so I discuss some of that material here, whilst making every 
attempt to avoid anachronistically imposing a conception of eminence on Suárez which post-dates 
him. Suárez is identified as the principal source for Descartes' employment of the concept (see Ariew 
et al, eds., (1998); Ariew et al, eds., (2003 p.238); Gorham (2003, p.4 and p.15)), and so we can 
reasonably expect an illumination of Descartes' work to also shed some light on Suárez's. 
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 In the formulations that follow I have standardised the notation used for clarity's sake. I have 
substituted a letter used to represent that which eminently contains some 
perfection/property/quality in the original author's text with O, P, etc. and letters used to represent 
these qualities with x, y, etc. Where this has been done it is indicated via means of square brackets 
around the letter in question.  
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 This thought might be seen to be echoed in Suárez's claim that eminent containment is 
"superior" (2011, p.8). 
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excellent adventure"), rather, it relates to completeness or wholeness, much as the terms 
'perfection' and 'greatness' often do in works from the medieval and early modern period. 
Both Stevens and Norton assume a reductionist interpretation of eminence, which Stevens 
gives as:
 132
 
[O] contains eminently the quality [x] if and only if there is something [y] such that 
[y] is different from, and more excellent than, [x], and [O] has [y]. (Stevens, 1978, 
p.338) 
In his response to Stevens' paper, Norton argues that this should have been: 
[O] contains eminently what is in [P] if and only if [O] contains other things at least 
as excellent as [P], or [O] contains other things more excellent than the things 
contained in [P]. (Norton, 1978, p.339) 
Norton's correction is that eminent containment, for Descartes at least, need not be 
containment of some superior distinct perfection; it could be simply something of equal 
excellence. I find Norton's claim persuasive, and will adopt it in what follows; however, 
should one prefer Steven's stricter condition, it does not seem to me that anything said 
below really turns on this, and so the reader is quite welcome to ignore the 'at least as' 
clause. Reconstructing Gorham's reductionist account taking into account the 'excellence 
criterion' gives us: 
(EC6) if O contains x eminently, then O formally contains y, and x≠y, and y is either 
at least as excellent as, or more excellent than, x;  
whereas the realist account should be read as: 
(EC7) if O contains x eminently, then O contains x and x is not identical to some 
property y which O contains formally, and the manner in which O contains x is at 
least as excellent, or more excellent, than the manner in which O contains some 
property y which O contains formally. 
Once again, in the name of thoroughness, the synthesis of these would be: 
(EC8) O contains x eminently if O contains y, and x≠y, and y is either at least as 
excellent as, or more excellent than, x and the manner in which O contains y is at 
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 Most likely due to the fact that such a reading is the one suggested by the French quotation on 
which they both focus: "Par exemple, la pierre qui n'a point encore est, non seulement ne peut pas 
maintenant commencer d'estre, si elle n'est produitte par une chose qui possede en soy 
formellement, ou eminemment, tout ce qui entre en la composition de la pierre, c'est-à-dire qui 
contienne en soy les mesmes choses ou d'autres plus excellentes que celles qui sont dans la 
pierre[...]" (Descartes, 1673, p.33). 
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least as excellent, or more excellent, than the manner in which O contains some 
property z which O contains formally.
133
 
We find ourselves with three potential accounts of what it means for some object to 
contain something eminently: a reductionist account (EC6) (reductionist in the sense that it 
reduces the notion of 'eminent containment' to that of 'formal containment'); a realist 
account (EC7) (realist in the sense that it reifies 'eminent containment' as some kind or 
form of containment distinct from 'formal containment') and a synthetic account (EC8) 
which preserves both the realist thought that eminent containment is distinct from formal 
containment and the notion that that which is eminently contained must be more excellent 
than something formally contained found in the reductionist account. 
 We should now be in a position to examine whether or not any one of these 
analyses can be helpfully employed in our interpretation of Suárez's remark that the 
foundation of a distinction of reason might be "the eminence of the object" (Suárez, 2007, 
p.18), and whether in particular such an interpretation can be employed in our 
understanding of Martin's claims about the ontology of properties. Before we proceed, the 
question of how we are to interpret the term 'contains' needs some attention.
134
 The 
driving forces behind the analyses given above have been the scholarly efforts of Gorham 
(2003), Stevens (1978), Norton (1978) and Robinet (2001). They were all addressing 
Descartes’ use of the term, which, like Aquinas' (see above), is primarily focussed on issues 
of causation. In this context, it seems harmless to interpret 'contains' as 'instantiates' 
where the entities being contained are properties; indeed, this seems the most natural 
manner of parsing the term in the vocabulary of contemporary metaphysics. If this is the 
interpretation of 'contains' at work, this seems to speak against a realist or synthetic 
analysis. Both of these analyses hold that there are at least two distinct kinds of 
containment, and so if ‘contains’ is to be understood as ‘instantiates’, then they hold there 
to be at least two distinct kinds of instantiation. On such an account, properties can be 
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 We might also want to append a 'likeness' criterion (as per Aquinas) to (EC6) and (EC8) which 
would read 'and y is a likeness of x'. However I find the term 'likeness' in this context horribly 
obscure, and so in the name of not multiplying formulations any more than I feel I must, have 
omitted to fully specify these as separate formulations. It ought to be clear why such an addition 
cannot be made to (EC7). 
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 The term ‘contains’ is that used by Stevens, Norton and Gorham, and so I have adopted it here. 
Thus far, I have taken the term to be non-technical and so it stands in need of some analysis if we 
are to hope to find the schema above of any use in providing some illumination of the nature of 
‘eminence’. 
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instantiated in at least two different ways: eminently and formally. It seems to me that 
there are a number of reasons that stand against such a view. First, it goes against common 
usage; I am not aware of any major metaphysical system that treats the term ‘instantiates’ 
(or a correlative of that term) as equivocal. Secondly, I find the claim that there are distinct 
forms of instantiation (probably irredeemably) obscure; it is hard to see just what such a 
claim means. Thirdly, to take there to be distinguishable kinds of instantiation requires us 
to understand instantiation as having some content which can vary. It would be by virtue of 
differences amongst these contents that the different kinds of instantiation could be 
distinguished one from another. However, generally speaking (and certainly within Martin’s 
metaphysic, the material to which we hope we might usefully apply these concepts), 
‘content’ is given by properties instantiated, and so instantiation itself just does not seem 
the right sort of thing to be content-ful.  
 Moreover, it does not seem that interpreting 'contains' as 'instantiates' is 
appropriate to the project at hand. For if we do take this line of interpretation—and hope 
that this can be employed in illuminating Martin's remarks that whilst there is no 
ontological division between quality and disposition—the distinction is nevertheless 
greater than one merely 'in-the-eye-of-the-beholder', then we seem to be making the 
foundation for this claim a matter of instantiating some property: a second order property, 
or property of a property. To analyse Martin’s claims about properties in terms of the 
Suárezian distinction of reason, and this in terms of eminence, and eminence in a realist 
manner treating ‘contains’ as ‘instantiates’, would give an analysis along the lines of: 
[From (EC7)] if a property contains dispositionality and qualitativity eminently, then 
that property instantiates
em
 d and q, and neither d nor q is identical to some 
property y which that property (formally) instatiates
fo
, and instantiating
em
 is at least 
as excellent, or more excellent, than instantiating
fo 135
 
Such an analysis treats both dispositionality and qualitativity as founded on further 
properties of the first-order property in question, albeit properties had eminently as 
opposed to formally—second-order properties d and q which provide the basis for the 
claim that dispositionality and qualitativity are contained eminently in the property, as 
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 This analysis is rooted in the realist account (EC7). As noted above, the synthetic account (EC8) 
preserves the realist notion of different kinds of containment. I shall not provide an equivalent 
translation of (EC8), it should be clear to the reader how such a translation would look—and more 
importantly, if (EC7) and its derivatives are found lacking by dint of their realist commitment, then 
(EC8) fails on the same grounds, and so need not be examined separately at this juncture.  
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opposed to formally. But what of d and q themselves? Martin's claims are intended to 
range over all real properties. This given, both d and q will instantiate some further third-
order properties to provide the foundation for their dispositionality and qualitativity, which 
will require further properties… etc. The generation of this regress is unattractive. Not only 
does it generate an (at the very least) unattractive regress, but more seriously it seems to 
rob properties of their proper place as ways that things are. Their ‘way-hood’, on such an 
interpretation, is always deferred to some higher-order pair of properties. Whilst such 
deference may be quite acceptable in certain formal settings (c.f. Tarski’s (1983) T-schema), 
I consider it to be much less at home in ontology. It seems that an account which must 
appeal to second-order properties in order to provide a grounding for Martin’s claims is 
unlikely to bear much fruit. The interpretation of 'contains' given above along with the 
analysis given by (EC7) might work well in the causal context, but cannot be applied to the 
case in hand.
136
 
 Indeed, there is no immediately evident parsing of 'contains' that seems to fit well 
with the case at hand—where we are to consider any real property as eminently containing 
the two extremes of a distinction of reason, qualitativity and dispositionality. If we accept, 
as may be the case, that no plausible interpretation of 'contains' can be given to fit the case 
at hand, then we might conclude that Suárez's first manner of grounding distinctions of 
reason ("the eminence of the object" (2007, p.18)) cannot be appealed to in any 
interpretation of Martin's claims about the surprising identity of the qualitative and the 
dispositional. If we do so conclude, then we must move on to the second option he offers, 
"some reference to other things which are truly distinct in the real order, and with respect 
to which such a distinction is excogitated or conceived" (ibid.). However, we might 
conclude that an interpretation of 'eminence' in terms of 'eminent containment' is a blind 
alley, and some other interpretation can be given that fits our current project better. Such 
a conclusion, whilst obviously possible, however, finds no support in the critical literature 
on the subject.
137
 If indeed another line of interpretation is forthcoming (and I suspect, but 
no more than suspect, that it may well be so in the context of Suárez's full body of work, 
especially given his frequent use of the term in diverse contexts), establishing the 
particulars of this interpretation would require a sustained and developed piece of 
scholarship in its own right, and I lack both the space and the resources to conduct such a 
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 Whether it in fact does, or does not, is no concern of this thesis. 
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 Or at least none that I have been able to discover. 
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study within this thesis.
138
 Such a conclusion would, therefore, also compel us, albeit for 
more pragmatic reasons, to pass over the notion of 'eminence' in our attempts to 
illuminate Martin's claims via Suárez's distinction of reason, and proceed to an examination 
of the second manner in which Suárez suggests such distinctions may be grounded. A third 
option would be to claim that we need not give an explicit interpretation of 'contains'. This 
would allow us to apply the analyses above to Martin’s position, bearing in mind the 
restrictions that refraining from giving some précising analysis of ‘contains’ puts into place. 
Chief amongst these is that if we take 'contains' as unanalysed, then it hardly seems we can 
take there to be two distinct concepts of 'contains' at work between formal and eminent 
containment. This is because we cannot offer any account of the manner in which they 
might differ. Both the realist and synthetic accounts of eminent containment hold there to 
be just such a distinction. Therefore, if we are to refrain from offering an analysis of 
‘contains’, it seems that we must reject the realist (EC7) and synthetic (EC8) accounts of 
eminent containment. Thus, as with an interpretation of 'contains' as 'instantiates', the 
reductionist (EC6) analysis stands as the sole live option.  
 Where does this leave us? We had hoped to understand a certain claim (Martin’s) 
by appeal to a notion (Suárez’s Distinction of Reason) which we found itself in need of 
further analysis (via ‘eminence’) and that that analysis itself called for explication. Having 
examined a number of ways of understanding ‘eminence’, the best option seems to be the 
reductionist interpretation of eminent containment, which I have expressed in terms of 
(EC6) above. The situation could be summarised as below: 
[Martin's claim] Whilst property is a unitary phenomena, qualitativity and 
dispositionality are distinct in a manner that is more than merely in-the-eye-of-the-
beholder;  
[My hypothesis] This claim can be interpreted via Suárez's distinction of reason;  
[From Suárez] This distinction of reason finds its foundation in the ‘eminence’ of 
the property; 
[Argued above] Eminence is (as far as it can be examined here) eminent 
containment; 
[Argued above] Eminent containment is best analysed as (EC6); 
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 Nor would it be becoming for me to merely speculate as to the form and content of such an 
interpretation in the absence of the requisite scholarly work. 
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[Therefore] Martin's claim can be analysed as (EC6): 
[Which gives us] a property contains qualitativity/dispositionality eminently if that 
property formally contains something y, and the qualitativity/dispositionality in 
question≠y, and y is either at least as excellent as, or more excellent than, the 
qualitativity/dispositionality in question. 
There are several reasons why this analysis seems to fall far short of providing what is being 
looked for in this section: a clear ontological basis for Martin's claim. First, if we refrain 
from offering further analysis of the term 'contains', then it seems obscure in the context at 
hand. It is not clear what could it mean for a property to ‘contain’ some further entity. Nor 
can I see how, even if it could, this would in some satisfactory sense provide a foundation 
for that property’s being both dispositional and qualitative. Secondly, we are also left with 
the question of just what 'y' might be—and no helpful answer is immediately 
forthcoming.
139
 If the account does no more than appeal to some ad hoc entity to provide a 
foundation for the distinction, then it is unsatisfying indeed. Thirdly, the concept of 
'excellence' in question may also require further specification. Finally, it is not clear how 
something's merely being more excellent makes it fit to play this foundational role for the 
distinction—surely the ‘more excellent’ thing ought also to be somehow relevantly related 
to the extremes of the distinction in question (what I have called Aquinas' 'likeness 
criterion may have been aiming at this). Given these considerations, it does not appear that 
there is any particular hope of illuminating Martin's claim with recourse to the distinction 
of reason, if this is understood to find its foundation in eminence. Thankfully, Suárez gives 
us a second option for how we might understand the distinction of reason, and it is to this 
we now turn. 
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 It occurs to me that we might take 'y' to be that property's dispositionality when enquiring as to 
how quality is eminently contained in the property, and to be that property's quality when enquiring 
as to how dispositionality is contained. Such a move would bring Martin's position and the 
interpretation discussed above into line with one another. However, it seems to me that to take this 
move renders this interpretation no more than a re-statement of the Limit View with the additional 
vocabulary of eminent containment (which, as noted, is itself not un-problematic), and as such can 
shed little light on the topic at hand. 
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6.5    Another Option 
The second disjunct of Suárez's quotation appeals to:  
[…]some reference to other things which are truly distinct in the real order, and 
with respect to which such a distinction is excogitated or conceived. (Suárez, 2007, 
p.18) 
When a distinction of reason is founded in this manner, although the two entities which are 
held distinct by a distinction of reason are in reality a single entity, the holding distinct of 
them is via an appeal to some other real distinction. Where should we look for this 
distinction which it is claimed is referenced in the drawing of a distinction of reason? The 
answer given by Suárez is in the concepts involved in the two extremes: the concepts of 
'quality' and 'disposition' are clearly distinct as if they were not, there would be nothing 
surprising about their identity. What is key is that whilst the "objective concepts" are 
clearly distinct, they are inseparable in the object (the property) itself: 
[...]whenever it is quite clear that any two extremes, which are united and 
conjoined in a thing, are distinct in their objective concepts in such a way that in 
the concrete individual they are absolutely inseparable... we have a sound and 
practically certain argument that they are not actually distinct in the object, but are 
distinct with a distinction of the reasoned reason[...] Thus Peter, man, animal and 
other like predicates, as they really are in Peter, are not distinct in objective fact. 
(Suárez, 2007, p.60) 
'Quality' and 'disposition' can be taken in this manner—distinct concepts, which both truly 
(although partially) represent a unitary, undifferentiated entity (a property), which are 
inseparable in reality and so are not "distinct in objective fact" but neither are they merely 
mental distinctions.
140
 Again we can note a formal similarity between general arguments 
Martin applies to questions of fundamental ontology and Suárez's treatment of the 
difference between real distinctions and distinctions of reason (in the former separation is 
possible, in the latter it is not). This similarity ought to lend credence to an interpretation of 
Martin's work which makes recourse to the metaphysical distinctions discussed by Suárez. 
Furthermore, it must be noted that this second line of interpretation is not at odds with the 
first given—indeed, the two lines of interpretation can be seen as complementing one 
another. Suárez's example appeals to just the sort of categorial hierarchy—Peter, man, 
animal—as has been discussed above. However, we are not forced to accept both together; 
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 It is not my intention here to argue that 'quality' and 'disposition' are such concepts. Martin gives 
his arguments for the inadequacy of pure qualitativity and pure dispositionality as concepts which 
exhaustively characterise properties (see Chapter Three). Rather, my concern here is to present a 
model under which this claim can be consistently and intelligibly maintained.  
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one could adopt the first approach without appealing to the second, and vice versa. I take 
this flexibility to be a virtue of the two lines of interpretation laid out. As this thesis 
continues, I will assume an interpretation of the surprising identity thesis which takes these 
two lines of interpretation as complementary; however, if in treating the applications in 
chapters x and y the adoption of just one or the other would make a substantive difference 
as to how the Limit View is applied, this will be noted in the text and these differences 
explored. As discussed in sections 5.4-5.5, the distinction between concepts which is 
appealed to in this account can either be conceived of as a positive real distinction (an 
actual distinction between two things or thing-like entities)
141
 or as a negative real 
distinction (ibid., p.17): these obtain between two entities which are actually separable and 
distinct, but are neither things nor thing-like entities, and so cannot be distinct by a positive 
real distinction. However, if these were things or thing-like entities, the distinction between 
them would be a positive real distinction, and so they are to still be considered really 
distinct. Which account of the distinction between the concepts of 'quality' and 
'disposition' we adopt will be determined by the metaphysics we adopt for concepts. I 
would call any metaphysics which took concepts to be either things or thing-like entities a 
realist conception of concepts—and under such an account the distinction would clearly be 
a positive one. Other accounts would make appeal to the negative distinction, which 
appears to sit more comfortably with Martin's general metaphysics, where the only 'things' 
are his objects, the propertied substances ((1980) and (2008, chapter 16)). Whether we 
take concepts to be distinct by a positive or negative real distinction, however, seems to 
have little bearing on the utility of this interpretation of the Limit View and its application 
to other areas of inquiry within philosophy. This given, we need not conclusively resolve 
the question here. 
 The Limit View, and especially the surprising identity thesis (which, as was seen in 
Chapter Four, is the only plausible way to maintain that properties are qualities-cum-
dispositions and dispositions-cum-qualities), have been challenged with obscurity and 
unintelligibility (see Armstong (2005); Lowe (2006, p.134) and section 4.4 of this thesis). 
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 By 'thing-like entity' I mean any entity which, in the metaphysical account in question, is, whilst 
not considered to be a thing (by whatever standard thing-ness is judged in that metaphysic), is 
considered to have some relevant similarity to things within that account. The standards for thing-
like-ness may well vary between accounts, just as the standards for thing-ness do. Many accounts 
may not have any thing-like entities, indeed, perhaps none do. Even if this is the case, this fact will 
not have any significant impact on what is discussed above, references to thing-like-ness can simply 
be ignored. 
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Even without having to face an explicit challenge such as this, given that the Limit View flies 
so starkly in the face of the conventions of the established debate regarding qualities and 
dispositions (see Chapters One and Two), proponents of this position must offer a clear and 
thorough account of what the claims of the Limit View amount to, and how they can be 
consistently interpreted. In the above I have laid out the commitments of the Limit View, 
and offered what I hope is a clear, detailed and intelligible interpretation of the most 
difficult of its claims: the surprising identity thesis. Through appeal to the resources of 
categorial ontology and/or the nuanced and subtle sorts of metaphysical distinction which 
were discussed by Scholastic philosophers we can come to understand what is meant by 
the claim that qualities and dispositions are in reality identical to one another (that is, both 
identical to a single property) and yet the distinction between them is more than merely in-
the-eye-of-the-beholder. This is an important result for anyone interested in the Limit 
View, for nowhere in Martin is there any discussion of the tension between these claims, or 
account of how it could be that the dispositional and qualitative are identical, and yet 
distinct from one another in a more-than-merely-mental fashion. Furthermore, coming to 
such an understanding should help to alleviate the worry generated by the most serious 
criticism which the view faces: that the identity thesis is obscure and unintelligible; and also 
to demonstrate that, pace Molnar, the Limit View is not anti-relist (see section 4.3 of this 
thesis). Whilst much has been said in favour of the identity thesis by both Martin (see 
Chapter Three) and Heil (see for instance 2003 and 2012), a detailed response to the 
obscurity charge has been lacking. I hope that what has been argued so far in this thesis 
remedies that situation. 
 In what follows, I shall be examining how the interpretation of the Limit View 
advanced in the first half of this thesis can be applied to the debate concerning the 
ontology of mind and body. I shall address both the Argument from Conceivability (also 
known as the Zombie Argument) and the Knowledge Argument, and go on to argue that if 
one adopts the Limit View, as advanced here, then the correct position one ought to adopt 
concerning the ontology of mind and body is a variant of neutral monism. 
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Chapter Seven: Martin and the Metaphysics of Mind 
 
Over the course of this thesis so far I have outlined the debate over whether all real 
properties of objects are fundamentally purely qualitative, purely dispositional, whether 
some are one and some are the other or whether they are neither. This latter position—
that all real properties are both qualitative and dispositional, and therefore are neither 
purely—which originated with C. B. Martin and was later developed by John Heil, has been 
the focus of this thesis.
142
 I have provided a detailed exploration of the conceptual 
development of this position, arguing that several distinct versions can plausibly be 
extracted from the body of Martin's work. Due to this, critical investigation of this position 
needs to begin with an act of interpretation. Such interpretation is a significant part of this 
thesis, and is conducted in Chapter Four–Chapter Six, starting with an examination of the 
criticisms that have been levelled at Martin's position and a defence of the position from 
these criticisms. This is followed by an exploration of the 'surprising identity' thesis, 
focussing upon how this thesis can be plausibly maintained alongside Martin's claim that 
the distinction between quality and disposition is more than 'in-the-eye-of-the-beholder' 
(see for instance 1996, p.174 or 1997, p.202). I have argued that there are at least two 
plausible strategies for maintaining these claims: one drawing on the resources of 
categorial ontology and the other drawing on a nuanced account of the metaphysics of 
identity and distinctness which relies heavily on the works of Francisco Suárez. The 
question of whether anything significant turns on which of these strategies one chooses 
remains open; although in the course of the discussion that follows I shall flag up any areas 
where there may be a substantive choice to be made. I do not intend to argue in favour of 
one over the other, and, as outlined in section 5.5 contend that, for the most part at least, 
the two converge.  
 The remainder of this thesis will examine the application of this account of 
properties to some questions in the philosophy of mind. There are several reasons for such 
a move. First, I am sympathetic to the view put forward by Martin that "[a] sensible 
ontology equips us to tackle problems in the philosophy of mind[...] that have long eluded 
solution" (2008, p.xv). Secondly, it would seem to count against Martin's position if it were 
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 The position has recently come into more favour than it previously enjoyed, and also finds 
support from, for instance, Jacobs (2011); Schroer (2010) and Engelhard (2010). Strawson (2008) has 
argued for a similar position, although his reasoning differs from that of both Martin and Heil. For a 
critique of Strawson's paper see David Oderberg (2009). 
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to fail by his own test for sensible-ness just outlined, and, so, perhaps by extension a failing 
of my interpretation of his position if it cannot be demonstrated to bear fruit in discussions 
about problems in the philosophy of mind. Thirdly, questions which arise in the philosophy 
of mind which focus on what has been called the 'hard problem' of consciousness, or the 
problem of experience (see for instance David Chalmers, 2010, chapter 1), are amongst the 
most mysterious questions that philosophy faces. As such, it is greatly to the credit of a 
theory if it can make some headway on such questions. Whilst I consider the interpretation 
of the Martin/Heil account of properties put forward in this thesis to have the potential to 
be usefully applied to a variety of philosophical problems, restrictions of space mean that I 
can only meaningfully engage with one or two applications in what remains of this thesis.
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Given this, considerations such as those outlined above have led me to focus on applying 
the ontology of properties put forward so far in this thesis to current debates in the 
philosophy of mind. 
 The application of an account of properties that claims all real properties are both 
qualities and dispositions to questions regarding consciousness and the ontology of the 
mind is not unique to this thesis, indeed Martin discusses such things in The Mind in Nature 
(2008). Whilst a significant portion of this thesis has been to a greater or lesser extent 
dedicated to Martin scholarship, this is not the purpose of what follows. Whilst I will briefly 
discuss what Martin has to say about the mind at the start of this chapter, I take the 
position I develop to be largely independent of the one he puts forward. It is my intention 
to show how a critical interpretation of Martin's account of the ontology of properties can 
be best applied to issues in the philosophy of mind, rather than to dwell on how plausible 
and defensible his own positive theorising about the mind and about consciousness is. Heil 
(2003) also discusses such an application of the thesis that properties are both qualities and 
dispositions, and Schroer (2010) discusses its relevance to the conceivability argument in. 
Some of what I have to say in what follows is in line with arguments they put forward, and 
some of it draws on their work. However, the response I give to the Argument from 
Conceivability goes beyond both Heil's and Schroer's, and is, I believe, more powerful.  
 In what follows I argue that accepting the account of properties put forward in this 
thesis allows one to develop a monistic ontology which faces up to the hard problem of 
consciousness. In doing so, I begin by addressing prominent arguments for property 
dualism. I look first at the Argument from Conceivability, then the Knowledge Argument. I 
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 In the conclusion of this thesis I outline some of the areas of application which there is not space 
to discuss in the main body. 
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go on to briefly discuss how someone who adopted the account of properties put forward 
in this thesis can respond to general worries generated by appeal to the so-called 
'explanatory gap'. The responses which can be given to these arguments will outline the 
shape of the approach to consciousness open to the proponent of the account of 
properties put forward in this thesis. In beginning to develop this approach I intend to show 
that it has the potential to meet the requirements that a theory of consciousness needs to 
live up to at least as well as any contending position. Furthermore, I delineate some areas 
where it may have a substantial advantage. It is worth stressing a dialectical point at this 
juncture—I do not take the viability of the Martin/Heil account of properties to turn on its 
success or failure in this area, as the position finds independent a priori motivation in the 
arguments discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis. Rather, the (already motivated) 
position can be thought to gain some appeal given the progress it can help us to make in 
this area.  
 Given the limited space left in this thesis, what is to follow will, of necessity, be 
much less than a fully developed theory of consciousness. Such an endeavour would 
require more time and space than I have had available over the course of researching and 
writing this thesis. However, what I hope to offer by the end is a sufficiently detailed sketch 
of how the development of such a theory might proceed that it is clear to the reader how 
adopting the account of properties put forward in this thesis might allow one to make 
headway in the philosophical task of understanding conscious experience and how it 
relates to the physical world. Once I have outlined this approach, I go on to locate it in the 
conceptual space of the current debates regarding consciousness and the mind-body 
relation. The position, I argue, cannot be easily assimilated to any of the currently popular 
positions. Rather, it is best interpreted as a variant of neutral monism, which, whilst it was 
popular in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, seems to have long fallen out of 
favour.   
 
7.1    Martin's Account of Mind 
The final sixty or so pages of Martin (2008) are by-and-large dedicated to setting out his 
account of mentality and of how mental entities relate to non-mental ones, set within the 
context of the ontology he has laid out earlier in the book. I hope that what follows is an 
accurate and intelligible summary of the contents of those chapters, despite being, of 
necessity, far less detailed than what can be found there. The summary that follows does 
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not mirror the exact structure of Martin's discussion, offering a paraphrase of each chapter. 
Rather, I have tried to collate and present together ideas and arguments from that 
discussion, focussing on those that relate most closely to issues discussed in this thesis. 
Inevitably, this process requires selectiveness and interpretation. Should the reader be 
interested in the definitive version of Martin's position regarding the mind, I urge them to 
engage with the relevant chapters themselves. There is much in this section that I shall not 
provide arguments in favour of, nor shall I draw out potential objections to and responses 
defending these claims, rather the aim is to give an outline of the account of mentality that 
Martin puts forward. I shall concentrate primarily on what Martin's account has to say 
about the ontology of mind and body; in particular on what can be said regarding the basis 
for distinguishing between the mental and the non-mental, and whether in order to uphold 
this distinction we must appeal to distinct kinds of entity at the fundamental ontological 
level. There are other topics to which Martin devotes significant attention in the later 
chapters of (2008) which are do not directly bear on this question, and these will receive 
comparatively little attention here.
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 Rather than frame his discussion in terms of substances or properties, leading to 
the question of whether an adequate account of mental phenomena requires us to posit an 
ontologically distinct type of entity over and above the physical, Martin addresses 
mentality primarily in terms of systems. Systems, unlike substances and properties, are not 
fundamental ontological categories. As such, it makes little sense to raise the question of 
whether an adequate account of mental phenomena requires positing an ontologically 
distinct kind of system, rather, it is better considered in terms of whether there are 
distinctive, unique features of mental systems which: (i) are never found in non-mental 
systems and (ii) require us to posit an ontologically distinct type of entity in order to offer a 
proper explanation of these features. Amongst the features of mental systems which 
Martin identifies are included: beliefs and desires; perception; intentionality; consciousness 
and control. One aspect of Martin's general strategy in approaching each of these features 
is to show that a proper account of them does not require us to admit a novel type of 
entity into any of our fundamental categories, whilst noting that there are certain features 
which are exclusively possessed by mental systems. Therefore, Martin's account sits firmly 
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 For instance, his defence of sensori-motor perception as a genuine modality of perception 
(Chapter 13), his discussion of the specific role of imagery in language use (Chapter 14) and the 
details of his account of various kinds of use mental systems engage in and how they relate to 
epistemological questions (towards the end of Chapter 15). These topics are interesting and Martin's 
discussion of them deserving of attention, but there is not space to undertake that task here. 
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in the monist camp with regard to the ontology of mind and body, whilst respecting the 
idea that there is some noteworthy distinction between the mental and the non-mental.  
 What I am calling 'control' is one feature that Martin discusses which might be 
thought to be a good candidate for a paradigmatic capacity of uniquely mental systems. A 
system could be considered to have the capacity (or, more likely, group of capacities) for 
control when it exhibits at least the following features: receptiveness to inputs, that is to 
say, the system is such that it can be said to receive inputs in some sense or another from 
whatever is outside of the system; reactivity to inputs, that is to say, the system may 
change on the basis of such input; generation of outputs, that is to say, the system can 
make changes to whatever is outside of it; selectiveness regarding outputs, that is to say, 
the system is such that it is capable of generating a variety of outputs but will, on the basis 
of factors internal to the system, on a given occasion generate a particular output rather 
than some other output which it is also capable of generating; adjustability of outputs, that 
is to say, that the system can continue or discontinue outputs it is generating in light of 
inputs it receives through feedback and feed-forward, and integration, that is to say, the 
generation and adjustment of outputs can be directed on the basis of goings on in other, 
integrated systems. It seems clear that conscious mental systems meet these 
requirements: we receive information from the external world, these inputs effect us, we 
react to them and generate behaviour on the basis of these, to which we can make 
adjustments. Might control then be the, or one of the, hallmarks of mental systems that 
distinguish them from non-mental ones? Martin holds that this is not the case. For 
instance, non-mental systems such as the hypothalamus exhibit all the features just 
enumerated (I shall not repeat his discussion of this here, see (ibid., pp. 136-138) for 
Martin's account of how the hypothalamus lives up to the standard set for control). 
Importantly, it is noted, non-mental systems that exhibit control can continue to operate 
fully functionally in the absence of conscious, mental systems. In evidence of this, Martin 
cites the case of a patient who remained unconscious but with a fully functioning 
hypothalamus (and other such systems) for seven years without the intervention or aid of 
any life-support machine (ibid.). If Martin is correct in his analysis, then perhaps exhibiting 
control is necessary for a system to count as mental, but it is not sufficient. 
 Another feature of mental systems which might be thought to distinguish them 
from non-mental ones is the having of beliefs and desires. It is fairly widely accepted that 
conscious human beings (and maybe some animals) engage in believing and desiring, but 
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even very sophisticated and complex physical systems such as the hypothalamus do not.
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In his account of believing and desiring, Martin emphasises their dispositional nature. The 
truthmaker for a claim such as 'A believes that x' should not be considered to be some 
item-like entity, which might bear the name 'the-belief-that-x', which is to be found 
residing within the mind of A. Beliefs (and desires, and other states that Martin identifies as 
of a similar kind, such as "thoughts, hopes and fears"—(2008, p.180)) are not the sort of 
thing that would show up on an inventory of A's mind, like pieces of mental furniture. 
Rather, the truthmakers for true ascriptions of beliefs, desires, etc., "[...]are best 
understood as dispositional state arrays whose nature is to be explained in terms of what 
such arrays are dispositions for[...]" (ibid., p.179). These states are "deep and 
intermingling", there are layers upon layers of such states, and numerous interrelations 
exist between them (ibid., p.180).  
 First, we ought to note that on this analysis, beliefs etc. are not simple, 
fundamental properties, rather they are complexes of such properties; or, at least, this is 
what I take Martin to be advocating in calling them 'arrays'. In considering this analysis, we 
should remember the rich account of dispositionality that Martin advances. Such arrays of 
dispositions will be directive for, selective for and prohibitive against an enormous variety 
of potential mutual manifestations in concert with a vast collection of reciprocal disposition 
partners. Included within the set of reciprocal disposition partners for any given belief-state 
will be other states of the system to which that belief is ascribed (including but probably 
not limited to other beliefs and similar states of the system alongside a variety of non-
belief-like states of the system) as well as external environmental factors. A particular 
manifestation of a particular belief(-like) state of a system on a given occasion may (and 
probably will, but need not always) involve several further states internal to the system—
some of which may be further belief states—as well as several states external to the 
system.
146
 This is given, it should be clear that this analysis is not conducive to the 
generation of conditionals such as: 
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 Although this claim might be denied by Dennett, for instance. For him, if, as at least seems 
plausible, ascribing beliefs and desires to the hypothalamus were a successful strategy for predicting 
its behaviour, then we are entitled to consider such a system as one which does have such states—
see (1987). 
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 This manifestation will be an action of or change to the system: the occurrence of a manifestation 
is not the belief itself. On this model, the dispositional array which is a particular belief can be had 
whilst not manifesting at all (this is simply a particular case of the principle that dispositions can 
persist un-manifested to which Martin is committed—see section 1.4 of this thesis).  
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 A believes x if A will y when z occurs; 
which could be used as a reduction base for belief ascriptions. A's y-ing on z, even if 
generally typical of believing x, might always be prohibited by the presence of some further 
reciprocal disposition partners for mutual manifestation—and this cannot simply be ceteris 
paribus-ed away. This is simply a particular case of the general irreducibility of dispositions 
to conditionals to which Martin is committed (see sections 1.1-1.4 and 4.1 of this thesis). 
 Given that non-mental systems can also exhibit layered dispositional state arrays 
with complex interrelation between them, it seems unlikely that having these features 
(which, according to Martin is what having beliefs or desires amounts to) is going to fulfil 
the role of a uniquely distinguishing feature that sets mental systems apart from non-
mental ones. Martin also considers whether there might be features unique to the sorts of 
dispositional state arrays which underlie beliefs and which are not found elsewhere—
perhaps whilst having the sort of dispositional structure outlined above is not unique to 
mental systems, there might be something special about the particular details of the 
structure of mental systems. Martin consider three potential such features—opacity, 
negation and assertion—which might be thought to be exclusive to mental dispositional 
state arrays, and claims that we can find parallels to all these in non-mental systems. It 
seems that as with control, perhaps exhibiting the sorts of dispositional state arrays which 
Martin claims are the truthmakers for ascriptions of beliefs, desires and similar 
psychological states is necessary for a system to count as mental, but it is not sufficient.
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 Perceptions, according to Martin, are also to be understood using the resources of 
his account of dispositionality. Perceptions, unlike beliefs, desires, etc., are not 
dispositional states of the system, but rather are mutual manifestations, the reciprocal 
disposition partners for which include both dispositions of the system and dispositions of 
the immediate, proximate environment in which the system is embedded (2008, pp. 143-
145). This immediate environment, in the case of the human being, includes the body; 
feeling our movements, proprioception, etc. are just normal cases of perception. Martin is 
keen to emphasise the co-priority of all sense modalities, especially what he calls tactile-
motor-kinaesthetic perception, which he sees as playing a key role in developing the 
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 We might still reserve the use of terms such as 'belief' and 'desire' for states of mental systems, 
to avoid the unappealing practice of using psychological names for similar disposition state arrays in 
non-mental systems. However, this presupposes our ability to distinguish the mental from the non-
mental, and so if we are to talk this like, we cannot appeal to belief and desire ascriptions in order to 
explain what distinguishes the former from the latter.  
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concept of three-dimensional space and of our personal boundaries, of the divide between 
me and not-me, of inner and outer (ibid., pp. 162-165). The nature and content of a 
perception will be determined by the natures of the dispositions involved in the reciprocal 
partnering that produced it as a mutual manifestation, and there is no natural priority 
which can be afforded to either the internal states of the perceiving system or to its 
immediate proximate environment. Martin recognises the difficulty in presenting a full 
account of the details of this in even a single case of perception, stating that "[d]etails of 
the nature of the reciprocity of the disposition partners for some mental activities are far 
from clear because they would largely be internal to the organism and forbiddingly 
complex" (ibid., p.143). That the account given might have the result that, in practice, we 
are unable to know the details of the symphony of reciprocal disposition partners whose 
mutual manifestation constitutes a given perception out not to count against the account—
our metaphysics should not answer to epistemological worries, and Martin characterises 
such epistemological limitations as "just one consequence of realism" (ibid., p.155). 
Nevertheless, it ought to be clear that if what perception amounts to is the mutual 
manifestation of reciprocal disposition partners both internal and external to the system, 
this is again a feature that is not different in kind to features that can be possessed by non-
mental systems. Exhibiting the type of dispositional make-up which underlies perception 
again looks to be a feature that may well be necessary for a system to count as mental, but 
it will not be sufficient, and so it cannot serve as a unique marker by which to distinguish 
the mental from the non-mental.
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 Martin, before offering an account of intentionality, distinguishes two senses in 
which it might be said that a state of a system is intentional: 
(7.i) its exhibiting various features such as directedness, selectiveness and 
prohibitiveness to things both actual and non-actual; 
and: 
(7.ii) its having significance and point for an agent (ibid., p.150). 
Unsurprisingly, (7.i), Martin states, is exhibited equally by mental and non-mental causal 
dispositions and complexly interrelated systems of array states of such dispositions. If 
intentionality is to be understood in terms of (7.i), then given the commitment of the Limit 
View of properties that all properties contribute to the dispositional nature of their 
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 What was said above regarding reserving 'belief' talk for mental systems can also be said 
regarding perceptual talk.  
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bearers, then all properties contribute to the directivities, selectivities and prohibitivities of 
whatever bears them: intentionality in the sense of (7.i) is ubiquitous. This given, 
intentionality in the first sense does not constitute a marker by which we can distinguish 
the mental systems from non-mental ones; all systems will bear the mark of (7.i)-type 
intentionality. It is conceiving of intentionality in these terms that has led Molnar (2003, pp. 
60-81); Martin and Pfeifer (1986), and Place (1996) to respond that rather than being the 
mark of the mental (what is often known as 'the Brentano thesis'), (7.i)-intentionality is the 
mark of the dispositional. Exhibiting intentionality in the first sense may well be necessary 
in order for a system to count as mental, but it will not be sufficient. 
 Martin suggests that the second manner of conceiving of intentionality, not merely 
as being directed etc. in particular ways towards things both actual and non-actual, but 
rather, in so being having significance for an agent, is preferable (2008, p.151). To fail to 
respect the difference between (7.i) and (7.ii), and so to treat instances of each as of but a 
single kind, he warns, leads us towards panpsychism (ibid.). The sort of significance Martin 
seems to have in mind regarding (7.ii) is semantic; he motivates the problem with the 
following quotation from Fodor: 
It's puzzling how a rock (or the state of having a rock in your intention box) could 
have a propositional object; but then, it's no less puzzling how a formula (or the 
state of having a formula in your intention box) could have a propositional object. It 
is, in fact, puzzling how anything could have a propositional object[...] (1987, pp. 
137-8). 
Martin takes the framing of the question, and the form of answer given by Fodor, to imply 
a wrongheaded search for particular entities which themselves display meaning or 
significance, perhaps irreducibly or primitively so.
149
 In what he sees as following in the 
footsteps of Locke and Wittgenstein, Martin denies the possibility of providing such an 
answer, on the grounds "[...] that intentionality [in the second sense] and significance 
reside not in particulars themselves, but in their uses. They do not just have an 
intentionalistic halo." (2008, p.151). If the claim that intentionality, significance and 
meaning are best understood in terms of use is to be illuminating, then some account of 
use needs to be given. 
 Martin offers the following provisional characterisation of 'use': 
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solution Fodor assumes is needed. 
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[...] use is intrinsic to systems of dispositional states capable of complex, directed, 
combinatorial, regulative, distal adjustments and control as well as negative and 
positive feedback. (ibid., p.177)  
This characterisation, Martin notes, applies to systems both mental and non-mental. Being 
the sort of system that can engage in use, then, is not a marker that distinguishes the 
mental from the non-mental. Martin (ibid., p.178) goes on to offer a more in-depth analysis 
of use, distinguishing between: 
 The instrument/mechanism of use: the manner in which the dispositional system 
concerned is structured such that it can engage in the relevant sort of use—Martin 
encourages us to think about how a water pistol and an acid pistol might have to differ 
compositionally in order to perform the same function, that is, expelling liquid in a 
particular manner. 
 The mode of operation: the particular ways in which the dispositional system 
concerned operates, that is, the various mutual manifestations for which it is directive, 
selective and prohibitive (etc.) with a variety of disposition partners.
150
 At a certain level of 
abstraction, the mode of operation of a water pistol and an acid pistol, for example, might 
be exactly alike. 
 The material of use: this is what is put to use by the system in the mode which the 
system operates. Perhaps the most significant difference in the analysis of the uses of 
water and acid pistols respectively is the material which they use. Different materials of use 
need not imply (as in the case of the water and acid pistols) different 
instruments/mechanisms and (at some level of detail) different modes of use. The example 
Martin uses to illustrate this is an oven, which could be used to bake bread, make ceramics, 
or indeed to set off fireworks! There would be no need to alter the structure of the system 
in order to put the system to these different uses, and it would operate on the various 
materials (dough, clay, fireworks) in just the same manner (ibid., p.179). 
 As has been noted above, mental and non-mental systems do not seem to differ in 
kind (although they may differ in some of the specifics) at the fundamental level with 
regard to the manner in which they operate, nor in the sort of mechanisms of use they 
employ; Martin offers the example of the autonomic nervous system in support of this 
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 Martin simply states that "The second aspect of use, mode of operation, ought by now to be 
familiar" (2008, p.178). I take him here to be referring to the general model for dispositionality and 
causation he has presented, which would be the ontological basis for the way in which a particular 
system works/behaves. 
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claim (ibid., p.181). This leaves the third aspect of use—the material—as a possible 
hallmark of mentality, as a way in which we can distinguish the mental from the non-
mental; and it is here that Martin locates just such a hallmark. In mental use alone, 
according to Martin, the material of use is sensate.
151
 Sensate material falls into two 
classes: sensory experience/input and imagery.
152
 Whereas sensory input is a matter of the 
mutual manifestation of some part of the system which is a sense organ and its immediate 
environment (which includes, in the case of some systems possessed by the human animal, 
its own body), imagery is entirely internal to the system. Imagery counts as sensate on the 
basis that it shares qualitative similarity with sensory input which typically comes (at least 
partially) from outside the system and results in output which is also (at least primarily) 
external.
153
 When imagery (that is, material that shares qualitative similarity with typical 
sensory input) is put to use by the system, it usually does not lead to output external to the 
system (ibid., p.138). Martin holds such material in special regard, calling himself a "mental 
chauvinist" insofar as he will reserve the terms 'mental', 'sentient', and 'conscious' for 
systems that exhibit use which takes as its material both sensory input and imagery (ibid., 
p.139). The qualities which underlie the similarities between particular inputs and their 
corresponding images are, according to Martin, "[t]he light of the world. They are 
embedded in the inner life of our minds. They are what we go over in our heads verbally 
and non-verbally, they embody the sensory richness of our dreaming and the very feel of 
our feelings" (ibid.).
154
 It appears we have found that which can act as a marker for the 
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 Beliefs and desires, often considered as paradigm intentional states, are not, according to Martin, 
fit material for use (2008, p.179), as they are best analysed in terms of various dispositional state 
arrays of the system. As such, they are not apt for use. Rather, they are part of the mechanism and 
contribute to the mode of operation of use made by the system.    
152
 Martin makes it clear than not all sensate material available to a system, however, is actually 
made use of. Whilst that that is, is the locus of significance, that that is not, is not "[...]of, as, for, 
from or that" anything; these are the "[...]countless bodily tweaks, twinges, tingles, and visual spots, 
flashes, blurrings, and less than total darkness with our eyes closed or open [that go] mostly 
unnoticed[...][and] are, it would seem, entirely useless to us." (2008, p.190).  
153
 It may be worth emphasising that images are not qualitatively similar to what they are images of, 
rather, they are qualitatively similar to what it is like to perceive (receive sensory input from) what 
they are images of. When I imagine a horse in a paddock, my image is qualitatively similar to a 
perception I could have/have had of a horse in a paddock, but most likely has very little qualitative 
similarity to horses and paddocks themselves, however they are arranged—see Martin (2008, 
p.166.) 
154
 It seems here that Martin takes the explanation for qualia to be in the qualitative similarities 
between sensory input and their corresponding images. Unfortunately he does not elaborate on the 
point here or elsewhere in (2008). 
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mental, a feature that a system can exhibit which will distinguish it from non-mental 
systems. 
 Martin does not understand the distinction between the mental and non-mental as 
one which can be drawn with neat, non-overlapping boundaries. Rather, it is a matter of 
degree: 
If various evolving disposition arrays are interrelated in sufficiently complex ways 
for interrelated alternative forms of reactiveness to alternative forms of sensate 
input, then such reactive manifestations may earn the name 'semantic or cognate 
use.' This, of course, is a matter of degree, as it should be. (ibid., p.188) 
and, of the account of use given above: 
The resulting picture is tripartite. It is, as well, gradualist. We want a model for the 
notion of use that can take us from semantic ooze to semantic light, and that does 
so in a way that makes these distinctions only a matter of degree. (ibid., p.178)  
This given, we may not be able to make a non-arbitrary decision about what degree of use 
of sensate material is required before significance, and so mentality, can be ascribed to the 
goings-on-in and doings-of a particular system. There might be a perceived tension 
between these gradualist claims, and Martin's profession of 'mental chauvinism': if there is 
no non-arbitrary dividing line, one might think, we can only discuss systems as being more-
or-less mental, perhaps even suggesting that the spectre of panpsychism lurks in the 
background of Martin's account. However, if the interpretation of Martin's account of the 
mind laid out above is correct, then several necessary conditions have been laid out for 
mentality. A system will not even be a candidate mental system unless it exhibits control; 
particular sorts of disposition state arrays; the necessary structures for perception, and use. 
The gradualism comes in once these conditions have been met. And even exhibiting these 
features will not guarantee the status of mental; a particular sort of material needs to be 
employed in the uses in which the system engages. So, whilst perhaps sharp boundaries 
may not be easy to draw within that limited set of cases, it does not seem that a Sorities-
style slide into panpsychism is a genuine worry for Martin.
155
 One way to put this is that 
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 I can envisage at least two dimensions on which the gradualism of Martin's account might be 
founded. First, similarity is a matter of degree, and insofar as the qualitative similarity between 
internal imagery and external sensory input is relevant to whether or not a  system counts as 
mental, differences in the degree of these similarities might be the foundation for gradations 
between systems moving from the barely to the clearly mental. There may be no non-arbitrary point 
at which we can draw the line on this scale between the conscious and the non-conscious. The 
second is a quantitative scale, one based on how much use the system makes of sensate material. 
Again, there may be no non-arbitrary level of use that guarantees consciousness. These two ways 
135 
 
whilst there might be more semantic ooze out there than we first suspected, it certainly is 
not everywhere! 
 Martin's account of the mind is, in essence, an analysis in terms of complex systems 
of interrelated dispositions. In order to count as mental, a system must exhibit certain 
features: it must be capable of making adjustments to itself and its immediate environment 
in reaction to changes both internal and external to itself, that is, it must exhibit control; its 
structure must include the particular sorts of dispositional state arrays that provide the 
truthmakers for belief and desire statements; likewise for perceptual activity, and it must 
be capable of engaging in use. Furthermore, the use must be of a specific kind—it must 
take for its material a mixture of sensory-input and imagery—so any such system must be 
capable to producing internal signals which are qualitatively similar to those it receives 
from its environment. As the extent to which this material is put to use, and the degree to 
which such internal images and external inputs are similar are both matters of degree, such 
an account is gradualist in nature. It should be clear that Martin's account, as laid out 
above, does not demand any ontological novelty at the fundamental level in order to 
account for mentality; it is a monistic account which sees the mental as arising from 
particularly structured complexes of powerful qualities; that is, properties the instantiation 
of which contribute to both the dispositional and qualitative nature of the object which 
bears them. Martin himself suggests the characterisation of this position as "[...]physicalist, 
although not 'materialist'"(ibid., p.161). 
 
7.2    The Ontology of Mind and Body 
One of the most important questions facing a philosopher tackling questions about the 
nature of the mind regards the ontological status of the mental. Perhaps the most pressing 
question on this topic is whether or not a plausible account of mental phenomena will 
require us to posit fundamental entities (in the broadest sense) which are ontologically 
independent of those fundamental entities required by a plausible account of 
(paradigmatically) non-mental phenomena. Unsurprisingly, there are a variety of different 
answers to this question. I will examine the conceptual space carved out by these answers 
in greater detail later in this thesis. Briefly however, one could delineate four broad classes 
                                                                                                                                                                    
need not be exclusive; both may need to be taken into account in the assessing of whether a 
particular system counts as mental. It bears repeating that the basis is certainly not a matter of 
degrees of complexity: Martin explicitly denies this, see for instance (2008, p.193). 
136 
 
of answer:
156
 three which answer the question with a 'no', albeit for different reasons, and 
one that answers it with a 'yes': 
 Idealism: "No, a plausible account of mental phenomena will not require us to posit 
fundamental entities (in the broadest sense) which are ontologically independent of those 
fundamental entities required by a plausible account of apparently non-mental 
phenomena, as these latter are fully accounted for by a full account of mental 
phenomena." 
 Physicalism: "No, a plausible account of apparently mental phenomena will not 
require us to posit fundamental entities (in the broadest sense) which are ontologically 
independent of those fundamental entities required by a plausible account of non-mental 
phenomena, as the former are fully accounted for by a full account of non-mental, that is 
physical, phenomena." 
 Neutral Monism: "No, a plausible account of apparently mental phenomena will 
not require us to posit fundamental entities (in the broadest sense) which are ontologically 
independent of those fundamental entities required by a plausible account of apparently 
non-mental phenomena, as both are fully accounted for by fundamental entities which it is 
not appropriate to characterise on a mental/non-mental binary." 
 Dualism: "Yes, a plausible account of mental phenomena will require us to posit 
fundamental entities (in the broadest sense) which are ontologically independent of those 
fundamental entities required by a plausible account of non-mental phenomena, as the 
former are not fully accounted for by a full account of non-mental phenomena." 
 Each of these broad classes of positions comprises a large number of precise, 
particular answers as to just how the ontology of mental phenomena ought to be spelled 
out. The very formulation of these broad answers raises questions in and of itself, most 
pressingly: how ought the distinction between mental and non-mental be drawn? For 
reasons of scope and limited space, I shall put this question to one side for now, returning 
to discuss it in Chapters Ten and Eleven of this thesis. In what follows I operate under the 
assumption that we are able to putatively and plausibly class at least some phenomena 
that we are pre-philosophically acquainted with into the paradigmatically mental and the 
paradigmatically non-mental. Philosophical investigation into the questions surrounding 
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 It may be possible to formulate an answer to the question of the ontology of mind and body that 
falls outside of these four broad classes; however, I take the four types of answer above to at least 
cover all the major positions currently championed in the debate. 
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the ontology of apparently paradigmatically mental phenomena, and which of the sorts of 
answers outlined above we eventually settle on regarding this, will inform us as to how 
much ontological weight we assign to, and perhaps as to how strictly we cleave to, our 
initial classifications. It is important to note that even if one settles on one of the types of 
answers outlined above that responds to the question posed with a 'no', this does not 
require the abandonment of the notion that there are informative and interesting ways of 
classing ontologically homogenous phenomena which may broadly reflect the initial classes 
of mental and non-mental. Rather, it requires that one abandons the idea that the 
fundamental entities which account for each class differ ontologically speaking. Depending 
on the particular flavour of the answer given, however, it is open that one might deny the 
notion that there are informative and interesting ways of classing ontologically 
homogenous phenomena which may broadly reflect the initial classes of mental and non-
mental. That is, the question as to whether there is something interesting and informative 
about these classes is not settled by the answer given to the question of whether or not a 
plausible account of mental phenomena will require us to posit fundamental entities (in the 
broadest sense) which are ontologically independent of those fundamental entities 
required by a plausible account of non-mental phenomena. 
 By far the fiercest battle currently being fought over this particular piece of 
intellectual territory is that between various forms of physicalism and dualism. One might 
claim that there are powerful intuitive pulls towards, and intellectual dividends to be 
collected from, subscribing to an account of the world in purely physical terms. One 
appealing aspect of the physicalist world view is the relatively successful track record that 
the physical sciences have in rendering mysterious and complex phenomena intelligible via 
appeal to simple entities and simple laws. One might hope that these laws, or some 
extension of them (that is, one which does not involve the addition of a class of entities or 
laws to our current physical theory which are so radically different from currently paradigm 
physical entities that these additions are not recognisably 'physical'), can account for 
(apparently) distinctive mental phenomena.
157
 Such a position, if defensible, offers an 
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 To borrow an example from Chalmers (2010, pp. 16-17), albeit for a different purpose, when it 
became clear that electromagnetic phenomena could not be explained in the terms of mechanical 
physics, new entities (electromagnetic properties) and new laws had to be added to physics. 
However, these additions have not been taken to indicate that there is more to the world than the 
physical, but rather that there is more to the physical than mechanics. The physicalist might hold 
that to properly account for mental phenomena, some addition to physical theory needs to be 
made, but that it is of a similar kind to that accounting for electromagnetism. The dualist would hold 
that the necessary additions to our overall theory are distinctively non-physical. Whether a 
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elegant and parsimonious ontology. Furthermore, one might hope that if mysterious, 
apparently mental, phenomena turn out to be physical, then the epistemological prognosis 
regarding such phenomena is encouraging. We are already well inducted in the practice of 
investigating complex physical phenomena. If apparently mental phenomena turn out to be 
simply more of the same, then we can be hopeful that by simply continuing with our 
current modes of investigating the world we will eventually render these mysteries 
intelligible. (Such mysteries include, for instance, how to understand phenomenal 
consciousness, or how to understand the causal relationship between the mind and the 
body). 
  However, powerful arguments such as the Argument from Conceivability; the 
Knowledge Argument and the Explanatory Gap have been put forward in favour of 
rejecting the physicalist ontology; and if these are compelling, no matter how desirable 
that ontology might seem, it must be rejected. In the next two chapters, I shall examine 
arguments against physicalism in light of an account of properties that claims all real 
properties are both qualities and dispositions, that is, the particular interpretation of the 
Limit View for which I have argued in this thesis. I will argue that these arguments are not 
so compelling as they might appear to be, given this theory of properties. The arguments I 
look at are most commonly put forward by those who propose some form of property 
dualism; that is, the view that in order to properly account for both physical and mental 
phenomena, we need to posit two fundamentally distinct types of property, that is, 
physical and mental properties. These can be contrasted with substance dualisms, which 
hold that one also needs both mental and physical kinds of substance in order to account 
for mental and physical phenomena.
158
 The responses given to these arguments, by 
removing much of the motivation for holding a property dualist account of mind and body, 
lay a foundation for the neutrally monist account elaborated in the final chapter of this 
thesis. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
particular proposed account of mental phenomena would count as more like the electromagnetism 
case or the dualist case is a matter that ought to be decided on the basis of the details of that 
particular theory. 
158
 Of course, substance dualists are likely to also be property dualists. Property dualism, however, is 
consistent with substance monism. 
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Chapter Eight: The Argument from Conceivability 
 
The central premise of what is often known as the argument from conceivability may well 
find its origin in, and be most immediately recognisable from, Descartes' claim that the 
mind and body can be conceived of as existing apart from one another (2008, Sixth 
Meditation). If they can be so conceived, the thought goes, then it is possible they could 
actually exist apart from one another (as for Descartes, whatever man can conceive, God 
can actualise (ibid., p.51). Any two things that can possibly exist apart cannot be identical, 
and so mind and body must be distinct—and this leaves us with dualism. If dualism is true, 
then physicalism (and indeed any form of monism) is false. An argument that bears at the 
very least a family resemblance to this argument has more recently been developed and 
defended by Chalmers (for instance, 2010, Chapter 6). It is this argument, insofar as it is 
used either indirectly or directly to support dualism, that this chapter shall focus on.  
 Chalmers' conceivability argument is focussed on one aspect of mental 
phenomena: conscious or phenomenal experience. This sort of experience is that which it is 
like to undergo a particular mental process or to be in a particular mental state. Examples 
include: 
[...]the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth 
in a visual field[...] the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs[...] bodily 
sensations from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; 
the felt quality of emotion[...] the experience of a stream of conscious thought.  
(ibid., p.5) 
We are asked to consider creatures, known as zombies, who are physically identical to us 
but who lack all such experience (Chalmers (1996, p.94)). Zombies appear exactly as we do. 
However, for all the similarity of their bodily movements and vocalisations to ours, when a 
zombie peers out into the gradually darkening red-hued sunset; inhales the musty smell of 
her closet whilst strains of the next door neighbours' daughter's clarinet practice come 
screeching through the wall; when she cries out wildly due to the touch of a red hot poker, 
or that of her lover (and so on...), there is nothing that it is like to be her, none of this is 
accompanied by conscious experience. The zombie is able to react and respond; to 
manipulate her environment; to regulate herself, just as we would in each of these 
situations—but there is nothing it is like to do so. If this seems too far-fetched, Chalmers 
claims we need not rely on full zombies, but partial ones, who lack some aspect of 
experience (2003, section 3.2), or what he calls inverts: creatures who do not lack any 
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particular experiences, but rather experience differently than we do, perhaps they 
experience red when we experience green, and vice versa (ibid.). It is worth reiterating at 
this juncture that these creatures (zombies, part-zombies and inverts) are to be exact 
physical duplicates of subjects of conscious experience such as ourselves.
159
 Zombies may 
well inhabit zombie worlds; worlds that are complete physical duplicates of our own, but 
without any conscious experience. In such a world, for example, my zombie twin is 
currently sat typing about zombies, just as I am here (1996, pp. 94-95), but there is nothing 
it is like for my twin to do so. The first premise of Chalmers' argument is that such creatures 
are conceivable.  
 
8.1    Some Preliminary Distinctions 
Before I go on to outline Chalmers' version of the argument from conceivability, I need to 
draw a number of distinctions that play a role in the argument. The first regards the 
distinction between the physical and experience. When Chalmers discusses the physical, he 
means by this the fundamental entities and laws which figure in a complete account of 
microphysics (2010, p.142), something he sees as inevitably "com[ing] down to two things: 
the structure and dynamics of physical processes" (1996, p.118). So the claim that zombies 
(or part-zombies, or inverts) are conceivable is the claim that there could be creatures who 
are identical to ourselves in terms of their microphysical composition, structure, dynamics 
and the microphysical laws which govern them, but which lack experience entirely (or 
partially, or differ in the nature of their experience). The relevant conception of conscious 
experience for this discussion is that outlined in the previous paragraph. 
 The second is a distinction between ideal, prima facie and secunda facie 
conceivability.
160
 Briefly, something is prima facie conceivable for a conceiver when, on first 
glance, it appears to be conceivable (to avoid circularity here, some criteria will need to be 
given for conceivability, more of which momentarily) (2010, pp. 143-144). This is to be 
contrasted with secunda facie conceivability. Something is secunda facie conceivable for a 
conceiver when it is prima facie conceivable and remains conceivable after some sustained 
rational scrutiny to ensure that it really does meet whatever criteria is being applied for 
conceivability (ibid.). Ideal conceivability is that which is conceivable for some ideal 
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 So a red-green colour-blind person is not an example of an invert, as a relevant physical 
difference (in the cones present in the eye, for instance), is present. 
160
 For a full account of this distinction, and those that follow, see Chalmers (2002). 
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conceiver.
161
 Secunda facie conceivability for us, Chalmers claims, is an excellent guide to 
ideal conceivability (2002, p.197).   
 Thirdly, positive and negative kinds of conceivability are to be distinguished. 
Chalmers is much clearer about what constitutes negative conceivability: something is 
negatively conceivable when it is not ruled out a priori, or when it does not entail a 
contradiction (ibid., p.149). Positive conceivability, on the other hand, is a much harder 
notion to pin down. Chalmers says that: 
Positive notions of conceivability require that one can form some sort of positive 
conception of a situation in which S is the case. One can place the varieties of 
positive conceivability under the broad rubric of imagination: to positively conceive 
of a situation is to in some sense imagine a specific configuration of objects and 
properties. It is common to imagine situations in considerable detail, and this 
imagination is often accompanied by interpretation and reasoning. (ibid., p.150) 
Exactly how much philosophical weight such a conception is able to bear is a controversial 
issue. However, the version of the conceivability argument that will be considered in this 
chapter only invokes negative conceivability, and so thankfully we need not engage in the 
difficult task of unravelling just what a positive conception is, and what the philosophical 
ramifications of such a conception are. The notion of negative conceivability provides us 
with a criterion by which to judge prima facie, secunda facie and ideal conceivability. 
Something is prima facie negatively conceivable if it does not entail a contradiction on first 
glance, secunda facie negatively conceivable if no entailment of a contradiction can be 
uncovered following sustained rational scrutiny and ideally negatively conceivable if an 
ideal conceiver could not detect the entailment of a contradiction from what is being 
conceived. 
 A fourth distinction which plays an important role in some formulations of 
Chalmers' version of the argument from conceivability is that between primary and 
secondary (or 1- and 2-) possibility. Again, I shall only outline this distinction briefly, as little 
that I have to say in this chapter turns on the distinction. (For Chalmers' own account see, 
(1996, chapter 2) or for a full discussion of both the foundations and applications of this 
distinction see Garcia-Carpintero, M. and Macia, J., eds., (2006).) Something is primarily 
possible if it is possible that it could actually be the case, if it is a way the world might 
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 There are certainly problems that arise with the concept of an ideal conceiver, and it is less than 
clear to me what it would take for some conceiver to be one. However, nothing I say in what follows 
will turn on this, and so I am happy to grant Chalmers the notion. He discusses some such problems, 
and tentatively indicates what an account of an ideal conceiver might look like in (2002, p.148). 
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actually be. In contrast, something is secondarily possible if it is a way the world might have 
been. From this we can draw a distinction between primary and secondary conceivability. 
What is primarily conceivable is what can be conceived of keeping what we know about the 
actual world fixed, what is secondarily conceivable is that which we can conceive of 
counterfactually. Chalmers draws on the distinctions between primary and secondary 
conceivability and possibility in order to defend the second premise of his argument from 
conceivability (that conceivability can lead us to possibility). As I do not challenge his 
argument on these grounds, I shall not delve deeper into this issue here. 
 Various combinations of prima facie/secunda facie/ideal; positive/negative and 
primary/secondary conceivability lead us to be able to formulate twelve different sorts of 
conceivability. Most of these receive some treatment in Chalmers (1996). As stated above, 
the discussion in this chapter is not sensitive to the primary/secondary distinction, and will 
not be concerned with the (somewhat nebulous) notion of positive conceivability. 
Intellectual honesty and philosophical prudence dictates that whilst we must begin pre-
theoretically with prima facie conceivability, we ought always to pass over it in favour of 
secunda facie conceivability: if we want to put any weight on what at first glance appears 
conceivable, it is incumbent on us to subject this appearance to sustained rational scrutiny. 
This leaves on the table secunda facie negative conceivability and ideal negative 
conceivability. As noted above, the former is considered by Chalmers to be a very good 
guide to the latter, and it is on the latter that the version of Chalmers' argument I will be 
discussing in this chapter relies.  
 
8.2    Chalmers' Argument from Conceivability 
The version of Chalmers' argument that I present below is reconstructed from the several 
different iterations of it he presents in Chapter 6 of (2010). I have omitted those parts of 
the argument that are not pertinent to the discussion at hand (such as references to the 
distinction between primary and secondary conceivability and possibility), and where he 
has used some symbolic shorthand, I have written out the argument fully. Despite these 
changes in presentation, and certain omissions, I hope I have presented Chalmers' 
argument accurately and charitably. Chalmers' argument from conceivability runs as 
follows: 
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(P1) It is ideally negatively conceivable that a world which is an exact physical 
duplicate of our world differs from our world in terms of the conscious experiences 
that occur there; 
(P2) If it is ideally negatively conceivable that a world which is an exact physical 
duplicate of our world differs from our world in terms of the conscious experiences 
that occur there, then it is possible that a world which is an exact physical duplicate 
of our world differs from our world in terms of the conscious experiences that 
occur there; 
(P3) If it is possible that a world which is an exact physical duplicate of our world 
differs from our world in terms of the conscious experiences that occur there, then 
physicalism is false; 
(C1) Physicalism is false. 
It ought to be noted that if this argument is intended to lend direct positive support to a 
dualistic account of the ontology of mind and body (I do not intend to attribute this usage 
to Chalmers), then an additional premise and conclusion need to be added: 
(P4) If physicalism is false, then dualism is true; 
(C2) Dualism is true. 
Premise one makes the claim that an ideal conceiver possessed of all relevant information 
could derive no contradiction from, or could not rule out a priori, the notion of a world 
which is an exact physical duplicate of our world at which nothing undergoes conscious 
experience (a zombie world); or one at which some of the physical duplicates of our-
worldly subjects-of-experience undergo less conscious experience than their our-worldly 
counterparts (a partial zombie world), or one at which some of these duplicate entities 
undergo different conscious experiences (an invert world). Premise two affirms the link 
between ideal negative conceivability and possibility. Premise three claims that such a 
possibility is incompatible with a physicalist account of the ontology of mind and body. The 
conclusion (and supplementary premise and conclusion necessary to make this argument a 
positive one in support of dualism) ought to be clear.  
 
8.3    Responding to the Argument: Part One  
There are a number of ways one might respond to Chalmers' argument. It is worth noting 
at this point that the argument appears to me to be valid, and so any response will 
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question the soundness of the argument. Premise three ought to be relatively 
uncontroversial. Thus, responses to the argument will target the viability of premises one 
(the conceivability claim) and two (the link between conceivability and possibility). I will 
briefly outline two potential responses which, whilst I am sympathetic to the moves they 
make, I shall not be putting forward in this chapter. The first challenges premise one, and 
the second involves a denial of premise two. Following this, I shall formulate a response to 
the argument based on the account of the ontology of properties put forward in this thesis 
which denies premise one. 
 Chalmers' first premise affirms that an ideal conceiver could not rule out a priori 
the existence of a zombie world. Clearly, as we are not ideal conceivers, nor are we 
acquainted with ideal conceivers, we do not have direct evidence or proof for this claim.
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Therefore, in order to be able to assert premise one with any force, we need some sort of 
guide to what could and could not be ruled out a priori by an ideal conceiver.  
 As discussed above, Chalmers' claims that we have an excellent guide to this in 
secunda facie negative conceivability; that is, in those notions we find are not ruled out a 
priori after sustained rational scrutiny. One might question how much weight this can bear, 
however. First, it ought to be noted that this cannot be a perfect guide to ideal negative 
conceivability, for if it were, then everything that is negatively conceivable secunda facie 
would also be negatively conceivable ideally, and vice versa. If this is the case, then it is 
hard to see how we can draw any distinction between ideal and secunda facie 
conceivability; indeed, we seem to have cast ourselves in the role of the ideal conceiver. 
Given that there must be a gap, it is open to Chalmers' opponent to ask just how large this 
gap might be. Chalmers' affirms that secunda facie negative conceivability is an excellent 
guide to ideal negative conceivability (2002, p.197), and thus that the gap is small, thereby 
lending a high degree of probability, if not certainty, that what cannot be ruled out a priori 
secunda facie will not be so ruled out ideally.  
 But what could license such a claim? It seems in order to do so, one would need a 
representative sample of notions not ruled out a priori secunda facie which could be 
demonstrated to be for the vast majority also not ruled out ideally; but it is very hard to see 
how such a comparison could be made. Thus, Chalmers' opponent might conjecture that 
we have no reason to affirm the link between secunda facie and ideal conceivability, and 
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 Indeed, one might even question whether we have any clear idea of what being an ideal 
conceiver entails. This is not a line of thought I shall follow up here, however. 
145 
 
therefore no reason to affirm premise one, notwithstanding the secunda facie negative 
conceivability of zombies.  It would be a disingenuous, if tempting, response for the 
defender of Chalmers' argument, to demand some examples of where these two come 
apart in order to motivate the criticism: as any claim that we can identify as ruled out a 
priori, even if for some time we took it not to be so, will be, per definiens, ruled out 
secunda facie, and therefore not an example of something which is negatively conceivable 
secunda facie but not so ideally. There is no example we could possibly give of such a 
notion, and so it is unreasonable to demand one. There may be something to such a 
response to Chalmers', however, to establish the force of such a response would require far 
more attention than I can dedicate to the question here. For the purposes of what follows, 
I am willing to grant that secunda facie negative conceivability is a good—although not 
perfect—guide to ideal negative conceivability. 
 Another way one might respond to Chalmers' argument (and one which has been 
more common in the literature than that which I have outlined above (see, for instance, Hill 
and McLaughlin (1999))) would be to deny the truth of premise two, that is, to deny that 
ideal negative conceivability entails possibility. If conceivability does not entail possibility, 
that is, if some things which are not ruled out a priori by an ideal conceiver with all relevant 
information, are nonetheless impossible, then Chalmers' argument does not go through. In 
spite of the fact that the notion of a zombie world does not entail any contradiction, if this 
criticism is correct, then this in no way guarantees that such a world is a genuine possibility. 
And as it is the possibility, and not the conceivability, of a zombie world which mitigates 
against physicalism, if the link between these two is severed, then we have no reason to 
take the conceivability of a zombie world to lead us to the falsity of physicalism.  
 Chalmers' discusses a number of ways this attack might be elaborated (2002). He 
responds by drawing on the resources of two dimensional semantics to distinguish 
between different notions of both conceivability and possibility, and attempts to establish a 
link between certain types of conceivability and possibility which are not vulnerable to the 
sort of criticism laid out above. Whilst I have sympathy with the claim that conceivability 
may not entail possibility, it is not a line a criticism that I will be pursuing here. The debate 
surrounding this question is complex, and Chalmers' response (for a full account, see (2010, 
section 3.6)) is subtle and nuanced. A proper treatment of this aspect of the debate 
surrounding the argument from conceivability would require far more space than I am able 
to dedicate to it here, and so in what follows, notwithstanding my sympathy for this line of 
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criticism, I grant the proponent of the Argument from Conceivability the truth of premise 
two, that is, I accept the link between ideal negative conceivability and possibility. 
 
8.4    Responding to the Argument: Part Two 
The response I will give to the argument from conceivability as developed by Chalmers 
targets premise one: the claim that a zombie world is ideally negatively conceivable. To 
appreciate the force of the response, we need to first take a closer look at the premise, and 
consider exactly what it is that we are being asked to accept as conceivable. The premise 
states: 
(P1) It is ideally negatively conceivable that a world which is an exact physical 
duplicate of our world differs from our world in terms of the conscious experiences 
that occur there 
That this premise is open to examination is a point often missed. Tim Crane, in his 
discussion of the argument, for instance, states "Premise (1) is also fairly 
uncontroversial[...] all [it] requires is that one can conceive of a physical replica of any 
phenomenally conscious creature which lacks [such consciousness]. This is clearly 
conceivable." (2001, p.100). Before we should give our assent to this analysis of the 
premise, we need to be clear on both what it means for some world to be an exact physical 
duplicate of our own, and what it would take for such a world to differ in terms of the 
conscious experiences that occur there. Only then will the conceivability of the premise 
acquire the 'clarity' Crane and others attribute it with.  
 These issues are ontological in nature, they concern what sorts of entities (in the 
broadest sense) there are in both our own world and the putative zombie world. How one 
answers these questions will depend on the sort of fundamental ontology one subscribes 
to.
163
 Throughout this thesis I have been working within the framework of an object based 
ontology. Objects, on this account, are propertied-substances, and form the most 
fundamental ontological category. What it would take for some world to be a physical 
duplicate of this world then includes, but may not be limited to: 
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 With one caveat: one cannot, in the context of this debate, appeal to a fundamental ontological 
distinction between the physical and the conscious in how one settles these questions. To do so 
would be to beg the question in favour of dualism, the very position the argument is supposed to 
promote (either directly, with the supplementary premise and conclusion given above, or indirectly, 
simply by mitigating against physicalism). 
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(8.i) it containing duplicates of all the physical objects found in this world; 
(8.ii) these objects being arranged in the same manner; 
(8.iii) these objects having the same physical histories (past arrangements); 
(8.iv) these objects being subject to the same physical laws. 
Condition (8.i) requires some further specification in terms of the sort of ontology being 
worked with in this thesis. For an object to be a duplicate of another object (physical or 
otherwise) it would need to instantiate exactly similar properties in an exactly similar 
pattern, both synchronically and diachronically. There may be other conditions. For 
instance, one might think there needed to be some shared quiddity between the substance 
and its duplicate, but on this matter I shall remain neutral, as it does not bear on what 
follows. The condition that will play an important role in my response is that regarding 
properties, and I hold that this is at the very least amongst the necessary conditions for 
some-thing to be a physical duplicate of some other thing.
164
  
 A response to this line of criticism might spring almost immediately to mind: the 
proponent of the argument from conceivability could simply deny this particular account of 
fundamental ontology, thus avoiding any ramifications it has for the argument. First, I take 
the basic tenets of this ontology to enjoy a respectable degree of plausibility and have 
independent motivation, and so I shall not defend them here. The purpose of this section is 
to show how accepting such an ontology allows one to respond to arguments such as that 
from conceivability, rather than to present arguments in favour of such an ontology. That 
adopting the ontology put forward in this thesis can furnish a line of response to arguments 
such as that from conceivability will be of special significance to those who are sympathetic 
to the ontology proposed and to the argument from conceivability—they may find they 
need to reassess one of their sympathies—and it may add appeal to such an ontology for 
those who appreciate the force of the argument but are uncomfortable with its 
conclusions. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, a key concept in the argument is 
that of duplication. Duplication, conceptually speaking, involves similarity; perfect 
duplication, exact similarity. Properties are what characterise objects, and as such, they 
provide the dimensions along which objects can be similar or dissimilar. Regardless of the 
general account of ontology the proponent of the Argument from Conceivability puts 
forward, they are going to have to provide some account of properties (whether their 
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 It would seem perverse to insist that A was a physical duplicate of B if these two instantiated 
dissimilar physical properties. 
148 
 
fundamental entities are objects, facts, states of affairs or whatever...) in order to give any 
substantive role to the notion of duplication. As will be seen below, it is the account of 
properties put forward in this thesis that will be operative in the response to the argument, 
and if what I have said above is correct, any proponent of this argument will have to have 
some such account. 
 As we have seen, an account of properties is essential to the proper understanding 
of premise one. Without a conception of what sorts of things properties are, one cannot 
conceive of duplication per se, and so not of physical duplication without a duplication of 
conscious experience. For some-thing to be a physical duplicate or some other thing, as has 
been shown, is for it to instantiate exactly similar physical properties in an exactly similar 
pattern both presently and throughout its history. Could the proponent of the argument 
claim that we do not need a positive account of properties to conceive of duplication, we 
can simply fill in the blanks with some sort of conceptual placeholder? I contend that they 
cannot. Remember, the account of conceiving in play here is that of not being able to 
uncover a contradiction a priori. Without a positive conception of the relevant notions, one 
cannot, with confidence, endorse the claim that no such contradiction arises. The demands 
of sustained rational scrutiny which amount to secunda facie conceivability require of us 
that an account be given.  
 For something to be a physical duplicate, is for it to instantiate exactly similar 
physical properties; that is, for Chalmers (see above), for it to instantiate exactly similar 
structural and dynamic properties at the microphysical level. Structural and dynamic 
properties, at first glance, seem like ideal candidates for characterisation in purely 
dispositional terms. These are to be contrasted, remember, with conscious experiences;  
things which, in the quotation given above, Chalmers characterises with the term 'quality' 
multiple times. Conscious experiences of the sort relevant to the current discussion, at first 
glance, seem like ideal candidates for characterisation in purely qualitative terms. If this is 
correct, then what we are asserting the conceivability of in asserting premise one, is that 
there could be some world which is an exact dispositional duplicate of our world, but which 
differs with regard to its qualitative nature; that is, that the preceding notion cannot be 
ruled out a priori, that it does not entail any contradiction. 
 That Chalmers' notions of physical phenomena and conscious experiences seem 
apt to be characterised in purely dispositional and purely qualitative terms, respectively, 
gives us reason to doubt (according to the account of properties put forward in this thesis) 
that what they pick out are properties. A proponent of the Limit View of properties does 
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not need to subscribe to the view that therefore these descriptions are erroneous, but 
rather that any inference from the validity of such descriptions to the claim that there are 
therefore pure dispositions or pure qualities is erroneous. Objects can be described in 
purely dispositional terms, just regarding how they will behave in a variety of situations; 
and likewise they can be characterised in purely qualitative terms, regardless of their 
potential behaviours. But neither of these characterisations is exhaustive, for the 
properties which, in complex combinations, are the truthmakers for these purely 
dispositional or purely qualitative descriptions are themselves purely neither, and impurely 
both. For a proponent of the Limit View, dispositions and qualities are identical. If 
duplication is to be characterised in terms of the instantiation of exactly similar properties, 
and if the notions of the physical and the consciously experiential in play in Chalmers' 
argument do not pick out properties, then the question surrounding the conceivability of a 
physical-but-not-consciously-experiencing-duplicate is less clear cut than it might at first 
have appeared to be, for we cannot straightforwardly identify some set of physical (purely 
dispositional) properties which are instantiated by both objects in the duplication-pair, and 
some set of conscious experience (purely qualitative) properties which are instantiated by 
only one of the objects in the duplication-pair. 
 Can a contradiction be derived from the combination of the arguments from 
conceivability's first premise and Limit View? I believe there can be. It has been suggested 
above that the proponent of the argument is committed to the claim that there could be a 
world alike in all its dispositional features to our own but differing somehow in at least 
some of its qualitative features. But according to the ontology of properties put forward in 
this thesis, dispositional and qualitative features are bestowed in virtue of properties in 
complex combinations, each of which makes specific contributions to both the overall 
dispositionality and overall qualitativity of the objects that instantiate them. These specific 
dispositional and qualitative contributions are identical to one another, and to the property 
itself. But the notion of an exact physical duplicate (that is, an object that instantiates 
properties that make exactly similar dispositional contributions) which is not a duplicate in 
terms of conscious experience (that is, an object that instantiates properties that do not 
make exactly similar qualitative contributions) fails to respect this identity. Given the 
transitivity of identity, a contradiction can be derived. Where D stands for some particular 
dispositional contribution made by some property, and Q for the particular qualitative 
contribution made by that same property, the Limit View asserts that: 
 (8.v) ∀x(Dx↔Qx); 
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which entails: 
 (8.vi) ¬∃x(Dx^¬Qx); 
but what we are being asked to conceive in premise one is that some object instantiates 
properties that make exactly similar dispositional contributions but not exactly similar 
qualitative ones, that is: 
 (8.vii) ∃x(Dx^¬Qx); 
so, the combination of the Limit View and premise one of the argument from conceivability 
yields: 
 (8.viii) ¬∃x(Dx^¬Qx)^∃x(Dx^¬Qx); 
which is a straight contradiction. The account of properties put forward in this thesis gives 
one the tools to make a principled denial of the first premise of the argument from 
conceivability. Furthermore, the account is motivated by a priori considerations (see 
Chapter Three of this thesis) which are independent of the issues in the philosophy of mind 
which are at stake in this account, and so cannot be accused of simply begging the question 
in favour of the inconceivability of zombies.  
 I am not the only person to have appealed to the Limit View of properties in order 
to respond to the argument from conceivability. Heil highlights the inconsistency between 
this view of properties and the possibility of zombies, stating: 
Qualities and powers cannot vary independently. The possibility of zombies 
depends on the denial of this thesis. (2003, p.248)
165
  
His attack on the argument focuses on the possibility, rather than the conceivability, of 
zombies. I have opted to aim at the latter, in order to fend off a potential response from 
the proponent of the argument. It might be held that if our modal epistemology comes into 
conflict with certain claims made by our ontology, then this highlights some problem with 
the ontology outlined. Proponents of the argument from conceivability, as I have presented 
it here, take secunda facie negative conceivability to be an excellent guide to ideal negative 
conceivability, which in turn is seen as a perfect guide to possibility. They might hold, 
therefore, that if a certain ontological position comes into conflict with what they take to 
be possible (via conceivability), this is simply evidence against that position. The strongest 
line of attack, then, is to show that first, for the conceivability claim to even get off the 
ground, some ontological account of properties or other must be given. This is not 
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something the proponent of the argument from conceivability can defer or remain quiet 
about. Secondly, given a certain account—the Limit View—the conceivability claim itself 
cannot be maintained. 
  I have shown that, given the inevitability of settling on a substantive account of 
properties for the proponent of the argument from conceivability, the notion of zombies 
entails a contradiction a priori; rendering them inconceivable by the lights of Chalmers' 
own account. Given this, questions of the relative status of conceivability and ontology with 
regards to our modal epistemology dissolve: the former is inextricably tied to the latter, 
and it is no longer open to the proponent of this argument to claim that the clash between 
the Limit View and the possibility of zombies highlights a defect with that ontology. Of 
course, the proponent of the argument from conceivability may wish to deny the Limit 
View altogether, but she cannot do that on the grounds that it clashes with the possibility 
of zombies, on pain of begging the question. She will need both an alternative account of 
properties, and independent motivation for adopting that account rather than this one.  
 Another response the proponent of the argument from conceivability might make 
to the claims made above is that even if one accepts that every real property makes both a 
dispositional and a qualitative contribution to whatever bears it, these contributions could 
come apart modally; that is, that an exactly similar property that makes contributions D1 
and Q1 at this world might make entirely different contributions—D2 and Q2, say—or 
partially different contributions—D1 and Q2, say—at some other world. One needs to be 
clear on what would need to be the case in order for these to represent genuine 
possibilities. The first case, where an exactly similar property makes completely different 
contributions in a different possible world, requires that we have a very peculiar account of 
property similarity. The natural way to consider two properties as members of the same 
exact resemblance class (the trope theorist's equivalent to calling two properties 'the 
same') would be in terms of those properties making exactly similar contributions to the 
objects that bear them. If we give up on this way of grouping properties as the 'same', we 
will need some other principle, by which to do so. The only option seems to be a quidditism 
according to which the identity of properties is trivial and brute (see section 2.3 or, for 
instance, Bird 2007, fn.38). Such a conception, however, will not help the proponent of the 
argument from conceivability. If we are to accept that two objects located at different 
worlds are duplicates of one another in virtue of bearing certain properties that can be 
considered the 'same', but which make wholly dissimilar contributions to those objects, we 
seem to have given up on any notion of duplication which is of philosophical interest. It is 
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also hard to see what would license, as the proponent of the argument would require, us 
considering these as specifically physical duplicates and specifically not duplicates in terms 
of conscious experience. 
 Much more promising is the second notion that perhaps exactly similar physical 
properties (properties considered in terms of their dispositional contribution) could 
contribute in distinctive ways in terms of qualitativity at different worlds. If one accepts the 
Limit View, zombie worlds may still not be conceivable, as these properties will always 
make some qualitative contribution, but, importantly, invert worlds will be conceivable 
(worlds which are physical duplicates but at which some conscious experiences are 
different rather than absent). Chalmers' takes the possibility of invert worlds to be enough 
to establish the anti-physicalist conclusion he is aiming at (1996, pp. 99-101), and if my 
response allows for them, then it is of little relevance to the debate being examined here. 
On what sort of view might it be possible for properties that make an exactly similar 
dispositional contribution to their bearers to make dissimilar qualitative contributions? One 
reason one might consider this a live possibility is not taking the identity claim of the Limit 
View seriously, and instead considering properties as somehow made up of a dispositional 
and a qualitative bit which could be freely recombined (see sections 3.3-3.5 and 4.1 of this 
thesis for further discussion of this notion). I have argued already that this is to 
misinterpret the Limit View of properties. As such, without independent motivation and 
support it is of little value as a response to the claim that dispositions and qualities do not 
vary independently of one another.  
 Another reason one might take the notion that the dispositional and qualitative 
contributions made by a property can vary independently of one another to be plausible is 
if one thought something like the following: properties are really qualities, but they all also 
make a dispositional contribution to whatever bears them in virtue of the laws of nature 
that hold at the world they are instantiated in. Thus, in different worlds with different laws, 
Q1 and Q2 could make the same dispositional contributions/play the same dispositional 
role. However, this manner of characterising the situation is of little use as a response to 
the challenge to the argument from conceivability laid out above. First, it also fails to 
properly understand the Limit View: there is no direction in which properties are really 
either qualitative or dispositional, and only circumstantially or contingently the other. 
Secondly, remember that a physical duplicate world must have the same physical laws of 
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nature in place as those in the world it is to be a duplicate of.
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 These putative laws, which 
determine what dispositional role is to be played by which qualities, could be argued to be 
physical according to the characterisation of 'physical' offered by Chalmers; that is, 
concerned with the dynamics of the fundamental entities of the world in question, and, if 
so, then they cannot vary between worlds considered as physical duplicates.  
 A final reason one might take this to be a viable possibility is if one interpreted the 
identity claim of the Limit View as a claim about an a posteriori necessity. At least one 
supporter of this position, Jonathan D. Jacobs, makes this interpretation (2011, pp. 89-90). 
Chalmers' discusses how a posteriori necessities might bear on his account extensively, and 
provides convincing arguments, utilising the resources of two-dimensional semantics, to 
show that an appeal to this class of identities do not pose a challenge to his argument (for 
instance, 2010, section 3.6). Briefly put, the idea is that if the identity between the physical 
(dispositional) and conscious experience (qualities) is an a posteriori one, then whilst 
strictly speaking these two could not vary independently, we must allow for a variation 
analogous to that between water being identical with H2O and watery-stuff being identical 
with XYZ on Twin Earth. If this is granted, Chalmers' is able to exploit a peculiar feature of 
qualities: whilst we might maintain a genuine distinction between water and watery-stuff, 
it is plausible that no such distinction can be maintained between some quality Q1 and Q1-
y-stuff. If this is the case, and so the same quality can play different dispositional roles in 
different worlds, then qualities and dispositions can vary independently of one another, 
and the conceivability of zombies (or at least inverts) is back on the table. As discussed 
elsewhere in this thesis, however, I do not think this is the correct manner in which to 
characterise the identity claim made by the Limit View.
167
 The identity between the 
qualitative and the dispositional is not like that of the Morning and Evening Star; two 
putative objects that turned out to be one, nor is it like that of water and H2O; that of an 
imprecise pre-scientific conception of a substance being coupled with precise scientific 
account of the substance's internal constitution. Rather, the reasoning in favour of the 
identity claim is a priori in nature, and concerns the nature of a certain fundamental 
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 They can of course vary with regard to non-physical laws, if there are any contingent non-physical 
laws out there with regards to which worlds can vary. 
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 Jacobs (2011) suggests that this is how the Limit View should be interpreted. However, the 
vulnerability of this interpretation to a Chalmers-style two-dimensional argument to establish that 
qualities and dispositions can vary independently of one another is a serious problem. 
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ontological category: properties. I have given an extended account of how one ought to 
understand the identity claim in Chapters Five and Six of this thesis.  
 Notwithstanding the arguments given so far in this section it may still occur to 
some to think that somehow zombies, part-zombies and inverts ought to be conceivable.
168
 
If this normative intuition is strong enough, it may lead one to conclude on those grounds 
that there must, therefore, be something wrong with an account of properties (such as the 
Limit View) which rules out zombies (and co.) a priori. If anything ought to be conceded to 
someone who formulated this sort of response, it is that there does not seem to be 
anything immediately troubling or difficult about forming a mental picture in one's mind of 
something that looks exactly like a human, goes around doing all sorts of human 
behavioural activities, but which differs with regard to conscious experience. Doing this 
might be taken by some to be 'conceiving'. The challenge to the Limit View is to plausibly 
accommodate this intuition, or, to put it another way, to provide an error theory for the 
argument from conceivability. If it can do so then the force this response has against the 
Limit View will be dispelled, and therefore it poses little problem for the challenge I have 
levelled at the argument from conceivability.  
 It is important to be clear about what needs to be accommodated here: the 
possibility of something that looks exactly like a human, engages in all sorts of human-like 
behavioural activities, but which differs with regard to conscious experience. Such an 
entity, it must be recognised, does not automatically meet the requirements of the first 
premise of the argument from conceivability: it is a further step to assert that this entity is 
a physical duplicate of a human being. The Limit View can accommodate the intuition in 
favour of the conceivability of this sort of entity. Remember that on this account 
dispositions are multi-track (see section 1.4 of this thesis); and the having of a certain 
property disposes the bearer to behave in an infinity of ways with an infinity of different 
reciprocal disposition partners. Given this, certain properties will share some of what they 
dispose their bearers to do; although no dissimilar properties will dispose bearers in exactly 
the same way. These properties which share some of the dispositional contribution they 
make to their bearers will nonetheless differ in terms of the qualitative contribution they 
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 Which if I am entirely frank I take to arise from nothing other than the ability one has to picture 
something like a person from which one then abstractly plucks the conscious experiences without 
any thought to how or why this might be possible. This sort of imagination I think is akin to what 
Chalmers calls 'positive conceivability' (see section 8.1 above), and I take it to be an extremely poor 
guide to metaphysical possibility, although I shall not pursue this line of thought any further here. 
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make. It seems to me that there could be two entities that were propertied such that they 
had substantial dispositional overlap with regards to all the reciprocal disposition partners 
one would normally expect them to come into contact with, but which diverged radically 
with regards to atypical partners. These would not however be dispositional (and therefore 
physical) duplicates of one another, they would simply appear as such when considered in 
a limited sense, or at a sufficiently coarse level of grain. The genuine possibility of these 
sorts of entities, whilst they do not fulfil the criteria of the first premise of the argument 
from conceivability, ought to satisfy the intuition that we can conceive of something that 
looks exactly like a human, engages in all sorts of human-like behavioural activities, but 
which differs with regard to conscious experience.
169
 That we can comfortably form a 
picture of such an entity in our mind—and indeed the genuine metaphysical possibility of 
such an entity—has no bearing on the truth or falsity of the first premise of the argument 
for conceivability, for whilst such things are similar in various ways to human beings, they 
are most certainly not duplicates of them in the relevant sense.  
 In this section, I have argued that in order for the conceivability claim which forms 
premise one of the argument from conceivability to be intelligible, some substantive 
account of properties needs to be given, for in the absence of such an account, we cannot 
make sense of the notion of duplication. I have tried to be as charitable to this argument as 
possible, accepting its account of conceivability, and the (not uncontroversial) claim that 
from this sort of conceivability one can draw substantive conclusions about possibility. I 
have demonstrated that accepting the account of properties put forward in this thesis—the 
Limit View—renders premise one of the argument false. Making explicit what it would take 
for there to be zombies, part-zombies or inverts—that is, the independent variation of the 
dispositional and qualitative contributions made by exactly similar properties—uncovers a 
contradiction which hitherto lay unnoticed. Zombies, part-zombies and inverts are shown, 
by the lights of the Limit View, to be secunda facie negatively inconceivable, and thus we 
have no reason to suppose they are ideally negatively conceivable, that is, to suppose the 
truth of premise one. I have responded to a number of objections that might be raised 
against my challenge to the argument from conceivability, and have attempted to dispel 
any lingering intuition that might remain that somehow zombies, part-zombies and inverts 
ought to be conceivable. In the next section I examine another argument often seen to 
favour dualism: the Knowledge Argument. 
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Chapter Nine: The Knowledge Argument 
 
Another important argument in the debate surrounding the ontology of mind and body is 
often known as the argument from knowledge. The basic idea of the argument is that it is 
possible to be in possession of complete physical knowledge of a certain system which is 
capable of conscious experience of some sort or another, whilst lacking knowledge of what 
it is like to have the sorts of conscious experiences that that system has. Arguments which 
make use of this sort of thought can be found in the work of numerous philosophers, 
including C. D. Broad (1925); Herbert Feigel (1958) and Thomas Nagel (1974). Perhaps the 
most notorious formulation of the argument from knowledge is that which Frank Jackson 
put forward in his article 'Epiphenomenal Qualia' (1982). In this article, Jackson asks us to 
consider a fictional neuroscientist, Mary: 
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the 
world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She 
specialises in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the 
physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe 
tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like 'red', 'blue', and so on. She discovers, for 
example, just which wave-length combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, 
and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of 
the vocal chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of 
the sentence 'The sky is blue'[...] What will happen when Mary is released from her 
black and white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn 
anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the 
world and our visual experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her previous 
knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is 
more to have than that, and Physicalism is false. (p.130) 
The argument can be set out as follows: 
(P1) Mary knows all the relevant physical facts before being exposed to coloured 
objects;
170 171
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 To whatever one considers to fall within the scope of the example—likely candidates being the 
neurological information; information regarding the behaviour of light radiation; information 
regarding the surface textures of mid-sized objects; information regarding the micro-physical 
structure of such objects, etc. 
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 Jackson's presentation of the argument quoted above is in terms of 'information', but the 
majority of the subsequent debate is couched in terms of 'facts', and so I shall adopt this 
terminology. 
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(P2) When exposed to coloured objects, Mary learns something both relevant and 
new; 
(P3) If Mary learns something new when exposed to coloured objects, then not all 
facts are physical facts; 
(P4) If not all facts are physical facts, then physicalism is false; 
(C1) Physicalism is false. 
It ought to be noted that if this argument is intended to lend direct positive support to a 
dualistic account of the ontology of mind and body (I do not intend to attribute this usage 
to Jackson), then an additional premise and conclusion need to be added: 
(P5) If physicalism is false, then dualism is true; 
(C2) Dualism is true. 
Premise one asserts that someone who has never been exposed to coloured objects, but 
has been schooled in certain scientific disciplines can be in possession of all the relevant 
physical facts regarding colour experiences, and that Mary is such a person. Premise two is 
the claim that such a person, when they are exposed to coloured objects for the first time, 
notwithstanding their complete physical knowledge, learns something new. Premise three 
asserts a link between the learning of something new and the existence of facts which 
correlate to the something new that has been learned. Premise four encodes Jackson's 
conception of physicalism as the "thesis[...] that all (correct) information is physical 
information" (ibid., p.127); which I am taking as equivalent to the claim that all facts are 
physical facts, a conception which he hedges by noting that physicalism is notoriously 
difficult to define. It may occur to the reader at this point that Jackson's conception of 
physicalism differs somewhat from the one I outlined earlier (see section 7.2). However, I 
do not think anything turns on this difference: Jackson later in the paper makes an explicit 
link between there being some new information (or new fact) and there needing to be a 
novel property or property-type (ibid., p.132), and it will come as little surprise to the 
reader that my response to this argument will be focussed on how the account of 
properties put forward in this thesis bears on the conclusions the argument makes. The 
conclusion (and supplementary premise and conclusion necessary to make this argument a 
positive one in support of dualism) ought to be clear.  
 Before moving on to look at some potential lines of response to the argument from 
knowledge, it is worth noting that Jackson has since rejected the argument, arguing in 
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Jackson (2003) that what Mary comes to do, when she first encounters coloured objects, is 
to enter into a variety of novel representational states (states representing there being a 
redness over there, and so on). However, there are no corresponding properties to ground 
these representations; there is no redness present either in objects or in experiences. 
Representation can be accounted for in broadly physicalist terms, and there is nothing else 
to account for. That what is represented (redness, say) does not really exist (according to 
Jackson) is not to the demerit of physicalism, as persons are able to misrepresent all sorts 
of things to themselves, beliefs, for instance, in the existence of fairies (assuming these are 
indeed false). All that needs accounting for, when Mary first encounters coloured objects, is 
that she starts to (mis)represent to herself in various consistent ways and gains the ability 
to recognise and imagine these (mis)representations. This can all be explained by appeal to 
the resources of physicalism, and indeed are in principle a priori predictable from Mary's 
full stock of physical facts. I do not find this line of response particularly convincing. First, it 
seems to take the phenomenal aspect of experience insufficiently seriously. Secondly, it is 
questionable whether it is a legitimate move to try to analyse phenomenal experience in 
terms of mere appearance. Whilst it can be merely an appearance that some feature of the 
world has some quality, it cannot also be merely an appearance that some experiential 
event is merely an appearance, on pain of regress. (Because an instance of something 
appearing to somehow to someone is itself an experiential event, with its own qualities—
see Strawson 2008a pp. 40-41). 
 Despite Jackson's rejection of it, debate over the Knowledge Argument has 
continued, and so I shall examine a number of common responses to it below, before 
moving on to examine how accepting the Limit View of properties ought to lead one to 
respond to the argument. 
  
9.1    Responding to the Argument: Part One 
There are various ways one might respond to the argument from knowledge. One might 
question the truth of premise one; that it is in principle possible for someone in Mary's 
situation to be in possession of all the relevant physical information. One might deny 
premise two, holding that Mary knows everything relevant if she knows all the physical 
facts, and so does not learn anything new when exposed to coloured objects. One may also 
deny premise three; that is, accept that Mary in some sense learns something new, but 
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deny that this entails there being facts that are not physical facts (this is probably the most 
common sort of response).  
 Objections of the first kind can be found in Alter (1998) and Harman (1990). Alter 
(1998, pp. 50-51), notes that in order for the argument from knowledge to go through, an 
additional, and currently undefended premise, which asserts that all physical facts can be 
learned discursively needs to be assumed. Without this assumption, we cannot be 
confident in our assertion that Mary can indeed know all the relevant physical facts prior to 
her exposure to coloured objects. So, even if she learns something new when she first 
encounters coloured objects, there may be no reason to suppose that this new thing learnt 
is some non-physical fact. It ought to be noted that there is no inconsistency between 
holding physicalism to be true and denying that all physical facts can be learnt discursively. 
Harman (1990, pp. 44-45) claims that there are certain functional facts, facts about the 
functional role played by certain concepts, such as the concept of something's being red, 
which someone in Mary's position cannot possibly know. It is these facts Mary learns when 
she is first exposed to coloured objects. If functional facts are taken to fall under the 
purview of physical facts, then Mary cannot know all the relevant physical facts prior to her 
exposure to coloured objects.  Thus, even though she learns something new when she first 
encounters coloured objects this new thing learnt is argued to be simply some functional, 
and so physical, fact. 
 Dennett (1991) puts forward an objection of the second sort. He first points out 
that one needs to proceed with caution in conducting this thought experiment. What 
premise one demands of us is not something readily imaginable. Someone who is in 
possession of all the relevant physical facts that anyone today possesses (and this, it is 
suggested, is the mental image of Mary conjured up by those who accept the Knowledge 
Argument's intuitive force) has only "a drop in the bucket" (ibid., p.399) compared to 
someone who possesses all the physical facts. He suggests that anyone truly in Mary's 
situation; anyone in the very difficult to conceive of situation of being in possession of all 
the relevant physical facts, might indeed learn nothing new when exposed to coloured 
objects for the first time. Dennett concedes that his response does not get anywhere near 
to proving that they would not learn anything new, but importantly, it establishes that the 
Mary thought experiment does not get anywhere near to proving that they would, it 
"simply pumps the intuition" (ibid., p.400) by insisting that something which is not 
anywhere near to being obvious (what things would be like for a being in possession of all 
the relevant physical facts) is in fact obvious. If Dennett is right, and no clear intuition can 
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be extracted from the Mary thought experiment, then the Knowledge Argument does not 
get off the ground, as we have no more reason to assert premise two than we have to deny 
it. A very similar response can also be found in Churchland (1985). 
 Responses of the third kind, that accept that when Mary is first exposed to 
coloured objects she learns something new, but that deny that this entails the existence of 
any facts that are not physical facts—that is, that deny premise three—are perhaps the 
most common. They come in a variety of forms. One way of expanding upon this sort of 
response is to claim that what is learnt by Mary is not factual, and so her learning 
something new poses no challenge to the physicalist claim that all facts are physical facts. 
Lewis (1983a) and (1988) and Nemirow (1990) and (2007) both respond to the argument 
from knowledge with the claim that what is gained by Mary when she is first exposed to 
coloured objects is not some item of non-physical factual knowledge, entailing a 
corresponding physical fact, but rather a set of abilities to recognise, imagine and predict 
ones behaviour in relation to coloured objects and experiences of coloured objects (Lewis 
1983a, p.131) or to be able to imagine what it is like to have such an experience (Nemirow, 
1990, p.495). Although Mary has previously lacked such abilities, this is not a threat to 
physicalism if one can accept that acquiring the abilities, whilst it requires something more 
than knowledge of all relevant physical facts (if it did not, Mary would already have these 
abilities prior to her release), does not involve any further factual knowledge and does not 
entail anything that is itself resistant to a physicalist analysis.  
 Conee (1985, p.298) rejects the Lewis/Nemirow account on the grounds that Mary 
might learn something new—knowledge, say, of what blue things look like—without 
acquiring the abilities described above, and indeed, might have such abilities without that 
knowledge. The abilities which form the key part of the Lewis/Nemirow response to the 
argument from knowledge are, Conee claims, neither necessary nor sufficient to account 
for the new thing Mary learns. However, Conee puts forward a similar response to the 
argument to Lewis and Nemirow, but one that appeals to acquaintance rather than abilities 
(1994). Knowledge by acquaintance is to constitute a third form of knowledge, in contrast 
to both factual knowledge and know-how/ability (ibid., p.136). The new thing that Mary 
learns, when she is first exposed to coloured objects, is some piece of knowledge by 
acquaintance (and perhaps also she gains some abilities), and such knowledge does not 
require the existence of some non-physical fact. For Conee, Mary becomes acquainted with 
a property of an experience, which we might call what-it-is-like-to-see-red, when she first 
encounters a red object. Prior to this, she only knew that visual experiences of red objects 
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have the property of what-it-is-like-to-see-red, and any other relevant (physical) facts. But 
this does not require that we posit any further non-physical facts. Thus, the Knowledge 
Argument's third premise can be denied: there is no reason to assert that just because 
Mary learns something new, there are some facts that are not physical facts.  
 A third way of formulating this sort of response to the Knowledge Argument is to 
claim that when Mary first encounters coloured objects, she does not learn any new fact, 
nor does she learn some non-factual thing (such as the how-to of an ability, or what it is to 
be acquainted with a particular property of an experience). Rather, she learns a fact she 
already knew in a novel manner. Such a response accommodates the intuitions that Mary 
learns something new when she is first exposed to coloured objects and that what she 
learns involves factual knowledge, what it denies is that this entails the existence of a new 
fact. This sort of response to the Knowledge Argument can be found in a number of 
philosophers' work, including, Horgan (1984); Tye (1986) and (1995); Bigelow and Pargetter 
(1990); Lycan (1990) and Papineau (2002) and (2007). There is not adequate space here to 
explore the subtle differences between the various formulations of these variants on this 
type of response, and so I restrict myself to outlining their common elements. According to 
these philosophers, when Mary first encounters coloured objects, what she gains are 
phenomenal concepts. These phenomenal concepts are necessary to knowing about 
certain properties of experiences: what-it-is-like-to-see-red type properties. Importantly, 
these properties are themselves physical, and what it is for a subject of experience to 
acquire and to have the relevant concepts can be captured without appeal to the non-
physical. The only way to acquire these concepts is to undergo certain experiences. Whilst 
physical and phenomenal conceptualisations of experiences involve exactly the same facts, 
the two are in a certain sense independent of one another; that is, given one, there is no 
way to infer the other a priori. This independence explains why Mary, despite being in 
possession of all the relevant physical facts, will still learn something new when she is first 
exposed to coloured objects. However, what she learns will only be some of the physical 
facts she already knew presented under a phenomenal conceptualisation. Given this, there 
is no need to invoke non-physical facts in order to explain Mary's learning something new, 
and so premise three of the argument can be denied. 
 Nor is there space to enter into a detailed discussion of the merits and pitfalls of 
each of these responses to the argument from knowledge. Alter (1998) offers some 
arguments for the inadequacy of both the Lewis/Nemirow ability based response and the 
Conee acquaintance based response; suggesting neither provides an adequate account of 
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whatever new thing it is that Mary learns when first exposed to coloured objects. It has 
been argued that the claim that what Mary learns is merely a new way of understanding a 
(physical) fact that she already knew cannot be used by the physicalist, as this involves 
invoking some sort of non-physical property in order to fix the reference of phenomenal 
terms. (For an example of this sort of argument, see White (2007), and for a reply, see 
Block (2007)). 
 
9.2    Responding to the Argument: Part Two 
In this section I will put forward a response to the argument from knowledge which follows 
from the adoption of the Limit View account of properties. Before formulating the 
response, however, the conditions under which the argument could be taken to succeed 
need to be examined. The argument hopes to overturn a particular ontological position—
physicalism—by establishing the existence of non-physical facts which are inconsistent with 
that position. Some attention needs to be paid to what sort of analysis we can give these; 
first, to the question of what facts in general are, and secondly to that of what it would 
take for them to be specifically non-physical.  
 A fact, I propose, is a way that the world is. A fact could be very precise and 
particular, concerning some miniscule detail of how the world is, or it could be quite 
general and complex. The ontology proposed in this thesis takes the world to be a world of 
objects, that is, propertied substances, and so a way the world is is a way that some object 
or objects are. Facts can capture the existence, the arrangement and the nature of object;- 
that is, they can capture which objects there are; the relations those objects bear to other 
objects and what properties those objects have. Perhaps facts can capture more than this, I 
certainly do not want to argue here that they could not, but equally cannot think of 
anything further that they might capture. Facts can be expressed in true statements, and so 
bear a certain relation to the truthmakers of those sentences. I do not take facts to be an 
ontological addition to the ways the world is that they capture. Consider a red, hot, chilli-
pepper. In this example, "chilli-pepper" is the name of the object, and "red" and "hot" are 
names of two of its properties. Certain facts obtain regarding this chilli-pepper: the fact 
that it exists; the fact that it is red; the fact that it is hot, to name but a few. In order for 
these facts to obtain, nothing more is needed, I propose, than the chilli-pepper's 
instantiating the properties of red-ness and hot-ness. There need not be additional entities; 
the facts do not exist as entities alongside those things which they are the facts about. 
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Facts, if this analysis is acceptable, are often intimately tied to properties: they can obtain 
in virtue of something's instantiating some property, and what they capture is just that that 
thing does instantiate that property. 
 What might make a fact a physical or a non-physical fact?
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 Some potential 
confusions need to be corrected at this point. First, if facts, as suggested above, are not 
entities alongside those that they obtain in virtue of, this cannot be a matter of some facts 
instantiating the property physical-ness and some facts lacking that property. Instantiating 
properties is what objects do. Objects are the entities which facts are about, and in virtue 
of which facts obtain; it would be a category mistake to treat facts as objects themselves. 
Secondly, on this analysis, a fact will not count as physical or non-physical just on the basis 
that it can be expressed in a true statement that involves physical or non-physical 
vocabulary. I propose that a fact will count as physical or non-physical in virtue of it being a 
fact about a physical or a non-physical object respectively. How might we draw this 
distinction at the level of objects? It seems there are two options on the table: objects 
might be physical or non-physical due to being made up of either physical or non-physical 
substance; or due to instantiating physical or non-physical properties. For the moment, I 
shall set aside the first of these options, the debate over which concerns substance monism 
and dualism, and consider the second, the debate over which concerns property monism 
and dualism, as the latter is the position the Knowledge Argument is most commonly taken 
to support.  
 We are now in a position to make explicit what the Knowledge Argument requires 
in order to establish its anti-physicalist conclusion. If, as the Knowledge Argument claims, 
Mary learns something new upon her release, that is, if premise two is correct, she learns 
something regarding previously unknown qualities. What she learns might be facts about 
the qualities of her own experiences, they might be facts about qualities of the objects she 
is experiencing for the first time, or they might be about both. I take it to be 
uncontroversial that facts about qualities, that is, facts about the qualitative ways that 
some object is or some objects are, whatever the objects concerned happen to be, obtain 
in virtue of the properties that that object instantiates. For the Knowledge Argument to go 
through then, we need a good reason to think that the properties in virtue of which these 
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 I am again, for now, going to dodge here the thorny issue of what makes anything physical or 
non-physical, and work under the assumption, present in the debate regarding the ontology of mind 
and body, that there is at least in principle a well founded and philosophically significant distinction 
here. 
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newly learned facts obtain are properties that previously Mary had no knowledge of; that 
is, they are properties that cannot be in some sense characterised as physical. 
 The account of properties put forward in this thesis holds that all properties make 
both a dispositional and a qualitative contribution to the object that bears them. Thus, in 
virtue of possessing a particular set of properties, facts about both the qualitative ways and 
the dispositional ways that an object is will obtain. But these facts obtain in virtue of the 
very same set of properties. On this view, when Mary learns a fact about the qualities of 
some object, she is learning a fact about the contribution made to that object by the set of 
properties it instantiates; although the fact she learns does not capture everything about 
that contribution. It does not capture, for instance, the dispositional contribution made to 
the object by the very same set of properties. 
 In the previous section of this chapter, in examining the Argument from 
Conceivability, the notions of dispositionality and qualitativity were tentatively aligned to 
those of the physical and the qualities of conscious experience respectively.
173
 This sort of 
characterisation seems to garner support from the quotation from Jackson via which I first 
introduced this argument. There he speaks of Mary's knowledge prior to her encountering 
any coloured objects as consisting in knowledge of "[...]what goes on when we see[...] 
which wave-lengths[...] stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces[...] the 
contraction of the vocal chords and the expulsion of air[...]" (Jackson, 1982, p.130—my 
italics and liberal cutting). His focus, in giving an account of what Mary knows about prior 
to her release, is on causal-cum-dispositional processes. In the idiom set out above, that is 
to say that prior to being exposed to coloured objects in normal conditions, Mary has 
knowledge of facts about the dispositional ways that objects are, facts that obtain in virtue 
of the set of properties that those objects instantiate. Importantly, there does not seem to 
be a principled way to deny to Mary full knowledge of dispositionality prior to her first 
colour experiences (regardless of whether or not 'the dispositional' and 'the physical' are 
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 It should be noted that one does not want to align these with the physical and the mental in 
general, as one does not want to exclude mental properties from causal efficacy. So we might rather 
say that we align the notions of dispositionality and qualitativity to the physical-and-some-mental-
states (perhaps this is best termed simply the 'non-phenomenal') and the qualities of conscious 
experience respectively. Crane (2001, section 28) makes the interesting, related point that the 
knowledge argument can be construed as not just having physicalism in its sights, but any theory of 
mind which accepts that Mary can learn all its facts prior to her experience; be it dualist, 
emergentist or whatever. Lewis makes a similar point: the "intuitive starting point wasn't just that 
physics lessons couldn't help the inexperienced to know what it is like [to see colours etc.]. It was 
that lessons couldn't help." (1990, p.281). 
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well aligned), as what it is argued she gains knowledge of is what it is like to see colours, 
and this sounds paradigmatically qualitative.  
 If the physical facts are these facts, as Chalmers holds (see section 8.4) and Jackson 
implies, then premise one entails that Mary knows all the dispositional facts; that is, she 
knows all the facts concerning the dispositional contributions made to the objects by the 
properties that they instantiate. Do any of the properties fail to get in on this act? No. 
Remember that on the ontology proposed, all properties contribute to the dispositional 
ways that their bearer's are. So, if physical knowledge is dispositional knowledge; that is, 
knowledge of facts which obtain in virtue of the instantiation of properties which 
contribute to the dispositional ways that their bearer is, then every property of the 
object(s) concerned will be a property that Mary has some knowledge of. Another way of 
putting this is that given the set of facts that Mary knows before her encountering coloured 
objects for the first time, every property of those objects will play some role in the 
obtaining of those facts. Thus, it is not open to the proponent of the Knowledge Argument 
to hold that there are two classes of property: mental (or phenomenal), and physical, which 
each contribute to their bearers in distinctive dispositional and qualitative ways, the latter 
of which Mary has no knowledge of prior to experiencing coloured objects for the first 
time, and the former of which she had full knowledge of prior to this. If the Limit View, and 
the alignment of the notions of the non-phenomenal and the dispositional is correct, then 
it must be accepted that Mary has knowledge concerning—knowledge of facts which 
obtain in virtue of—all the properties of the objects in question prior to her first colour 
experiences. The only other option is to abandon premise one, which would be to abandon 
the argument. 
 The significance of this for the knowledge argument is that accepting that Mary has 
no knowledge of the qualitative nature of things prior to her release, and even accepting 
that the new knowledge she gains is factual knowledge, does not force one to accept an 
ontology which posits a second type of property—mental properties—in virtue of which 
the newly learned facts obtain. The epistemological route to ontological conclusions on 
which the Knowledge Argument turns has been blocked. What Mary learns are facts about 
the qualitative contribution made to the way the object concerned is by the properties that 
it instantiates, but these properties are the very same properties as those which, if premise 
one is taken seriously, Mary already has knowledge concerning. If no new properties are 
required to provide the basis for the new facts that Mary learns, if these facts obtain in 
virtue of the very same properties that Mary already has knowledge of, then the proponent 
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of the argument cannot use it to draw the sort of ontological conclusions necessary to 
motivate property dualism.
174
  
 This sort of response is uniquely available to the proponent of the approach to the 
ontology of properties put forward in this thesis. Consider briefly the other major candidate 
ontologies with regards to properties: categoricalism; dispositionalism and a mixed view. 
Categoricalism holds that the basic properties are non-dispositional, and that dispositions 
are contingently realised by their categorical bases. Thus, full knowledge of facts which 
obtain in virtue of an objects having certain dispositions obtain in virtue of contingently 
realised properties, which the facts that obtain in virtue of the categorical properties of 
objects do so due to the intrinsic properties of those objects. On this account of properties, 
what the Knowledge Argument needs to get from its epistemological premise to its 
ontological conclusion—that some properties might fail to get in on the act regarding the 
facts Mary knows prior to her first colour experiences—is entirely plausible. 
Dispositionalists do not face this issue, but they face another. If they accept the proposed 
characterisation of the non-phenomenal as the dispositional, then they are forced to claim 
that there are no phenomenal properties, and that Mary would, with full dispositional 
knowledge, know what it is like to experience colour before she ever does so: essentially, 
this is Dennett's response (1991) plus the claim, which he backs away from, that indeed 
Mary could not learn anything new. Perhaps this response is correct, but it is unlikely to be 
one that would faze the proponent of the Knowledge Argument. Alternatively, they could 
reject this characterisation and, in order to maintain the intuition that Mary might learn 
something new, accept that not all the relevant dispositional properties (and thus not all 
the relevant properties full stop) get in on the act regarding what Mary knows prior to her 
first colour experiences; but this then paves the ground for the dualist conclusions of the 
Knowledge Argument, and so will not be acceptable to the dispositionalist who also wants 
to hold to a monistic ontology such as physicalism. It should be clear why the mixed view, 
that there are fundamental properties which are pure dispositions and which are pure 
qualities, is almost tailor made for the conclusions of the Knowledge Argument that there 
might be a dualism involving phenomenal and non-phenomenal properties. 
                                                           
174
 This is not to say that someone in Mary's position necessarily would not have any qualitative 
knowledge. Perhaps she would. Like Dennett, I find it hard to have a strong intuition regarding this 
thought experiment. However, the response given to the Knowledge Argument above is all the 
stronger for being able to grant to the proponent of the argument the premise that she would not 
have such knowledge. 
167 
 
 In the discussion of facts above, I claimed that what would make a fact a physical 
fact would be its obtaining in virtue of the instantiation of a physical property, what would 
make it non-physical would be its obtaining in virtue of the instantiation of a non-physical 
property. The response I have given to the Knowledge Argument contends that the very 
same properties are involved in the obtaining of the facts Mary knows pre- and post- her 
first colour experience. How then should we characterise these two sets of facts? If the 
properties involved in the obtaining of the facts Mary knows before her release are best 
characterised as physical properties, then it seems that all the facts will be physical, as they 
all obtain in virtue of these very properties. What it means for a property to be best 
characterised as physical is the focus of the next chapter; and further discussion of how 
properties as conceived under the Limit View are best characterised will occupy what 
remains of this thesis. A monistic account of property can accommodate the intuitions at 
play in motivating the Knowledge Argument, and this is enough to demonstrate that the 
argument does not support dualism. The lesson a physicalist will take from this, I am sure, 
is that all the properties, and thus all the facts, are physical facts. My suspicion is that the 
dualist, rather than being convinced to abandon dualism by the considerations raised in 
this section, will look elsewhere for an argument, or else want to deny the ontology that 
this response is predicated upon; although like the proponent of the Argument from 
Conceivability, she will need independent grounds upon which to do so. 
 We have seen that even given that Mary learns something new upon first 
encountering coloured objects, this does not motivate the positing of distinct types of 
property, some physical, some mental. Rather, the approach to the ontology of properties 
set out in this thesis allows for the intuition that some facts might only be learnable 
through distinctive kinds of experience, experience which cannot, as Lewis (1990) puts it, 
be had from lessons, whilst recognising that the properties in virtue of which these facts 
obtain are the very same set of properties which underpin the lesson-learnt facts. Where 
does this approach to the issues which arise from the Knowledge Argument leave us with 
regard to the ontology of mind and body? In this chapter and the last, I have argued that it 
does not favour a property dualist response to the problem, but not yet put forward any 
positive account. The final chapter of this thesis will be concerned with outlining how, if 
one accepts the account of properties set forward in this thesis, the relationship between 
mind and body should be conceived. This work will be largely programmatic, as there is 
simply not space here to give a detailed account.  
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9.3    Explanatory Gaps 
Both the argument from conceivability and the zombie argument attempt to move from 
certain epistemological premises to the conclusion that a certain ontological position, 
physicalism, is false. Another argument which adopts this same sort of strategy exploits 
what is usually known as the explanatory gap. The driving intuition behind explanatory gap 
arguments is that it is hard to see how physical information can explain why there is 
phenomenal consciousness in general, and why there is the specific sorts of phenomenal 
consciousness that there happens to be. Often, the notion of explanation being deployed is 
intimately tied with that of deduction: the gap is motivated by the claim that we cannot 
deduce from the physical state of the world either that there will be phenomenal 
consciousness or what any phenomenal consciousness that there is will be like (see, for 
instance, Chalmers (2010, p.307) or Levine (1993, p.550)). The move is then to make an 
inference from this claim to an ontological gap. As Chalmers' puts it "if we cannot explain 
consciousness in terms of physical processes, then consciousness cannot be a physical 
process" (2010, p.307), and so physicalism must be false. If the additional premise is held, 
that if physicalism is false, then some form of dualism is true, then arguments from the 
explanatory gap provide direct support for a dualistic account of the ontology of mind and 
body. 
The argument could be formulated as below: 
(P1) No physical explanation can be given for why conscious experience is as it is; 
(P2) If no physical explanation can be given for why conscious experience is as it is, 
then physicalism is false; 
(C1) Physicalism is false. 
As before, if this argument is intended to lend direct positive support to a dualistic account 
of the ontology of mind and body, then an additional premise and conclusion need to be 
added: 
(P3) If physicalism is false, then dualism is true; 
(C2) Dualism is true. 
I am not going to spend as much time examining the explanatory gap as I have the other 
arguments against physicalism, as I believe there are reasons for rejecting it which are 
independent of considerations of the correct ontological account of properties, which is the 
focus of this thesis. First, I agree with Heil that whilst there is clearly an explanatory gap 
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between current physics and phenomenal consciousness, it is not clear that the burden of 
proof lies with the physicalist to prove that it can in principle be bridged any more than it 
lies with the dualist to prove that it cannot; the possibility of closing the gap may be 
something we simply have to be epistemically humble about (2003, p.236). This line of 
response brings into question the assertability of premise one, without which the argument 
fails. Secondly, Crane (2001) has questioned the link asserted by premise two between 
what he calls physicalism's explanatory adequacy and it's truth, arguing that there is no 
reason why one has to accept that the truth of physicalism as an ontological thesis ought to 
be dependent on whether or not it is explanatorily adequate, suggesting instead that 
ontological and causal adequacy suffice (the theses that there are no non-physical entities 
and no non-redundant, non-physical causes, respectively). This line of response brings into 
question premise two, without which the argument also fails. Thirdly, as Crane also points 
out, the first premise plausibly relies on a particular notion of explanation—one which is, as 
noted above, tied to deduction—which is often assumed by proponents of explanatory gap 
arguments. It is open to the defender of a monistic ontology to reject the notion that this is 
the sort of explanation they need to be able to provide, and suggest instead another notion 
of explanation, perhaps causal, is both closer to the usual sense in which the term is meant 
and less likely to be compatible with premise one (ibid.). Furthermore, even if one accepts 
that the 'deductive' notion of explanation at play in the explanatory gap argument is the 
correct one, Heil argues that "[...]the lack of an analytical or definitional connection among 
two kinds of concepts cuts no ice ontologically" (2003, p.236).
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 I am sympathetic to these responses to explanatory gaps arguments, and take 
them together to seriously undermine the force of such arguments.  
 I have suggested above that we may be able to align claims about the physical with 
those about the dispositional contributions properties make to the objects that bear them, 
and that claims about conscious experience may bear a special relationship to the 
qualitative contributions properties make to the objects that bear them. Before moving on 
from looking at explanatory gap arguments to examine this suggestion in more detail, 
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 Martin expresses a similar idea, although perhaps less clearly, when he states that "[d]ifferent 
kinds of explanation are not 'reducible' (that is, by entailment or translation) to one kind of 
explanation, although the items and happenings mentioned in different kinds of explanation could 
be ontologically reducible, that is, come down to (be nothing over and above) the same items and 
happenings mentioned in that explanation[...] Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and 
interest relative. None of this applies to objects or events themselves and how they are 
constituted[...]" (2008, p.132). 
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which shall be the business of the next chapter, it may be useful to examine the 
explanatory gap argument outlined above in light of this suggestion. The claim of the first 
premise would then be that no explanation in purely dispositional terms could account for 
the qualitative features of conscious experience, and the second that, if this is the case, 
then physicalism is false. The explanatory gap becomes one between the dispositional and 
the qualitative. The first premise, under this interpretation, is plausible. If the account of 
properties put forward in this thesis is correct then we should not expect that the 
dispositional will explain the qualitative, for there is no direction of priority between the 
two, all properties are best conceived of dispositional-cum-qualitative and qualitative-cum-
dispositional. Can we draw the ontological conclusions from this that stem from the second 
premise of the argument? It seems at the very least questionable that we could. Even if it is 
established that there might be, in principle, no way of bridging the explanatory divide 
between the dispositional contributions properties make to their bearers (which I have 
suggested broadly speaking aligns with the physical) and the qualitative contributions 
properties make to their bearers (which I have suggested bear some important relation to 
phenomenal consciousness), this will not establish that a monistic ontology is false, for 
these contributions are made by one and the same property. The explanatory gap need not 
be attended by an ontological one, for both the dispositional and the qualitative features of 
objects are accounted for by the very same set of properties. The claim that dispositions 
are identical to qualities, and vice versa, bridges the ontological gap which is the conclusion 
of the explanatory gap argument. One might wonder whether it provides the elusive bridge 
which crosses the explanatory gap itself? It is not clear to me that it does so; the identity 
claim at work here will not serve an explanatory role, as it is not a reductive claim. As 
discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis, there is no direction of priority between the 
dispositional and the qualitative. However, that the Limit View provides an ontological, but 
not an epistemic bridge, should not damage the ontological credibility of that view. 
 As has been seen over the course of this chapter and the last, adopting the Limit 
View allows one to give responses to arguments in favour of property dualism, and thus to 
maintain a monistic ontology of mind and body. However, it has not yet been established 
whether this ontology is a variant of physicalism, idealism, phenomenalism or some other 
monism. The next two chapters will examine what it means for an entity to be best 
characterised as physical or mental. On the basis of the characterisations advanced in these 
chapters, I will argue that if one adopts the Limit View, the position one should occupy 
concerning the ontology of mind and body is a variant of neutral monism. 
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Chapter Ten: Characterising the Physical  
 
So far in the second half of this thesis we have examined arguments which are supposed to 
militate against physicalism in favour of (most commonly) property dualism—the claim that 
the apparent distinction between mental and physical phenomena is a genuine ontological 
distinction, one that is to be accounted for in terms of two fundamentally different kinds of 
properties. We have seen how adopting the Limit View of properties undermines these 
arguments. A proponent of a monistic account of the ontology of the physical and the 
mental can, therefore, meet the challenges laid down by the (property) dualist if they 
choose to adopt such an account of properties. In this chapter, I shall explore the positive 
ramifications of adopting this account, focussing on particular on what type of monism fits 
best with the adoption of the Limit View account of properties. First, I shall examine in 
more depth an issue that so far I have deferred: the question of how best to characterise 
both the physical and the mental. Following this will be an overview of the conceptual 
landscape which the various approaches to the ontology of mind and body define. I shall 
argue that the territory most comfortably occupied in this landscape by the theorist who 
adopts the Limit View is that of neutral monism. In the final section of this chapter I 
develop in greater detail the consequences of adopting a neutral monism alongside the 
Limit View for a theory of mind. 
 
10.1    Characterisations of the Physical and the Mental 
In the preceding chapters I have proceeded without giving any precise characterisation of 
either the 'physical' or the 'mental', noting simply that we do seem to be able to draw a 
prima facie distinction between putative phenomena answering to each of these types. 
Where I have addressed the work of others (for instance Chalmers and Jackson) where they 
do offer or suggest a characterisation of some such distinction (in these cases, one broadly 
along the lines of the 'physical' relating to the dispositional and the 'mental', or some 
important aspect of the mental, to the phenomenal or qualitative), I have adopted their 
characterisation. In this section, I shall offer a brief survey of ways of characterising the 
distinction between the mental and the physical. Janice Dowell highlights this issue in her 
discussion of the debate surrounding the ontology of mind and body, stating that one of 
the core goals for any attempt to address this debate must be "[...]identifying a plausible 
answer to the question: 'what is it for a property, kind, or entity to be a physical one?" 
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(2006b, pp. 54-55). This exploration shall lay the groundwork for my later claims that if one 
adopts the Limit View, then the appropriate accompanying view of the ontology of mind 
and body is that of neutral monism. Engaging in such an exploration is an important task, I 
believe, for any contribution to the debate concerning the ontology of mind and body, but 
this importance is particularly keenly felt if one wishes to advance a neutral monism. The 
reason for this is that, whilst we might be thought to have a reasonable pre-critical, 
intuitive grasp of physicality and mentality, the same cannot be maintained regarding the 
neutrality which neutral monism holds applies to all fundamental entities. Thus, it is crucial 
that an explicit and developed account of physicality and mentality accompany any 
presentation of neutral monism. Without this, it is not possible to motivate the neutrality 
claim which is central to neutral monism. For these reasons, what follows will be a fairly 
lengthy examination of the notions of physicality and mentality, but I hope that, in the final 
chapter, where I advance a new variant of neutral monism, it will be clear that this 
lengthiness was necessary. 
 Before I proceed, there are a couple of issues which ought to be resolved. First, 
some might suggest, against what I have said above, that if one takes the physical-mental 
distinction not to be reflected in fundamental ontology (as any neutral monist will do), then 
no substantive attempt to characterise the distinction needs to be made (as Heil has done 
(2012, p.209)). To do so is incumbent only on those who wish to maintain that such a 
distinction is reflected in the way things are with the most fundamental constituents of 
reality. One reading of this suggestion would be that it is only dualists, of either the 
property or substance sort, who are required to do so. On this point I disagree. A 
substantive account of the distinction needs to be given by the proponent of any position 
in this debate, for it is only with reference to such an account that the physicalist can 
justifying labelling her monism such, rather than, for instance, idealist; and, more crucially 
for my discussion here, that the neutral monist can distinguish herself as properly neutral, 
as upholding the view that the nature of the most ontologically fundamental constituents 
of reality are neither best characterised as physical nor as mental. Note that none of this 
entails that the characterisations we might give of the physical and the mental need to be 
exclusive of each other, or even that they need to be given in broadly homogenous terms; 
we might find that the mental is best characterised in a very different manner to the 
physical, and vice versa. To give substance to the claim that the fundamental constituents 
of reality are neither physical nor mental, we need at least a broad conception of what it 
would take for them to be one, or the other, or both. This in turn requires that we have 
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some informative characterisation of these two categories. It seems to me that it could 
only be on these grounds that one could maintain, as Heil does, and any neutral monist 
also should, that the distinction between the physical and mental is not a "real" one 
(ibid.).
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 Perhaps this is too strong, and given the specific content of his claim, Heil is 
correct that he need not give such account—nothing I say will turn on this, and so I am 
happy to remain neutral on this question—but certainly it seems to me that some 
monisms, including the position I advocate below, will be required to.  
 Secondly, the ontological framework within which I am working in this thesis is one 
of substance and property. Properties are the ways substances are, substances are what 
bear properties. Any way some substance is will be accounted for in terms of the properties 
that that substance bears. Simple objects are propertied-substances, and these are the 
most fundamental existents; properties taken as not borne by any substance; and 
substances taken as not bearing any properties are abstractions from objects. Complex 
objects are made up of relatively simpler ones, bottoming out in the simple objects. It 
seems there are, within this framework, (at least) four ways we might structure the 
question of how best to characterise 'physical' and 'mental': 
(10.i) What does it mean for a simple object to be physical/mental? 
(10.ii) What does it mean for a substance to be physical/mental? 
(10.iii) What does it mean for a property to be physical/mental? 
(10.iv) What does it mean for a complex object to be physical/mental? 
It should be clear that (10.i) will only be answerable with reference to (10.ii) or (10.iii): all 
there is to simple objects is their being propertied-substances, their natures are exhausted 
by this, and so whatever it is about them that might make them physical or mental will be a 
found either in something about their substance-hood or their propertied-ness (or maybe 
both). Closely considering (10.ii), we can see that any answer given to it within this 
framework will have to make reference to (10.iii): substances are as they are just in virtue 
of the properties they instantiate, so whatever it is about the way some substance is that 
means it qualifies as 'physical' or 'mental' will be something to do with the particular 
properties it instantiates. This is not to say that a physical substance (if there were any such 
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 It should be noted at this point that Heil does not identify himself as a neutral monist, and I do 
not mean to foist that position upon him. Heil's position may be distinct from neutral monism, but 
any neutral monist will agree with his claim that there is not a distinction between the physical and 
the mental which operates at the fundamental level, ontologically speaking. 
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thing) would have to instantiate the property physical-ness (if there were any such 
property), or that a mental substance (if there were any such thing) would have to 
instantiate the property mental-ness (if there were any such property). To think this would 
be to endorse what Heil (2003, chapter 3) calls the picture theory, and such an approach 
has already been rejected elsewhere in this thesis (see section 1.4).
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 This leaves questions 
(10.iii) and (10.iv) on the table: what it might mean to characterise properties or complex 
objects as physical or mental.  
 One possible sort of answer to (10.iv) would be in reference to the simple objects 
of which it is composed, which would lead us in turn back to question (10.i), which, as we 
have seen above, eventually leaves us posing question (10.iii). Another sort of answer to 
question (10.iv) would appeal to features which we can only discuss by making reference to 
the complex whole; although this need not imply some sort of emergentism, as the 
truthmakers for statements regarding the whole may just be its simplest parts (see, for 
instance, Heil (2012, p.209)). This is the sort of answer given by Martin in his discussion of 
mentality which is summarised in section 7.1 of this thesis. In what follows, when 
discussing various approaches towards characterising 'physical' and 'mental', I shall 
distinguish between the sorts of answers that such approaches might give to questions 
(10.iii) and (10.iv). It should be noted at this point that there is no a priori reason to 
suppose that our best characterisations of these two concepts would necessarily answer 
both of these questions, nor to think that they would necessarily answer one but not the 
other; they might furnish us with answers to both, or to just one. Likewise, there is no a 
priori reason to suppose that each characterisation will be the same in this respect; we may 
find that some furnish us with answers to both, whilst the others only to one, or that they 
each furnish answers to one but not the other.  
 
10.2    Appealing to Science 
One approach to giving a characterisation of what it means for something to be physical 
makes appeal to the physical sciences. An entity counts as physical just in case it is the sort 
of entity that appears in the theories of physical science. Approaches of this sort come in 
two broad camps: those that make appeal to current scientific theories (Melnyck, for 
instance, proposes this sort of view, (1997)) and those that appeal to future, perhaps ideal, 
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 Other frameworks might afford alternative ways to answer question (10.ii); perhaps through an 
appeal to 'attributes', as in Cartesian Dualism, or Lowe's Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism (2006). 
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science (see for instance Dowell (2006a) and (2006b), or Poland (1994)). One criticism of 
such an approach, when it is combined with physicalism, is that it faces what is sometimes 
known as Hempel's dilemma (1969). In brief, the dilemma runs as follows: if we choose the 
first option, the result is that physicalism seems likely to be false, as it is unlikely to be the 
case that just those entities compassed by contemporary physics exist. The second horn, in 
appealing to ideal physics, is thought to leave physicalism as trivial, insofar as 'future, ideal 
physics' is taken to mean something along the lines of 'whatever theory actually captures 
all of what there really is'. Furthermore, the second approach seems to lack the level of 
specificity and determinateness that is required in order for such a characterisation to be 
informative; we are told nothing of the nature of such entities except that an ideal theory 
of the world's fundamental constituents will include them. In what follows, whilst I shall be 
considering characterisations of the physical that have developed in the body of literature 
that responds to this dilemma, I shall not be too deeply concerned with how successful 
such characterisations are in meeting the challenge laid down insofar as the proper 
formulation of physicalism is concerned, as it is not this doctrine that I am trying to 
maintain.  
 Although I am not trying to defend physicalism here, Hempel's dilemma does 
highlight some important issues regarding the characterisation of the physical. Consider the 
first horn. The object of our inquiry in this section is to explore characterisations of the 
physical that will be useful and informative with regards to the question of whether or not 
the fundamental components of reality are such that they should be characterised as 
physical. If we take 'physical' to apply just those entities that appear in our current physical 
sciences, then the answer to this question is most likely that they are not. But this answer 
should not be satisfying in terms of the current inquiry, as the reason behind it is not some 
insight into the ontological nature of either physicality or of the fundamental constituents 
of reality. Rather, it simply stems from a reasonable epistemic humility that admits that our 
current scientific account of the world we inhabit is unlikely to be a completed, ideal one. 
Melnyck (1997—see p.625 for a summary) offers an interesting argument to try and blunt 
the point of the first horn of Hempel's dilemma. Regardless of the success of this argument 
in terms of defending physicalism (I shall remain neutral on how successful Melnyck's 
argument is), it does not make any difference to what I have said with regards to the limits 
of this sort of characterisation in the context of our present inquiry, as it revolves around 
considerations regarding the sort of attitudes we take in theory selection, and such 
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considerations are not pertinent to inquiries that are ontological in nature, such as the one 
at hand. 
 The second approach is to take the physical to be characterised by those entities 
that are compassed in a completed, ideal physics. The worry here is that this 
characterisation renders the thesis of physicalism trivial; and, is insufficiently determinate 
and specific with regards to the nature of the physical, rendering the characterisation 
uninformative. Again, these problems seem to apply not just in the case of the defence of 
physicalism, but also for our present inquiry. The question at hand, whether or not the 
fundamental components of reality are such that they should be characterised as physical, 
will, under a future-science based approach to characterising the physical, be answered 
'yes'. But once again, the answer is unsatisfying, as it stems from the stipulation that these 
fundamental components will all be accounted for in a completed, ideal physics. This 
answer fails to satisfy the needs of the present inquiry as whatever the ontological nature 
of the fundamental constituents of reality turn out to be, if the physical is characterised in 
this way, then they will qualify as physical, and conversely, what 'being physical' turns out 
to consist in just is having the nature that the fundamental constituents of reality have; 
essentially, the term 'physical' has been defined so as to be co-extensive with 'fundamental 
constituents of reality'. 
 Dowell (2006b) has proposed a version of this sort of account with additional 
constraints which are intended to mitigate the problem set out above. She holds that any 
account of what counts as physical must make reference to our best scientific theories, as 
we can always conceive of future developments in physics as defeating any non-science 
based characterisation. This idea is motivated by examples such as the move from a 
mechanistic conception of physics (in which we might take, say, deterministic behaviour 
and impenetrability as defining features of the physical) to modern physics; the discovery 
of phenomena that are treated within the physical sciences which lacked these features 
was not taken to be the discovery of non-physical phenomena, but reason to abandon such 
a characterisation (ibid., pp. 32-33). Such considerations are taken by Dowell to generalise 
to any attempt to characterise the physical by appeal to definitive features. She lays out a 
characterisation of scientific theories in general, and adds an 'integration' requirement to 
the characterisation of 'physical'; in order to count as physical, the positing of an entity 
must not only be compatible with a pattern of explanation of the most fundamental 
constituents of reality, but must be well integrated into explanatory theories which bear 
the hallmarks of scientific theories (ibid., pp. 38-39) and concern these fundamental 
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entities. In (2006a), she is also suggestive that a 'concreteness' constraint may be 
applicable, stating that "[T]o count as basic and physical, a property must be well 
integrated into the most complete and unified explanation possible for the relatively basic 
occupants of space-time," (p.6, my emphasis). Such constraints render this characterisation 
of the physical informative, Dowell, argues, because bearing them in mind we can 
understand what it would take for there to be entities that did not count as physical 
(2006b, pp. 36-38). For instance, should it turn out that our best ontological theorising 
requires miraculous events or Cartesian egos, then some entities are non-physical, as the 
former would not be well integrated into a pattern of scientific explanation, and the latter 
are non-spatio-temporal. She identifies exhibiting highly regular behaviour as crucial to 
integration (2006a, p.6).
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 Suppose we accept Dowell's characterisation. Being physical, for her, is something 
that is most properly predicated of the relatively basic entities, what I have termed 'simple 
objects' above. This given, it seems likely that question (10.iv), regarding complex objects, 
will be answered with reference to the simple objects that compose them; and a complex 
will count as physical just in case its component parts are all physical. As we saw above, this 
puts question (10.iii) centre stage. On Dowell's account, it seems a property will count as 
physical insofar as it either has a concrete instantiation and confers on its bearer 
dispositionalities, or falls under some law, which govern(s) its behaviour in a highly regular 
fashion. Note that this characterisation, whilst it might at first glance appear to favour a 
powers ontology of some form or another, does not necessarily do so: it is equally 
compatible with a categoricalist account of properties that holds that dispositional 
properties are in some sense grounded in non-dispositional one (see section 1.2 of this 
thesis for a discussion of this sort of position), just so long as the grounding properties will 
be required in order for the account to be complete and well integrated.
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 Unlike potential 
formulations considered above, this account of the physical does encode certain 
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 A relatively unrestricted version of a future-physics based account is offered by Poland (1994). 
However, the restricted version presented by Dowell appears to have a greater scope for 
overcoming the worries posed by Hempel's dilemma, and so it is on this version I shall concentrate. 
(See Crook and Gillett (2001) for a criticism of Poland's approach along these lines.) 
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 I do not intend to take a position on this question. However, if one accepts Dowell's account of 
the physical, plus physicalism itself, and it turned out that non-dispositional properties were not 
necessary for a complete and integrated scientific account of space-time's most basic occupants, 
then this might be seen as a good reason to reject non-dispositional properties.  
178 
 
ontological restrictions on what might be physical: only concrete, dispositional (or 
disposition granting) properties are in the running.  
 Jessica Wilson accepts something similar to Dowell's account with an additional 
proviso that the basic physical entities must not "[...]individually possess or bestow 
mentality[...]" (2006, p.61), where mentality is understood in terms of "[...]qualitative 
experience and intentionality[...]" (ibid., p.69). Dowell, on the other hand, explicitly allows 
that fundamentally mental entities may just turn out to be physical; we ought not to decide 
a priori on the incompatibility of the mental and the physical, but rather this should be an a 
posteriori matter. If we hold that the mental and physical are incompatible, but do so a 
posteriori, then our characterisation of the physical (and of the mental) must allow for 
some way the incompatibility claim can be falsified by the world. In order to meet this 
demand, Dowell allows that mental entities might be well integrated into a pattern of 
explanation bearing the hallmarks of a scientific theory of the most basic occupants of 
space-time, and holds that should they do so, then they count as physical (2006b., pp. 43-
45). There are, of course, ways that fundamentally mental properties could be that do not, 
on this account, count as physicalism: for instance, should they feature in our complete and 
ideal theory of the reality's most fundamental constituents and yet not be well integrated 
into the parts of that theory that bear the hallmarks of science. This given, Dowell should 
not be thought of as failing to respect the differences between physicalism and dualism in 
allowing that mental properties may just turn out to be physical. 
 It is important to recognise that what is at stake between Wilson and Dowell is not 
whether or not the world might turn out to be a certain way; a way in which entities that 
individually possess or bestow either qualitative experience or intentionality are well 
integrated into a pattern of explanation bearing the hallmarks of a scientific theory of the 
most basic occupants of space-time, but rather whether or not this way the world might be 
should count as one in which every entity is a physical entity. This disagreement is an 
important one for physicalists, as there is something genuine at stake for them: depending 
which view one sides with, one will give different answers regarding which ways a world 
could turn out to be count as physicalist ways. Both sides agree that a world with non-
integrated fundamental mentality is a dualist world; both agree that a world with no 
fundamental mentality and no non-integrated fundamental properties is a physicalist 
world, but there is disagreement over whether or not the case between these, where there 
is well integrated fundamental mentality ought to count as physicalist or dualist. Seen in 
these lights, it is hard to see how we could definitively adjudicate between these rival 
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accounts. Wilson believes she has the edge, on the basis of historical and pragmatic 
considerations regarding our current pre-theoretic concept of what it is to be physical 
(2006, p.85 onwards); in favour of Dowell's proposal is the intuition that anything which 
can be well integrated into a particular scientific framework can justifiably be characterised 
as falling under the extension of the predicate which picks out the subject matter of that 
science. Neither supporting claim lacks appeal entirely, and perhaps how one is drawn on 
this question will largely come down to a matter of how much weight is given to certain 
intuitions. Luckily, for the purposes of the present inquiry, we need not settle the debate 
now, as nothing I say below will turn on this issue: the reasons to be given for holding that 
the Limit View is best situated within a neutrally monist ontology are not sensitive to 
whether or not physicality and mentality are fundamentally incompatible with one 
another.    
  
10.3    Paradigm Physical Objects 
Another approach to characterising the physical, proposed by Daniel Stoljar, is by reference 
to paradigm physical objects: 
"[...]a physical property is a property which either is the sort of property required 
by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and 
their constituents or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) 
supervenes on the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic 
nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents. According to this 
conception, for example, if rocks, trees, planets and so on are paradigmatic 
physical objects, then the property of being a rock, tree or planet is a physical 
property. Similarly, if the property of having mass is required in a complete account 
of the intrinsic nature of physical objects and their constituents, then having mass 
is a physical property." (2001(a), p. 257—see also 2001(b))  
Stoljar calls this the object-based conception of the physical, and it is to be contrasted with 
the theory-based conception, which broadly aligns with the sort of characterisation 
discussed above, one which draws on the physical theory in characterising the physical. 
Stoljar's object-based conception, given the quotation above, matches up truly applicable 
predicates to properties relatively unrestrictedly, which, as discussed in section 1.4 of this 
thesis, is an approach to identifying properties which ought to be rejected. However, the 
spirit of the account can be maintained without adopting such an abundant theory of 
properties, applying it rather to a relatively sparse conception. On this account, as I 
understand it, we select some sample of what are prima facie non-controversial examples 
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of entities we take to fall under the extension of 'physical': complex objects, it seems, like 
rocks, trees and planets.
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 Whatever properties are required to give a full account of the 
intrinsic nature of these paradigms (whether on a sparse or an abundant conception) make 
up our set of physical properties. We can then assess non-paradigm cases in contrast with 
this set. Should it turn out that some prima facie non-paradigmatically-physical object 
(some object that is, say, prima facie mental) instantiates only properties from within that 
set, then, despite initial appearances, that object counts as physical. Physicalism will be 
true just in case all objects are either paradigmatically physical or turn out to be physical by 
lights of the procedure outlined above. Another way to express this is that physicalism will 
be true if all real properties are members of the set of properties required to give a full 
account of the intrinsic nature of paradigm physical objects.  
 If we were to adopt the object-based conception of the physical that Stoljar 
proposes, we would again find that answers to questions of types (10.i) and (10.iv) in the 
end defer to answers to questions of type (10.iii): properties again take centre stage. The 
answer to question (10.iii) will hold that a property counts as physical if and only if it is the 
case that it is a member of the set of properties that are required to give a full account of 
the intrinsic nature of the members of the set of paradigm physical objects, or is a property 
that logically or metaphysically supervenes on such properties. Before proceeding, there 
are a number of issues that need clarification. First, some might be concerned that such an 
account is insufficiently ontologically serious. Why should our ontology depend on our 
accounts of things? Whilst I agree that there is a reading of this conception that falls foul of 
such a worry, I think an ontologically serious reading can also be given, insofar as we can 
make sense of 'giving a full account' as meaning something along the lines of 'listing all the 
real properties of'. In this spirit, a property is physical just in case it is a member the set of 
real properties of the members of the set of paradigm physical objects. Secondly, this 
account seems to assume properties are universals, shared by multiple objects. However, it 
ought to be clear to the reader that an analogous account, in which properties are 
considered particulars can be fairly straightforwardly given appealing to exactly resembling 
classes of properties. Finally, on a sparse theory of properties, it might be questioned 
whether or not there are any real properties that logically or metaphysically supervene on 
any other properties. If it is held that there are not any, this does not pose any real 
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illustration. Maybe someone who took biological kinds ontologically seriously would say trees are 
paradigmatically biological rather than physical. 
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problem for the account, as the second disjunct in the characterisation of the physical 
given above is merely redundant, and so this is an issue on which we can remain neutral. 
 Whilst I do think that Stoljar's position can be defended against all of the worries 
(very briefly) outlined above, I do not think that we should adopt his object-conception of 
the physical. What appears to me to be an insurmountable problem arises for this 
conception when we consider a particular sort of emergence. Genuine substantial 
emergence occurs, not when certain configurations of relatively 'low level' entities bring 
into being some novel, relatively 'high level' entities (as, for instance, when it is suggested 
that mental states emerge from complex physical ones), but rather when certain mutual 
manifestations of reciprocal disposition partners involve the coming into being of some 
novel substance with novel properties. There is no need, in the case of genuine substantial 
emergence, to appeal to any conception of reality as being layered; it is uni-layered 
emergence, or perhaps better yet, simply un-layered emergence. (See Martin 2008 (pp. 
130-131) and Heil (2012, pp. 26-31)  for further discussion of the possibility of this sort of 
emergence.) Perhaps genuine substantial emergence is the sort of thing that occurs in 
particle accelerators, or maybe it happened during the big bang. At any rate, even if it does 
not/did not happen in either of these very particular environments there does not seem to 
be any compelling reason to deny the possibility of genuine substantial emergence a priori. 
The problem for the object-based conception of the physical is that it entails that any novel 
property which comes into being as a result of genuine substantial emergence cannot be 
physical, as it will not (by dint of being novel) be a member of the set of real properties of 
members of the set of paradigm physical objects. An analogous problem can be run based 
on considerations of alien properties. 
 It does not seem that our account of the physical ought to rule out a priori the 
coming into being of new kinds of physical property. Indeed, if genuine substantial 
emergence might occur in particular circumstances in particle accelerators, as part of 
experiments done by physicists, whose results are to be integrated and assimilated into the 
body of our account of the relatively fundamental constituents of reality, it seems perverse 
to maintain an account which would rule out these involving novel physical properties. 
Considering genuine substantial emergence seems to lend considerable intuitive appeal to 
a conception of the physical along the lines proposed by Dowell. In response to this 
problem the proponent of the object-based conception might suggest that were the novel 
substance suitably similar to existing paradigm physical objects, then it could be included 
into the set of paradigm physical objects and thus its properties would be introduced into 
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the set of physical properties. How could this response work? The only manner in which 
the emergent entity could be similar to anything else is in terms of the properties it 
instantiates, as these are the ways the entity is, in virtue of which it is similar or dissimilar 
to everything else. Its properties will not, ex hypothesi, be exactly similar to those of 
existing paradigm physical objects, or else they would not be novel. But perhaps they could 
be non-exactly similar (in the way, for instance, that red and orange are non-exactly similar 
to each other, and more so than either is to green). All properties are non-exactly similar to 
all other properties (apart from those that they are exactly similar to), although as the 
degree of non-exactness of this similarity increases, we tend towards talking of 
dissimilarity. If an appeal to non-exact similarity is going to be made by the proponent of 
the object-based conception in order to show that their account does not rule out 
emergent, novel properties in the sense described above, then they will need some 
criterion by which to judge how non-exactly similar an object needs to be to existing 
paradigm physical objects in order to be admitted to that set. But any criteria that could be 
given would presuppose some notion of physicality other than the object-based 
conception, and whatever this notion is, it seems it will be prior to the object-based 
conception itself. 
 Another issue appears as though it may plague this type of account. Let us assume 
that monism is true: all phenomena, despite prima facie heterogeneity, are fundamentally 
accounted for by one homogenous ontological kind of property, which we'll call the F-
properties. Now suppose we adopt the object-based conception of the physical. We select 
our sample of paradigm physical objects, and investigate the properties which account for 
their intrinsic nature, and find out that they are the F-properties. So, we conclude that the 
F-properties are the physical properties, and go on to investigate the rest of reality to try to 
find out whether or not there are non-F-properties out there, or whether, if there are not, 
physicalism is true. As it turns out, given our initial assumption, there is nothing but the F-
properties; so we conclude that physicalism is true. But what if we had started our 
investigation with some other kind? Say, we began by investigating paradigm aesthetic 
objects, armed with an object-based conception of the aesthetic. This would hold that the 
aesthetic properties were those that are required to give a full account of the intrinsic 
nature of paradigm aesthetic objects. What properties would these turn out to be? Given 
our assumption that everything is accounted for by the F-properties, this procedure would 
lead us to the conclusion that the F-properties are the aesthetic properties. As we extend 
our investigation, to the rest of reality to try to find out whether or not there are non-F-
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properties out there, or whether, if there are not, 'aestheticalism' is true. As it turns out, 
given our initial assumption, there is nothing but the F-properties; and so we conclude that 
aestheticalism is true. The very same procedure that led us to believe in the first instance 
that everything (including the aesthetic) was physical leads us to the conclusion that 
everything (including the physical) is aesthetic. If the initial assumption—that all things are 
F-things—is correct, then whatever paradigm class of objects we start our investigation 
with, be they physical, aesthetic, moral, biological, chemical, mental—whatever!—we will 
end up concluding the truth of that -alism. It seems adopting an object-based conception of 
the physical, unless we rule out doing likewise for the aesthetic, the mental etc., runs the 
risk of dissolving the boundaries between different accounts of the fundamental nature of 
reality. 
 The object-based conception faces major problems regarding the manner in which 
it will treat properties of genuinely emergent novel substance. Furthermore, if monism is 
true, then the procedure by which the object-conception operates cannot tell us anything 
substantive about the fundamental nature of reality. It lacks the resources to distinguish 
between physicalism, panpsychism, idealism, aestheticalism, biologism and so on. Perhaps 
these problems can be overcome by reference to some other notion of the physical, such 
as the science/theory-based conception, but if so, it seems such a notion is prior to the 
object-based conception, and we are better concerning ourselves with that prior notion. 
This given, I shall not discuss the object-based conception any further. 
  
10.4    The Via Negativa 
A fourth approach to characterising the distinction between the physical and the mental is 
the via negativa; simply defining the physical as the non-mental (in Chapter Two a number 
of similar approaches to characterising the distinction between dispositionality and 
qualitativity were examined). Vicente characterises the general strategy of the via negativa 
as follows: 
This maneuver consists of defining the physical negatively, that is, by contrasting it 
against a class of entities that is better defined. The class in question is the class of 
mental entities. We may not know which physical entities there are, or what it is to 
be a physical entity, but we are on safer ground as regards what constitutes the 
mental domain, such as beliefs, desires, qualia, etc. (2011, p.397) 
This approach is endorsed by, for instance, Papineau: 
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[I]t isn't crucial that you know exactly what a complete physics would include. 
Much more important is to know what it won't include... the sentient, say, or the 
intentional[...] (2001, p.12)
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It should be clear how answers to questions such as (10.i)-(10.iv) will be formulated given 
this characterisation of the physical: something will count as physical just so long as it is not 
mental. The via negativa approach to characterising the physical relies on the idea that we 
can give an informative and substantive characterisation of the mental, in order that this 
act as a contrast class for the physical. It is worth noting that it might be claimed that this is 
not as straightforward as the proponent of the via negativa hopes, or that we are in no 
better position to characterise the mental than the physical. In the following section we 
shall be considering various accounts of how the mental should be characterised, and so I 
shall postpone discussion of the viability of giving a characterisation of the mental until 
then, and, insofar as the via negativa is concerned, proceed with optimism on this front. 
Another criticism, raised by Vicente is that, if a via negativa approach to characterising the 
physical is to be adopted, then one will need to not only specify that the physical is the 
non-mental, but also, for instance "[...]non-astrological, non-biological, etc. [...]" (2001, 
p.398). The point is sharpened by the consideration that we do not have an exhaustive list 
of the classes against which the physical is to stand in contrast. One strategy that might be 
adopted is to make the claim that in all domains but the mental, we are in a position to give 
straightforward reductions from whatever given domain to the physical, and so we need 
not include these in our negative contrast class. This claim, however, will find far from 
universal support (see, for instance, Heil (2012, p.6) or Hendry (2010)).  
 Vicente's criticism certainly appears to have some weight, especially if what one is 
looking for from a characterisation of the physical is something that gives some account of 
the what would have to be the case, ontologically speaking, for something to count as 
physical (rather than, say, simply a way to separate the physical from the mental). I do not, 
however, intend to argue that it is an insurmountable issue; perhaps the proponent of the 
via negativa can produce a response which will avoid the criticism. I am happy to remain 
neutral on this question, as there is a more pressing reason why I do not think, at least 
insofar as the aims of the current inquiry are concerned, that one should characterise the 
physical negatively, via reference to the mental as a contrast class. The bigger problem is 
that, if we adopt the via negativa, no distinction can be drawn between physicalism and 
neutral monism. Prima facie, at least, there seems to be a difference between these two 
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ontologies, despite the fact that they agree that fundamentally speaking, everything is such 
that it is best characterised as non-mental. They disagree in that the former goes further 
than this, by saying that as well as being best characterised as non-mental, the 
fundamental entities are best characterised as physical; the latter that they are neither 
best characterised as mental nor physical.
182
 According to the via negativa account, neutral 
monism does not even seem to be an intelligible position; its specification amounts to the 
claim that the fundamental entities are neither mental nor non-mental. But if these terms 
pick out two mutually exclusive, exhaustive classes, this cannot be, on pain of 
contradiction. Neutral monism, from the standpoint of the via negativa, seems to be 
committed to the fundamental entities being both not-mental and not-not-mental! This 
might, to some, seem to smack of a verbal dispute, but there is something substantive at 
stake. Suppose we accept this characterisation, and assume that via negativa physicalism is 
true. The question still arises: what is the nature of the fundamental constituents of 
reality? One answer that could be given to this would be in line with some substantive 
conception of the physical. Other potential answers would deny this, and offer some 
different characterisation. What I am calling 'neutral monism' would be one (or perhaps 
some subset of) the latter sort of answer. The former is, I think, more properly called 
physicalism.
183
   
 Worley (2006) puts forward a slightly different formulation of the via negativa 
approach, characterising the distinction as below: 
My suggestion, then, is that our basic conception of the physical is a dynamical 
one. Physical objects are those whose behavior is entirely due to the operation of 
(impersonal) forces. Objects move because they are pushed, or dropped, or 
otherwise caused to move by some force. But they don't move because they want 
to. Agents, on the other hand, are objects whose behavior can, at least in part, be 
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 Some might think that no such distinction needs to be drawn. However, even if some physicalists 
might be happy with a characterisation of the physical that does not differentiate between 
physicalism and non-physicalist, neutral monism (because, I suppose, they see the definitive issue at 
stake as the denial of irreducible/fundamental/sui generis mentality), it ought to be clear that these 
are distinct positions (one which claims everything is fundamentally such that it is best characterised 
by some relatively substantive notion of the physical, say, Dowell's; and one which claims everything 
is fundamentally non-mental), whether one wants to call them both physicalism or not. 
183
 Or perhaps not more properly. It does not really matter what we call these various answers to 
questions that arise when we consider the ontology of mind and body. What is important is that we 
are able to distinguish between these various answers based on the particular ontological nuances 
of each account.  
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explained in terms of their goals, desires, and other representational states. Agents 
do move because they want to. (ibid., p.112) 
she goes on to elaborate: 
Photons may not have mass, and point particles may not have dimension, and 
waves in an aetherless world may be as different from particles as you like; but 
nonetheless, the behavior of photons and electrons and all the rest is to be 
explained in terms of impersonal forces, rather than because they have beliefs and 
desires. The same goes, of course, for tables and chairs and other ordinary 
examples of physical objects. (ibid., pp. 112-113) 
The physical, then, is characterised as that which, when we wish to offer an explanation of 
its behaviour, we need not resort to the ascription of intentional states. Worley's account 
then gives an answer to questions (10.i) and (10.iv): what it is for an object to be physical is 
for it to exhibit behaviour of a certain kind; behaviour that can be fully explained in terms 
of impersonal forces.
184
 This version of the via negativa characterisation of the physical 
does not, however, seem to avoid the problems raised above. If 'impersonal force' is given 
a broad enough interpretation, then it seems that the problem outlined by Vicente's will 
arise for this account as much as for the standard via negativa account: surely we need to 
not only contrast the physical with that which demands explanation in terms of personal 
agency, but also that which demands astrological or biological (or whatever) explanation in 
order to account for its dynamic behaviour. A version of the second problem raised above 
also seems to arise for Worley's account. Again, no distinction can be drawn between 
physicalism and neutral monism, as that which requires postulating personal agency in 
order to account for its dynamic behaviour, and that which does not, seem to form two 
exhaustive, mutually exclusive classes, and both ontologies might agree that nothing 
requiring such a postulate should be part of our final ontology.  
 Further to these issues, another arises for Worley's account that does not for the 
usual specification of the via negativa characterisation of the physical. Her characterisation 
ties the distinction between the physical and the mental to explanation. But it is not clear 
that explanatory considerations ought to be taken to have ontological import. We may find 
non-intentional explanation the most felicitous (relative to certain interests etc.) regarding 
certain phenomena, but it is a further step to hold that these phenomena, on the basis of 
our explanatory successes and failures, do not actually have any intentional states (and 
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intentional stances—see Dennett (1987). 
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likewise is true with regards to intentional explanation).
185
 Some may be happy with a 
characterisation of the physical in these terms, but insofar as the current inquiry is 
concerned, we require something a little more ontologically serious. For these reasons, we 
should set aside attempts to characterise the physical negatively, in contrast to either the 
mental generally (as per the common via negativa account) or that which requires belief 
and desire attribution to account for its dynamic behaviour more specifically (as per 
Worley's account) in favour of a characterisation that maintains an ontologically serious 
attitude and preserves the distinction between neutrally monist and physicalist ontologies. 
 
10.5    Dispositionality and the Physical 
In previous chapters, we operated with a conception of the physical that was suggested in 
the works of the authors who put forward the Arguments from Conceivability and the 
Knowledge Argument. Chalmers explicitly, and Jackson implicitly, tied the notion of the 
physical to that of the dispositional (see Chapters Eight and Nine, respectively).
186
 Let us re-
examine this approach in light of the discussion above, especially insofar as it relates to the 
most satisfactory approach to characterising the physical that we have looked at so far: 
Dowell's restricted future-science based account. First, it seems that an account of the 
physical that aligns, at least to some relatively significant degree, the notion of the physical 
with that of the dispositional, lurks in the background of most of the accounts we have 
addressed so far. Dowell's account sees meeting the integration requirement as a matter of 
having properties that appropriately govern and regulate behaviour; which sounds very 
much like having dispositions. In Stoljar's discussion of the difference between a theory- 
and object-based conception of the physical, he hold that the properties that a theory-
based conception will not incorporate are just the non-dispositional properties (2001, 
p.258), and hopes to use the object-based conception to extend the notion of the physical 
to non-dispositional properties (although, as we have seen, this approach faces some 
serious difficulties). He comments on the intimate relationship between physical theory 
and the dispositional, noting that an expression of this intimacy can be found in the works 
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 Of course, Dennett would disagree on this point; but to hold that to be intentional is just to be 
predictable via the ascription of intentional states is to adopt an ontologically light-weight approach 
from the outset. 
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 More recently in Jackson (2006), he has adopted a future physical sciences based 
characterisation, with the further addition that anything that is completely composed of physical 
entities also counts as physical. 
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of Russell; Blackburn; Ramsey; Carnap and Lewis (see references in Stoljar (2001, pp. 285-
286)). Worley's particular version of the via negativa also seems to have intimate ties to 
dispositionality, reserving the notion of the mental for that whose dynamic behaviour can 
only be ascribed to certain sorts of causal process, those which are agent driven, and 
considering the physical to be that which exhibits dynamic behaviour of a certain kind, that 
is, to that which has a certain sort of dispositional nature. 
 Given the considerations above, I hold that the best characterisation of the physical 
is an interpretation of Dowell's restricted future science based account that incorporates 
the notion that the physical is intimately related to the dispositional. This would furnish an 
answer to question (10.iii) as below: 
(P) A property is properly characterised as physical insofar as: (i) it is a property 
which is referred to in a (relatively complete) theory of the relatively fundamental 
elements of our universe; (ii) the theory in question bears the hallmarks of a 
scientific theory; (iii) it is a concrete entity and (iv) confers on its bearer a 
dispositional nature such that it's behaviour is highly regular allowing that this 
behaviour can be well integrated into the theory. 
(P) meets the challenges of Hempel's dilemma. It is non-trivial as it allows us to see various 
ways in which a physicalism based around (P)—let's call this (P)-physicalism—could be 
false. One way is that some properties that meet all the other requirements of (P) could be 
non-dispositional, that is to say, our final theory of the relatively fundamental entities 
might include pure qualities or purely categorical properties that do not confer dispositions 
on their bearers.
187
 Another way (P)-physicalism might be false is if all properties are 
disposition conferring, but some are not well integrated; for instance, they are the powers 
that allow angels to perform their miracles (or perhaps there might be some mental 
dispositions which cannot be well integrated; this would be an empirical, rather than 
metaphysical matter). A final way in which (P)-physicalism—taken as the claim that all the 
entities in the world are best characterised, fully and thoroughly, without omission of any 
substantive feature of their nature, (P)-physically—could be false is if there is more to a 
property than the features mentioned in (P), despite the relevant property meeting all the 
requirements set out by (P).
188
 (P) is a desirable characterisation of the physical because it 
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 Which is not to say that no such properties could confer dispositions on their bearers—but rather 
that those that do would not falsify (P)-physicalism. 
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 There may be more ways for it to be false, but I hope that mentioning these three should be 
sufficient to make it clear that (P)-physicalism is not a trivial claim. 
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incorporates substantive ontological requirements: a property will only count as physical 
given certain features of its nature. It allows us to formulate answers to all of questions 
(10.i)-(10.iv) via the answer (P) gives to (10.iii). A substance is physical just in case all the 
properties it instantiates are (P)-physical; a simple object is physical just in case it is a 
substance instantiating only (P)-physical properties and a complex object is physical just in 
case it is entirely composed of simple objects meeting this requirement (and, furthermore, 
if it should have any emergent properties
189
 then they must be (P)-physical. Finally, (P) 
allows us to draw a distinction between physicalism and neutral monism: if (P)-physicalism 
is false in the third way outlined above, and monism is true, then this opens up a 
conceptual space in which to conceive of neutral monism as opposed to both the truth of 
physicalism and dualism. The reader might come, at this point, to question whether, given 
what has been said thus far, neutral monism can be distinguished from idealism, 
phenomenalism and panpsychism; monisms that hold that all entities are in some sense 
best characterised as mental. In the final chapter of this thesis I examine the variant of 
neutral monism that I advance alongside each of these positions, and provide arguments to 
support the claim that it can be adequately distinguished from them (see sections 12.4 and 
12.7).  
 Characterisations of the physical based on current science such as Melnyck's may 
meet Hempel's dilemma, but are insufficiently ontologically serious for the current inquiry. 
The object-based characterisation suggested by Stoljar faces serious difficulties stemming 
from the possibility of genuine substantial emergence and from its inability to distinguish 
meaningfully between competing monistic -isms. The via negativa approach to 
characterising the physical lacks the resources to distinguish between physicalism and 
neutral monism; perhaps even to formulate the latter intelligibly. Insofar as we desire to 
draw such a distinction, we must reject the via negativa characterisation of the physical. 
The most appealing characterisation of the physical is a particular interpretation of 
Dowell's restricted future-science based account; as expressed by (P). This satisfies three 
important desiderata: as shown above, it can be used to formulate a non-trivial 
physicalism; it incorporates substantive ontological considerations and is sensitive to the 
distinction between physicalism and neutral monism. 
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 In this chapter I have argued that (P) represents the best characterisation of what it 
means for something to be physical. In the next chapter I examine how the mental is best 
characterised. 
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Chapter Eleven: Characterising the Mental 
 
Chapter Ten examined various characterisations of the physical, and settled on (P) as a 
generalised expression of what it means to say of a property that it is physical. In this 
section we examine how best to characterise the mental. Armed with two conceptions, one 
of the physical, and one of the mental, we will be well placed to consider whether reality is 
best characterised—fundamentally, ontologically—as consisting of purely physical entities; 
purely mental entities; two kinds of entities, alongside each other, one purely physical and 
the other purely mental; or of consisting of a single kind of entity, one which is neither best 
characterised as purely physical nor as purely mental.  
 A wide variety of phenomena falls under a pre-theoretical conception of what 
counts as mental: things such as beliefs; desires; emotions; moods; frames of mind; 
unconscious urges; thoughts; language; awareness; willings; worries; compulsions; phobias; 
phenomenal experiences; sensations; trains of thought; perceptions, and more besides. We 
come to group all of these phenomena together, I think, in part because we stand in a 
particularly intimate relationship to a particular subset of each of these categories; those 
which we call our own beliefs; worries; experiences etc. It is not immediately apparent that 
all these things share something in common in virtue of which they are all grouped 
together as mental phenomena. It seems at least plausible that a full account of the 
fundamental nature of mental phenomena will be heterogeneous. If this is the case, then 
we are unlikely to be able to provide a single characterisation, such as (P), which captures 
what it is for an entity to be mental. In what follows I will address a number of attempts to 
provide such a characterisation, and, considered in light of trying to answer questions such 
as (10.i)-(10.iv), suggest that none of these are satisfactory. I will go on to examine some 
more restricted notions of the mental which focus on phenomenal experience. 
 
11.1    Intentionality 
One answer one might give to the question of how best to characterise the mental is by 
appeal to the notion of intentionality. Brentano (1874) suggests this approach, stating that 
intentionality is the "mark of the mental". If characterising the mental in terms of the 
intentional is to be informative, then we need to give an account of what it is for something 
to be intentional, in terms which both avoid mention of mentality and which are in some 
sense clearer than our pre-theoretical grasp of mentality (we would not require this if all 
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we wish to do is find a way to pick out mental items, but this is not sufficient for the 
present task, as we are interested in the nature of the mental, hoping to equip ourselves to 
answer questions regarding whether or not mentality and physicality are fundamental 
features of the world and how they relate one to the other).  
 If intentionality is to serve as an appropriate characterisation of the mental, then it 
had best turn out that all the sorts of phenomena listed above exhibit intentionality, and 
likewise that phenomena we are not comfortable welcoming into the mental fold do not do 
so. Intentionality has been the subject of a vast amount of philosophical discussion and 
debate, and for reasons of space I am not be able to examine this material in anything like 
the detail it doubtlessly deserves. (See, for instance, Crane (2001) for an extended 
discussion.) Brentano characterises the intentional as below: 
[...]what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, 
direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a 
thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as 
object within itself, although they do not do so in the same way. In presentation, 
something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, 
in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. (1874, p.88)  
Adopting the Brentano Thesis (that intentionality is the mark of the mental), furnishes 
answers of the following sort to questions (10.iii) and (10.iv). A property will count as 
mental just in virtue of instantiating that property, the object that does so exhibits the 
feature of intentionality. A complex object will count as mental just in case it exhibits 
intentionality. It is worth noting that a complex object may be such that it exhibits 
intentionality, but that there are no individual properties it instantiates in virtue of which it 
exhibits this feature.  
 Being intentional may be a result of complexes of appropriately related properties. 
Should this be the case, then it appears that there might be mental entities—complex 
objects—but no mental properties, according to the Brentano Thesis. Nothing I say below 
turns, however, on whether this is, or is not, the case. The proponent of the Brentano 
Thesis will not want to allow that a property counts as mental just in case it is part of a 
complex of properties which, in virtue of instantiating that complex, the object that does so 
exhibits intentionality. It may be the case, for instance, that all mentality requires some 
physical basis. In this sense, certain physical properties of the complex object which does 
exhibit intentionality will be part of the complex in virtue of which it does so. However, 
prima facie, it does not appear that one would want to count these very properties as 
mental. 
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 It is clear that many phenomena that we would pre-theoretically accept as mental 
states exhibit intentionality. From the list given above, I think it is unproblematic to ascribe 
intentionality to the following items: a belief always seem to be a belief of, that or in such-
and-such; desires seem to be to, that, for or against such-and-such; unconscious urges 
seem to be similar to desires in this respect; thoughts are about, concerning or that 
something-or-other; many of the entities involved in language seem to be amongst the 
clearest candidates for exhibiting intentionality; when one wills, one wills that such-and-
such comes about; to have a compulsion is to be strongly drawn towards doing something 
or other in some particular way, and it looks appropriate to characterise this specific course 
of action as the intentional object of the compulsion; phobias are fears of some particular 
sort of thing; trains of thought have, metaphorically speaking, some destination, a broad 
subject matter, which looks like a good candidate for an intentional object; perceptions are 
seeing, hearings and so on of something-or-other.  
 Regarding the other items on the list, things are not quite so clear cut. Whilst 
emotions and moods do clearly exhibit intentionality at times, they arguably do not always 
do so. Those reporting depression, for instance, often report sadness, anxiety or boredom 
that is not about anything, but rather involve "[...]the world as a whole looking strangely 
different" (Ratcliffe, 2012). It appears plausible that such states are amenable to non-
intentional analyses. To be in a certain frame of mind does not seem to involve, in the way 
entertaining a belief or a thought does, standing in a relation to some intentional object. 
Rather, being in a certain frame of mind is plausibly characterised as being in a state which 
somehow modifies or colours the manner in which one does stand in such relations. 
Awareness, like emotion, may often have an intentional object, but there is a sense of the 
word, when it is used say in phrases such as "you should be aware of your surroundings" 
where this is less clear. Whilst the surface grammar of such a phrase suggests "your 
surroundings" as the intentional object of the recommended state of awareness, another 
plausible understanding of what it is to be in such a state is to be in a state of readiness to 
engage with particular features as intentional objects. Frames of mind and awareness may 
be importantly related to intentionality, without themselves exhibiting the feature. 
Phenomenal experiences and sensations do not look to be always straightforwardly 
intentional. Undergoing a certain phenomenal experience, or a particular sensation, has a 
specific character, there is something that it is like to undergo just that experience or 
sensation (think about the way an itch differs from a tickle, or an experience of extreme 
heat differs from one of time flying). However, it is less than clear that having such a 
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character is a matter of intentionality. An itch feels a certain way—a very specific sort of 
way—but it does not seem that an itch is about that feeling; that the itch contains, or is 
directed towards that feeling; rather, experiencing the itch just is feeling that way. Some 
sensations, such as itches, also tend to have a location, they are felt in some part or other 
of the body. But again, they do not seem to be about or directed towards that location.  
 How should we respond to such cases—instances of what look to be pre-theoretic 
paradigms of mentality, but regarding which it is less than clear that they exhibit 
intentionality—in light of an attempt to understand the mental in terms of the intentional? 
Various options present themselves. One, which is unlikely to be very appealing, would be 
to exclude, on the basis of their appearing not to be intentional, the sorts of phenomena 
described in the previous paragraph from counting as mental. Such an approach is 
unattractive, however, as it not only flies in the face of a common sense notion of what 
counts as mental and what does not, but also renders accounting for mentality in terms of 
intentionality mere stipulative redefinition. One might take the opposite lesson from such 
phenomena, and conclude that they are not intentional, that they do, as common sense 
suggests, count as mental, and that therefore not all mental phenomena is intentional 
phenomena. Such a line of thought may well be attractive to an opponent of the attempt 
to characterise the mental in terms of the intentional, but will, for obvious reasons, be 
deeply unattractive to the proponent of this view. Another sort of approach that could be 
taken would be to argue that such states are indeed intentional. Arguments could be given, 
and the notion of intentionality expanded upon and broadened such that, despite the 
prima facie appearance that sometimes emotions, moods, sensations etc. defy 
characterisation in intentional terms, in the final analysis, they do all turn out to exhibit 
intentionality. This would allow the proponent of the claim that intentionality is the mark 
of the mental to accommodate pre-theoretic intuitions regarding what counts as mentality. 
 This final approach appears to be the only attractive option for anyone who wants 
to maintain the claim that intentionality is the mark of the mental. However, such an 
approach presents (at least) two challenges. First, on pain of becoming ad hoc, the 
broadening of the concept of intentionality cannot be done in a piecemeal fashion such 
that it simply accords with some common sense conception regarding which phenomena 
are to be counted amongst the mental. Rather, a principled approach must be adopted. 
This raises the second challenge: just as the first approach discussed above is unattractive 
because it excludes too much intuitively mental phenomena; an approach which includes 
too much intuitively non-mental phenomena will also be unattractive. As Chisholm puts it: 
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The problem for proponents of this[...] [the Brentano] thesis is not so much that of 
showing that mental phenomena are intentional as it is that of showing that 
physical phenomena are not intentional. (1967, p.203) 
Given a broad account of intentionality, books, maps and signage (amongst other things) all 
seem, in important ways, to be directed towards some object or to make reference to 
some content; that is, to exhibit the feature of intentionality. However, such things do not 
appear to be, at least on a common sense, pre-theoretical view, examples of mental 
entities. If accepting that intentionality is the mark of the mental means accepting that 
road signs and metro maps possess mentality, then it seems this approach to characterising 
the mental includes too much. However, worries such as this can be answered by appeal to 
'derived intentionality' (for more on this distinction see Searle (1983)). Books, maps and 
signage (and other examples of similar apparently non-mental phenomena which exhibit 
intentionality) are only intentional in virtue of some non-derivatively intentional entities 
bearing appropriate relations to the relevant book, map or sign.
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 The distinction between 
derived and non-derivative intentionality provides a principled line along which to divide 
phenomena. Thus, entities which exhibit only derived intentionality need not be 
considered mental, and so as long as all the non-derivatively intentional entities are 
relatively well aligned with a common sense conception of what should and should not 
count as mental, then a broadened account of intentionality need not be seen to be 
unattractive on the grounds that it ascribes mentality to too many common-sensically non-
mental entities; at least, not on the grounds of the sort of intentionality exhibited by things 
such as books, maps and signage.  
 However, if there are entities which are non-derivatively intentional, and which, 
common-sensically speaking, do not appear as though they ought to count as mental 
entities, then either the view that intentionality is the mark of the mental, or our common 
sense classification of which entities are mental and which are not, ought to be abandoned. 
It has been suggested by Martin and Pffiefer, Molnar, and Place that dispositions seem to 
meet the traditionally proposed criteria for possessing the feature of intentionality: 
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 The nature of exactly how derived intentionality works and the nature of the relevant relations 
that need to obtain between non-derivatively intentional entities and those that exhibit derived 
intentionality need not concern us here.  
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We will show that the most typical characterisations of intentionality[...] all fail to 
distinguish[...] mental states from[...] dispositional physical states. (Martin and 
Pffiefer, 1987, p.531)
191
 
I think that the Brentano Thesis is basically mistaken. Thinkers who wished to deny 
the intentionality of certain types of mental states have said this before, of course, 
but my intention is to subvert the Brentano Thesis from the other direction, as it 
were. I accept the intentionality of the mental, and go on to argue that something 
very much like intentionality is a pervasive and ineliminable feature of the physical 
world. (Molnar, 2003, p.61) 
If[...] you believe, as I do, that ‘intentionality’ is a philosopher’s technical term, and 
that it means whatever the typical characterizations of it given by philosophers 
make it mean, you must conclude that intentionality so defined is the mark not of 
the mental, but of the dispositional. (Place, 1999, p.225) 
If dispositions exhibit intentionality, then accepting the Brentano Thesis, which entails that 
to exhibit intentionality is sufficient to count as mental, leads one to accept that any 
substance which instantiates dispositional properties has some measure of mentality. 
Given the ubiquity of dispositional properties on the ontology proposed in this thesis, 
accepting the Brentano Thesis seems to lead to panpsychism.
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 Furthermore, in the last 
chapter, dispositionality was identified as a key component of what it means for something 
to be physical! The second challenge outlined above cannot be met: taking intentionality to 
be the mark of the mental, at least on the sort of characterisation Brentano lays out in the 
quotation given, has the result that many more sorts of entity count as mental than our 
common sense conception of the term would allow. Rocks, refrigerators and Rubik’s Cubes 
all instantiate dispositional properties, but on no common sense conception of mentality 
would such things be included in the set of things which have minds. Either our common 
sense view of mentality must be jettisoned, or the Brentano Thesis must be rejected; and I 
contend that the latter of these is the more palatable. It may be necessary for something to 
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 Martin and Pffiefer argue that the spirit of the Brentano Thesis is correct—intentionality ought to 
be the dividing line between mental and non-mental phenomena. Therefore, they hold, given that 
seemingly non-mental dispositions meet the criteria for intentionality, we must have our 
characterisation of intentionality wrong. See Chapter Seven of this thesis for a discussion of the 
alternative notion of intentionality that Martin proposes in his later work. That notion, however, 
differs significantly from the one under discussion here, and so Martin and Pffiefer's point stands as 
a criticism of the Brentano Thesis as characterised in this chapter. 
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 Mumford (1999) accuses Place of being committed to panpsychism on the basis of his argument 
that dispositions seem to exhibit intentionality. However, as Place (1999) notes in his reply, this only 
follows if one assumes the truth of the Brentano Thesis: that to possess intentionality is sufficient to 
count as mental. This is, however, the very claim that is in dispute. 
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count as mental for it to exhibit intentionality, in the sense under discussion above, but it 
does not look to be sufficient.  
 
11.2    Introspection 
Arthur Pap offers the following characterisation of mental states: 
Let us describe a mental state as a state which can be directly observed only 
through introspection and cannot be directly observed by more than one 
individual, viz. the individual who is in that mental state. (1949, p.267) 
For a state to count as mental is for it to be, first, such that only one individual is in that 
state (of course, other individuals might be in exactly similar states), and secondly, such 
that it can only be directly accessed by that very individual, and only through a process of 
introspection. Pap's characterisation of the mental would answer questions (10.iii) and 
(10.iv) in something like the following ways: a property counts as mental just in case its 
instantiation is constitutive of the object that instantiates it being in a state which is 
directly observable only by that very object and only via a process of introspection; a 
complex object counts as mental just in case it is in a state such that that state is directly 
observable only by itself and only via a process of introspection. 
 Like the Brentano Thesis, Pap's account seems to capture something that is 
certainly common to many of the sorts of phenomena that, common-sensically, would be 
thought of as mental. Returning to our list, emotions; moods; thoughts; awarenesses; 
willings; worries; phenomenal experiences; sensations and perceptions seem to 
straightforwardly fit this characterisation. Whilst we might sometimes talk in terms such as 
'seeing the worry written all over her face' or 'feeling her pain'; such talk is broadly 
metaphorical—for instance, a creased brow and trembling lip are signals on which we take 
it to be a reliable inference that the person exhibiting them is worrying about something—
the 'seeing' here is indirect.  
 However, it does not seem to be so clear that unconscious urges, compulsions and 
phobias fit the characterisation given by Pap. In the first case, what makes an urge 
unconscious is its very inscrutability to introspection; these sorts of phenomena may not be 
directly observable by anyone. Thus, it seems that unconscious urges fail the test for 
mentality on Pap's account. However, unconscious urges seem, common-sensically at least, 
to be paradigm examples of mental phenomena. Perhaps there are no such urges. It is at 
least controversial whether or not the unconscious is a genuine aspect of human 
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psychology. If in fact there is no unconscious, it might be held that no problem arises from 
the consideration. However, I think this move is a little quick. If we are to make use of Pap's 
account in the present context, we are treating it as having ontological weight. This means 
that not only should the characterisation be apt for actual phenomena, but for merely 
possible phenomena also. Whilst the claim that there is no unconscious aspect to human 
psychology may be thought to have sufficient weight to merit assertion, the claim that 
there could not be any psychology that had an unconscious aspect (essentially, a claim that 
a Freudian picture of the mind is not only false, but impossible) is much stronger, and 
enjoys less support.
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 At the least, it seems that the question of the (metaphysical) 
possibility of unconscious urges and the like is an open one. This given, the possibility of 
there being unconscious aspects to the mind, whilst perhaps not decisive against, certainly 
casts doubt upon the adequacy of Pap's characterisation of the mental. Perhaps being 
exclusively accessible to introspection is sufficient for a state to count as mental, but it is 
questionable whether it is necessary. 
 Similar issues seem to arise with compulsions and phobias. It may be much clearer 
to others that someone has a particular compulsion or phobia on the basis of their 
behaviour than it is to the very person who possesses these states. Perhaps, with careful 
introspection, compulsions and phobias can be directly observed, and thus do not pose a 
problem for Pap's account, but at the very least it is not as clear that they do as it is in other 
cases (such as, for instance, perceptions or sensations). 
 Problems of a similar nature arise for the second part of Pap's characterisation; 
that for a state to count as mental, it must be directly accessible to only one individual. I 
contend that it seems to be an open question as to whether or not paradigmatic mental 
states might be accessible to more than one individual. Examples of mental states being 
directly accessible to more than one individual abound in literature and film. In Gene 
Rodenberry's television and film series Star Trek: The Next Generation, Counsellor Deanna 
Troi is an 'empath', she has the ability to directly sense the emotional states of others. 
Group-minds are common in science fiction, where the experiences of any one individual 
within the group are had by all members; for instance, the Children in John Wyndham's The 
Midwich Cuckoos, of whom one of the main characters in the book, Gordon Zellaby says: 
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 Perhaps it could be insisted that unconscious urges and the like can exist, for Pap, but they just 
will not count as mental, due to not being accessible to introspection. This move, however, seems at 
worst ad hoc; a principled reason needs to be given, independent of availability-to-introspection in 
support of holding, for instance, that a conscious desire is mental but an unconscious one is not.  
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And since the mind [of the Children] is collective, what about the sensations it 
receives? Are the rest of the children enjoying her bullseye too? It would appear 
not, and yet they must be aware of it, and perhaps of its flavour. A similar problem 
arises when I show them my films and lecture to them. In theory, if I had two of 
them only as my audience, all of them would share the experience—that's the way 
they learn their lessons[...] (1957, p.132) 
In the two group-minds of the Children (one composed of four boys, the other of four girls), 
direct access to sensation, memory and perception is not limited to a single individual, but 
rather is available to all four members of the group. Mind-reading—the direct accessing of 
the thoughts of another, whether due to some innate or acquired mental ability or via 
some sort of technological device—is another common fictional trope (see, for instance, E. 
E. 'Doc' Smith's Skylark series of novels). It is unlikely that any of these phenomena actually 
occur. However, whether Counsellor Troi style empathy, minds like the collective minds of 
the Children, and mind-reading are possible seems a much more open question.
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 If they 
are possible, then it seems that thoughts, emotions, perceptions and the like all fail to meet 
Pap's characterisation of the mental it is not the case that such states "[...]cannot be 
directly observed by more than one individual" (1949, p.267). It seems that if one wishes to 
adopt Pap's characterisation, then one faces a dilemma: either endorse the claim that, 
metaphysically speaking, Troi's empathic ability, group-minds and mind-reading are all 
impossible, and thus take on the responsibility for providing good reasons in support of 
that claim, or else accept the possibility of such things, and with it the conclusion that 
almost all the phenomena we would, on a common sense view, take to be mental, do not 
in fact qualify as such. Neither horn looks attractive, although as with the previous worry 
regarding the unconscious, perhaps this problem is not quite so grave as to be decisive 
against Pap's account. 
 A final worry for attempting to characterise the mental in Pap's terms—as any state 
which is directly accessible only by introspection and only by the individual in that state—is 
generated by the inclusion of the term 'individual' in the characterisation. In order for the 
characterisation to avoid circularity, some sense must be given to the term 'individual' that 
does not include terms such as 'subject of experience' or 'psychological unity'. An 
'individual' cannot be characterised in terms of a 'subject of experience' or a 'psychological 
unity' for Pap, as this would reintroduce mentality into what is intended as a 
characterisation of mentality. What must be avoided is a presupposition of mentality in the 
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 Indeed, some people take such phenomena to not only be possible, but to have actual instances. 
Such belief strikes me as unjustified given the evidence, but not logically incoherent. 
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characterisation of what it takes for something to count as an 'individual'. This means that 
many common accounts of individual personal identity which make use of notions such as 
being a subject of experience or of being a psychological unity of one sort or another will 
not be available to anyone adopting Pap's characterisation of mental states.
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 Other 
conceptions of individual personal identity are available, so again, this worry is not decisive 
against the characterisation, but it adds to the theoretical baggage one must accept if one 
chooses to adopt Pap's account.  
 Neither the Brentano Thesis, which on close inspection seems too radically at odds 
with a common sense conception of what does and does not count as mental, nor Pap's 
characterisation of the mental, which carries with it significant theoretical baggage (a 
commitment to the metaphysical impossibility of Freudean psychology and various para-
psychological phenomena and restrictions on the way we can characterise individuals in 
this context) are attractive. Many of the problems for these two positions arise from the 
diversity of the phenomena which on a common sense view seem to be paradigmatic 
examples of mental phenomena. This might give us reason to think that no simple, unified 
characterisation of the mental might be available. 
 
11.3    The Phenomenal and the Psychological 
Chalmers recognises this issue, and distinguishes between two broad classes of mental 
phenomena, what he calls 'psychological' and 'phenomenal'. Psychological mentality is 
characterised as: 
[...]the causal or explanatory basis for behaviour. A state is mental in this sense if it 
plays the right sort of causal role in the production of behaviour, or at least plays 
an appropriate role in the explanation of behaviour[...] What matters is the role it 
plays in a cognitive economy. (1996, p.11) 
in, contrast, phenomenal mentality is characterised as: 
[...]conscious experience[...] a mental state as a consciously experienced mental 
state. (ibid.) 
that is, one of which: 
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 Approaches of this sort include such as Locke's memory-based account, and its descendents, for 
instance, Shoemaker (1970). 
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[...]there is something it is like to be in that mental state[...] we can say that a 
mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel—an associated quality of 
experience. (ibid., p.4) 
Given a common sense understanding of the term 'mental', there is no competition 
between these two notions; both psychological and phenomenal states or entities properly 
count as mental. Furthermore, these two characterisations ought not to be seen as 
mutually exclusive, some states might be both psychological and phenomenal and some 
might be one but not the other (ibid., p.12 and pp. 16-17). It should be clear that this sort 
of account, in recognising the diversity of the concept of mentality, immediately avoids 
some of the problems discussed above: for instance, it can accommodate unconscious 
urges, compulsions, phobias etc. which might unavailable to introspection as psychological 
states; undirected feelings of sadness or anxiety as phenomenal, and so on. I am unable to 
think of examples of phenomena which seem, from a common sense point of view, to 
qualify as mental, and yet do not meet one or the other of these characterisations: 
Chalmers' account seems to include everything it ought to.  
 There might be some worry that, like the Brentano Thesis, Chalmers' 
characterisation of psychological mentality might include too much. Whether or not this is 
the case will turn on what interpretation is given to "the right sort of causal role" and "an 
appropriate role in the explanation" in the quotation given above. All sorts of phenomena 
play causal and explanatory roles with regards to the behaviour of complex organisms, 
including, but probably not limited to a huge variety of internal states of the organism, 
environmental features and historical factors. However, we will not want to count all such 
phenomena as mental. The presence of oxygen in the environment is causally relevant to 
any behaviour that human beings engage in (without it, there would be no behaviour 
occurring at all), but it is an unacceptable departure from common sense views about what 
is and is not mental to count the presence of oxygen as a mental state. The challenge for 
elaborating on the notion of appropriateness at play in the characterisation is to give the 
term 'appropriate' a sense in this context other than simply whatever-is-in-line-with-a-
common-sense-view-of-mentality. Whether or not this challenge can be met I am not sure. 
 However, thankfully, this need not be an issue that detains us here. The context of 
the present discussion is ontological. We are interested in how the mental and physical can 
be characterised with a view to answering questions about whether reality is 
fundamentally constituted of just physical entities; just mental entities; both physical and 
mental entities or entities which are not best characterised as either physical or mental. 
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Chalmers makes it clear that psychologically mental entities are not ontologically distinct 
from non-mental entities: 
The psychological aspects of mind pose many technical problems for cognitive 
science, and a number of interesting puzzles for philosophical analysis, but they 
pose no deep metaphysical enigmas[...] The reason for this is clear[...] the question 
"How could a physical system have psychological property P?" comes to the same 
thing as "How could a state of a physical system play such-and-such a causal role?" 
This is a question for the sciences of physical systems. (ibid., p.24) 
Psychological mentality is ontologically of a kind with the physical world, according to 
Chalmers. It is a matter of dispositionality, causality and structure, which as we saw earlier 
in this chapter is a central aspect of what it is for something to be properly characterised as 
'physical' according to (P). Whatever elaboration on the notion of appropriateness that 
appears in the characterisation of psychological mentality is given, it will not have 
ontological bite, but will, it seems be primarily concerned with our explanatory ambitions 
and norms. The presence of oxygen in the environment may be excluded from the notion 
of psychological mentality just because, in the epistemological context at hand—explaining 
behaviour—it can be taken as a given, a standing condition, a prerequisite, or the like (even 
if one rejects the notion of anything being a standing condition metaphysically speaking). 
 If there is no distinction to be made, in a fundamental, ontological sense, between 
physical phenomena and psychologically mental phenomena, then we need no longer 
concern ourselves with the nature of the latter. It is enough to note that, once a pluralistic 
view of mentality such as Chalmers' is adopted, we can straightforwardly accept that some 
phenomena which is, on a common sense view, paradigmatically mental may well just turn 
out to be physical (at least, in fundamental, ontological terms). Questions about the 
relationship between the physical world and psychological mentality come under what, 
according to Chalmers, we might call the 'easy' mind-body problem—easy in that there 
does not, prima facie, appear to be an ontological gulf between the physical and the 
psychological (ibid., pp. 24-25). Should it turn out that all mental phenomena is 
psychological, then it seems the physicalist worldview will be vindicated. 
 However, if there are phenomenal mental states—and first person experience 
suggests strongly that there are—the question regarding the ontology of mind and body 
remains open. In the case of phenomenal mentality, the analogous question to that posed 
by Chalmers in the quotation above is 'How could a physical system have a phenomenal 
property Q?', which comes to the same thing as 'How could a state of a physical system 
have a qualitative feel; an associated quality of experience?'. It is this sort of mentality 
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which motivates the questions regarding the ontology of mind and body: is it the case that 
phenomenal mentality is, ontologically speaking, distinct from physicality and psychological 
mentality? How phenomenal mentality relates to physicality we could consider the 'hard' 
mind-body problem, and how it relates to psychological mentality Chalmers' calls the mind-
mind problem. Unlike in the case of psychological mentality, it is not clear that answering 
these questions is a job for "the sciences of physical systems" (ibid., p.24).
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 Chalmers' notion of phenomenal mentality has two aspects: phenomenal mentality 
has a qualitative nature, and this qualitativity can be the content of, or inform, or feature in 
an experience. The quotations looked at thus far have been concerned with states. 
Chalmers' does not offer an explicit account of the ontology of states. However, he equally 
often talks in terms of properties, (for instance, "[w]e have seen that there is a 
psychological property associated with the experience of emotion[...]" (ibid., p.28) or 
"[...]when a phenomenal property is picked out[...]" (ibid., p.23). States, I take it, are the 
instantiations of a property or some properties by a substance or some substances at or 
over a period of time. Thus, states are not ontologically fundamental, and can be explained 
in terms of substance and property. Properties are the ways substances are. Whether or 
not something meets the characterisations laid out by Chalmers', thus, will primarily be a 
matter decided on the basis of the nature of the properties that thing instantiates. Thus, 
from Chalmers' characterisations of the mental we could generate the following principle 
to complement (P) and to furnish an answer to question (10.iii): 
(M) A property is properly characterised as mental if it: (i) plays an appropriate role 
in the causal or explanatory account of behaviour, that is, is a psychological 
property; or insofar as it (ii) has some sort of qualitative nature which (iii) can be 
part of the content of, or inform or feature in an experience. 
A complex object will count as mental, on Chalmers' characterisation, just in case it 
instantiates properties which satisfy (M). Thus, as with the discussion of the 
characterisation of the physical above, answers to question (10.iv) are to be given in terms 
of answers to question (10.iii). Whether or not some object counts as mental and physical 
is a matter to be settled according to the properties that object is characterised by. In what 
follows, we will not be concerned with properties which are properly characterised as 
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questions is a job for the sciences of physical systems, but it is not, as it might be thought to be in 
the psychological case, obvious that it is so. 
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mental just in virtue of meeting condition (i), the purely psychological properties, as our 
concern is with the 'hard' problems. 
 Galen Strawson's position on how to characterise the mental is similar to 
Chalmers'. Strawson recognises the divide between psychological (dispositional, non-
experiential—or DN—phenomena, in Strawson's own terms) and phenomenal (or 
experiential, in Strawson's own terms) phenomena. However, he suggests that 
psychological (dispositional, non-experiential) phenomena are not genuinely mental 
phenomena (1994, pp. 165-167). However, if the distinction is accepted and the specifically 
metaphysical differences between the phenomenal and the psychological discussed above 
noted, nothing really turns on this issue; it is merely terminological.  
 Strawson argues in favour of the claim that "it is only the actual occurrence of 
experiential phenomena that is a distinctively mental occurrence" (ibid., p.174). This claim 
might be seen to be in conflict with the 'can be' that appears at the start of part (iii) of (M). 
If Strawson's claim is correct, perhaps 'can be' should be replaced with 'is'. However, I do 
not think such an amendment is necessary; indeed, I think it weakens the characterisation. 
Consider the following two (exhaustive) options: either whatever, ontologically speaking, 
accounts for experiential phenomena (let's call this 'E') is as a matter of necessity always 
actually experienced, or else whatever does so is sometimes actually experienced and 
sometimes not. If the former is the case (as I suspect Strawson might take it to be), then 
the 'can be' turns out to be equivalent to 'is'; for in this case if E exists, then E is actually 
experienced just in virtue of its ability to be so. If the latter is the case, and E accounts, 
ontologically speaking, for experiential phenomena, but is not as a matter of necessity 
always actually experienced, then E can exist at t and not be experienced at t; thus, 
whether or not E is actually experienced does not seem to be a matter which is determined 
entirely by E's nature.  
 Bearing in mind that the sort of characterisation of 'mental' for which we are 
looking ought to bear ontological weight, it should be one that is determined by the nature 
of the entities under consideration. Thus, surely, it will be E's ability to be experienced—
that it 'can be'—which should qualify it as counting as mental. Given that the 'can be' 
appearing in (M) is consistent both with the view that Strawson argues in favour of, and 
with its opposite, it turns out (M) is neutral between those views, and thus is not in conflict 
with Strawson's position. However, if (M) were to be amended so that part (iii) began with 
'is', then (M) would be in conflict with the latter view. I cannot see conclusive grounds for 
preferring one view to the other, and on this basis I take it to stand in favour of (M) that it 
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is consistent with both (and even if you do think there are good grounds for preferring one 
view to the other, this does not count against (M) as currently formulated whatsoever). 
 A worry arises for (M) that bears comparison to the problem raised earlier for Pap's 
account regarding the inclusion of the term 'individual' in his characterisation of mentality. 
Part (iii) of (M) makes reference to 'experience', and it could be objected that this term 
cannot be understood without employing the concept of mentality itself, or that at least 
the notion of 'experience' is equally as mysterious as that of mentality. There is something 
to this worry, and it is one that Chalmers' candidly accepts, holding that experience just has 
to be taken as a primitive, whilst noting that at least, as far as primitives go, it has the 
advantage of being one with which we are intimately acquainted (see, for instance, ibid., 
pp. 3-4). I am inclined to agree with Chalmers' sentiment that experience might have to be 
taken as a primitive. If it is, then (M) in no sense provides an analysis of, or definition of, 
the mental; but it can still function to illuminate what it is for something to count as 
mental. A similar move might be available to Pap: to take the notion of 'individual' as 
primitive. However, the cases are not quite analogous. There are good reasons to suppose 
that 'individual' can be given an analysis, one in terms of mental states, and so in Pap's case 
it looks like the direction of explanation is the wrong way around. Conversely, in the case of 
(M), the notion of 'experience' looks like it is co-primitive with the notion of 'mentality': 
part of what it is for something to be mental is for it to feature in experience, and part of 
what it is for something to be an experience is for it to feature mental things. Naturally, if 
experience can be given an analysis in terms which do not invoke mentality, then this 
analysis can be plugged in to (M) and the worry disappears. Whilst my intuition runs with 
Chalmers' that this will not be possible, nothing I say turns on this issue, and so I am happy 
to remain open to the possibility that experience could be analysed. 
 As a characterisation of what it is for something to count as mental, (M) has 
significant advantages over both the Brentano Thesis and Pap's account. First, (M) seems to 
accord with a common sense view of mentality. It does not either exclude phenomena 
which, on a common sense view of the mind, seem paradigmatically mental, nor does it 
include phenomena whose acceptance as properly mental phenomena would require a 
radical departure from a common sense view of the mind. Secondly, it does not carry with 
it the sort of metaphysical baggage that I have argued above makes Pap's account an 
unattractive one. Finally, whilst both it and Pap's account face a similar problem—outlined 
in the previous paragraph—it seems that a more (if not completely) satisfying response to 
this worry can be given on behalf of (M) than can be given on behalf of Pap's account. For 
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these reasons, in the discussion that follows, I will take (M) to provide the best 
characterisation of what it is for something to count as mental. 
 Over the last two chapters we have investigated how the physical and the mental 
might best be characterised, and, having considered various options on both counts, 
arrived at (P) and (M). Neither characterisation is perfectly precise, nor are either 
completely clear of worries or objections. They will not do as analyses or definitions. 
However, I hope that they are clear enough, and substantial enough, that they can help us 
to get a grip on exactly what questions regarding mind and body are getting at, and to 
clarify what proper answers to such questions might look like. What I have said over the 
past two chapters has been briefer than it might be were there no limitations on time or 
space, but I hope I have done enough to motivate two claims. First, that it is essential that 
in attempting to answer questions concerned with the ontology of mind and body, we 
engage with a developed account of the ontology of properties; for on the best available 
characterisations of what it is to count as physical and mental, properties play the central 
role. Secondly, that central to the notion of physicality is dispositionality, and to the notion 
of mentality is qualitativity. 
 The next chapter will address the questions concerning the ontology of mind and 
body in the context of the ontology of properties—the particular interpretation of Martin's 
Limit View—argued for in Chapters Four, Five and Six of this thesis, making use of (P) and 
(M) to precisify these questions and shape the answer given to them. 
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Chapter Twelve: The Limit View and the Nature of Mind: Sketch for a Neutral Monism 
 
"If, as Aristotle said, 'thought and its object are one,' so are sensations and 
perceptions one with their 'objects.' In fact, there are not sensations or perceptions 
and their objects. There are objects, and when these are included in the manifold 
called consciousness they are called sensations and perceptions." (Holt, 1914, 
p.214) 
 
In this chapter I will argue that, if we accept the version of Martin's Limit View for which I 
have argued, then the approach to the ontology of mind and body that we ought to adopt 
is—a once popular, now neglected—neutral monism.
197
 I briefly outline the core 
commitments of neutral monism and provide a survey of several versions of it, focussing on 
those proposed by Ernst Mach, William James, Bertrand Russell and, most recently, 
Kenneth Sayre. I then go on to outline the version of neutral monism which I believe to be 
the natural position to adopt concerning the ontology of mind and body if one accepts the 
interpretation of the Limit View argued for in this thesis. Following this, I examine the space 
occupied by my version of neutral monism in the conceptual landscape of the mind-body 
debate, exploring how it relates to to other monisms, both mental- and physicalistic; to 
emergent dualism and to panpsychism. I then respond to some objections often raised to 
neutral monism. I conclude with a brief look at the advantages of adopting a neutral 
monism of the sort I sketch out, and at potential areas of application. 
 This chapter does far less than present a fully-fledged theory of mind and body or 
account of the place of consciousness in the natural world. Rather, it outlines the shape 
which I believe such a theory should take if one adopts the version of the Limit View argued 
for in this thesis. Prima facie, the position I sketch has the potential to make headway on 
difficult question in the philosophy of mind and in metaphysics more generally. On these 
grounds, I contend, it merits serious consideration. 
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 It should be noted that recent comments from Heil, one of the principle proponents of the 
powerful-qualities view, are suggestive that he may be leaning towards some version of neutral 
monism (see for instance (2013)). The position this chapter advances was, however, developed 
independently of Heil's recent work. 
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12.1    The Core Commitments of Neutral Monism 
Neutral monism has two central features. The first of these is its (unsurprising) 
commitment to a monistic ontology: for the neutral monist, there are no ontological 
divisions between different kinds of fundamental entity. The 'monism' of neutral monism is 
not a claim that there is, numerically, just one fundamental entity (as in, for instance, a 
Spinozistic metaphysic, or in Schaffer's 'priority monism' (2010)); although I take neutral 
monism to be compatible with this claim. Furthermore, the 'monism' of neutral monism 
does not commit one to a one-category ontology; although many traditional neutral 
monists did adopt bundle theory, this is not an essential feature of the view (see 
Stubenberg (2010, section 7.4)). Rather the claim is that, in some important sense, all the 
fundamental entities (whether these belong to a single category, such as in a trope 
theoretic ontology or to various categories, say, substance and mode) are of a single 
type.
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 The second (again, unsurprising) claim of neutral monism is neutrality. Neutral 
monists hold that the fundamental entities are all of a type, as discussed above, and that 
the nature of that type is such that the fundamental entities are best characterised as 
neutral between physical/material and mental/psychological/experiential. For the neutral 
monist, physical and mental phenomena may still be considered real, but they are to be 
accounted for, ontologically speaking, in terms of phenomena which are not themselves 
fundamentally physical or mental.  
 Any view that incorporates these two commitments is a neutrally monist position. 
Given this, neutral monism is a relatively flexible theoretical framework; there is room for 
elaboration in a variety of directions. Different neutral monisms may offer wildly divergent 
accounts of, for instance, the nature of the neutral entities themselves and of how they 
relate to the notions of mind and body. In the next section I briefly outline several neutrally 
monist positions, before going on to elaborate my own, distinctive version. 
 
12.2    A Brief Historical Survey 
Perhaps the most significant English-speaking neutral monists, historically speaking, are 
James and Russell. Both, however, were influenced by Mach. For Mach, the most basic 
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 Just as physicalism, for example, is not committed to a one-category ontology, but just to the 
claim that all the fundamental entities of whatever ontological category are physical entities. 
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entities, ontologically speaking, are what he calls the 'elements'. Whilst the elements are 
most easily identified by considering what might now be called qualia—a particular patch 
of colour, a smell, a feeling of warmth—for Mach, they are not to be understood as either 
intrinsically mental or intrinsically physical: 
A colour is a physical object as soon as we consider its dependence, for instance, 
upon its luminous source, upon other colours, upon temperatures, upon spaces 
and so forth. When we consider, however, its dependence upon the retina[...] it is 
a psychological object, a sensation. (Mach 1914, p.17) 
Rather, it is in virtue of participating in certain groupings with other entities that what are 
intrinsically neutral qualify as physical or psychological. When our focus is on a particular 
element qua a member of one particular group of phenomena it presents itself to us as 
physical, when our focus is on it qua a member of another group, it might present itself as 
mental. This leads Mach to the following characterisations of the distinction between the 
physical conception of the world and the mental conception of the world: 
Not the subject matter, but the direction of investigation, is different in the two 
domains. (ibid., pp. 17-18) 
I see, therefore, no opposition of physical and psychical, but simple identity as 
regards these elements. (ibid., p.43) 
The 'simple identity' to which Mach refers is not a reduction in favour of either the physical 
or the mental, but rather is in their both being accounted for by a single, neutral type of 
entity: the elements. Our immediate contact with these neutral entities is what is "[...] 
immediately and indubitably given[...]" in experience (ibid., p.45), but they ought not to be 
considered to be in any sense mind-dependent.  
 James (see, for instance, the essays collected in (1912)) puts forward a similar 
position to Mach, although in his terminology the most basic neutral entities of which the 
world is composed are called 'pure experience'. As with Mach's 'elements', instances of 
pure experience are neither intrinsically mental, nor intrinsically physical. Counting as 
either physical or mental is a matter of how an entity is considered given its relations with 
certain other entities. James considers a pen: 
To get classified either as a physical pen or as someone's percept of a pen, it must 
assume a function, and that can only happen in a more complicated world. (1912, 
pp. 123-124) 
Considered in terms of being a persisting entity which can effect certain changes, be put to 
certain uses and stand in certain stable relations to other entities, the pen is physical; 
considered in terms of something that comes and goes from the immediately experienced 
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world depending on one's own circumstances, it is a mental item. But it is neither of these 
in a fundamental, ontological sense. 
 In his later writings on the topic, Russell presents a version of neutral monism 
which differs significantly from that of Mach and James.
199
 His basic, neutral entities are 
'events', which again are picked out through reference to experience: 
When I speak of an event I do not mean anything out of the way. Seeing a flash of 
lightning is an event; so is hearing a tyre burst, or smelling a rotten egg, or feeling 
the coldness of a frog. (1927, p.222) 
Russell conceives of physical entities as being composed of all the events that occur at the 
location of that entity (ibid., p.385). On the basis of this commitment, plus the claims that 
(a) the brain is composed of microphysical particles and (b) apparently mental phenomena 
are events that happen where there is a brain, Russell is led to the conclusion that some of 
the events out of which the microphysical particles which make up a brain are composed 
include what are normally thought of as mental states (ibid., pp. 320-321). As we have 
seen, for Mach and James, the neutral entities which compose a macrophysical object and 
the appearances of that object are to be identified; and these entities are best 
characterised as neutral because their respective physical and mental characterisations 
stem from their being considered qua being dependent on or related to various other 
entities. For Russell, the neutrality stems from a different source. Appearances of a pen are 
not the very pen itself considered qua its dependence on a retina or according to its 
unstable presence in the given of experience, but are rather constituents of matter quite 
apart from the pen—matter in the brain of the person to whom they appear. The basis for 
the neutrality of the events which underlie both matter and the mind, for Russell, rests on 
a number of claims. First, such events are not properly characterised as mental because 
they fail to exhibit what Russell sees as a hallmark of mentality—intentionality (see 1921, 
p.141). Secondly, we have no grounds, on the basis of the phenomenal quality such events 
have, for considering them distinctively mental, for, given all we know, all events may have 
such quality. So events are not mental. And as they clearly do not match up to a traditional 
conception of material or physical, Russell's events must be considered neutral.  
 Notwithstanding the differences mentioned above in the details of, on the one 
hand, Mach and James' neutral monism, and on the other, the later stages of Russell's 
version of this position, Stubenberg (2010, section 4) identifies some core philosophical 
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principles which motivate all three positions.
200
 The first of these is a thoroughgoing 
empiricism which puts what is given in experience centre-stage; be this Mach's 'elements'; 
James' 'pure experience', or Russell's 'events'. The second is a realism about what is given; 
all three thinkers wish to avoid idealism. It is easy to see how these positions might 
combine to motivate a neutrally monist position. First, what is given in experience seems 
quite radically different from the world as described in fundamental physics. If all 
knowledge is to be gained through the given, then we can know little of the theoretical 
entities of physics. This may make both physicalism and dualism (where one of the two 
kinds of fundamental entity is physical) unattractive to philosophers sharing the twin 
sentiments of empiricism and realism. Secondly, the commitment to realism means that 
the rejection of physicalism and dualism does not lead to the idealistic or phenomenalistic 
conclusion that the world is composed of fundamentally mental entities. So, having 
rejected physical monism, mental monism and psycho-physical dualism, the natural place 
to settle seems to be neutral monism. Thus for Mach, James and Russell, their 
epistemological commitment to empiricism plays a major role in motivating their neutrally 
monist metaphysics. 
 A distinctive version of neutral monism has been proposed by Sayre much more 
recently. For Sayre (1976), the fundamental entities are states of information. These 
informational states are ontologically prior to both mental and physical states, and provide 
a reduction base for both (ibid., p.16). Given Sayre's claim that both the mental and the 
physical can be reduced to the informational, it makes sense to consider the informational 
as best characterised neither as physical nor as mental. Sayre's position is a marked 
departure from the neutral monisms of Mach, James and Russell. It does not hold that the 
given in experience provides us with the most basic entities. Rather, the basic entities are 
"[...]mathematical (statistical) structures" (1996, p.312). Sayre (in a memo distributed to 
the Notre Dame philosophy department, and quoted in Stubenberg (2010)) explicitly 
distances himself from Russell, stating that his own position has "[...]more in common with 
the ontology of the late Platonic dialogues[...]" than it does with Russell's. 
 The discussion in this section has been, of necessity, very brief. (For a fuller account 
of the history and development of neutral monism see Stubenberg's excellent Stanford 
Encyclopedia entry (2010) and Eric Bank's (2010).) However, I hope I have presented 
enough to give the reader a theoretical backdrop against which to consider the position I 
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discusses which I do not have the space to explore here—see (2010) for details. 
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sketch below. In what follows, I shall endeavour to draw appropriate parallels and contrasts 
between my own position and those discussed above. 
 
12.3    The Limit View and the Ontology of Mind and Body 
In this thesis I have argued for an understanding of the Limit View along the following lines. 
Qualitativity and dispositionality are real, irreducible, ineliminable features of the world. 
However, they both find their basis, ontologically speaking, in a single type of entity; what I 
have been calling simply properties. These properties are the ways things in the world are. 
Any such way some-thing is will have consequences for that thing; it will inform both what 
that thing is like, regardless of how it might behave in possible (but currently non-actual) 
circumstances (that is, it will confer some quality on the thing) and it will determine how it 
will behave in any one of a vast number of possible (but currently non-actual) 
circumstances (that is, it will confer some disposition on the thing). The property that will 
be the source of these contributions to the thing in question is unitary, and so these 
contributions cannot be separated from each other in reality, that is, we could not get rid 
of one whilst maintaining the other, for to get rid of one would require us to get rid of the 
property itself, and so the other would follow. Both the quality and the disposition are 
identical to the property itself, and so also to each other. However, notwithstanding this 
identity, there is a distinction between qualitativity and dispositionality that is more than 
simply an artefact of the mind. I have suggested that this claim—which some (Lowe and 
Armstrong) have found difficult to conceive of—can be understood by drawing on the 
resources of multi-categorical ontology and of Scholastic discussions of the metaphysics of 
distinctness. Whilst the distinction between quality and disposition is not a fully fledged, 
real distinction between thing and thing, it is nevertheless finds some license in the nature 
of properties themselves; what Suarez calls a distinction of the reasoned reason (see 
Chapters Five and Six of this thesis for a fuller discussion). 
 I have also argued in favour of the following characterisations of the notions of 
physicality and mentality: 
(P) A property is properly characterised as physical insofar as: (i) it is a property 
which is referred to in a (relatively complete) theory of the relatively fundamental 
elements of our universe; (ii) the theory in question bears the hallmarks of a 
scientific theory; (iii) it is a concrete entity and (iv) confers on its bearer a 
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dispositional nature such that it's behaviour is highly regular allowing that this 
behaviour can be well integrated into the theory. 
And: 
(M) A property is properly characterised as mental if it: (i) plays an appropriate role 
in the causal or explanatory account of behaviour, that is, is a psychological 
property; or insofar as it (ii) has some sort of qualitative nature which (iii) can be 
part of the content of, or inform or feature in an experience. 
Given these characterisations, the major positions in the debate surrounding the ontology 
of mind and body could be given the following schematisation: 
(Physicalism) All fundamental properties are (P) properties. Apparent (M) 
properties are identical with/eliminable in favour of/reducible to/dependent on
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(P) properties; 
(Mentalism) All real properties are (M) properties. Apparent (P) properties are 
really constituted by (M) properties; 
(Property Dualism) Some properties are (P) properties, others are (M) properties; 
(Neutral Monism) Neither (P) nor (M) properly or fully characterises the real, 
fundamental properties. The nature of the real properties is neutral between (P) 
and (M). 
Specific versions of each of the types of position listed above will fill out and elaborate on 
these schema in different ways.  
 We have seen that dispositionality and qualitativity play a central role in the best 
characterisations that can be given of the notions of the physical and the mental, 
respectively. Part of what it is for a property to be physical, according to (P), is for that 
property to confer dispositionality on its bearer. Part of what it is for a property to be 
mental, according to (M), is for that property to have a qualitative nature which can be the 
content of, of inform or feature in an experience. Whilst these characterisations involve 
more than simply the alignment of the physical with the dispositional and the mental with 
the qualitative, it is the contrast between dispositionality and qualitativity, I contend, that 
gives the apparent distinction between mind and body ontological bite. And according to 
the account of the ontology of properties for which I have argued in this thesis, no real 
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property can be fully and properly characterised as either a disposition or as a quality. 
Rather, properties bestow both a dispositional and a qualitative nature on the objects by 
which they are instantiated, but this dispositionality and qualitativity are, fundamentally, 
ontologically speaking identical to one another. They are accounted for by a unitary and 
undifferentiated entity: the property itself. One way one could put this is that properties, 
according to the Limit View, are neutral between dispositionality and qualitativity, between 
being best characterised as dispositions or as qualities. 
 If the distinction between physicality and mentality, when it comes to the 
ontological features of these notions, tracks that of the distinction between disposition and 
quality, then our ontology of properties will inform our ontology of mind and body. If the 
distinction between disposition and quality is one which can be properly drawn in 
fundamental ontology, then so too can the distinction between mind and body, suggesting 
that property dualism is correct. If the distinction between disposition and quality, 
however, is not one which is realised in fundamental ontology, then the distinction 
between mind and body will also fail to be so realised, and it would appear that a monism 
of one form or the other ought to be favoured over dualism. If dispositionality reduces to 
qualitativity, then there look to be prospects for the claim that the physical is really 
constituted by the mental, and the aspirations of some form of mentalism—perhaps an 
idealism or phenomenalism—will be met. If qualitativity can be explained in terms of 
dynamic behaviour of complex systems (note that it is the poor prospects on this front that 
Chalmers identifies as the hard problem of consciousness (1996, pp. 24-25)), then a 
reduction of the most mysterious features of the mind to physicality may be on the cards, 
meeting the theoretical goals for a variety of forms of physicalism. 
 None of these conditions are met on the account of properties proposed in this 
thesis. Properties themselves, on this view, cannot be taken to be fundamentally 
dispositional, at the expense of qualities; they cannot be taken to be fundamentally 
qualitative, at the expense of dispositionality; or indeed split into two fundamental types, 
qualities on the one hand, and dispositions on the other. Rather, dispositionality and 
qualitativity are both equally accounted for by an entity which is not best characterised as 
either one or other; which is neutral between the two. If the ontology of mind and body is 
to track that of dispositionality and qualitativity, then both are accounted for, ontologically 
speaking, by neutral entities which are neither best characterised as physical nor best 
characterised as mental: by properties themselves, powerful qualities. 
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 The fundamental stuff of the world—the simple objects, propertied-substances—is 
neither best characterised as physical stuff nor as mental stuff, on this view, for properties 
are neither best characterised as (P) properties or as (M) properties. Ontologically 
speaking, all reality is composed of entities which are of a kind. Whatever the significant 
difference is between mind and body, it is not one which can be drawn in terms of the 
nature of the fundamental stuff of the world. Such a position is at odds with the debate 
concerning the ontology of mind and body as it is most commonly drawn today, for it is 
implicit in all the major positions—monisms of either physical- or mental-istic flavour and 
dualisms—that this distinction ought to be drawn in terms of fundamental ontology. The 
disagreement is simply over the relative ontological priority of mind and body; and over 
whether or not both actually exist.
202
 Once one accepts, however, the sort of account of 
properties which I have proposed in this thesis, it becomes hard to see just how the sort of 
distinction driving the currently orthodox framing of the debate could be drawn. Whether 
or not one accepts that (P) and (M) are adequate characterisations of physicality and 
mentality,
203
 I do not believe that one can elaborate on the notions of physicality without 
drawing on that of causation, behaviour, structure, which are accounted for by 
dispositionality; or indeed on mentality without phenomenal experience, which is a matter 
of qualitativity, of having some intrinsic what-it-is-like-ness.
204
 If this claim seems too 
strong, then it can at least be noted that in the contemporary debate concerning the 
ontology of mind and body, it is common to make these associations (as discussed in 
Chapters Eight and Nine). Therefore, given the already common association of mentality 
with qualitativity and physicality with dispositionality, further consideration of the 
ramifications that specific theories of properties have for the ontology of mind and body 
are called for: (P) and (M) are not functioning as deus ex machina-s. 
 The version of neutral monism I am proposing here, it should be noted, does not 
imply any sort of anti-realism or eliminativism regarding either mind or body. For, just as it 
                                                           
202
 Note how strikingly similar the conceptual set-up of the mind-body debate is to the dispositional-
categorical debate: there too all orthodox parties agree that there are two sorts of property, and 
simply disagree as to which exist, or, if accepting both in some sense or another, over which is more 
fundamental than the other. 
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 As mentioned previously, I certainly do not hold them to be full definitions or analyses, but hope 
they are at least helpful in clarifying what is it stake in the mind-body debate. 
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 It is important to note that some-thing X's possessing an intrinsic what-it-is-like-ness may not 
entail that there is a what-it-is-like-to-be-X. There being something a rock is like may not be the 
same as there being something it is like to be a rock (of which more below—see section 12.7). 
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is maintained that notwithstanding their identity, a distinction which is more-than-in-the-
eye-of-the-beholder obtains between dispositionality and qualitativity, so it can also be 
maintained that it is so with the notions of mentality and physicality. It is natural that we 
are led to think of the world in terms of mind on the one hand, and body on the other, 
because, although each of these phenomena are accounted for by what are underlying 
entities neutral between the two, nevertheless, just as the distinction between quality and 
disposition finds some license in the way things are, so too does the distinction between 
mind and body. This distinction is not so great as a distinction between thing and thing. 
'Mental' and 'physical' do not act as kind terms which demarcate phenomena at the 
fundamental, ontological level. But nor is it merely an act of the intellect to draw this 
distinction. (Chapters Five and Six of this thesis discuss how this distinction ought to be 
understood.) 
 One advantage that the sort of neutral monism that I am proposing might be 
thought to have is that it accommodates driving intuitions from the two most prominent 
camps in the current debate regarding the ontology of mind and body. First, in line with the 
aspirations of many forms of physicalism, it presents a unified picture of reality, in which, 
fundamentally speaking, there is no great schism of divide between what goes on in our 
heads and extra-cranial reality. Mentality and the physical realm are continuous with one 
another, and uniform. In this sense, the neutral monism I propose might be held to find a 
home for the mind in the natural world. Conversely, a neutral monism driven by the 
version of the Limit View that I have proposed also has the potential—perhaps to a limited 
extent—to accommodate the dualist claim that there is an important sense in which a 
conception of physical reality and one of mental reality cannot be fully reconciled. Whilst 
the lesson taken from this by the dualist is that there must exist some fundamental, 
ontological schism between the mental and the physical, the lesson the neutral monist who 
accepts the account of properties I have proposed will take is that, despite being accounted 
for ontologically speaking by unitary entities which are neutral between the two notions, 
the distinction between mentality and physicality nevertheless tracks a distinction which is 
given some license in the way things are: broadly speaking, it tracks that which obtains 
between the notions of dispositionality and qualitativity. 
 The version of neutral monism I am proposing should be distinguished from those 
proposed by Mach, James, Russell and Sayre on a number of grounds. First, in contrast to 
the positions of Mach, James and Russell, my position is driven by metaphysical, as 
opposed to epistemological concerns. Rather than taking a certain stand towards what is 
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given in experience, my position stems from an examination of the nature of various 
phenomena. Given the conclusions reached earlier in this thesis regarding the nature of 
properties; of the relations between dispositionality and qualitativity, and of the best 
characterisations of physicality and mentality, my version of neutral monism is the natural 
position to adopt regarding the ontology of mind and body. Furthermore, Russellian 
monism is generally understood to involve a distinction between the behaviour of an 
object and the underlying, non-dispositional properties which explain this behaviour (see 
for instance Chalmers 2003, Section 11). Regarding Sayre's neutral monism, it takes both 
mental and physical phenomena to be ultimately explained in terms of mathematical 
structures, or informational states. Such a position seems to be close to a Pythagoreanism, 
suggestive of a world of pure quantities devoid of quality. Thus, there is a clear difference 
between the metaphysics I propose, and that put forward by Sayre (which may naturally fit 
better with some form of strong dispositionalism—see Martin (1997) for a discussion of 
mathematicised views of nature and strongly dispositionalist metaphysics). Whilst both of 
these sorts of positions might be seen to maintain the physicalist intuition regarding the 
uniformity of nature, none of them look, prima facie, to be able to also accommodate 
dualist insights into the significant differences between mind and body. Insofar as an ability 
to do so is an advantage, my version of neutral monism may fare better than both 
traditional formulations and Sayre's informational version. 
 I have outlined my position, and distinguished it from those discussed in the 
previous section. In what follows, I hope to draw out more of the details of this position 
through distinguishing it from, and considering it in light of, the other major positions in the 
debate concerning the ontology of mind and body. Following this, I will examine some 
criticisms often levelled at neutral monism, and attempt to show how my version can be 
defended from these.  
 
12.4    Neutral Monism, the Limit View and Mentalism 
One objection often levelled at traditional versions of neutral monism is that rather than 
being neutral, the fundamental entities that the neutral monist posits are really better 
characterised as mental. The worry is that neutral monism actually collapses into idealism, 
phenomenalism or some similar position.
205
 One motivation for this line of criticism may 
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subjective idealism, or Strawson (1994, p.97 fn.6), who labels Russellian monism "phenomenalistic". 
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well be the sort of terminology employed by traditional neutral monists. James talks of the 
neutral entities in terms of 'pure experience', and Russell often of "sensation" and 
"appearance" (and indeed, in the quotation in section 12.2 above, whilst the term 'event' is 
neutral enough, the examples given are of what are typically considered to be mental 
states).
206
 With regards to my version of neutral monism, it should be noted that this 
motivation is lacking; the neutral entities proposed on my view, properties or powerful 
qualities, are not presented in typically mentalistic terms. However, it should still be 
questioned whether this criticism applies. I do not think that it does. One way it could turn 
out that my version of neutral monism is in fact mentalistic, as opposed to neutral, would 
be if, on my account, all real properties are in fact best characterised as (M) properties. But 
this would imply that all real properties are in fact qualities, and their dispositional nature 
was somehow secondary to this. It should be clear by this point that this is not the account 
of properties that I am suggesting. Another way that this criticism might gain purchase is if 
it turned out that on my view all real properties were in some way mind-dependent.
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Again, this is not the view being proposed here. Properties, the ways substances are, are 
mind-independent entities, and nothing in the version of the Limit View which I have 
presented in this thesis suggests otherwise. 
 A view which deserves special attention is one considered by Chalmers, in his 
discussion of Russellian monism: protophenomenalism (see his 2003, section 11). This view 
holds that the fundamental properties are qualities, or perhaps proto-qualities, which in 
the right combinations generate qualities. These underlie and account for the dispositional 
(and thus, physical) nature of reality. It seems contentious, at least, whether this sort of 
position is a neutral or a mentalistic kind of monism. Either way, my version of neutral 
monism should be distinguished from this one for the same reasons that it should be 
distinguished from Russellian monism—these reasons are outlined above. 
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(See Stubenberg (2010, section 7.1) and also his (2008) for a discussion.) 
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 There is a trivial way that all real properties could be mind-dependent if panpsychism is true. (See 
section 12.7 below for a discussion of my version of neutral monism and panpsychism.)  
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12.5    Neutral Monism, the Limit View and Physicalism 
Perhaps a similar worry could be raised against neutral monism from the other direction; 
that rather than being neutral, the fundamental entities that the neutral monist posits are 
really better characterised as physical, and neutral monism collapses into some form of 
physicalism. One way it could turn out that my version of neutral monism is in fact 
physicalist, as opposed to neutral, would be if, on my account, all real properties are in fact 
best characterised as (P) properties. But this would imply that all real properties are in fact 
dispositions, and their qualitative nature was somehow secondary to this.
208
 It should be 
clear by this point that this is not the account of properties that I am suggesting. 
 Another reason one might have for suspecting that the version of neutral monism 
that I am proposing is really a sort of physicalism might be if one adopted Stoljar's object 
based account of the nature of physicality, where whatever type of properties it turns out 
that paradigmatically physical objects instantiate (which on my account would indeed be 
powerful qualities) count as the 'physical' properties. For reasons already outlined, 
however, I do not think this account of physicality is promising (see section 10.3 of this 
thesis for a detailed discussion of this issue). Similar thoughts drive Strawson's (2008a pp. 
20-22) conception of what it is to be a physicalist; and I would anticipate that he might 
consider my position to be a physicalism rather than a neutral monism. Central to his 
position is the idea that "[...]we have no good reason to think that we know anything about 
the physical that gives us any reason to find any problem in the idea that mental 
phenomena are physical phenomena" (ibid., p.20). I have suggested, in arguing that (P) 
provides a helpful characterisation of physicality, that we do have good reason to think 
this. It should at least be noted that if we are to accept Strawson's position of ignorance 
regarding the nature of physicality, then nor does anything we know about the physical 
give us any reason to find any problem in the idea that both mental and physical 
phenomena are accounted for, ontologically speaking, by neutral entities. 
 
12.6    Neutral Monism, the Limit View and Dual-Aspect Theory 
Another account of the ontology of mind and body in light of which neutral monism should 
be discussed is the dual-aspect theory most commonly associated with Spinoza. According 
to Spinoza's metaphysic, 'thought' and 'extension' are two attributes of a single, all 
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encompassing substance, 'God or nature'. Any given entity can be conceived as a 
modification of extension—as physical—or as a modification of thought—as an idea, as 
mental. Although these attributes characterise a single substance, they are held by Spinoza 
to be "really distinct" (Ethics I, prop. 10, schol.). Some comments in Spinoza are suggestive 
of distinct but united mental and physical realms: 
So long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we must explain the whole 
order of nature, or the connection of causes, through the attribute of thought 
alone. And so long as they are considered as modes of extension, the order of the 
whole of nature must be conceived through the attribute of extension alone. 
(Ethics II, prop. 7, schol.) 
This quotation suggests that these two realms are nomologically closed off from one 
another, running, as it were, in parallel. Thus, for Spinoza, the idea that mind and body 
interact is mistaken (see, for instance, the preface to Ethics V).  
 Whilst there are some striking similarities between the version of neutral monism 
that I am proposing, and dual-aspect theory, the two positions are distinct. In order for the 
two positions to be considered the same, the theoretic roles and relations of 
dispositionality and qualitativity on my view would need to be equivalent to those of 
extension and thought on Spinoza's. This, however, is not the case. Before I proceed, I 
should note that interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics is both difficult and controversial. 
There is not the space in this thesis for serious interpretative scholarship of Spinoza's 
metaphysics, and I will limit myself to making two quite general claims to attempt to 
distinguish my position from a dual-aspect theory. The first is, I think, quite clear. The 
second, a little more speculative.  
 First, if dispositionality and qualitativity are, on my view, to be considered the 
theoretic counterparts of Spinoza's thought and extension, then these terms pick out 
attributes. Attributes need to be attributed of something; traditionally, and certainly on 
Spinoza's metaphysic, of a substance. On the position for which I have argued, 
dispositionality and qualitativity are abstracted or partial manners of considering 
property.
209
 If dispositionality and qualitativity are to be treated as attributes, this implies 
that properties, then, are to be considered as substances. This, however, is a simple 
category mistake. It is in virtue of instantiating properties, which I have suggested are to be 
themselves considered neutral between disposition and quality, that objects—propertied-
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 Manners which, nevertheless, find some extra-intellectual ground or license in the nature of 
things—see Chapters Five and Six. 
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substances—have the dispositional and qualitative features that they do. One could 
perhaps hold a dual-aspect theory of dispositionality and qualitativity, where these terms 
picked out attributes stemming from the essence of a substance; but that is not the 
metaphysic proposed here.  
 The distinction that I have argued obtains between dispositionality and qualitativity 
is a distinction of reason, one which, whilst grounded in or licensed by the nature of the 
phenomena in question, is unrealised in reality, it requires some act of the intellect; what I 
have suggested is partial consideration or abstraction. This does not seem to be the case 
with Spinoza's attributes. Whilst the distinction between attributes in Spinoza's 
metaphysics does not indicate a distinction in substances, I think his 'real distinction' claim 
can be taken seriously: attributes appear like they may be non-substantial but nevertheless 
thing-like entities between which a real distinction obtains.
210
 Given the differing sorts of 
distinctions that obtain between on my account dispositionality and qualitativity, and, in 
Spinoza's metaphysics thought and extension, it should not be maintained that there is a 
parity of theoretic role between Spinoza's attributes and my conception of property. 
Furthermore, the prospects for the sort of parallelism suggested in the quotation from 
Ethics II above look less promising on my view than on Spinoza's, lending further support to 
the claim that these two views ought not to be conflated. 
 There may be some interpretations of Spinozan dual-aspect theory which bring it 
closer to the sort of neutral monism I advance than others, but as I have suggested above, 
there are some quite general metaphysical principles according to which the two positions 
should be distinguished. 
 
12.7    Neutral Monism, the Limit View and Panpsychism 
Strawson (2008a) puts forward an argument for a physicalist-panpsychist position which 
centres around the following three commitments: 
(a) fully acknowledg[ing] the evident fact that there is experiential being in reality, 
(b) tak[ing] it that there is also non-experiential being in reality, and (c) [being] 
attached to the ‘monist’ idea that there is, in some fundamental sense, only one 
kind of stuff in the universe. (ibid., p.56) 
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 Parchment (1996) argues for this interpretation of how particular attributes are distinguished 
from one another in Spinoza, whilst claiming that the distinction between the totality of attributes 
and the one substance, 'God or nature', is a lesser distinction. 
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He claims that any realistic physicalist must accept this sort of position. To do otherwise 
would be either to accept some form of dualism (by denying (c)); to accept some form of 
idealism (by denying (b)), or to commit what he colourfully calls "[...]the deepest woo-woo 
of the human mind[...]" (ibid., p.55) by rejecting the existence of that which we are most 
certain exists: experience itself (by denying (a)). The argument is strengthened by a further 
claim that if (a) is denied, the physicalist's only way to accommodate the first-personal 
evidence we have of the existence of experience is to posit some form of emergence: 
fundamental reality is non-experiential, but the experiential arises from the non-
experiential. Strawson holds such a position to be inherently unstable, on the grounds that: 
If it really is true that Y is emergent from X then it must be the case that Y is in 
some sense wholly dependent on X and X alone, so that all features of Y trace 
intelligibly back to X (where ‘intelligible’ is a metaphysical rather than an epistemic 
notion). Emergence can't be brute. It is built into the heart of the notion of 
emergence that emergence cannot be brute in the sense of there being absolutely 
no reason in the nature of things why the emerging thing is as it is (so that it is 
unintelligible even to God). For any feature Y of anything that is correctly 
considered to be emergent from X, there must be something about X and X alone 
in virtue of which Y emerges, and which is sufficient for Y. (ibid., p.65) 
Accepting brute emergence, which, according to Strawson, is the only refuge of the non-
panpsychist-non-eliminativist-physicalist, amounts to the acceptance of miracles, and 
widespread ones at that. This should be intolerable to anyone with naturalist sentiments, 
and thus, it turns out, is no refuge for any sort of physicalist at all (ibid., pp. 55-56). Thus, 
anyone wishing to be a physicalist must accept that experiential phenomena are 
ubiquitous: they must accept panpsychism. He later suggests that the neutral monist is in 
exactly the same position; it cannot be held that the neutral entities are non-experiential 
on pain of making the existence of experience (who's denial is 'woo-woo') a matter of brute 
emergence, which itself should not be tolerated. 
 Strawson's argument is powerful. However, its conclusion that non-mentalistic 
monisms entail panpsychism—which I take to be the view that mentality is a ubiquitous 
and fundamental feature of reality—requires scrutiny if its import with regard to my 
position is to be properly understood. One way of interpreting the conclusion—one which 
seems strongly suggested by Strawson's acceptance of the view that taking something to 
be experiential implies the existence of a corresponding subject of experience, and 
therefore, given the ubiquity of experiential properties, that fundamental particles are 
subjects of experience (ibid., pp. 71-72)—is that panpsychism should be understood as the 
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claim that phenomenology, the having of some 'inner life' relevantly similar to the sort 
enjoyed by human beings, is ubiquitous and fundamental. 
 Strawson is led to a conclusion of this sort because of an additional premise: his 
apparent commitment to the claim, discussed briefly in section 11.3 of the previous 
chapter, that whatever can be experienced is an actual instance of experience.
211
 I am not 
convinced by this claim, unless by 'actual instance of experience' something very different 
from 'inner life relevantly similar to the sort enjoyed by human beings' is meant. On the 
view that I am proposing, qualitativity is ubiquitous, in the sense that whenever something 
instantiates some property, the qualitative nature of that thing is informed in some manner 
just in virtue of it instantiating that property.
212
 And I have suggested that it is qualities that 
inform, or feature in, or characterise experiences. However, I do not think that this implies 
that the instantiation of a property that bestows a qualitative nature on its bearer (as any 
real property will) is itself an instance of experience. Another way of putting this might be 
that I do not find the claim that 'there is something X is like' to be equivalent to that of 
'there is something it is like to be X'. It seems that Strawson must accept this equivalence.  
 One reason to think that whilst qualities are what inform, characterise or feature in 
experiences, but are not, of necessity, instances of experience, is if one accepts a 
distinction between the notions of what one might call an experienced-quality and a 
quality-of-an-experience (see, for instance, Heil (2003, section 19.3)). Experiencing the 
particular feel of air rushing past ones face as one rides a roller-coaster might be a good 
example of an experienced-quality, the exhilaration that comes alongside this a quality-of-
the-experience. There is something it is like for air to rush past the face of someone riding a 
roller-coaster. There is something it is like to be a person past whose face air is rushing 
whilst riding a roller-coaster. Naturally, these two somethings-it-is-like are deeply 
interrelated. There would be something it is like for air to rush past the face of zombie-
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 Lockwood, in discussing Russell's neutral monism, seems to hold a similar point of view, asking 
"Does it make sense, even, to speak of intrinsic qualities that, though in some sense continuous with 
the phenomenal, nevertheless do not literally figure as features of a "point of view", in Nagel's 
sense..." (1981, p.157) 
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 What I do take as brute, I suppose, is that properties, in virtue of the nature they have, inform 
their bearers in a certain manner. But I do not see how any realist about properties can fail to take 
this as brute. It should be noted that this claim does not amount to the sort of brute emergence 
which Strawson finds objectionable—qualitativity and dispositionality do not emerge from 
properties. 
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Chalmers whilst it rode a roller-coaster,
213
 too, despite the fact that there is nothing it 
would be like to be zombie-Chalmers riding a roller-coaster. None of this implies that there 
is something it is like to be the air rushing past the face of someone, zombie or no, riding 
on a roller coaster. Qualities, as Martin puts it: 
[...]are the light of the world. They are embedded in the inner life of our minds. 
They are what we go over in our heads verbally and nonverbally, they embody the 
sensory richness of our dreaming and the very feel of our feelings. (2008, p.139) 
Qualities are what experiences feature, are characterised and informed by: both the 
qualities of the very experience itself and the qualities of things experienced. But qualities, 
remember, are not fundamental. There are not properties that are best characterised as 
qualities, at the expense of dispositionality. That which accounts for qualitativity—the 
properties—also accounts for dispositionality. Thus dynamic interaction is built right into 
the ontological basis for qualitativity; just as intrinsic quality is built right into the 
ontological basis for dispositionality. The having of an inner life like that enjoyed by human 
beings requires qualitativity; for qualities are what inform, characterise and feature in this 
inner life. But this is not to say that every instance of qualitativity is just such an inner life. A 
particular kind of dynamic interactivity, a particular kind of structure will also be required. 
On the view of properties that I am proposing, this intimate relation between qualities and 
structures is to be expected, for in the neutral property itself, qualitativity and 
dispositionality are identical.
214
  
 The position I am suggesting does not fall foul of Strawson's warnings about the 
magical nature of brute emergence. I am not sure the position suggested above should be 
considered a kind of emergence at all, but if it were to be read in that way, it certainly 
would not be brute emergence. Strawson insists that if experience arises from non-
experience, there must be something about non-experience which makes it intelligible that 
experience so arises. If, as I am suggesting, the non-experiencing features of the world are 
dynamically-interactive-qualities-cum-intrisically-qualitative-dispositions, then it does 
appear to me intelligible that some parts of reality enjoy inner lives like those enjoyed by 
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 Pretending, for a moment, that such a creature might be possible, and thus be able to take rides 
on roller-coasters. 
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 Chalmers (2003, p.132) sees the structuring of experience as posing a problem for neutral 
monism, on which view he suggests we ought to expect experience to be nothing but a "[...]jagged 
collection of phenomenal spikes". Perhaps this holds for something like the interpretation of 
Russellian monism to which Chalmers adheres, which reduces dispositionality to unknown intrinsic 
properties, but it does not have the same bite against my position.  
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human beings, and that other parts, nevertheless all made up of the same sort of stuff, do 
not. Indeed, I find this more intelligible than the idea that an inner life like my own could be 
composed out of some sort of collection of other inner lives, all independent of one 
another. This is less than argument against Strawson's view, but I hope it is enough to at 
least clearly demarcate my own position from his, and demonstrate that the version of 
neutral monism I am proposing is not a version of panpsychism, where this is taken to be 
the doctrine that inner lives relevantly similar to those enjoyed by human beings are 
ubiquitous. 
 Perhaps this interpretation of Strawson's panpsychism is too strong, and he means 
by 'the experiential' not an actual instance of experience relevantly similar to that enjoyed 
by human beings, but just something similar to what I mean by qualitativity. If so, then 
perhaps my position and his are in certain respects broadly in agreement: we both take 
qualitativity to be ubiquitous. However, if this is the case, I would question the idea that 
this position is 'panpsychist' in any sense which should raise the sort of alarm bells 
association with that doctrine usually does. We can call qualitativity intrinsically mental if 
we like, and on the back of this take the ubiquity of quality to indicate panpsychism, but 
this will not have the consequence that phenomenology is enjoyed throughout the 
universe. 
 
12.8    Neutral Monism, the Limit View and Dualism 
My version of neutral monism is clearly not property dualism, for it does not hold that (P) 
and (M) pick out two different kinds of property, between which some sort of genuine 
distinction obtains. In my discussions of the ontology of mind and body thus far, I have 
concentrated primarily on property dualism, which currently is the most popular form of 
pluralism. However, Lowe presents an alternative sort of dualism, what he calls 'Non-
Cartesian Substance Dualism' (see for instance 2006). This position does not rely for 
support on the Conceivability or Knowledge arguments, against which I have argued in 
Chapters Eight and Nine of this thesis. Rather, on the basis of considering the different 
persistence conditions which apply to persons and their bodies, Lowe suggests that the two 
cannot be identified; the self must be a separate substance.
215
 Due to restrictions on space, 
I cannot offer a full analysis of how the account of properties which I have proposed in this 
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 The view is labelled 'Non-Cartesian' as, in contrast to traditional conception of the Cartesisan ego, 
it ascribes spatio-temporal properties to the self. 
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thesis and the version of neutral monism which I think is the natural extension of this 
account into the debate concerning the ontology of mind and body relates to this version 
of dualism. However, I would like to make some suggestive remarks. It seems that given the 
notion of genuine substantial emergence discussing in section 10.3 of this thesis, there may 
be space to accommodate Lowe's conclusions within a neutrally monist framework. 
Perhaps selves do emerge as separate substances from bodies, but if this emergence is 
mono-levelled, and the characteristic properties of the emergent substance, even if novel, 
are all neutral properties, then Lowe's arguments need not motivate a departure from the 
ontological framework proposed here. 
 
12.9    Why be a neutral monist who accepts the Limit View? 
Adopting the version of neutral monism I have proposed has a number of advantages. First, 
in general, neutral monism provides an elegant and parsimonious account of the relation 
between the physical and the mental. I have argued above that objections which are 
commonly raised to traditional versions of neutral monism, centring around the idea that 
the position is inherently unstable and inevitably collapses into one or the other of the 
more common accounts of the ontology of mind and body, do not apply to my version of 
neutral monism. Further to this, the specific account of neutral monism that I have 
proposed has the advantage of being able to accommodate intuitions and aspirations from 
both sides of the debate. It fulfils the physicalist goal of providing a unified and monistic 
account of the place of the mind in nature; and can also, through the interpretation of the 
distinction which obtains between disposition and quality for which I have argued, 
recognise the dualist intuition that there is some significant difference between mentality 
and physicality, without being forced to the conclusion that this compels us to posit two 
distinct kinds of property at a fundamental, ontological level. It can also provide insight into 
why it is that finding the place of the mind in nature has seemed to pose such a difficult 
challenge; for as long as it was assumed that dispositionality and qualitativity were 
accounted for by fundamentally different kinds of property, it was natural to find difficulty 
in reconciling the causal-structural picture of the world provided by the physical sciences 
with the intrinsically qualitative nature of the manifest image. No other position current in 
the debate regarding the ontology of mind and body can claim all of these advantages; with 
the potential exception of Strawson's physicalist-panpsychism. The view I have proposed 
has the (what might be rather slim) advantage of being more intuitively plausible than 
Strawson's: the claim that the having of an inner life relevantly similar to that enjoyed by 
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human beings is ubiquitous throughout nature is either very hard to understand, or taken 
on face value seems somewhat implausible. 
 For those of a monistic mindset, as I have argued in Chapters Eight and Nine, the 
position which I favour can provide responses to powerful arguments in favour of property 
dualism such as the Knowledge Argument and the Argument from Conceivability. 
Furthermore, I have suggested it may be able to accommodate recent arguments in favour 
of substance dualism within a monistic framework. 
 A neutral monism of the sort that I have proposed, which conceives of the neutral 
entities as properties which can be conceived of as dynamically-interactive-qualities-cum-
intrisically-qualitative-dispositions, looks, prima facie, to have the potential to make some 
headway with questions concerning mental causation. Given that it treats the mental and 
the physical as on a par, ontologically speaking, the initial source of the problem—the 
question of how this mental sort of stuff could interact with that very different physical sort 
of stuff—loses its motivating power. However, there are more nuanced versions of the 
problem, such as that which is sometime raised against Davidson's anomalous monism 
(1970). Davidson suggests that all events are physical events, in virtue of answering to 
physical descriptions, but some events are also mental events, in virtue of answering to a 
mental description. As these mental events just are physical events, the initial question 
concerning mental causation does not arise. However, the problem of mental causation has 
been raised for Davidson's view in another form: even if some mental events are physical 
events, and so it is not problematic to see how those very events can engage in causal 
interaction, it is hard to see how they could do so qua being mental events. (See, for 
instance, Heil (2013) for a discussion of Davidson's view and the problem of mental 
causation). I think that this problem can be avoided on my account. It is not the case, on 
the account proposed here, that the real properties do some things qua being a (P) 
property and some qua being an (M) property. Given the identity thesis, it does not even 
make sense to talk in terms of what a property does qua being a disposition and qua being 
a quality. To talk in these terms is treat properties as having a somehow dual or compound 
nature, to adopt something akin to a mereological conception of the Limit View. This is an 
interpretation I have argued against (see Chapter Three). If it does not make sense to talk 
about a real property qua being a disposition or a quality, it does not make sense to ask 
about its role qua physical or mental, and so this version of the problem of mental 
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causation simply does not arise.
216
 Much more needs to be said on this topic, but there is 
not the space for such discussion here. I hope I have said enough to at least motivate the 
claim that the position I am proposing may have interesting and potentially useful 
applications in the context of the debate concerning mental causation.  
 A full understanding of the consequences and applications of the view which I have 
proposed would require a much deeper exploration than there has been space to conduct 
here. Having provided a framework for a unified view of the ontology of mind and body, 
which stems primarily from metaphysical as opposed to epistemological principles, which 
can accommodate a wide variety of intuitions and theoretical aspirations, avoid major 
criticism associated with neutral monism in general and which looks to have interesting 
applications for the mental causation debate, is, I hope, enough to convince the reader that 
it is a position which at the very least merits serious consideration. 
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 At least, not where the 'qua' here is supposed to carry any ontological bite. We could consider or 
conceive of a property, through an act of abstraction, qua being a pure disposition or a pure quality, 
but nowhere is this realised in nature. 
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Conclusion 
 
In the first half of this thesis I advanced an interpretation of the Limit View account of 
properties, first proposed by C. B. Martin. According to the Limit View, the distinction 
traditionally taken to obtain between dispositional and categorical or qualitative properties 
is not realised in reality. Rather, the Limit View takes all real properties to contribute to 
both the qualitative and the dispositional nature of the substances which instantiate them. 
That properties are apt to do so is explained by the surprising identity thesis: dispositions 
are identical to qualities, and indeed both are identical to the simple, unitary property 
itself.  
 The central aim of the interpretation advanced in this thesis has been to address 
two difficulties which the position, as previously articulated, appears to face. First, both 
Armstrong and Lowe and have levelled a charge of obscurity at the Limit View, challenging 
the proponent of the position to explain just what it could mean for the dispositional and 
the qualitative to be identical to each other. Second, there is an inherent tension in the 
Limit View as presented by Martin: despite his adherence to the surprising identity thesis, 
Martin also insists that a distinction obtains between the dispositional and the qualitative 
that is more than 'in-the-eye-of-the-beholder'. Prima facie, these two positions look to be 
inconsistent. However, it is desirable that both be maintained, as responses to criticisms 
levelled by Armstrong and Molnar rely on them. 
 I have argued that the obscurity charge can be met, and the internal tension in the 
Limit View resolved, by paying close attention to the nature of both the identity claim and 
the distinctness claim. In doing so, I drew on the conceptual resources of the nuanced 
approach to the metaphysics of identity and distinctness found in the work of late-
Scholastic philosopher Francisco Suárez, and of recent research concerning multi-
categorical ontology. That properties can be such that both (i) the dispositional is identical 
with the qualitative, and (ii) there is, nevertheless, a distinction which is more than 'in-the-
eye-of-the-beholder' between the dispositional and qualitative can be understood if one 
interprets the distinction posited in (ii) as a distinction of reason—a distinction which, 
whilst it is not a real distinction between thing and thing, finds some grounding, license or 
foundation in reality, and so is not merely a mental or conceptual distinction. 
 In the second half of this thesis, I examined how the interpretation of the Limit 
View advanced in the first half could be applied to the debate concerning the ontology of 
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mind and body. I have shown that if one adopts this version of the Limit View, one is able 
to offer novel responses to two powerful arguments against physicalism, and in favour of 
property dualism: the Argument from Conceivability and the Knowledge Argument, making 
the Limit View an attractive position to any philosopher of a broadly monistic mindset. 
 Following this, I engaged in an investigation of how the notions of 'physical' and 
'mental' are best characterised, arguing that dispositionality plays a central role in our 
concept of physicality; and qualitativity in our notion of mentality. 
 Making use of these characterisations, in the final chapter of this thesis, I 
presented a sketch of a new variant of neutral monism; I have argued that this is the 
position that should be adopted if one accepts the interpretation of the Limit View 
advanced earlier in the thesis. This version of neutral monism departs from the radical 
empiricist stance which is historically associated with the view. Rather than adopting this 
epistemologically driven approach, and considering the neutral entities to be that which is 
given in experience, I argue, based on the ontological considerations outlined earlier in the 
thesis, that properties as conceived under my interpretation of the Limit View are natural 
candidates for playing the role of the neutral entities. In addition, I provide arguments to 
support the claim that the version of neutral monism I propose is a genuinely distinct, novel 
position, which does not collapse into either other forms of monism (physicalism, idealism 
etc.) or some form of dualism or dual-aspect theory; nor does it entail panpsychism. 
 The material in the final chapter is suggestive of a number of avenues of future 
research. First, in unifying mind and body, ontologically speaking, the version of neutral 
monism I have outlined precludes the problem of mental causation being motivated 
through an appeal to the apparent radical difference between mentality and physicality. 
Investigating, from this starting point, how a detailed theory of psycho-physical causation 
could be formulated, would be a valuable contribution to the contemporary mental 
causation debate. Secondly, uniting the dispositional with the qualitative, and conceiving of 
all reality as characterised by dynamically-interactive-qualities-cum-intrisically-qualitative-
dispositions, may open up interesting avenues for research in the philosophy of perception; 
especially concerning phenomena such as illusion, hallucination and perceptual 
representation. 
 Given the interpretation advanced in this thesis, the Limit View can meet the 
challenges raised by Armstrong and Lowe, and is, despite apparent internal tensions, 
consistent. Not only is the position consistent, but it is an attractive and exciting one: for, 
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as I have argued, it appears to have the potential to open up new ways of thinking about 
difficult and entrenched problems in the philosophy of mind, especially those concerning 
the ontology of mind and body. 
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